Secretary Meink’s wake-up call deserves restating,

One area of particular focus for the US Space Force is “space control,” the ability to ensure that US satellites can operate without interference while denying adversaries the same freedom. Unfortunately, 10 to 15 years ago, some of our adversaries started to weaponize space, and weaponized space aggressively. We stood on the sideline, probably too long. We didn’t want to go down that path, but now we are pushing hard. We didn’t start the race to weaponize space, but we have to make sure we can continue to operate in that domain. Going forward, we can’t lose that high ground.

This long overdue improvement in strategic communication marks a turning point toward rebuilding a credible American space deterrent. China seized the high ground through a rapid build-up of space deterrence and warfighting forces, while Australia, Japan, and South Korea observed warily this tipping of the strategic balance. The US and Europe pretended it was not a problem at all.

This was part of a broader trend for the West to bury its head in the sand for most of the past 35 years, from nuclear deterrence to space warfare. As adversaries weaponized space, the US Space Force (USSF) acknowledges at long last it must focus on fielding credible and effective deterrence and warfighting forces in space.

The USSF published an International Partnership Strategy, where “strength through partnerships” aligns allies with US space efforts. There are challenges, however, for an effective USSF international strategy. These include divisive geopolitics in space and foundational issues surrounding space defense strategy beyond support services. In addition to geopolitical and strategic quandaries, organizational politics stand in the way of a sound strategy. If the US has more robust space capabilities, partnering with the US is more attractive for allies. The ability to go it alone with the prospect of winning is what gains allies.

It turns out allies make similar moves. The US and UK Space Commands conducted their first-ever coordinated satellite maneuver in early September 2025. Among Quad members, Japan’s new space domain defense guidelines spearhead rapid battlespace awareness and real-time detection and tracking of threats. This further reinforces the importance of disrupting adversary command, control, communications, computers, and information (C4I) and other expanding threats. India will develop “bodyguard satellites” after an orbital near-miss. France’s National Strategic Review 2025 makes space central to sovereignty and defense, to acquire rapidly deployable ground and space capabilities to deny, disable, or disrupt adversaries. Last, but certainly not least, Germany is ramping up its military space posture.

When Boris Pistorius, Federal Minister of Defense of Germany, announced a $41 billion investment to counter the “fundamental threat” posed by Russia and China, he mentioned their targeting and tracking of Western satellites. While flying over Germany on reconnaissance missions, two Russian Luch-Olymp spy satellites tracked two Intelsat satellites used by the German Bundeswehr.

Pistorius suggested the Bundeswehr could centralize Germany’s military space functions to quickly respond in conflict. That requires investment in hardened systems less prone to Russian and Chinese jamming, spoofing, and manipulation. Installing “guardian satellites” to provide defensive and offensive capabilities to boost deterrence is required.

Insufficient yet required functionalities need fixing. This includes resilience of satellite constellations and ground stations, secured launch functions, improved space domain awareness capabilities, and space surveillance satellites.

This does not happen in a capability vacuum and leaves some questions unanswered on how to square that with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Despite Ariane 6 and rocket ventures, Europe does not have the required launching capability and still depends on SpaceX. IRIS², the European security-oriented constellation, will not be operational until the 2030s. Until then, dependency on Starlink remains.

Industry partners, such as Eutelsat, SES Satellites, Airbus Defense and Space, Thales, and OHB SE, will get the contracts for the German and European military space systems, but are they financially fit-for-purpose and able to deliver quickly? It depends. Airbus and Thales have heavy defense order backlogs. Eutelsat must recover from its acquisition of OneWeb, and SES just acquired Intelsat.

The question of military space capacity building for non-US NATO allies further resonates outside NATO. Japan does everything to strengthen its military space industrial base, while India puts in a serious effort from space situational awareness to launchers to warfighting satellites. Allies will get there eventually, but it may not be fast enough vis-à-vis Russia and China.

One thing is clear, the center of gravity in deterrence is shifting to space-enabled, long-range, rapidly replaceable kill webs. With NATO officially calling space a warfighting domain, it is no longer a support area. Non-US NATO leaders need to build military space capacity. They should not wait another decade to adopt an Allied Space Operations Doctrine 1.0.

Indo-Pacific allies should endeavor for a similar effort, all while leveraging NATO’s military space experience. That might include some degree of coordination between NATO and Indo-Pacific allies, especially for areas of concern to all, such as the Arctic. Without delegated authorities, codified protect-and-defend protocols, attribution thresholds, tactically responsive launch (less than 96 hours), and common allied space rules of engagement, the good guys’ response times will miss the fight as adversaries dominate orbit.

Christophe Bosquillon is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. He has over 30 years of international experience in general management, foreign direct investment, and private equity and fund management across various industries in Europe and the Pacific Basin. The views expressed are the author’s own.

A Realist Shift in Western Military Space Posture was originally published on Global Security Review.

In the UK, under Prime Minister Keir Starmer, gross domestic product (GDP) growth has stalled. PM Starmer committed to spending at least 2.5 percent of GDP on defense. However, funding has not materialized. A clear plan for future UK defense may not emerge until the Summer of 2025.

In Germany, left-of-center Chancellor Scholz dissolved his coalition, and the Christian Democratic Union’s Friedrich Merz is expected to take over with a right-of-center coalition after snap elections in the first quarter of 2025. However, the rise of the Alternative for Germany (AfD) party, whose leader recently chatted with Elon Musk, remains a wild card. Germany has yet to define and fund its defense budget at the 2 percent of GDP threshold.

Chancellor Scholz, who paid a last visit to Ukraine in early December 2024, committed to deliver Patriot systems in 2025. Merz wants to up the ante with the delivery of Taurus medium-range missiles to Kyiv. While the Ukraine dossier is being used as a political football, a root cause of the problem is that NATO’s defense math just does not add up.

In France, the downfall of the Barnier government stems from rejection of his budget. The new centrist prime minister François Bayrou now faces the same budgetary dead-end and parliamentary gridlock. Barnier was punished for trying to reduce the French deficit to 5 percent of GDP in 2025. The European Union (EU) rule is 3 percent as the maximum.

France’s current deficit is over 6 percent of GDP and might end up closer to 7 percent. France is in third place for debt-to-GDP ratio at 111 percent. Only Greece and Italy have a worse situation.

The EU average is 82 percent, with Germany maintaining a healthy 62 percent. There is a looming debt crisis, and it will not be possible to kick the can down the road forever. France already passed its 2024–2030 Military Programming Act (Loi de Programmation Militaire).

President Macron is committed to seeing it through until the 2027 presidential election. Yet the funding needs to be in place for France to remain the top European spender in civilian and military space.

At the other end of the spectrum is Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, and Sweden. These Nordic and Baltic states clearly lead the way, as they are all becoming increasingly significant players in European security. In particular, Sweden and Finland’s membership in NATO plays a central role in securing the High North and deterring Russia, as these two countries continue to supercharge NATO’s deterrence.

Meanwhile, Russian President Vladimir Putin placed his economy on a war footing. His defense budget steadily increased over the past two years. Of course, this strains society’s resources and patience after nearly three years of war. The vast majority of Russian society is wired to bite the bullet and take the pain for as long as necessary until an endgame pans out. And for good measure, Putin will maintain his nuclear swagger at the highest level.

For the West, it is time to think deeply about deterring the use of low-yield theater nuclear weapons. This is a capability that not only Russia but China has deployed in great numbers and is in the process of augmenting.

The latest uncertainty comes from NATO member Romania. The courts unexpectedly nullified the results of the first round of presidential elections—deeming them unlawful because of alleged Russian interference.

The establishment candidate, who favors EU and NATO, is likely to win. But blaming the surge on an alleged TikTok-driven Russian conspiracy misses the deeper picture: across Europe, from France to Germany to Austria to Hungary to Romania, there is a rising wave of discontent with the current European order. Thus, “extremist” parties are supported in disrupting mainstream left-of-center politics.

The grapes of wrath stem from stalled economies, unwanted immigration from Africa and the Middle East, growing crime and social disruption, and a welfare state that cannot afford both native born citizens and the influx of immigrants. Europe’s wealth level gap with the United States is 30 percent and growing.

By culture, Europe disdains billionaires and even taxes or tries to interdict their free speech, as exemplified in a recent exchange on X (Twitter) between former European Commissioner Thierry Breton and Elon Musk. Not wired for animal instinct, creative destruction, freedom of innovation, entrepreneurship, and disruptive capitalism, European socialism loathes wealth creation as a positive value.

Even though history shows that socialism only leads to failure, or, in the words of Lady Thatcher, “running out of other people’s money,” Europeans tend to shrug and call that state of things “Venezuela without the sun.”

As long as this does not change, the best and the brightest will keep flocking to the US, be it from India, Latin America, or South Africa. To say that it is time for Europe to get its act together would be an understatement. Europe needs to understand that it can never develop into an autonomous power without the free creation of wealth, which is required to fund the defenses Europe requires.

Christophe Bosquillon is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. He has over 30 years of international experience in general management, foreign direct investment, and private equity and fund management across various industries in Europe and the Pacific Basin. The views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

More Political Uncertainties Affecting Europe’s Defense Build-up was originally published on Global Security Review.

The incoming administration may prefer a blend of hard power and transactional diplomacy. An exit strategy for Ukraine and Russia is for both to come across as winners through conflict resolution.

A Russian maximalist position would require Ukraine to lose on all fronts. This means no return of territory; no European Union (EU) or North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) membership. In theory, Russia needs to be incentivized to either give back the territories, and/or allow Ukraine to join NATO and the EU. The latter, however, is the least likely since it was Western encroachment on Russian borders and Ukrainian efforts to join Western organizations that served as Russian justification for their aggression.

In reality, Russia will never return Crimea to Ukraine. Crimean history, for Russia, is a bloody struggle against the Ottomans, making Crimea important to Russian pride.

The normal EU or NATO accession process takes years or decades. Expediting Ukraine’s accession to either will only reinforce Russian fears that the West is attempting to encircle Russia.

Ukraine’s reconstruction represents a serious economic challenge for the West. The United Nations currently estimates the cost of reconstruction at $486 billion. Who will pay for that reconstruction may play a large role in any negotiations.

Previous public statements by Western officials calling for the expedited membership of Ukraine in NATO only provokes Russian recalcitrance, which will be a challenge for Donald Trump to overcome. With Finland and Sweden now part of NATO, the Baltic Sea is a NATO lake that is closed to Russian naval assets. Ukraine in NATO will threaten Russia’s warm-water ports.

Ukraine in NATO is a non-starter for Russia. Keeping Crimea is an important part of ensuring Russian security. An acceptable compromise will require both sides to walk away unhappy while claiming victory. Ukraine may have to accept the loss of Crimea and the Donbass. It may also require an agreement to forgo joining NATO and, likely, the EU. Russian troops will end their aggression against Ukraine and leave. Western states will likely have the unenviable task of rebuilding Ukraine.

The Biden administration’s decision to allow Ukraine to strike Russia with American weapons is not sustainable in the long run, making it difficult for Ukraine to coerce Russia into a “good deal” in any peace talk. Public opinion in Ukraine supports ending the war short of victory. Ukrainians just want the war to end.

The endgame for Ukraine does not stop at Ukraine’s border. The Trump administration is expected to also play a role in protecting NATO member-states near Russia from further aggression. Appearing too weak empowers Russian aggression, while imposing unrealistic conditions will not end the war.

The exact conditions of any deal are certain to include elements that are not strictly related to the conflict’s settlement. For example, European states may agree to purchase American natural gas instead of Russian natural gas. European NATO member-states may also be required to pay for reconstruction.

A return to the purchase of Russian natural gas, Russia’s biggest export to Europe, may serve as a bargaining chip in negotiations, it is easily conceivable that a Trump administration will want payback for previous American support. This may include a much larger position on Europe’s energy and other markets.

Germany, which is heavily dependent on Russian natural gas, will care deeply about such negotiations. Lifting sanctions will be important for Russia and Europe.

The brave new world that is the future of Europe may stand somewhere between a new NATO versus Russia bipolarity and balkanization. Some countries may attempt to play all sides involved. Deterrence may still hold, but European NATO must certainly rearm.

Across NATO, there is an effort already underway to learn the lessons of the Ukraine war. Any endgame must ensure the West is far more effective at making sense of those lessons than are China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia. Developments in cyber, space, drone, and missile warfare are all critical elements of post-war learning.

For the sake of the Ukrainian people, it is time to end this conflict. But it must be done in a way that protects the future of Ukraine while understanding Russian fears. Rightly, Russian President Vladimir Putin deserves the disdain of the free world. Absent the ability to impose a clear victory on Russia, which is a challenge given Russian nuclear arms, a negotiated settlement is the only viable option.

Christophe Bosquillon is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. He has over 30 years of international experience in general management, foreign direct investment, and private equity and fund management across various industries in Europe and the Pacific Basin. The views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

An Endgame in Ukraine was originally published on Global Security Review.

In planning to strengthen space defense capabilities, the French military procurement agency, Directorate General of the Armament (DGA) focuses on surveillance, security, and cooperation. France aims to have a full space defense capability by 2030, built on military space capabilities such as Earth observation, communications, positioning, and navigation. The country is also expanding its space situational awareness capability to monitor, classify, and better understand space activities and threats.

France unveiled Toutatis, a new space surveillance program to protect low-Earth orbit assets, focusing on satellite detection, characterization, and targeting. Toutatis works with two satellites. A “spotter” cubesat detects targets and a smaller target satellite—developed by French start-up U-space in partnership with defense industry major MBDA.

France also works on geosynchronous orbit surveillance through the Yoda program of small satellites with cameras to monitor space threats. The annual military space exercise, AsterX, highlights the need for enhanced situational awareness in low-Earth orbit. Within two years, the Toutatis program will test capabilities with planned launches of maneuverable satellites.

Rather than kinetic weapons against weaponized space assets, France deploys non-destructive measures like dazzling adversaries with lasers to neutralize threats—without creating debris. The country also seeks to balance autonomy with international cooperation. For example, an envoy from Ukraine recently discussed space defense in Paris. Pawan Kumar, Director of the Indian Defense Space Agency, recently provided the French space command with an update on military space cooperation between the two countries.

The French view is that enhanced situational awareness in space, through programs like Toutatis, is a cornerstone of its space defense strategies. Nations should prioritize investments in monitoring technology to observe potential threats and signal their deterrence capabilities.

France’s focus on space start-ups indicates a shift towards commercial and civilian involvement in space security. A timely joint-announcement made by two rising space ventures, Cailabs and Unseenlabs, revealed they successfully tested space laser transmission for satellite downlink in a world first. While Cailabs supplied the optical ground station, Unseenlabs deployed a low-Earth orbit nano-satellite with a laser payload. The pair established a stable link for several minutes. France’s Ministry of Armed Forces called the successful test a world first. It was a first for the commercial sector, but a few other experiments remain confined to American government attempts.

The French Defense Innovation Agency funded the test with €5.5 million ($6.1 million). The Cailabs/Unseenlabs system will be integrated on France’s future military satellites. Laser technology is hard to intercept or hack, compared with radio antennas.

Such a capability would be useful for expanding battlefield data transmissions. France’s optical communications satellite project, dubbed Keraunos (thunderbolt in Greek), helps mitigate the effects of atmospheric turbulence, making space-Earth liaisons handy on mobile, land-based, naval, and airborne platforms.

The European Space Agency Director, General Josef Aschbacher, rightly noted that a gap in space spending between Europe and the United States (a ratio of 1 to 6) is complicated further by spending in Europe that is spread among a wider range of national space agencies. Streamlining European defense and space governance is thornier than in the US since it involves structural reforms on technological gaps, fragmented capital markets, and strategic spending.

A rather disappointing report on European competitiveness by Mario Draghi, former Italian Prime Minister and president of the European Central Bank, generated immediate push-back from Ludwig Moeller, director of the European Space Policy Institute (ESPI). ESPI methodically reviewed the Draghi Report’s shortcomings when it came to European Defense and Space. ESPI suggested the report lacked an impulse for the needed market reforms.

As stated by Eva Portier, space deputy in France’s military procurement agency, Directorate General of the Armament (DGA), “Access to space is an essential element of our national sovereignty, our capacity to use space to launch our satellites and conduct operations.” While greater Europe is struggling to fundamentally unite in its efforts to counter future malicious space efforts by China and Russia, France is stepping forward in a more limited way. It is not lost on observers that French satellite names harken to a past where France needed protection. For example, Toutatis, discussed above, was a divinity once worshipped in ancient Gaul and Britain, and was considered a protector of Gallic and Celtic tribes. The annual military space exercise, AsterX, led by the French Air and Space Force and involving 15 partners countries, is a wink to Asterix and Obelix, leading characters of a comic book series describing the adventures of a small village resisting the Roman invaders. Legend has it the Gauls feared only “that the sky would fall on their head.”

French efforts are moving in the right direction, but unless Europe reforms and consolidates space defense efforts across the continent, Europe will be unprepared when a crisis occurs. Major space reforms take time. Thus, it is important those reforms begin now. France simply cannot accomplish what is needed on its own.

Christophe Bosquillon is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. He has over 30 years of international experience in general management, foreign direct investment, and private equity and fund management across various industries in Europe and the Pacific Basin. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

France Doubles Down on Space Defense Tech was originally published on Global Security Review.

Total NATO military expenditures for 2024 are estimated at $1.474.4 trillion. As Russia grows increasingly assertive, many on both sides of the Atlantic are wondering how NATO member-states will step up and contribute to the continent’s defense.

To withstand a Russian attack, NATO must plan for between 35 and 50 extra brigades of 3,000–7,000 troops each—adding 105,000–350,000 soldiers. Germany must contribute 3–5 extra brigades or 20,000–30,000 combat troops.

Protection from air attacks is a major German and Eastern European vulnerability. Former German Defense Minister and current President of the European Commission Ursula van der Leyen recently emphasized the need for Germany, under its new defense plans, to quadruple its air defenses. That includes Patriot missile batteries and shorter-range systems to protect bases, ports, and railway transportation systems.

Should Russia attack NATO, hundreds of thousands of troops, together with tanks, equipment, and ammunitions, will have to make their way to the eastern front through Germany. Preparations for war with Russia indicate that Poland, the Baltics, and other Eastern NATO allies are primary targets, but so is Germany. During the Cold War, Germany had 36 Patriot missile air defense units. The count is down to nine—after donating three to Ukraine. Berlin just ordered four Patriot missile units at a cost of 1.35 billion euros.

The United States spends about 3.5 percent of its gross domestic product (GDP) on defense, but the Congressional Budget Office projects that will fall to 2.5 percent by 2034. NATO member-states recently issued a joint communique that said, “We reaffirm that, in many cases, expenditure beyond 2 percent of GDP will be needed in order to remedy existing shortfalls and meet the requirements across all domains arising from a more contested security order.”

The Baltic states are adamant about the need for increased defense spending. Tuuli Duneton, Estonia’s Undersecretary for Defense Policy, praised the 23 NATO member-states who now meet the 2 percent spending target. She suggested raising the spending goal to 2.5 to 3 percent.

Pointing to NATO’s “capability gaps,” Lithuanian Defense Minister Laurynas Kasčiūna stated, “We’ll start to talk at least about 2.5 percent as a floor,” pointing to NATO’s “capability gaps.” He added, “When we analyze what the countries need to develop soon, for a decade maybe, it’s not even 2.5 percent. It’s not even 3 percent. It should be more if you want more air defense systems, if you want more long-range strike capabilities.”

NATO plans focus on logistics, troop movement, and cyber defenses in preparation for conflict with Russia. After NATO’s plans for the biggest defense upgrade in three decades were agreed upon last year, now is the moment of truth: the minimum defense requirements to meet these plans were sent to national governments, highlighting significant shortfalls in air defenses, long-range missiles, troop numbers, ammunition, logistics, and secure digital communications.

Fixing these shortfalls requires billions of euros in investment. By autumn 2025, NATO aims to set binding targets for members to ensure Europe’s defense. Achieving these targets may be difficult due to budgetary constraints and differing views on NATO’s stance towards Russia.

NATO’s effort to navigate a moment of clear and present danger is made more difficult by the Herculean task of rearming. Deep industrial reconstitution and technological evolution are both needed and taking place across all value chains in all defense tech investments, including space, cyber, drones, and the role of artificial intelligence on the battlefield. Despite its current state of political uncertainty, change-adverse politicians and populations must be convinced of the need for refocusing on defense.

Europe must face a Kulturkampf in which Europeans overcome the three decades of cognitive denial about war in Europe. The biggest obstacle to the above efforts is likely to come from populations that are accustomed to generous welfare programs at the expense of defense preparations. Europe cannot tax its way out of its current problem. European taxes are already the highest in the world.

Compelling communication strategies are essential to justify the increased defense budgets. Officials need to emphasize the pan-European necessity for national and regional security. The twin brother of blood and treasure returned from a long hiatus. Making the argument to citizens becomes an even tougher sell if conscription across Europe is required to mobilize hundreds of thousands of troops to fight.

Asking ordinary citizens in Western or Southern Europe whether they are willing to die for Ukraine or Lithuania or even Poland will likely draw a negative response. Not all European populations seem willing, able, and ready to fight as nation-states united under the concept of pan-European patriotic defense. Those now leading the effort de guerre are found among Poles, Balts, and, in no small part, the newly energized Nordic countries.

In short, if Europe wishes to survive, it must adapt, deter, and defend itself now. Waiting will only add more blood and treasure to the bill that must be paid.

Christophe Bosquillon is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. He has over 30 years of international experience in general management, foreign direct investment, and private equity and fund management across various industries in Europe and the Pacific Basin. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

NATO’s Defense Math Does Not Add Up was originally published on Global Security Review.