However, when looking deeper, combining field developments, the Taliban’s contradictory conduct, and shifting regional dynamics, reveals a more complex reality. This enmity may not be as absolute as it seems. Instead, it could present a multi-layered game in which the Taliban leverages the ISIS-K threat to justify internal repression, gain regional legitimacy, and position itself as the “lesser evil.” In this light, ISIS-K might serve both as a tactical threat and a strategic asset for the Taliban—a manufactured crisis that enables the group to tighten its grip on power at home and increase its geopolitical leverage abroad.

Open Hostility or Controlled Competition?

Since appearing in Afghanistan, ISIS-K launched brutal attacks on civilians, from deadly bombings against religious minorities to assaults on hotels housing Chinese and Russian citizens. These incidents were widely publicized, framing ISIS-K as a dangerous destabilizing force in the public mind.

Yet, a closer look reveals an intriguing pattern: the majority of ISIS-K attacks occurred in provinces like Nangarhar and Kunduz, the very areas where the Taliban launched “anti-ISIS” operations to consolidate their own authority. The Taliban consistently portray their campaigns against ISIS-K as “heroic battles” against terrorism. Yet beneath this narrative lies a troubling question: could the Taliban be managing or even facilitating ISIS-K’s presence as a pretext to justify their own rule, gain international support, and ruthlessly crush opposition?

It appears ISIS-K never posed an existential threat to the Taliban. On the contrary, its existence allows the Taliban to brand themselves as “terrorism fighters” while targeting domestic opponents, civil society activists, former security personnel of the previous republic, and even ethnic groups like Tajiks and Uzbeks. In Nangarhar, for example, hundreds were detained on allegations of ties to ISIS-K, though many were once affiliated with the republican government.

For the Taliban, ISIS-K represents a “manageable threat,” dangerous enough to draw local and international backing, but not so strong as to undermine their own power. In fact, it provides an opportunity for the Taliban to further entrench themselves.

The Haqqani Network and Crisis Management

At the heart of this theory lies the Haqqani Network, a sophisticated and shadowy branch of the Taliban known for its long-standing ties with Pakistani intelligence services and transnational jihadist networks. Field patterns suggest that in eastern Afghanistan, there is a kind of covert coexistence between the Haqqanis and elements of ISIS-K. Major ISIS-K attacks in Kabul, including assaults on hotels frequented by Chinese and Russian diplomats, raise suspicions that these incidents may have occurred with either Haqqani facilitation or their tacit approval. There are also reports indicating that some mid-level ISIS-K leaders once cooperated with the Haqqanis.

This relationship can be analyzed through three possible scenarios. First, there is the direct management scenario. Here, the Haqqani Network actively directs parts of ISIS-K to operate within controlled limits.

Second, there is the limited influence scenario. In this scenario, the Taliban and the Haqqanis have some influence over ISIS-K and use it for political purposes.

Third, there is the independent ISIS scenario. In this case, ISIS-K acts independently, but the Taliban opportunistically exploit its existence for political gains.

Although there is no definitive evidence of full collusion between the Taliban and ISIS-K, the Taliban’s selective responses to ISIS-K’s activities suggest we are witnessing “crisis management” rather than an all-out war. Even if we dismiss the first scenario, there is sufficient evidence to support the second. While the Taliban may not entirely control ISIS-K, they at least seek to manage it, benefiting from its existence while preventing it from becoming a genuine threat to their dominance.

A Regional and International Bargaining Chip

For the Taliban, ISIS-K is not merely a domestic issue, it is also a key “bargaining card” in dealings with regional powers. By presenting themselves as the only effective barrier against ISIS-K, the Taliban have transformed from international pariahs into reluctant but necessary security partners for neighboring countries.

To China and Russia, they say, “Without us, ISIS-K will spread into Central Asia and Xinjiang.” To Iran, they warn, “Weakening the Taliban will empower ISIS-K on Afghanistan’s western borders.” To Pakistan, they remind, “Uncontained ISIS-K activity could jeopardize economic security and projects like CPEC.” By managing the ISIS-K threat, the Taliban position themselves as the lesser evil and draw financial and political support from regional actors.

Crisis Engineering: A Familiar Tactic

What the Taliban is doing today is not unlike Pakistan’s strategy in the 1990s, when Islamabad exaggerated the threat of al-Qaeda and the Taliban to extract financial and political concessions from the US and Saudi Arabia. The Taliban have now reproduced this model, creating and managing a more extreme enemy to bolster their own position. This tactic aligns with the theory of a “constructed crisis,” in which security actors inflate or even control threats to use them as tools for pressure and legitimacy.

It is likely, then, that the Taliban never intend to fully destroy ISIS-K. Its continued existence forms an essential part of their political and security survival strategy.

Targeted Attacks: Eliminating Opponents in Terror’s Shadow

In this geopolitical chess game, the Afghan people remain the primary victims. The Taliban’s “anti-ISIS” operations increasingly target civil activists, former security forces, and even ethnic minorities. Some ISIS-K attacks, like the one on the Taliban’s Foreign Ministry, fueled suspicions about the Taliban’s role, or at least their prior knowledge, of such incidents. Some reports even suggest that the Taliban warned their personnel in advance of certain attacks.

These operations may act as a tool for the “targeted elimination” of internal opponents, allowing the Taliban to avoid direct responsibility. Rather than weakening the group, this tactic reinforces the Taliban’s position in Afghanistan’s security equations.

Taliban and ISIS-K: Two Sides of the Same Coin?

At first glance, the Taliban and ISIS-K seem like sworn ideological enemies. But on closer inspection, field evidence and geopolitical logic suggest their relationship is far more complex than a simple rivalry. The Taliban leveraged ISIS-K’s presence to crack down on internal dissent, bolster their regional legitimacy, and present themselves as a defensive shield against terrorism and global threats emanating from Afghan soil.

As long as this intricate game continues, the Taliban can maintain their role as a “necessary but unpleasant” player in regional and global affairs, while Afghanistan remains trapped in a security quagmire with no easy way out.

For reasons of personal safety, the author has used a pseudonym.

The Taliban and ISIS-Khorasan: A Real Rivalry or a Strategic Game to Engineer Crisis? was originally published on Global Security Review.

It is good to have a combat veteran as the new Secretary of Defense. It is also good to have someone who, while writing a book on the current state of the military, came to understand the difficulties service members face, why they choose not to resign or not re-enlist, and how hard it can be for some once they leave the service. That same research will also help you to eliminate the politicization that left the military hurting for recruits.

This understanding and experience will be helpful in correcting the course of the Department of Defense. Prioritizing warfighting capabilities and lethality over supporting the mission creep of bureaucracy is critical but antithetical to everything that is Washington, DC. The Pentagon was focused on budgets and bureaucratic infighting long before you arrived. The five-sided puzzle palace will fight back and has a long institutional memory.

Just remember, of all services and the department itself, only the US Air Force Airmen gave more money to Republicans than Democrats. There is at least one ray of hope.

For decades the military has had its combat forces slashed, bases closed or consolidated, and weapon systems and platforms reduced or retired—all while the Chinese, Iranians, North Koreans, and Russians expanded their military capabilities and plotted the destruction of the international order Americans built. While the war on terror was lost by the very people who hate the fact that you are Secretary of Defense, you have an opportunity to right the ship before it is too late.

No doubt, you will receive more input on what you should do than you can possibly digest. Let me offer a quick list.

First, a sovereign state, by definition, controls its borders. That is a military function. Help President Trump secure the border. There is no such thing as acceptable illegal immigration.

Second, adopt the Weinberger Doctrine as your overriding strategy for the use of military force. You will never go wrong if you do.

Third, the military may be the best socialist system in the world, but it is time to overhaul the personnel system and bring it into the twenty-first century. The military is unique, but do not let that be an excuse.

Fourth, modernization and expansion of the nuclear arsenal must be your top spending priority. A bigger Army, conventional Navy, or conventional Air Force will not deter China, Iran, North Korea, or Russia; only a robust strategic and theater nuclear arsenal can achieve that objective.

Fifth, service members, particularly junior enlisted, have lived in toxic base housing for far too long. This problem should not make this list, but after two decades it has yet to be solved.

Sixth, remove the cancerous social and political activism that inundates the military. Nothing harms unity more than pitting servicemembers against one another because of their race, gender, or some other contrived distinction. Based on your initial actions, your efforts are already moving ahead.

Seventh, there is simply too much duplication across the services and within the services. Ensuring command opportunities should not lead to the creation of unneeded commands. The services are too small to be inefficient.

Eighth, expand the number of combatant ships, missile defense systems, and the combat air force. Neither the Navy nor the Air Force has the capability to wage a sustained campaign against a peer. Not only does the nation lack the delivery platforms, but it will go Winchester in a matter of days. Thus, every kind of weapon is also needed.

Ninth, take the time to reset the baseline and see what the military really needs to defeat the Axis of Autocracy. Is it drone swarms, missile technology, robots? Whatever the answer may be, it is unlikely exactly what we already have.

Finally, get very good at telling the American people why it is more important to spend tax dollars on the military than the entitlements they know and love. This is perhaps your biggest task. In 2024, the federal government took in $4.4 trillion and spent $4.6 trillion on entitlement programs alone. That is unsustainable. The federal government was never meant to take care of the health, retirement, and education of Americans. It was specifically tasked to defend the nation.

You have a big job ahead of you. Good luck. Americans want nothing more than your success. The safety of the country depends on it.

Michael Fincher is a Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

Congratulations on Becoming the Secretary of Defense was originally published on Global Security Review.

Those European intelligence agencies tasked with countering malicious cyber actors are simply unprepared for the fight they face. Disinformation campaigns waged by the Chinese, North Koreans, and Russians are also plaguing Europe. When Russia first began such efforts to shape election outcomes about a decade ago, their rather low-cost efforts were successful enough to encourage further disinformation efforts.

French efforts to sound the alarm about disinformation in Europe and Africa were largely unheeded and is now bearing fruit for China and Russia as several African nations are turning against the West and toward these autocracies. The cyber four of China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia, through their security institutions, targeted the UK and French institutions, financial markets, and security infrastructure at home and their prestige abroad.

In response to the exponential growth of cyberattacks, in April 2023, new regulations were passed in France to secure the computer networks of state institutions. The French government also recognized the importance of international security cooperation in combating cyber terrorism.

When the French rail network was vandalized in July 2024 the French Interior Minister warned of the possible involvement of foreign cyber warriors. Saboteurs had already carried out attacks against fiber-optic cables and other infrastructure. For months, French intelligence was on its heels as consecutive attacks on the country’s critical infrastructure occurred. Russian and other European nationals were arrested for varying destabilization attacks. French intelligence and police also launched an operation to find cyber sleeper cells.

The Olympics began as thousands of police and military personnel were operating across the country in an effort to prevent future terror attacks of any kind. If the cyberattacks on France prior to the Olympics are an indicator of a looming threat, France has its work cut out for it.

Cyber threats are more than just hackers exploiting the internet. On July 26, 2024, terrorists damaged lineside communication cables on three of the most important ligne a vitesse radiating from Paris. These attacks disabled signal technology at key junctions including in LGV Nord at Croisilles—connecting Paris with Lille. Eurostar rail networks were also disrupted ahead of the Olympics. Thus, damage to communication networks can take a physical form.

China is now engaged in open hybrid warfare against the West—more broadly. Policymakers, parliamentarians, and intelligence officials in the UK and France sometimes advocate for reforms to address these challenges, but little happens. The lack of cyber expertise within European intelligence agencies leads to numerous domestic security challenges. The French government, for example, was exasperated with the sabotage campaign that took place.

France accused Russia of cyberattacks during the election earlier this year—all to disrupt the country’s democracy. Authorities asserted that the Russian Federal Security Service was behind sustained attempts against the French institutions.

The UK took measures in response to cyber threats from China, demonstrating a proactive stance, but British efforts are not widely understood and accepted. Recent cyberattacks on the UK’s National Health Service and the Ministry of Defense highlight significant challenges faced by the Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) in countering hybrid warfare tactics from state actors like China and Russia.

These attacks illustrated vulnerabilities in the UK’s cybersecurity infrastructure and raised concerns about the effectiveness of GCHQ’s strategies in mitigating threats posed by advanced persistent threat (APT) groups.

In July 2024, cyberattacks on the NHS disrupted critical healthcare services, compromised patient data, and operational capabilities. Attacks on Ministry of Defense infrastructure jeopardized national security by leaking sensitive information and undermined military readiness.

The presence of foreign spies within UK state institutions suggests these networks have successfully penetrated high-security environments, posing substantial risks to national security. The presence of a strong Russian security and intelligence infrastructure in Eastern Europe, and its reluctance to accept Western security-sector reforms is a threat to internal and external security for the region.

In Eastern Europe, reshaping intelligence and police services is part of the consolidation of democracy. In the Czech Republic, Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, and Romania, intelligence agencies are experiencing a cultural hangover from a bygone era. In these countries, the process of bringing intelligence services into a Western way of operating is progressing slowly.

The war in Ukraine is also leaving a deep impact. European intelligence service strategies, operations, and collection processes in and outside their sphere of influence. They never realized how to introduce the reforms required to prevent Russian success. The Danish, for example, produced the PET Report, which uncovered espionage networks in Denmark. The PET Report has noted several cases that illustrated how a number of foreign states were actively carrying out intelligence activities against Denmark using cyber and other means.

In short, Europe is facing a challenging future when it comes to the malicious cyber activities of China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia. European intelligence services are unprepared for the adversary they face. The challenge is growing. The time is now for Europe to respond.

Musa Khan Jalalzai is an author, journalist, and member of Research Institute for European and American Studies, Director of Law Enforcement and Intelligence Analysis Centre London, and Fellow of Islamic Theology of Counter Terrorism. The views expressed are his own.

The European Union’s Cyber War Challenge was originally published on Global Security Review.

Cirincione begins his article, “President Joe Biden has a terrible nuclear policy. A re-elected President Donald Trump’s would be much worse.” President Trump, should he win, will likely follow the path of every new president since 1994 and conduct a Nuclear Posture Review, and, like the last three presidents, follow a path that reflects the threat facing the United States. Until something concrete takes place, Cirincione is merely speculating by attributing the plan of some conservative organizations, Project 2025, to Donald Trump.

Cirincione also willfully misrepresents the record of the Biden administration when he writes that Biden has “authorized the largest nuclear weapons budgets since the Cold War.” This suggests President Biden supports nuclear weapons. The Biden Nuclear Posture Review called for the retirement of the B-83, the nation’s only megaton class nuclear capability. Biden also proposed canceling the sea launched cruise missile-nuclear (SLCM-N) and eliminating the nuclear hedge. Neither of these efforts are the actions of a man who supports the nuclear arsenal. Biden, however, had the misfortune of dealing with a reality that was inconsistent with his ideology, something that is never a problem for disarmament groups because they have no responsibility to protect the country.

Cirincione claims that Trump’s nuclear policy is informed by the “new conservative manifesto Project 2025.” When Trump was recently asked about Project 2025 he said that he has never heard of it. He even went on Truth Social to write, “I know nothing about Project 2025.” This is certainly not something Trump would lie about. Trump is, in fact, relying on a small number of officials from his first administration for advice and guidance. He does not need the Heritage Foundation or any other think tanks to tell him what to think.

Understood for what it says, rather than the conspiratorial insinuations of many progressives, Project 2025’s nuclear arsenal related proposals are largely accurate and well-reasoned. An honest assessment of the coming decade clearly indicates a need to expand the American nuclear arsenal to counter a growing Russian, Chinese, and North Korean nuclear capability. When Cirincione writes, “These proposals [from Project 2025] would add unnecessary new weapons to an already expansive nuclear arsenal” he is merely denying the reality facing the United States.

This country is already well behind Russia in the size and capability of its nuclear arsenal and will fall behind China within a decade. The United States will soon face three autocratic regimes with a collective arsenal several times greater than the American arsenal.

Cirincione goes on to criticize every nuclear policy prescription in Project 2025, suggesting that none are necessary. Nothing could be further from the truth. Contrary to his critique, prioritizing nuclear weapons programs over other defense programs is a wise move. Nuclear deterrence is the cornerstone of American defense policy—ensuring that adversaries think twice before considering aggressive action against the United States.

Interestingly, Cirincione fails to acknowledge that former President Barack Obama made an agreement with the US Senate in 2010 in which the Senate agreed to ratify New START in return for modernization of all three legs of the nuclear triad. Presidents Obama, Trump, and Biden all honored this agreement in the main, even if they sought change on the margins.

Cirincione even goes so far as to criticize modernizing the National Nuclear Security Administration’s Manhattan Project-era infrastructure and production complex. This is not a radical move but a sensible effort that was needed decades ago. The desire of Joe Cirincione and other disarmament advocates to allow the nuclear weapons complex to atrophy into obsolescence is a dangerous path that only wealthy idealists with tall fences can contemplate. It is only because of three decades of neglect that Americans are now forced to modernize all three legs of the nuclear triad.

In other words, Joe Cirincione and his fellow travelers in the disarmament community advocated for the actions that led the nation down the path it is now on. Today, both Republican and Democrat administrations recognize the trouble facing the nation, even as disarmament advocates complain about efforts to fix the problems they helped create. It is simply an example of the Dunning-Kruger effect at work.

Tying Donald Trump to Project 2025 and vilifying both is an effort to obfuscate and avoid having a substantive discussion about the nuclear breakout of China, Russia’s nuclear threats, and other meaningful issues that challenge the mantra of the disarmament community.

What is perhaps most disappointing is just how far the Bulletin has fallen. Rather than engaging in meaningful discussion on nuclear issues, the journal is increasingly publishing articles that read more like an excerpt from Antonio Gramsci’s Prison Notebooks or Herbert Marcuse’s “Repressive Tolerance.” They, like Cirincione’s own article, seem more interested in advancing the radical ideology of modern-day Marxists than having a fact-based debate over the role of nuclear weapons in national security. This penchant for the absurd makes it hard to take a once-conscientious publication and its contributors seriously.

James Ragland is a Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. Views expressed are the author’s own.

Joe Cirincione is Wrong about Donald Trump was originally published on Global Security Review.