Historically, authoritarian regimes without succession plans often face power struggles when the leader eventually dies, retires, or is overthrown. The absence of a designated heir could lead to internal conflicts within the CCP when Xi is gone.

The only possible threat to his authority could emerge from within the security apparatus. Furthermore, his grip on power is not static; it is continuously reinforced through persistent anti-corruption efforts and CCP rectification campaigns. In other words, Xi Jinping’s entrenched control over China’s political system and the mechanisms he employs to maintain power was and remains prominent.

Political Variables

The lack of a clear successor suggests that Xi intends to rule indefinitely, breaking with the leadership norms established after Mao Zedong’s era. This raises concerns about political stability in the long term, as the absence of a transition plan increases the risk of a power struggle when he eventually leaves office.

Also, it means a weakness of political opposition that emphasizes that opposition within China has largely disappeared, with dissenters either forced into exile or silenced through political repression. This suggests a highly controlled political environment where resistance is ineffective. While this strengthens Xi’s immediate grip on power, it does not necessarily eliminate discontent. Rather, it forces opposition underground. If economic hardships or political scandals arise, suppressed grievances could resurface, potentially destabilizing the regime—meaning that discontent is potentially creating instability in the future.

Although Xi appears unchallenged, the security apparatus is a possible source of opposition. Security forces are crucial to maintaining authoritarian rule, and, if internal divisions emerge, they can pose a serious threat to his leadership. Thus, if divisions emerge within China’s security forces whether due to policy disagreements, economic struggles, or leadership disputes, Xi’s position could be at risk.

While there is no clear indication of this happening, it suggests that control over the military and intelligence agencies remains a key factor in his rule. To wit, in authoritarian regimes, the military and intelligence agencies are often the key enforcers of the leader’s rule, but they can also become sources of internal opposition. However, so far, he has maintained tight control over the military and state security agencies through purges and loyalty tests.

There is also a role of anti-corruption and party rectification campaigns in Xi’s bureaucracy and leadership. Rather than merely consolidating power in a passive way, Xi actively reinforces his authority through continuous anti-corruption drives and ideological campaigns to eliminate political rivals and maintain loyalty within the CCP. While these measures strengthen his rule, such campaigns may also create resentment among officials who fear they could become targets.

Aging Political Leadership

The top leadership is tilted in Xi Jinping’s favor. However, this top leadership is aging. An aging leadership also means that many of Xi’s key supporters may retire or pass away, potentially opening room for new political dynamics that he may not fully control.

In 2027, the current Politburo will have an average age above 68. Should they be renominated then, the average age of Politburo members would be above 73 on the eve of the next Party Congress and current Central Committee members are not far behind. Their time horizon will become shorter, and if no potential successor appears, their political position will become increasingly vulnerable. Again, a defining feature of Xi’s leadership is the lack of a designated successor, breaking from previous CCP norms that aimed to ensure stability through planned transitions. Without a clear heir, uncertainty will grow among the party elite, increasing the risk of political maneuvering or factional struggles as different groups seek to position themselves for leadership roles. This uncertainty could weaken Xi’s grip on power over time, especially as leaders begin to consider their own political futures beyond his rule.

As the current leadership ages and their career time horizons shrink, their incentives may shift. Rather than unwavering loyalty to Xi, some officials might begin looking for alternative paths to secure their personal or factional interests. If no successor emerges, competition among different factions could intensify, creating a fragile political environment. Additionally, older officials may become less effective in governance, potentially exacerbating policy stagnation or mismanagement, further weakening the regime’s overall stability.

Unless Xi Jinping changes his basic formula to ensure support and discourage any debate, his power will become brittle, and the likelihood of a succession crisis will increase. His leadership strategy requires grooming a successor or adjusting his approach to elite management. While his current control appears strong, the absence of institutionalized succession mechanisms makes a future power struggle more likely. Historically, power vacuums in authoritarian regimes often lead to internal conflicts, and China could face a similar scenario if Xi does not prepare a clear transition plan.

There are also nuanced views of Xi Jinping’s governance style, highlighting both his consolidation of power and the underlying complexities within China’s political and economic landscape. Despite Xi’s centralization of power and strong grip on influence, Chinese bureaucracies remain highly fragmented, with institutional silos, rival factions, and competition among individuals. This contradicts the idea of a fully unified authoritarian system, suggesting that power struggles still play a role in policy decisions.

Clearly, there is Xi’s ability to enforce policy shifts while maintaining ideological rigidity, as well as the role of elite competition in shaping China’s future. Additionally, the influence of princelings (descendants of revolutionary leaders) remains significant, particularly in state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and financial institutions. While the next leader may not necessarily be a princeling, elite clans could act as key power brokers, determining leadership transitions behind the scenes.

At a deeper level, there is a pattern in Xi’s governance. Initial inflexibility followed by strategic reversals or rigidity then with certain pragmatic adjustments. When policies face resistance or cause unintended consequences, this would be addressed through a “pullback pattern” or “rear-view mirror approach” that are evident in key crises, including: the 2015 stock market crisis, the COVID-19 lockdowns, the 2020 real estate crash, and the Sino-American trade war.

This suggests that Xi is a risk-taker but not reckless; meaning, he is willing to implement bold policies but is also pragmatic enough to change course when necessary. However, these reversals are often framed in a way that protects his authority, shifting blame onto subordinates or external factors.

Xi’s political capital plays in a “selective policy flexibility versus ideological rigidity.” While Xi shows pragmatism in adjusting economic policies, his core ideological agenda remains unchanged. His governance remains centered around: reinforcing ideology; promoting “struggle” (斗争); and maintaining a strong international posture. Even in areas where Xi has shown flexibility such as real estate bailouts or fiscal stimulus, shifts are constrained by his broader ideological commitments.

Xi is also deepening policies that predated his rule. He has an affinity for the self-strengthening movement of the Qing empire, summed up by the famous maxim, “Chinese learning as the essence, Western learning for practical use” (中学为体, 西学为用). Republican China sought help from Germany to modernize its arms industry and sent students on scholarships to the United States. The best-known case of this is rocket scientist Qian Xuesen who, after leaving the United States in 1955, led China’s ballistic development.

After the founding of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), the 1950 Sino-Soviet Treaty was the basis for what is called the largest technology transfer in history. Much of this focused on industry and infrastructure, but it also involved education and the training of scientists, including in the nuclear field.

The Sino-Soviet rift inaugurated a period of closure, but Mao Zedong nonetheless launched several “big projects” during the Great Leap Forward. They are recalled today to justify the present large-scale policies.

At the end of the Cultural Revolution, Zhou Enlai, followed by Deng Xiaoping, hailed the “four modernizations” (四个现代化) that put the accent on big science again. Since the early 1960s, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has never ceased from engaging in research and development on new weapons, serving as a harbor for scientists in times of political turmoil or during more recent anti-corruption campaigns.

A chief aim of China’s normalization with the United States was to acquire key technologies. From former US Presidents Richard Nixon to Jimmy Carter’s presidency, which was the heyday of the US convergence with China against the Soviet Union, supercomputers (supposedly for climate predictions), nuclear knowledge, radar installations, and many other dual-use technologies were shared. Large contingents of Chinese students underwent education and training abroad, mainly in the United States.

Successively, we can observe that Xi’s foreign policy adaptations are evident with strategic pauses. There is a pattern of assertiveness followed by recalibration. The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), once a cornerstone of China’s global strategy, has seen a decline in outward investments and loans, possibly due to economic slowdowns and concerns over debt sustainability. Additionally, in response to changing global dynamics, particularly under a potential Trump second presidency (2024–2028), China appears to be cautiously reassessing its relationships with key nations, including India, Japan, and the UK. This suggests that while Xi projects strength internationally, he is also willing to adjust diplomatic strategies to navigate shifting geopolitical realities.

Implication and Conclusion

Per its implication, while Xi’s control appears secure for now, the long-term consequences of his rule remain uncertain. The suppression of opposition, lack of a succession plan, and reliance on internal purges could make the political system more fragile over time. If economic challenges or elite divisions intensify, his grip on power may face unexpected tests.

Xi’s leadership is characterized by strong, centralized control, but his dominance is not necessarily permanent. His reliance on security forces, ideological campaigns, and repression keeps him in power, yet these same factors could generate internal tensions. Whether his rule remains stable or faces future challenges depends on how well he navigates potential economic, political, and internal security risks.

While Xi Jinping maintains firm control over the CCP, the aging leadership and the absence of a succession plan introduce long-term vulnerabilities. If these issues remain unaddressed, they could lead to political uncertainty, elite fragmentation, and a potential succession crisis. Xi’s ability to navigate these challenges will determine the long-term stability of his rule and the CCP’s future.

Xi Jinping’s leadership is characterized by a mix of ideological rigidity and strategic pragmatism. While he has consolidated power, elite competition, bureaucratic infighting, and security apparatus tensions remain underlying factors in China’s political landscape. His policy approach follows a recognizable pattern: firm initial positions, followed by controlled reversals, when necessary, which helps him maintain authority while adapting to challenges. However, as China faces economic pressures, elite power struggles, and an evolving international environment, the long-term sustainability of this governance model remains uncertain.

Jumel G. Estrañero is a defense, security, and political analyst and a university lecturer in the Philippines.  The ideas are the author’s own.

Xi Jinping’s Bureaucracy in 2025: A Critique was originally published on Global Security Review.

In this still frequently neglected or covered-up existential rivalry, the two sides face equally monumental but decidedly asymmetrical consequences. Should Beijing lose, the CCP will likely fall and fade. The Chinese nation, people, and state, even with the same name, will survive and likely thrive. Should Washington lose, however, not only will the American system of government likely fail, but the American way of life and national independence will diminish as American power and influence is superseded by a domineering PRC.

After long delays, hesitations, and self-delusions, a rare American consensus emerged to focus on the epic PRC-USA competition and fending off China’s effort to spread illiberal Chinese power. Given its vast well of resources, extensive network of alliances, great pool of talent, still functional democratic decision-making mechanism, and vibrant marketplace of ideas, the United States is coming up with cost-effective measures to win this competition, likely cheaper and more peaceful than what was required during the Cold War.

Critically, the United States should aim to achieve three hierarchical objectives in the PRC-USA race. They are ranked in descending order of importance. First, prevent the CCP from reordering the world by taking over global leadership. Second, prepare for but deter an all-out war with the PRC. Third, work toward a sociopolitical and ideological transformation of the PRC into a constructive peer. In the end, the US must ensure that Beijing is unwilling and/or unable to replace American leadership in the world.

The United States and its allies should curb the idealistic but toxic enthusiasm for globalization and world governance. The evolving ideals of the right to intervene (RTI) in other sovereign countries for the responsibility to protect (RTP) other country’s citizens, for example, should remain an inspiring ideal rather than a legal norm. Extremely rare and absolutely necessary cases of RTI and RTP are acceptable.

Americans must unapologetically strengthen the United States by maintaining dominance in economics, military power, education, and innovation. It must also remain a nation that is admired for its freedoms at home. It is in the greater interest of the world (including the Chinese people) to put America First, make America strong, rebuild America back better, and let America lead again. These campaign slogans were not only useful for presidential campaigns in 2016, 2020, and 2024, but they are important in reminding the rest of the world what is in their own best interest—a strong America.

These ideas should be delinked from the shortsightedness of isolationism and disassociated from any particular politician. The US must succeed in the international competition for power. It must also use its immense power judiciously to be ever more cost-effective.

A quick look at Taiwan may be a good illustration. Taiwan is critical for Beijing and the primary point of contention in the PRC-USA rivalry. The ROC (Republic of China) was a major US ally after World War II. However, the ROC’s international status was literally traded away by the United States over 40 years ago. The desire to enlist the PRC in the fight to win the Cold War against the Soviet Union proved more important.

Taiwan subsequently evolved to become the first democratic Chinese polity of and, in many ways, a leader across Asia. It has also drifted away from the monolithic Chinese world, to seek its own self-rule, autonomy, and independence.

The CCP, for its own political interest rather than the Chinese national interest, desires to absorb Taiwan with bribery, tricks, intimidation and force. Should Beijing accomplish that goal, it would achieve a major objective of its “great power” strategy, making a giant leap to dominate the Asia-Pacific and score a significant victory over the US and its allies.

The United States must not let Taiwan fall to Beijing. This is not because of the island’s beauty (its old name Formosa means beautiful island in Portuguese). Nor is it because of the advanced microchips that Taiwan makes. It is because the United States cannot allow the CCP to win the PRC-USA rivalry. American interests and the interests of a free world dictate that the US must ensure Beijing does not take Taiwan over the will of the Taiwanese people.

Without fundamental sociopolitical reform at home, even peaceful unification of Taiwan and the PRC should be objectionable to the United States. It sends the wrong signal to every nation watching the outcome of this competition. Winning the PRC-USA rivalry is much more important than the Beijing-Taipei dispute.

The United States must use its power well in defending Taiwan against the PRC. Between peaceful unification of the island with the Chinese Mainland in a framework of democratic federation on the one end, and Sino-American military conflict in response to an invasion of an independent Taiwan on the other end, there are many options. The US can employ numerous and inexpensive options like destroying the “Great Firewall of China,” providing smart weapons to Taiwan, fighting at the time and place of American choosing, and altering the nuclear balance in East Asia. The list can go on.

Imagination, wisdom, persistence, and perseverance, more than mere force and material power, will enable the United States to safeguard world order. The Taiwanese people are counting on an American victory in the PRC-USA rivalry.

Fei-Ling Wang, PhD, is a Professor at the Sam Nunn School of International Affairs at the Georgia Institute of Technology. Views expressed in this article are his own.

The PRC-USA Rivalry and Taiwan was originally published on Global Security Review.