Since the establishment of the Republic of Korea in 1948, the Korean Peninsula has experienced violent ideological strife, culminating in a war that claimed the lives of 10 percent of its people. The following decades were marked by authoritarian governments in the South and a cult-like regime in the North—cloaked in the guise of communism.

During authoritarian rule in South Korea, which was often characterized as a dictatorship, martial law was declared on several occasions to maintain law and order. It also served as a crucial mechanism in preparing for potential invasions by North Korea.

Martial law in South Korea refers to a legal framework under which the administrative and judicial powers of the state are transferred to a military commander. This extraordinary measure is stipulated under the Constitution of the Republic of Korea. It grants the president authority to declare martial law in circumstances of war, armed conflict, or other national emergencies of similar gravity. Its objective is to address military requirements or ensure public safety and order when normal governance is deemed inadequate.

Martial law is divided into two types: emergency martial law and security martial law. Emergency martial law grants the government sweeping powers, including the suspension of the warrant system, restrictions on freedom of the press, curbs on publication rights, limitations on assembly and association, and the overriding of civilian courts and government agencies.

These measures are intended to ensure swift and decisive action in times of crisis. When martial law is declared, the president must notify the National Assembly immediately. If the Assembly demands its termination through a majority vote, the president is legally obligated to comply. While the National Assembly retains legislative authority, there are exceptional cases where a military regime may temporarily assume control, particularly during a coup or other events that disrupt the constitutional order.

On December 3 at 10 p.m., President Yoon Suk-Yeol declared martial law. This marked the first time in 45 years that martial law was invoked in South Korea. President Yoon justified the decision by citing actions of the National Assembly and opposition party, which he claimed were paralyzing the judicial and administrative systems. Specifically, their pursuit of numerous impeachment motions against officials and ministers, coupled with a unilateral decision to reduce key public welfare and defense budgets for the coming year. Yoon specifically cited these actions as undermining the essential functions of the state.

President Yoon framed them as attempts to disrupt constitutional order and overthrow the liberal democratic system. He went so far as to label the National Assembly a “den of criminals,” warning that the nation was in a “dire and precarious state.” To safeguard the liberal democratic system and protect citizens from North Korean communist forces and anti-state elements, he declared martial law, taking a step that would significantly escalate political tensions.

What followed was both alarming and puzzling. The Martial Law Commander was announced almost immediately, accompanied by a proclamation that limited civil liberties.

Troops were deployed to the National Assembly building, ostensibly to secure control, but the details of their mission remained unclear. Notably, the government refrained from taking control of broadcasting networks, implementing a curfew, or restricting internet access—measures that have traditionally been associated with martial law. This restraint raised questions about the intent and preparedness behind the declaration.

Within just two hours, 190 of the 300 National Assembly members gathered in an extraordinary session. Demonstrating remarkable decisiveness, they unanimously voted to overturn the martial law decision. The swift and unified response underscored the strength of South Korea’s democratic institutions, even under extraordinary pressure. The critical question that followed was whether President Yoon would adhere to this decision, given the volatile circumstances.

As of this writing, the democratic mechanisms appear to have prevailed. President Yoon complied with the Assembly’s decision, and the troops, whatever their initial directives may have been, refrained from any extreme actions. The system of checks and balances worked, averting what could be a prolonged and destabilizing crisis. This resolution highlights the resilience of South Korea’s democracy, even when tested under such dramatic circumstances.

The entire ordeal lasted only six hours, yet its implications are profound. It was bizarre, embarrassing, and politically damaging for the Yoon administration. The short-lived declaration of martial law raises significant questions about the president’s judgment, the advice he received, and the decision-making process within the government.

The absence of traditional martial law measures, such as media control or curfews, suggests either a miscalculation or an intent to avoid inflaming public outrage. Regardless, the political fallout will be severe and long-lasting.

This six-hour ordeal, while alarming, ultimately reaffirmed the strength of South Korea’s democratic systems. The National Assembly acted swiftly and decisively, and the president adhered to constitutional norms, ensuring the crisis did not escalate further.

However, the incident leaves lingering doubts about the future of the nation’s political climate and the ability of its leadership to navigate complex challenges. It will serve as a sobering case study in the delicate balance of power, the risks of executive overreach, and the resilience required to uphold democratic principles.

The “silver lining” of this affair is undeniable; the democratic system worked. Yet the political and reputational costs will shape South Korea’s discourse for months, if not years, to come. It is a stark reminder that democracy, though tested, must remain vigilant and steadfast in protecting its core values against both external and internal threats.

LTG (Ret.) Chun In-Bum was the commander of the Republic of Korea’s Special Forces Command. He is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. 

Six Hours of Crisis: Martial Law, Democracy, and Leadership in South Korea was originally published on Global Security Review.

One example of this malfeasance was the repeated use of the term fascism/fascist or Nazism/Nazi to refer to Donald J. Trump and his supporters. Among those raising this concern were disaffected officials from the first Trump presidency. For example, retired four-star general John F. Kelly, who served as Trump’s White House chief of staff, caught media attention by going public with warnings that Trump would try to govern as a dictator.

In addition, thirteen republicans who served in the first Trump administration released an open letter on October 25 charging that Trump’s disdain for the professional military and his admiration for autocrats would be dangerous for America. They contended, “The American people deserve a leader who won’t threaten to turn armed troops against them, won’t put his quest for power above their needs, and doesn’t idealize the likes of Adolf Hitler.”

The widespread use of the fascist moniker by Trump opponents, as well as the identification of Trump as an admirer of Hitler, substitutes emotional frustration for a nuanced appreciation of history and policy. This is so for at least two reasons.

First, the Nazi and fascist ideologies of the 1920s and 1930s cannot be replicated in 21st- century America. There are too many checks and balances in the American system of government to permit a fascist dictatorship or a similarly authoritarian system from taking root in the United States.

The geniuses who designed the American system of government dispersed power among three branches of the federal government and divided powers between the federal government and the states for a reason. The priority of values in the American political system favors liberty over efficiency. Admittedly the apparent inefficiency of government compared, say, to private business, is sometimes frustrating. But Americans instinctively mistrust centralized power as inimical to freedom, and history validates the prudence of that judgment.

Second, the character and training of the US professional officer corps would preclude the collaboration of the highest-ranking generals and admirals in subverting democracy. The graduates of American war colleges are steeped in the constitutional legitimacy that surrounds civil-military relations. An anti-democratic usurper demanding that the armed forces become partisan subordinates, as opposed to apolitical guardians of democracy, would meet with Pentagon resistance and, if necessary, refusal to carry out illegal orders.

Of course, complacency on the character of civil-military relations is never desirable; democracy must always be safeguarded against imminent dangers. But overstatement of American vulnerability to any single president or administration is distracting from more probable and immediate dangers and challenges.

First among these dangers is the relentless march of technology and its tendency to produce an elite of technocrats who exert indirect or direct control over public choice. When technocrats are in the private sector, they can influence public policy indirectly by leading successful corporations that make desirable consumer goods or other commodities.

On the other hand, when technocrats reside in government bureaucracies, their influence and power are not determined by market forces, but by law and government regulation. For most of the 20th century, the United States successfully balanced the creativity of the private business sector with the regulatory regimes of government bureaucracy. In the twenty-first century, this balance is at risk by bureaucracy in hyperdrive.

Aided by the explosion in new information technology, the federal bureaucracy now resembles Cheops’ pyramid and intrudes into every corner of American life. In turn, a more activist government is demanded by disgruntled interest groups or litigious citizens who take every grievance, real or imagined, into the local, state, or federal judicial system.

The result is a logjam of jurisprudential clutter and a never-ending cascade of regulations that dictate how Americans work, eat, sleep, drive, watch television, cook, and educate their children. A list of things that the government does not regulate would be harder to draw up than a list of things that the government controls directly or indirectly.

In short, mastery of advanced technology is a necessary condition for American national security and defense. On the other hand, technological micro-management of the American body politic can only depress innovation, discourage original thinking, and empower dysfunctional government controls over social and political life.

A second concern that both political parties need to address is the restructuring of the international political and economic system to the detriment of American leadership and security.  Russian President Vladimir Putin recently hosted a conclave of member states of BRICS (originally Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) plus some thirty other countries interested in joining or otherwise supporting the group. BRICS is explicitly designed to push back against the rules-based international order led by the US and its Western allies.

On the international security front, China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea (the CRINKs) are acting in concert as system disrupters in support of aggression in Europe, the Middle East, and East Asia. Iran and North Korea are providing explicit military assistance to Russia for its war against Ukraine, including ballistic missiles and drones.

North Korea has also begun sending troops to fight under Russian command in Ukraine.  China has moved into a more open military alliance with Russia, that includes joint war games and training exercises, including scenarios with forces that are potentially nuclear-capable.  Russia is confident that it can outlast Ukraine in manpower and war-related resources despite NATO support for Kiev. At the level of high diplomacy and statecraft, no recipe for a negotiated settlement of this war is on offer.

China continues to press forward its Belt and Road Initiative and other measures to dominate global trade and infrastructure development. As well, China apparently aspires to become a third global nuclear superpower, with forces essentially equivalent to those of the United States and Russia by 2035 or sooner.

A third concern that should occupy the attention of the next administration is the matrix of challenges to American and allied conventional and nuclear deterrence. Russia’s war against Ukraine, China’s gathering storm for a future strike against Taiwan, and Iran’s wars against Israel via proxies in Gaza, Lebanon, and Yemen, all point to a decline in respect for American power and a willingness to test American resolve by direct or indirect action.

In addition, Iran is already a threshold nuclear weapons state, and an Iranian bomb could set off a reaction among Middle Eastern countries that would make a serious dent in the nuclear nonproliferation regime. Iran’s Houthi proxies in Yemen have diverted maritime commerce throughout the world and have evolved from a fledgling insurgency into a well-armed terrorist strike force capable of ballistic missile and drone attacks throughout the region.

With respect to nuclear deterrence, the fate of the American strategic nuclear modernization program that was supported by the Obama, Trump, and Biden administrations is now uncertain as to its timing and continuing support from Congress. The intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) component (Sentinel) of the nuclear triad faces scrutiny over its rising costs and delayed schedules. The possible collapse of the New START regime in 2026 could presage an open-ended nuclear arms race among China, Russia, and the US.

Other challenges to nuclear deterrence stability include developments in hypersonic offensive weapons, in advanced missile and air defenses, and in space and cyber weapons for deterrence or defense. Kinetic attacks on US space-based assets and cyberattacks against both military and civilian targets can be acts of aggression in themselves; or, on the other hand, they can be precursors for nuclear first strikes or for large-scale conventional offensives against American and allied North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) forces and infrastructure.

In short, (1) managing the balance between governmental and private-sector technology innovation; (2) steering the pivotal role of the United States in a more competitive international system; and (3) supporting credible conventional and nuclear deterrence against more ambitious regional actors and nuclear competitors provides a partial menu of priorities that should receive more attention from policymakers. Demagoguery’s day has passed. It is now time to govern for the betterment of the nation.

Stephen Cimbala, PhD, is a senior fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies and Professor of Political Science at Penn State Brandywine.

The Wrong Agenda for Political Debates was originally published on Global Security Review.