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		<title>Brilliant Pebbles Can Provide a Real Space-Based Missile Defense for Golden Dome</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/brilliant-pebbles-can-provide-a-real-space-based-missile-defense-for-golden-dome/</link>
					<comments>https://globalsecurityreview.com/brilliant-pebbles-can-provide-a-real-space-based-missile-defense-for-golden-dome/#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Matthew Mowthorpe]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 19 Jan 2026 15:29:15 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Allies & Extended Deterrence]]></category>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=32151</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>The announcement of Golden Dome in May 2025 has reinvigorated discussions around the often-maligned concept of space-based missile defenses. Ever since President Reagan’s 1983 speech  announcing the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), space-based missile defenses have been opposed by some as unrealistic. Although SDI was successful in bankrupting the Soviet Union, many in Congress never viewed [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/brilliant-pebbles-can-provide-a-real-space-based-missile-defense-for-golden-dome/">Brilliant Pebbles Can Provide a Real Space-Based Missile Defense for Golden Dome</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/videos/breaking-president-trump-announces-the-golden-dome/">announcement</a> of Golden Dome in May 2025 has reinvigorated discussions around the often-maligned concept of space-based missile defenses. Ever since President Reagan’s 1983 <a href="https://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/ronaldreagansdi.htm">speech</a>  announcing the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), space-based missile defenses have been opposed by some as unrealistic. Although SDI was successful in bankrupting the Soviet Union, many in Congress never viewed SDI as legitimately achievable. The noble aim of irradicating threats from intercontinental missiles has often been lost to those who seek to question not only the technical feasibility but also their impact on nuclear deterrence. Yet following the announcement of Golden Dome by President Trump, Congress <a href="https://www.aip.org/fyi/lawmakers-seek-next-steps-on-golden-dome">allocated</a> $25 billion for program development and initial deployment, suggesting the government is finally moving in the direction of supporting a robust homeland defense capability through the deployment of an SDI concept now technically ready for use: Brilliant Pebbles.</p>
<p>The fundamental aim of Golden Dome is to protect the United States from air or space-based missiles armed with a variety of warheads: nuclear, chemical, biological, or conventional. Golden Dome will be made available to key allies should they deem it necessary for their own defenses in an increasingly complex global security environment. However, the level of <a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/golden-dome-creates-a-new-missile-defense-bargain-with-us-partners/">interest</a> these allies have in negotiating the terms of missile defenses from the U.S. remains to be seen.</p>
<p>While moving beyond the technical development of SDI, Golden Dome is not ushering a new age of missile defense strategy. A national missile defense policy has been in place since the 1990s following a hotly debated period in Congress where a “placebo defense” was finally deployed. The term “placebo defense” was coined by prolific political strategist <a href="https://www.missiledefenseadvocacy.org/advocacy/tributes/dr-william-van-cleave-1935-2013/">Dr. William Van Cleave</a>, who advocated for a layered concept of missile defense while he was a member of “<a href="https://www.commentary.org/articles/richard-pipes-2/team-b-the-reality-behind-the-myth/">Team B</a>.” Team B was commissioned by the-then Director of Central Intelligence, President George H.W. Bush for the purpose of providing the government with alternative intelligence assessments and policy guidance regarding the Soviet strategic threat.</p>
<p>Dr. Van Cleave first used the term “placebo defense” in lectures at the Department of Defense &amp; Strategic Studies at Missouri State University in 1996. While not officially defined in any academic paper, “placebo defense” describes the U.S. policy of deploying limited missile defenses incapable of defending against significant ballistic missile attack from either Russia or China. Rather, such limited missile defenses instead minimize the threat by rogue states like North Korea and Iran. The goal in part was to silence the critics who claim the U.S. must at least be able to defend itself from those rogue nations more likely to launch one or two missiles at U.S. forces overseas, or key coastal areas of the country.</p>
<p>The Team B concept of layered missile defense was supported by former SDI officials who <a href="https://www.laserwars.net/p/strategic-defense-initiative-space-based-laser-interview">advocated</a> for a space-based laser (SBL) system to provide the most effective method of intercepting ballistic missiles. While this would be ideal for balancing technical feasibility and overall program cost, SBLs were not supported by Congress and follow-on administrations. Valuable research and development have since been neglected, making SBLs unlikely achievable anytime soon.</p>
<p>Golden Dome is now poised to move forward with some of the Team B concepts and additional strategists since the 1990s. To move Golden Dome forward rapidly, it is time to reconsider Brilliant Pebbles, which is also referred to as Future Space-Based Interceptors. <a href="https://www.llnl.gov/archives/1980s/brilliant-pebbles">Designed</a> by Lawerence Livermore National Laboratory, Brilliant Pebbles envisioned placing small space-based interceptors (weighing around 10 kilograms) in Low Earth Orbit (LEO) capable of colliding with intercontinental ballistic missiles during the boost-phase of their trajectory. These interceptors would remain in orbit for only 18 months. Brilliant Pebbles was cancelled in 1993 due to a lack of political support in Congress despite some strategists <a href="https://www.wsj.com/opinion/why-did-brilliant-pebbles-fail-to-launch-reagan-bush-cost-tech-6b252ad7?gaa_at=eafs&amp;gaa_n=AWEtsqeRShKMKVoHpHRmxitIdjsAUq0dzPI98tD0e4UXU_DkgUP_xGEdbWkd3bPKpBY%3D&amp;gaa_ts=695ae1e0&amp;gaa_sig=mGYrAI49uoHw2veffOK--WZ07WTjuvwmQnC4CWamEUa95fmPmtWRDs_9MTYuB7krBLSTaScIIEnfU7uoDyqMDA%3D%3D">arguing</a> the technical feasibility of the program and its technical readiness for deployment in the near term.</p>
<p>Since the program’s end, the technical efficiency of small pump-fed engines and the impulse of solid axial engines, the areas of technological development that limited the concept in the late 1980s, have improved. It is now possible for an interceptor to reach 20g acceleration and cover a range of 800 km, well beyond the capabilities in the original project. Further mission analysis is still needed to determine the number of Brilliant Pebbles required to provide adequate missile defenses within the Golden Dome strategy. Furthermore, the cost to deploy Brilliant Pebbles using this concept will also be <a href="https://www.careyaya.org/resources/blog/spacex-s-radical-reduction-in-launch-costs-and-lessons-for-innovation">vastly reduced</a> using current U.S. space launch capabilities provides by companies such as SpaceX and Blue Origin.</p>
<p>The ability of Golden Dome to effectively protect the U.S. from air and space missile threats fundamentally relies on selecting the most effective space-based missile defense system. Brilliant Pebbles is a system whose maturity can be advanced quickly and cost effectively to provide a boost-phase intercept capability. This could finally put to an end to the “placebo” missile defense system which leaves the U.S. insufficiently defended.</p>
<p><em>Dr. Matthew Mowthorpe is currently working at BAE Systems where he is responsible for space control. Views expressed are the author&#8217;s own. </em></p>
<p><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/Brilliant-Pebbles-Can-Provide-a-Real-Space-Based-Missile-Defense-for-Golden-Dome-.pdf"><img decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-32091" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/2026-Download-Button.png" alt="" width="209" height="58" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/2026-Download-Button.png 450w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/2026-Download-Button-300x83.png 300w" sizes="(max-width: 209px) 100vw, 209px" /></a></p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/brilliant-pebbles-can-provide-a-real-space-based-missile-defense-for-golden-dome/">Brilliant Pebbles Can Provide a Real Space-Based Missile Defense for Golden Dome</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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		<title>ICBM EAR Report Jan, 3 2025</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/icbm-ear-report-jan-3-2025/</link>
					<comments>https://globalsecurityreview.com/icbm-ear-report-jan-3-2025/#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Peter Huessy]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 08 Jan 2025 13:16:27 +0000</pubDate>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=29765</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>ICBM EAR Report Executive Summary Based on the latest EAR Report, these are the critical points on global security, upcoming events, and the ongoing discourse on nuclear deterrence, modernization, and geopolitical strategy for 2025. Quotes of the Week Xi Jinping (China): &#8220;No one can stop the historical trend” of China’s “reunification” with Taiwan.&#8221; U.S. Ambassador [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/icbm-ear-report-jan-3-2025/">ICBM EAR Report Jan, 3 2025</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong>ICBM EAR Report</strong> <strong><br />
Executive Summary</strong></p>
<p>Based on the latest EAR Report, these are the critical points on global security, upcoming events, and the ongoing discourse on nuclear deterrence, modernization, and geopolitical strategy for 2025.</p>
<p><strong>Quotes of the Week</strong></p>
<ul>
<li><strong>Xi Jinping (China):</strong> &#8220;No one can stop the historical trend” of China’s “reunification” with Taiwan.&#8221;</li>
<li><strong>U.S. Ambassador Philip Goldberg (South Korea):</strong> Reaffirmed the U.S.-South Korean alliance amidst geopolitical tensions.</li>
<li><strong>DPRK Kim Jong Un:</strong> Committed to implementing the &#8220;toughest&#8221; anti-American policy while criticizing the U.S.-South Korea-Japan security partnership.</li>
<li><strong>Antony Blinken (U.S. Secretary of State):</strong> Highlighted Russia&#8217;s intentions to share advanced space technology with North Korea.</li>
<li><strong>NATO Official:</strong> Warned of unconventional Russian attacks causing substantial casualties.</li>
</ul>
<p><strong>Upcoming 2025 Seminar Events</strong></p>
<ol>
<li><strong>January 10, 2025, 10:00 AM:</strong> Robert Soofer &amp; Mark Massa on &#8220;The Case for Homeland Missile Defense.&#8221;</li>
<li><strong>January 31, 2025, 10:00 AM:</strong> Shoshana Bryen &amp; Ilan Berman on &#8220;Middle East Update and the Iranian Nuclear Threat.&#8221;</li>
<li><strong>February 14, 2025, 10:00 AM:</strong> Stephen Blank &amp; Mark Schneider on &#8220;Russian Intentions with Its Growing Nuclear Forces.&#8221;</li>
<li><strong>February 28, 2025, 10:00 AM:</strong> Hon. Madelyn Creedon &amp; Hon. Frank Miller on &#8220;Assessment and Update of the Posture Commission.&#8221;</li>
<li><strong>March 14, 2025, 10:00 AM:</strong> Gordon Chang &amp; Rick Fisher on &#8220;The Chinese Nuclear Threat &amp; Implications for US Security.&#8221;</li>
</ol>
<p><strong>Nuclear Derangement Syndrome</strong></p>
<ul>
<li>Criticism of nuclear deterrence is gaining momentum, focusing on framing nuclear weapons as both unnecessary and dangerous.</li>
<li>The Union of Concerned Scientists highlights essays opposing nuclear modernization, which are countered with arguments emphasizing deterrence as essential for stability.</li>
<li>The critique overlooks the strategic necessity of nuclear weapons in preventing large-scale conflicts and ensuring global security.</li>
</ul>
<p><strong>The Biden-Trump Arms Race</strong></p>
<ul>
<li><strong>Criticism:</strong> The Biden and Trump administrations&#8217; claims of an arms race are exaggerated. They focus on necessary modernization within New START limits.</li>
<li><strong>Reality:</strong> Modernization efforts (Columbia submarines, Sentinel ICBMs, B21 bombers) align with treaty commitments, aiming for readiness by 2042.</li>
<li><strong>Key Concern:</strong> Rising nuclear capabilities of Russia and China surpass New START limits, demanding U.S. responses to maintain strategic balance.</li>
<li><strong>Counterarguments:</strong> Opponents argue modernization fuels an arms race, while proponents emphasize deterrence and technological edge against adversaries.</li>
</ul>
<p><span style="color: #000080;"><strong>Download the full report.</strong></span></p>
<p><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/ICBM-EAR-week-of-January-3.pdf"><img decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-29719 size-medium" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-300x83.png" alt="" width="300" height="83" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-300x83.png 300w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button.png 450w" sizes="(max-width: 300px) 100vw, 300px" /></a></p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/icbm-ear-report-jan-3-2025/">ICBM EAR Report Jan, 3 2025</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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