North Korea’s expanding nuclear arsenal is changing more than just the amount of destruction Pyongyang could inflict. This may be altering the North Korean leadership’s way of calculating how it could use nuclear weapons in a limited conflict while not necessarily triggering regime change. North Korea is developing a larger and more diversified nuclear inventory, tactical nuclear warheads, solid-fuel intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM), multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRV), cruise missiles, and hypersonic weapons systems. Moreover, North Korea’s September 2022 nuclear law established the conditions under which nuclear weapons may be used preemptively. 

These developments would become particularly perilous when paired with uncertainty regarding how the United States would respond to North Korea’s limited use of nuclear weapons and a simultaneous dual contingency involving China and North Korea. Consequently, the central challenge facing South Korea extends beyond deterring an all-out nuclear attack. It must also ensure Pyongyang does not conclude that limited nuclear use is controllable, survivable, or politically successful. 

A larger nuclear inventory affords greater operational flexibility to North Korea. While a small nuclear stockpile would have to be preserved for regime survival and strategic retaliation, a much larger arsenal would enable Pyongyang to allocate a subset of warheads to American targets, others to Japan, and still others to South Korean military targets. North Korea could reach the tipping point when Kim Jong-un believes he possesses sufficient nuclear capacity to use them for tactical purposes while preserving a survivable nuclear reserve to deter further escalation. 

To achieve doctrinal legitimacy for early use of nuclear weapons, North Korea’s 2022 nuclear doctrine authorizes the use of nuclear weapons not only in response to a nuclear attack but also when the leadership, nuclear command structure, or valuable strategic targets are threatened. Pyongyang could argue that a South Korean attack against its missile bases, command centers, and underground facilities is an attempt to neutralize North Korea’s nuclear deterrent. In that case, a tactical nuclear strike could be portrayed as a defensive measure to halt allied operations and terminate Western aggression. 

This creates a dangerous interaction with South Korea’s Three-Axis System. The Kill Chain is intended to destroy North Korean launchers and command facilities before missiles are fired. Korean Air and Missile Defense (KAMD) is intended to intercept the remaining missiles, and Korea Massive Punishment and Retaliation (KMPR) is intended to pose a threat to the North Korean leadership. From Pyongyang’s perspective, these strikes may be interpreted as an integrated operation aimed at destroying North Korea’s nuclear forces and decapitating its leadership. Ironically, increased South Korean preemptive-strike capability may result in  greater North Korea’s incentive to disperse authority, shorten decision times, and launch its forces before they could be destroyed. 

North Korea’s lessons learned from the Russo-Ukrainian war could make this posture even more dangerous. Russia has repeatedly combined or integrated drones, cruise missiles, and ballistic missiles with other measures. North Korea could apply similar methods on the Korean Peninsula. Beginning with cyberattacks and GPS jamming, followed by reconnaissance drones toward missile-defense batteries, airfields, ports, and command centers. An additional wave could include decoys, one-way attack drones, low-altitude cruise missiles, ballistic missiles including KN-23 and KN-24, and hypersonic systems. 

Nuclear-tipped missiles could be mixed with conventionally armed weapons to generate attack uncertainty like a “haystack attack.” South Korean operators might not be able to discern which incoming objects are decoys, which carry conventional warheads, and which are armed with nuclear warheads. As a result, Seoul would be compelled to consume their stock of interceptors against numerous targets. North Korea does not need hundreds of drones to neutralize the KAMD. It would instead need drones that could damage radar, communications vehicles, generators, reloading systems, or command hubs long enough for ballistic missiles to penetrate successfully. 

The Atlantic Council’s Guardian Tiger tabletop exercises explicitly revealed this problem. In one scenario, North Korea employed a low-yield nuclear weapon against ROK Navy facilities. In response, the United States chose to conduct strong conventional strike operations instead of opting for nuclear retaliation, partially because of concerns about escalation with China. 

These risks could be amplified during a Taiwan conflict with American military assets heavily deployed in the Taiwan Strait. Under such circumstances, North Korea could use mobilization, missile attacks, or tactical nuclear blackmail either to coerce the United States into dispersing its assets or to restrict Seoul’s support for Taiwan operations. Meanwhile, China might disapprove of North Korea’s use of nuclear weapons but still intervene to forestall regime collapse.  

South Korea should respond by denying North Korea confidence in such a strategy. In that regard, the following six recommendations are worth pursuing, either individually or collectively. 

First, the Three-Axis System should be operated as a continuously functioning, integrated architecture instead of three mutually separated stages. Intelligence, cyber operations, electronic warfare, missile defense, long-range strikes, civil defense, continuity of government functions, and nuclear consultation with the United States should be aligned through prearranged response options. 

Second, every base that hosts a major missile-defense system should be equipped with its own independent, low-cost counter-drone defense layer. This should include passive sensors, short-range radars, jammers, programmable airburst guns, low-cost missiles, decoys, protected power generation, and rapid recovery teams. 

Third, South Korea should also increase the depth of its interceptor magazine. Reload vehicles, storage and production facilities, and communications networks should be dispersed and protected. 

Fourth, the Kill Chain should concentrate less on searching for every mobile launcher and focus more on destroying the broader launch ecosystem, including tunnel entrances, command nodes, reloading points, transportation support, communications relays, and choke points. 

Fifth, Washington and Seoul also need a classified bilateral plan concerning North Korea’s limited nuclear use. This should regulate viable responses to a demonstrative nuclear explosion, an attack on military bases, and the use of nuclear weapons during a Taiwan contingency. 

Finally, South Korea should also prove that a single nuclear strike cannot paralyze the country. Thus, dispersed aircraft, alternative ports, hardened command posts, emergency runway repair, redundant communications hubs, and diverse measures for the continuity of government functions are at the core of a deterrence through resilience strategy. 

In all, North Korea’s nuclear threshold will rise only when Kim Jong-un concludes that limited nuclear options are not viable on the Korean Peninsula. Seoul should convince Pyongyang that a single nuclear attack would not fragment alliances, secure China’s protection, or end the war on North Korea’s terms, but would instead expose the North Korean regime to uncontrollable escalation and destruction. 

Dr. Ju Hyung Kim is President of the Security Management Institute, a defense think tank affiliated with the South Korean National Assembly. He researches East Asian security, military strategy, and alliance management and has published widely in international defense and foreign-policy outlets. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own. 

North Korea’s Emerging Limited Nuclear-Use Strategy was originally published on Global Security Review.

The previously concluded and now cancelled US-Iran Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) revealed a paradox at the heart of the Middle East security landscape. Both sides have been negotiating back and forth on de-escalation, a compromise on enriched uranium, and freedom of passage through the Strait of Hormuz. However, beneath these ongoing diplomatic efforts is a reality that is becoming increasingly clear. For the Iranian regime, a regional environment of managed conflict is more strategically valuable than a sustained peace agreement. This explains why, even after signing the 60-day ceasefire memo, Iran still attacked ships in the Strait of Hormuz, prompting the U.S. to respond to discourage future Iranian violence.

Iran will likely avoid a full-scale war that risks its destruction, instead preferring a continued proxy-driven, tension-filled regional environment to maintain deterrence and project power without escalation. Recent talks on uranium and safe passage through the Hormuz Strait will fuel Iran’s resistance to normalization with the U.S. and GCC.

Instability As a Strategic Infrastructure

For Iran, pushing for regional instability or proxy confrontations is not merely a temporary policy dispute. It has become embedded in the state’s architecture itself. Iran has built and framed its domestic popularity and regional legitimacy around the concept of resistance against Western pressure, particularly from the U.S. and Israel. This narrative was deeply institutionalized within Iran’s regional strategy, military doctrine, and its main controlling security establishments, the IRGC and Basij forces. In this regard, a comprehensive peace deal with the U.S. would create profound structural questions inside Iran, including the rationale of the “resistance” doctrine in place for decades, the logic of maintaining extensive regional proxy networks, and preserving a missile- and drone-heavy militarized regional posture.

In different ways, a controlled conflict has become part of the regime’s survival and operating environment. Therefore, achieving a sustainable peace agreement can entirely destabilize internal balances of power more than maintaining them. This explains why, even during periods of increased international diplomatic efforts, Iran often preserves parallel escalation mechanisms in addition to never conceding any of its nuclear program development to date. Thus, pursuing negotiations alongside adding pressure on multiple fronts is not a contradiction within Iranian strategic thinking. Instead, they are complementary tools.

The Asymmetric Leverage

Iran’s ability to threaten and demonstrate control over maritime access to the Strait of Hormuz negatively impacted global oil markets and exposed the vulnerability of international energy flows to customer states. In this respect, around one-fifth of global oil flows transit through the Strait of Hormuz, making it one of the most globally strategic water passages. Accordingly, the ongoing Hormuz crisis reinforces Tehran’s preference for controlled instability.

Iran uses the Hormuz situation to benefit itself domestically and internationally, framing it to show that strategic, asymmetric disruptions give diplomatic leverage. Even after military pressure, the U.S. remains focused on negotiations to reopen Hormuz and restore shipping stability. This is Iran’s leverage that it does not want to cede. Tehran, specifically the IRGC, which appears to be the decision-making authority, believes that maintaining control of Hormuz but avoiding escalation preserves its bargaining power, especially since hardliners see concessions to the U.S. as losses. Iran wants full control of the Strait, knowing it cannot fight the U.S. directly, and employs asymmetric leverage to influence the strategic balance.

Iran’s air force and navy remain significantly limited compared to those of the U.S. and regional GCC states. Additionally, Iran’s economy suffers under sanctions and American quarantines. As a result, Tehran has spent decades developing a different form of deterrence, including ballistic missiles, drones, proxy warfare networks, and regional escalation networks across Iraq, Lebanon, and Yemen. Among Iran’s regional proxy groups, Iran-backed Houthis in Yemen remain one of the most critical factors in Iran’s current asymmetric model of confrontation. Since the start of the U.S.-Israeli confrontation with Iran, the Houthis have so far chosen not to fully participate in ground fighting. This is particularly concerning because the Houthis are currently Iran’s most strategically positioned proxy group in the Middle East, armed with a wide range of missiles and drones, capable of inflicting strategic damage across the Red Sea and Bab el Mandeb and potentially causing another global maritime shock like Hormuz. This allows Iran to effectively deploy a multi-chokepoint strategy at any time. Alongside their threat to maritime security, the proximity of the Houthis to GCC states and the group’s history of fighting Saudi Arabia from 2015 to 2022 give Iran additional leverage to pressure the region.

This asymmetric model works best for Iran when geopolitical friction persists. Even without fully going into a conventional war with the U.S., Iran can complicate Western military planning and generate political costs for its opponents. Therefore, a stable regional order with normalized relations would significantly reduce the strategic utility of all these tools.

Deterrence and The Regime Survival Dimension

Iran’s broader regional strategy relies heavily on maintaining a “forward proxy defense” doctrine beyond its borders to project influence. This approach has served several purposes simultaneously, including creating multiple escalation fronts and increasing the political cost of directly attacking Iran. From Tehran’s perspective, a low-level regional friction prevents the emergence of a fully consolidated anti-Iranian security order.

There is also an internal political dimension that Western analyses often overlook. For example, external confrontations in the hybrid warfare narrative, which often bolster regime unity as periods of increased confrontational pressure enable the Iranian leadership to suppress dissent and rally nationalist sentiment. They frame this to their local population as the West’s war on Islam, aligning it with the state’s ideological identity, deeply rooted in anti-Western and resistance narratives. An internationally accepted peace agreement with the U.S. could lead to unwanted domestic effects for Iran, such as reduced ideological cohesion and increased demands for broader political reforms. Ironically, a limited confrontation might seem safer for regime stability than reaching a peace agreement.

Regional Peace, Security, and Iran

During the recent confrontation, which culminated in April’s ceasefire, more than 80 percent of Iran’s missiles and drones were directed at GCC states. This suggests Iran was willing to strike neighboring countries outside the immediate conflict even though they were not directly fighting with Iran. Such actions undermine regional trust and raise questions about Iran’s willingness to function as a responsible contributor to regional security.

The central paradox of any U.S.-Iran negotiations is that peace itself will threaten some of the strategic foundations upon which Iran has operated for decades. Regional instabilities and relatively managed conflicts provide Tehran with bargaining leverage, geopolitical relevance, and a degree of deterrence it seeks to demonstrate. A sustained peace deal, by contrast, risks reducing Iran’s asymmetric advantages that it has been trying to capitalize upon while also exposing its internal political and strategic vulnerabilities. The U.S. must recognize this reality or risk negotiating without a clear understanding of Iran’s strategic intentions.

Dr. Mohamed ELDoh is a business development and consulting professional in the defence and security sector. Mohamed holds a Doctorate from Grenoble École de Management, France, an MBA from the EU Business School, Spain, and an Advanced Certificate in Counterterrorism Studies from the University of St Andrews, UK. He regularly authors articles addressing defence cooperation, counterterrorism, geopolitics, and emerging security threats in the Middle East and Africa. The views of the author are his own.

Iran’s Strategic Logic of Instability was originally published on Global Security Review.

Proliferation of unmanned systems in modern warfare has popularized the notion that traditional platforms have reached the end of their operational relevance. Particularly, the Russia-Ukraine war has deepened the perception that small, agile, and inexpensive drones have rendered manned platforms in land, air, and sea domain obsolete.

This argument gains credibility while assessing drones’ performance against manned armored vehicles which are now routinely labelled as outdated systems against drone-enabled precision strikes. Yet, what is often depicted in the media is only one side of the coin. Drones often fail to find targets, are intercepted, or manage to hit their target, thus not achieving intended results. Despite proliferation of first-person view (FPV) drones, armored vehicles continue to play a vital role in maneuver warfare and protected mobility. Modern armor strategies have evolved to include combined arms and dispersion rather than mass for increasing survivability and combat efficiency. In the Russia-Ukraine war, several rudimentary measures like installation of cope cages atop turrets, have been implemented by both militaries to enhance the survivability rate of tanks against kamikaze drones. Vehicle mounted jammers have also shown promising results. Defensive technologies, like active protection systems (APS) and electronic countermeasures (ECM), have proven their efficiency against FPV drones. Thus, it can be argued that drones have not turned armored vehicles obsolete; they have forced them to evolve into more refined systems.

Similarly, in the aerial domain, many analysts perceive unmanned aerial systems (UAS) as cost effective alternative vis-à-vis manned aircraft. Yes, UASs have shown impressive evolution. From dropping laser-guided bombs (LGBs) to firing cruise missiles, air-to-air missiles, torpedo, and even smaller drones, drones have come a long way in changing warfare. Increasingly, drones have pushed manned aircraft aside as a more efficient option for operational engagement. In Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, Azerbaijan innovatively employed aerial drones to expose Armenian air-defenses’ positions making them vulnerable to subsequent Azerbaijan’s targeted strikes. This unique use of drones as a crucial component of SEAD/DEAD (Suppression & Destruction of Enemy Air Defenses) kill chain marked a watershed moment in modern warfare.

However, the inherent limitations of drones are obvious too. UASs are more susceptibility to electronic warfare (EW) disruption and have unproven records in complex battlespace with dynamics rules of engagement (ROEs). Claims that unmanned systems will soon replace fighter jets overlook the enduring advantages of human decision-making in contested and escalation-sensitive environments. Manned aircraft provide operational flexibility and command judgment that are yet to be replicated through automation alone. The developmental trajectory suggests that instead of perceiving UAVs as one-one-one substitute for piloted aircraft, the future lies in Manned-Unmanned Teaming (MUM-T) where manned aircraft will serve as command nodes while accompanied unmanned systems will provide mass, persistence, and attainability.

In the naval domain, the successfully employment of kamikaze surface and aerial drones by Ukraine in the Black Sea conflict is now frequently cited as an indicator that large surface combatants will soon turn into relics of past. Besides sinking multiple Russian warships in the Black Sea, Ukraine has even damaged a Russian Kilo class submarine stationed at Novorossiysk harbor using an underwater suicide drone. The Russian Black Sea Fleet, despite having overwhelming superiority over Ukrainian counterpart, has failed to establish sea-control in the Black Sea primarily due to remarkable performance of Ukrainian naval drones.

Similarly, in the Red Sea crisis, the Houthis’ rudimentary drones have challenged the operational persistence of Western naval powers. Kamikaze drones have compelled American, British, French, and German warships to deplete expensive air-defense missiles, which in some cases resulted in pre-mature withdrawal. Close-in Weapon Systems (CIWS) is usually considered a potent point of defense against all types of aerial threats in the maritime domain. However, both gun-based and missile-based CIWS have limited magazine capacity and engagement range. This suggests that against a more capable adversary, drone swarms can saturate warships’ defenses and can cause mission-kill by damaging critical instruments onboard, rendering them inoperable for extended time duration.

Although naval drones have added an additional layer of threat for warships, they do not, in themselves, render them obsolete. Novel defensive capabilities for countering drone threats are already in the developmental phase. Few systems have been deployed and evaluated in real combat. For example, on 03 March 2024, an Italian Andrea Doria class destroyer shot down an incoming kamikaze drone threat in Red Sea using DART projectiles fired from 76mm deck gun, a move far more economically feasible than air-to-surface missile. Similarly, high-energy lasers (HELs) onboard warships are being tested for countering drones. Besides kinetic defensive application, soft-kill measures such as jammers and decoy systems are also emerging as critical components of warships defensive suite.

In addition, the Black Sea and the Red Sea are enclosed bodies of water, offering limited operational space for naval forces and providing tactical advantage to drone-based asymmetric tactics. In blue waters, however, the effectiveness of such drones would diminish considerably. In open seas, it is unlikely that even mass formations of drones would be able to penetrate modern naval armadas. Although suicide drones can be used in formation with cruise and ballistic missiles to outclass adversary air-defenses, but repeating such a feat against time-sensitive and well protected high-value naval ships would be a very challenging undertaking. Thus, it can be argued that sea drones can be employed as enablers or force-multipliers in conjunction with other systems, but not as decisive instruments of naval warfare.

The future of warfare will not be defined by the triumph of drones over manned platforms. Today, drones have turned into a potent tool of warfare and are also an integral part of the kill-chain of modern militaries around the globe. However, limitations cannot be ignored. In practice, drones work less as independent war-winning weapons but are enablers and force-multipliers. In the age of viral narratives and simplified conclusions, misperceptions regarding military technologies are bound to persist. No single military system determines the outcome of war, and no single innovation renders all others irrelevant. Military power is cumulative and contextual.

Ahmad Ibrahim is a Research Associate at Maritime Centre of Excellence (MCE), Pakistan Navy War College (PNWC), Lahore. The views of the author are his own.

Assessing the Credibility of Manned Platforms in Contemporary Drone-Rich Combat Environment was originally published on Global Security Review.

The ongoing conflict involving Iran, the United States, and Israel has produced one of the most significant case studies in the evolution of contemporary warfare. Iran, a state that lacks a competitive air force and possesses limited naval power, has demonstrated that ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and unmanned aerial systems can offset some conventional disadvantages and impose serious costs on technologically superior adversaries. This development is not confined to the battlefield. It represents a doctrinal shift with lasting implications for American deterrence strategy, allied defense planning, and the long-term viability of current U.S. force structures. Understanding what Iran has and has not achieved is essential for making sound policy going forward.

The Cost-Exchange Problem 

At the operational level, Iran’s most consequential contribution has been exposing a structural vulnerability in layered air defense: the cost-exchange dilemma. Systems such as Patriot, THAAD, and Iron Dome were engineered to intercept high-value ballistic and cruise missile threats. When deployed against coordinated waves of low-cost drones and short-range missiles, these systems are forced to expend interceptors valued at hundreds of thousands or millions of dollars per shot against threats that cost a fraction of that amount. The arithmetic is unsustainable at scale. As analysts at the Center for Strategic and International Studies have noted, saturation attacks can exhaust defensive inventories faster than replenishment is possible, creating windows of vulnerability that adversaries are quick to exploit. For the United States, this is not merely a technical problem, it is a strategic one that requires urgent attention in both procurement and doctrine.

The development of the Golden Dome missile defense architecture and expanded investment in directed energy and electronic warfare systems reflect growing official awareness that current interception models are not cost-competitive. These are necessary steps. However, technology alone cannot resolve a dilemma that is fundamentally about the economics of offense versus defense. Adversaries will adapt their tactics faster than procurement cycles can respond unless the U.S. also changes the strategic logic driving their calculations.

Attrition Without Decision: The Limits of the Iranian Model

The Iranian approach has imposed genuine costs on its adversaries, but it has not produced decisive military outcomes. This distinction is critical. Iran’s missile and drone campaigns have disrupted logistics, strained defensive inventories, and created operational uncertainty. They have not, however, defeated U.S. or Israeli military power, seized or held territory, or forced a negotiated settlement on Iranian terms. The model is one of strategic attrition, not strategic victory. Survivability and persistence are not equivalent to effectiveness, and the broader narrative of a drone revolution rendering conventional military power obsolete requires significant qualification.

The claim that air superiority is no longer a necessary condition for strategic effectiveness also warrants scrutiny. Air superiority remains essential for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; for close air support of ground operations; and for denying adversaries freedom of movement. What Iran’s campaign demonstrates is that a state without air superiority can still impose costs and delay adversary operations—not that air power has been rendered irrelevant. The bar for what air superiority can guarantee has been raised. Its strategic value, however, has not disappeared. Policymakers and analysts should resist the temptation to draw sweeping conclusions from a conflict that remains ongoing and whose full operational record is still emerging.

Implications for American Deterrence

The proliferation of precision strike capabilities across state and non-state actors undermines the assumption that technological overmatch alone is sufficient to deter conflict. When adversaries can field asymmetric capabilities that challenge U.S. and allied defenses at an acceptable cost to themselves, deterrence by denial becomes increasingly difficult to guarantee. The U.S. must prioritize cost-effective interception technologies, particularly directed energy weapons, that can neutralize mass drone and missile attacks without depleting high-value interceptor stocks. This is a resource allocation problem as much as it is an engineering one, and it demands serious engagement at the budgetary and strategic planning levels.

The Iranian model is also exportable, and this may prove to be its most consequential long-term dimension. States with limited defense budgets that are aligned with China or Russia can observe the operational lessons from this conflict and apply them in their own regional contexts. The proliferation of domestically produced or externally transferred missile and drone capabilities across the Middle East, South Asia, and the Indo-Pacific represents a compounding deterrence challenge. American extended deterrence commitments to allies in these regions will become harder to sustain if the cost-exchange problem is not structurally resolved. As Defense News reported, the proliferation of drone technology is already forcing militaries worldwide to reconsider their approach to air and missile defense.

There is also a crisis stability dimension that deserves serious attention. Rapid, sustained missile and drone strikes compress decision-making timelines and increase pressure for early, and potentially disproportionate, responses. In a multipolar environment where multiple actors possess similar strike capabilities, the risk of miscalculation is elevated. The U.S. should pursue updated arms control frameworks and diplomatic mechanisms to manage the proliferation of these systems alongside its technical and procurement investments. Deterrence cannot be reduced to hardware alone.

Conclusion

Iran’s missile and drone campaign has not rewritten the principles of warfare, but it has exposed critical assumptions underpinning American deterrence in ways that cannot be ignored. Distributed, low-cost, high-impact systems are now accessible to a wider range of actors and the gap between offensive capability and defensive cost is widening. The United States requires a

deterrence posture that integrates cost-effective defense, credible offensive options, active non-proliferation diplomacy, and sustained alliance management. Meeting this challenge demands strategic adaptation across doctrine, procurement, and diplomacy, not simply an incremental increase in interceptor production.

Dr. Tahir Mahmood Azad is currently a research scholar at the Department of Politics & International Relations, the University of Reading, UK. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

Iran’s Missile-Drone Campaign and Its Implications for the United States’ Deterrence was originally published on Global Security Review.

By mid-June 2025, after years of preparation, the Israelis, in one fell swoop, destroyed half of Iran’s ballistic missile capabilities, destroyed some nuclear facilities, and assassinated Iran’s leading nuclear scientists and the leadership of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Then on June 23, 2025, a pre-dawn bombing raid ordered by US President Donald Trump took out of commission the hard-to-crack nuclear facilities of Fordow, Natanz, and Esfahan.

Beyond adding to Israel’s capabilities with American B2 bombers loaded with GBU-57 massive ordnance penetrators, bunkers busters, the bombing cemented American leadership in dealing with the Iran problem. A review of joint Israel-US capabilities helps explain how deterrence in the region is returning and what to expect next.

Since the October 7, 2023, massacre of Israelis by Hamas, an Iranian proxy, Israeli intelligence and military units, all backed by superior defense technology, methodically destroyed Iranian capabilities and supporters. Iran’s “Ring of Fire” utterly failed to achieve Iran’s strategic aims.

Israeli and American space-based intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance enabled early warning, target verification, and battle damage assessment. Israel relied on a precision-strike doctrine that is supported by systems like the Ofek, AMOS, and Eros-B space assets. Israel maintained surveillance for dominance above Iranian military and nuclear infrastructures. Iran merely linked its space program to the IRGC.

With multi-layer sensor fusion, Israel integrates Eitan unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV), ELW-2090 airborne warning and control systems, and ground-based radars like the EL/M-2080 Green Pine with satellite data into a national and regional situational awareness (SA) web, shaping strikes and missile defense prioritization. Space-derived situational awareness enables real-time assessment of missile launches, UAV swarm attacks, or asymmetric maritime threats by Iran and proxies operating from the Red Sea or Persian Gulf.

Cyber intelligence, signal intelligence (SIGINT), and electronic warfare form another layer. In the conflict, Israel command, control, communications, and computer (C4) systems pit Unit 8200 against IRGC affiliated cyber units.

Israel’s missile shield includes Iron Dome, David’s Sling, and Arrow-2/Arrow-3. They combine to create a web of coverage. Arrow’s high-altitude, long-range interceptors tackle Iranian ballistic missiles such as Fattah, Shahab, and Sejil. Iron Beam laser defense, under development, aims to address low-cost, high-volume threats like UAVs and small rockets.

Israeli capabilities for missile defense, early warning, C4, and interoperability are integrated with US Central Command and the systems of the Gulf States. The US supports Arrow and David’s Sling. Aegis ballistic missile defense and terminal high altitude area defense (THAAD) systems in the region share radar feeds. American space-based infra-red system satellites provide missile-launch detection.

Bahrain hosts the US Navy and supports regional C4ISR, and has growing maritime security ties with Israel. The US expanded its Saudi Arabian basing in Tabuk to feed into the regional missile defense picture. The United Arab Emirates enables THAAD, Patriot (PAC-3), radar integration, and air picture sharing with the US and Israel. Jordan, the United Kingdom, and France also contribute to defensive actions during missile and drone attacks.

Iranian targets and their proxies have nowhere to hide. The US Space Force’s Space Operations Command Mission Delta 4 identifies and tracks threats. It did so during the April 2024 and October 2024 Iranian missile and drone attacks on Israel. Operating 24 hours a day, 365 days a year to share intelligence, Mission Delta 4 ensures no missile launch ever catches America or her allies and partners by surprise.

A space-enabled Israel, integrated with Gulf State operations, eliminated Iranian air defenses, triggered covert operations inside Iran, and launched targeted bombings and assassinations. The American bombing topped these other efforts. Israel, as the military strong horse, irreversibly altered the regional balance of power, possibly ushering in the demise of a threatening Iranian Shia hegemony—an objective shared by Sunni Arab Gulf States.

Regime change was never a stated war aim but was an anticipated consequence if it occurred. It did not. The surviving Shia Islamist leadership and IRGC are now engaged in repression and remain capable of inflicting much suffering on both the region and Iranians.

It is unclear to which extent proxies such as Hezbollah, the Houthis, and Shia militias can still attack Israel and American assets in the region. Military outcomes, though, are not the sole factors defining the Iranian endgame. The Iranian taqiyya-driven regime and its Shia hegemony ideology are down, but not out. Their nefarious ideological influence can persist around the Gulf, as far as Yemen and Africa, and beyond.

Considering the cost of inaction and a failure to reinstate deterrence, eradicating a threat to the homeland, Middle East bases, and Gulf allies means the effort was worth it. If the conflict drags on, the costs will rise. Disruption of maritime traffic and oil markets could bring its predictable cohort of economic disruptions. Terrorism around the globe is déjà vu.

In the words of German Chancellor Friedrich Merz, “Israel is doing the dirty work for all of us.” Depending on the roles the new Syrian leadership and a resurgent Türkiye play, the Iranian endgame may take different forms.

Yes, President Trump decisively played the hand he was dealt. But there are many more moves left in this game. The best moves may be still to come.

Christophe Bosquillon is a senior fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. He has over 30 years of international experience in general management, foreign direct investment, and private equity and fund management across various industries in Europe and the Pacific Basin. The views expressed are the author’s own.

Deterring Iran: The Art of No Deal was originally published on Global Security Review.

Peace in international affairs is not a natural state; it is actively maintained through strength. As Winston Churchill famously noted, true peace is achieved not by retreating from power, but by wielding it wisely.

Today, with China rapidly modernizing its conventional and nuclear forces and Russia pursuing territorial ambitions backed by nuclear threats, a kinder and gentler approach risks inviting greater aggression. Only a credible deterrence posture—grounded in empirical evidence and historical lessons—can secure strategic stability.

Reinforcing American nuclear dominance is not about favoring conflict over diplomacy; it is about ensuring that American deterrence is strong enough to compel respect and maintain global order in an increasingly volatile world.

First Things First

American nuclear weapons serve as a cornerstone of deterrence, preventing strategic attack and reassuring allies. This element of deterrence is under pressure as China and Russia rapidly expand their arsenals, and North Korea advances its capabilities, creating a complex, multipolar threat environment.

The primary point in the original article was the need to reestablish American nuclear dominance—not as a provocation but as a stabilizing force. In an era of rising threats and eroding deterrence, a more robust and flexible nuclear posture is essential to prevent conflict, assure allies, and preserve global security.

Misreading the Nature of Nuclear Dominance

A primary claim presented by Canyon is that advocating for nuclear dominance is tantamount to seeking advantage through expansion, thereby increasing the risk of catastrophe. This is a misrepresentation of evidence. The call for dominance is not about reckless arms racing or seeking victory in nuclear war. Rather, it is about ensuring that the United States’ nuclear posture is credible, flexible, and resilient enough to deter adversaries in a world where the old rules no longer apply.

The Cold War’s doctrine of mutually assured destruction (MAD) worked because both sides fielded survivable second-strike capabilities and clearly communicated those capabilities to the other. Today, China and Russia are modernizing and diversifying their arsenals at a pace not seen since the 1980s. China’s warhead stockpile surpassed 600 in 2025 and is projected to double by 2030. Russia, meanwhile, maintains the world’s largest inventory of non-strategic nuclear weapons—estimated at 2,000 warheads—many of which are integrated into conventional military operations, as seen in Ukraine.

Dominance in this context means closing critical gaps—like the absence of credible theater-range nuclear options—and ensuring that American extended deterrence is not just theoretical, but practical and adaptable to new threats.

Historical Lessons: Arms Races and Escalation

Invocation of the Cold War arms race is erroneously used as a cautionary tale, suggesting that any move toward dominance will inevitably provoke adversaries and increase the risk of miscalculation. History is more nuanced.

The most dangerous moments of the Cold War—Berlin (1961) and Cuba (1962)—were not the result of American dominance but of perceived weakness, ambiguity, and miscommunication. The 1980s nuclear buildup, while expensive, ultimately contributed to the Soviet Union’s willingness to negotiate arms reductions (Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) and Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START)) from a position of mutual strength. As former Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger noted, “Deterrence is not about parity; it’s about credibility and resolve.”

Moreover, the post–Cold War era of American nuclear restraint did not prevent Russia’s annexation of Crimea, China’s militarization of the South China Sea, or North Korea’s nuclear breakout. A senior research professor at Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee, asserting that “adversaries exploit perceived gaps in US resolve and capability, not its strength.”

The Risks of a Passive Posture

Canyon argues that modernizing or expanding American nuclear capabilities—such as the SLCM-N or space-based interceptors—will only accelerate a global arms race. Yet, the data show that adversaries are already racing ahead, regardless of American action.

Nearly 95 percent of Russia’s nuclear triad is modernized, with new hypersonic and dual-capable systems. China is rapidly fielding road-mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM), ballistic missile submarines, and hypersonic glide vehicles. North Korea bolsters over 50 nuclear weapons with growing missile survivability and regional reach.

Iran was advancing toward a nuclear threshold, with uranium-enrichment activities previously nearing weapons-grade levels. In response, the United States launched a preemptive strike targeting Iran’s key nuclear facilities at Fordow, Natanz, and Isfahan. American officials framed the operation as a limited, precision action designed to neutralize an imminent threat and prevent a larger, more destructive regional war.

By acting before Iran could cross the nuclear threshold, the US aimed to avoid a future scenario in which multiple states—particularly Israel—might engage in broader, uncoordinated military campaigns. The strike also sent a calibrated message intended to deter further escalation while leaving diplomatic channels open.

Iran’s ballistic missile arsenal remains one of the largest in the region, and its proxy network, coordinated through the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ Quds Force, continues to operate across Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, and Yemen.

The US, by contrast, faces delays and budget overruns in its own modernization efforts and lacks credible theater-range nuclear options in both Europe and Asia. This is not dominance; it is vulnerability.

Diplomacy and Arms Control: Not Mutually Exclusive

Canyon calls for a return to arms control and diplomacy, citing the expiration of New START in 2026. Diplomacy is essential, but history shows that arms control only works when backed by credible deterrence.

The most successful arms control agreements (Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (SALT), INF, START) were negotiated when the US held a position of strength. The collapse of the INF Treaty and the uncertain future of New START are not the result of American intransigence but of Russian violations and China’s refusal to join trilateral talks. As the Congressional Research Service notes, “Arms control is not a substitute for deterrence; it is a complement to it.”

Alliance Cohesion and Forward Deployment

The suggestion that forward-deploying nuclear assets makes allies “targets, not safer” is textbook pacifist propaganda. This ignores decades of alliance management and empirical research. Extended deterrence—backed by visible, credible, American capabilities—has prevented proliferation in Japan, South Korea, and NATO for generations.

A 2023 RAND study found that allies are more likely to pursue their own nuclear options if they doubt American commitments. Forward deployment, joint planning, and regular consultations are essential to alliance cohesion and nonproliferation. The United States’ nuclear umbrella extends to over 30 allied and partner nations, primarily within NATO, but also including countries like Australia, Japan, and South Korea. These nations are assured of American protection, including potential nuclear response, in case of attack.

Economic Trade-offs: Security and Prosperity

Context is key. Canyon points to the $1 trillion cost of nuclear modernization over 30 years, suggesting these funds would be better spent elsewhere. This figure represents less than 5 percent of projected defense spending over that period, and less than 0.1 percent of gross domestic product annually. The cost of deterrence is dwarfed by the potential costs of conventional war should deterrence fail. Small conflicts like Afghanistan and Iraq cost over $7 trillion. The cost of a war against China would be far higher.

National strength is not a zero-sum game between security and social spending. The credibility of US leadership—and the stability it underwrites—enables the very prosperity and global order that supports education, healthcare, and infrastructure.

Public Opinion and Global Norms: A Reality Check

Canyon’s claim that “most Americans and the global community favor arms reduction” lacks empirical rigor. Sweeping generalizations like this demand robust, replicated data across diverse populations. Without that, such assertions are more rhetorical than factual.

In contrast, multiple credible surveys reveal consistent public support for deterrence and defense. For example, a November 2022 poll found that 60 percent of Americans believe the military’s primary role is to deter attacks on the US. A national survey showed that a vast majority of voters view nuclear deterrence as critical to national security, with nearly three-quarters supporting modernization efforts.

The 2023 NATO Annual Tracking Survey found that 61 percent of allied respondents believe NATO membership reduces the likelihood of foreign attack, and 58 percent see it as a deterrent. In Germany, 64 percent support a European nuclear deterrent independent of the US, reflecting growing concern over strategic autonomy.

Another poll reported that 69 percent of Americans feel defense spending increases their sense of security. These data points underscore a clear trend; public opinion, in the US and Europe, favors credible deterrence over disarmament, especially amid rising threats from China, North Korea, and Russia. This is the factual foundation that reinforces the case for maintaining and strengthening American nuclear capabilities, not as a provocation, but as a stabilizing force in an increasingly volatile world.

The Real Existential Threats

Extreme weather events, natural disasters, pandemics, and mass displacement are among today’s gravest challenges. Yet, using these non-nuclear crises to justify a softened stance on nuclear deterrence is like comparing apples and oranges. Even the most intelligent and well-informed individuals sometimes fall into the trap of an “either-or” debate, mistakenly assuming it is only possible to address one threat or the other.

Multiple risks demand simultaneous attention. Credible nuclear deterrence is not an overreaction; it is a precise, vital response to a threat that, if unleashed, would compound other crises and shatter global stability.

Conclusion: Dominance as Responsible Leadership

Canyon’s critique is a masterclass in wishful thinking, a dangerously naive philosophy that would lead the free world to ruin if ever implemented. It stems from a misplaced comfort with notions of restraint and diplomacy, ignoring the hard reality that security is founded on military strength. History, from the catastrophic failures of appeasement in the 1930s to the isolationism preceding Pearl Harbor, teaches that weakness only emboldens tyrants. Each concession, whether to Hitler’s remilitarization of the Rhineland or to modern-day aggressors, proves that diplomacy without credible force is nothing more than indulgence.

The current global landscape is dominated by adversaries who respect only strength. Russia, under its neo-imperialist regime, wields its vast nuclear arsenal to bolster conventional aggression. China’s unprecedented military modernization is reshaping the balance of power in Asia, and Iran continues its relentless march toward nuclear capability while sponsoring proxy terror. To imagine that these regimes would respond to soft words or empty promises is akin to believing that a repeatedly misbehaving child will learn simply by being put in timeout. Real change is forced change.

American strength, particularly through a robust nuclear deterrent, is not a provocation; it is the only language these adversaries understand. It ensures that any aggressive action exacts a price too steep to consider. In an increasingly perilous world, where the stakes are nothing less than the survival of global stability, a commitment to maintaining unparalleled military dominance is both pragmatic and essential. Ignoring this reality is not idealism, it is willful blindness that invites disaster.

Brandon Toliver is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies.

Exposing Willful Blindness: American Strength Is Nonnegotiable was originally published on Global Security Review.

First, SDI was not an actual defense initiative as much as it was a response to the Soviet Union’s rapidly growing strategic nuclear offensive forces and their own anti-satellite space forces. As William Van Cleave wrote in his 1986 report,

The Soviet Union has long been developing a multifaceted ballistic missile defense and, in fact, has already begun deploying such a defense. The Soviets have also began exploiting space for military purposes nearly two decades ago. They have already deployed anti-satellite (ASAT) space weapons. The overriding threat to American security today—that is, a rapid growth in offensive nuclear and conventional weapons systems—has come about precisely because the Soviet Union has been racing to build a weapons system, while the United States has not.

The same can be said of China today and is true of Golden Dome.

While there are plenty of Chinese, Russian, and Western arms control advocates criticizing Golden Dome as weaponization of space and an imbalance of forces, they all fail to note that Golden Dome is a response to the current imbalance of nuclear and space forces that advantages China and Russia. The utility of nuclear weapons, coupled with the advancement of hypersonic and space-to-ground attack options in the hands of the nation’s enemies grew in recent years.

The Chinese are in the midst of a breakout in the size and capability of their nuclear forces. Both China and Russia are engaging in a similar effort with their space attack forces. Both deployed ASAT and other space weapons systems that not only threaten American critical space infrastructure, but the homeland itself. As such, Golden Dome is a response to the already de-stabilizing activities of the Chinese and Russians. They, not the United States, are actively building weapons systems, especially in space.

Second, the narrative that SDI was a weapons development program is false. President Reagan’s speech directing SDI called it a research or “study” program. The 1985 Report to Congress on the Strategic Defense Initiative said that “it should be stressed that SDI is a research program that seeks to provide the technical knowledge required to support a decision on whether to develop and later deploy advanced defensive systems. It is not a program to deploy those weapons.”

President Trump understands this by his comments that while Reagan pursued SDI, “[he] didn’t have the technology.” However, Golden Dome is, in fact, a weapons deployment program. As his directive in the executive order states, “The United States will provide for the common defense of its citizens and the nation by deploying and maintaining a next-generation missile defense shield…[including] the development and deployment of proliferated space-based interceptors capable of boost-phase intercept,” among other sensors, trackers, and other weapons capable of defeating various threats from hypersonic, ballistic, and cruise missiles. While SDI was a study for a future decision to deploy space-based missile defenses, Golden Dome is the decision to deploy before Trump leaves office.

Finally, another false narrative in the anti–Golden Dome commentaries is that the system will be full of “untested technology.” This is not the case. If anyone looks at the systems listed in the executive order from January 2025, one will see that several of the sensors and layers are already in the current programs of record, many of which have already started deployment in orbit.

While some of the systems, such as the space-based interceptor, are not deployed yet, the technology for intercepting such missiles is in various forms of testing and/or use—for decades. Just because SDI had grand visions of lasers bouncing off mirrors or large chemical lasers in space, does not mean that Golden Dome’s space-based interceptors must be based on those concepts. Current anti-ballistic missile tech gained considerable ground over the past four decades and is ready for deployment sooner than later.

Vulnerability is not an option. Protecting Americans and the homeland from space and missile attack is a strategic imperative that must not fail. Congress must ignore the false narratives of the late 20th century. The threat is real, the technology is real. It is time to field Golden Dome for America.

Christopher Stone is Senior Fellow for Space Deterrence at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies in Washington, DC. He is the former Special Assistant to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space Policy. The views and positions are those of the author and do not reflect the positions and opinions of the Department of Defense or the author’s employer.

A Second Look at the Critiques and Narratives Against Golden Dome for America was originally published on Global Security Review.

Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khamenei, recently criticized the US proposal for a nuclear deal, while also expressing his doubts about the success of talks. US Special Envoy for the Middle East Steve Witkoff argued that Iran should not be allowed to possess enrichment capabilities and declared such capabilities a red line. Iran, however, rejected the US demand and stuck to the traditional Iranian narrative that Tehran will continue the enrichment process with or without a deal. The divergent positions of the two sides indicated that the talks were likely to reach a dead end, but this time Iran’s nuclear program appeared to have reached a pivotal moment.

As Iran has gained the tools and necessary understanding of enrichment technology, it was unrealistic to think that Iran would completely terminate its enrichment capabilities without the pressure of a war or regime change. Structural realist Kenneth Waltz claimed that if Iran became a nuclear power, nuclear balance and stability vis-à-vis Israel would result. However, it is worth critically reviewing this argument in the context of the South Caucasus region, particularly Azerbaijan, as this challenges Waltz’s notions.

Offensive Realism

In his 2012 article, “Why Iran Should Get The Bomb,” Waltz argued that trying to dissuade a country from seeking a nuclear weapon via sanctions and isolation does not yield a positive result, as the case of North Korea illustrates. Waltz formulated three scenarios regarding Iran’s nuclear program. In the first scenario, Tehran was compelled to end its nuclear program in the face of heightened international sanctions and diplomacy. In the second scenario, Iran developed a breakthrough capability but stopped short of testing a nuclear weapon. In the third scenario, Iran conducted a nuclear test.

It is worth mentioning that in the two decades since Waltz wrote the article, international sanctions and increased diplomatic pressure failed to achieve a meaningful result. Even with the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), Iran’s enrichment continued in exchange for sanctions relief. The second possible prediction that Iran will acquire the capability but not test a nuclear weapon can be applied to the present. US Secretary of State Marco Rubio described Iran as on the “threshold of a nuclear weapon.”

Waltz’s central argument is based on the assumption that Israel’s nuclear edge in the Middle East creates an imbalance and that Iran’s intention is to provide a nuclear balance, thereby creating deterrence between Israel and Iran. However, considering Iran’s regional policies over the past decades and its foreign policy instruments, such as using surrogates and proxy forces to destabilize its neighbors and the entire region, one can argue that the notion of Iran’s possession of nuclear capabilities would create “stability” through a nuclear balance does not stand scrutiny.

The ideological nature of the Iranian regime alongside its expansionist foreign policy challenges Waltz’s view. Iran’s increasing ballistic missile capabilities and drone production is an indication that the Iranian nuclear program will facilitate Iran’s offensive nuclear capabilities.

Waltz also overlooked the domestic dimension and variables, meaning the imperialist tendencies within Iran, as well as variables in perception, such as the worldview of the Supreme Leader and Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) leaders. Moreover, Waltz’s argument that Iran is striving to ensure its own security by possessing nuclear weapons is questionable in the context of the Russia-Ukraine war, which repeatedly shows that having a nuclear deterrent does not shield a country from attack and loss of territory via conventional means.

While structural realists view the international system as anarchic and see states as striving, at a minimum, to ensure their survival, the offensive realist perspective explains state behavior more accurately. In fact, the anarchic nature of the international system directs states to maximize security, and to do so they maximize relative power. Regardless of specific threats states try to expand power. As security is not guaranteed under the anarchic international system, states maximize power to ensure their security.

As John Mearsheimer argues, states maximise their relative power because having military advantage ensures their security. The notion that Iran possessing nuclear weapons is about ensuring Iranian security and creating a nuclear balance fails to address the offensive nature of Iranian foreign and security policies in the region as well as its expansionist approaches.

An offensive realist perspective explains Iran’s nuclear program strategy accordingly, as Iran’s track record and foreign policy instruments show it takes a hegemonic approach in the region to maximize its influence over neighboring countries and increase its relative power. Waltz viewed Iran’s nuclear strategy vis-à-vis Israel, but a nuclear-armed Iran would have a very different geopolitical role in a region like the South Caucasus, sandwiched between two rogue, imperialist regimes—Iran and Russia.

Considering that Iran and Russia are strategic allies that share common geopolitical views of the West and desire to curtail the Westward-looking foreign policies of the South Caucasus, particularly Azerbaijan, a nuclear-armed Iran will not create a balance but push regional actors towards Russia against their will—particularly considering that membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is unlikely.

According to Robert Gilpin, “As the power of a state increases, it seeks to extend its territorial control, its political influence, and/or its domination of the international economy.” Thus, a nuclear-armed Iran would engage in solidifying and maximizing its geopolitical goals and interests in its neighboring countries, creating more instability.

Iran’s Nuclear Programs and the Region

The lessons of Russia’s imperialist war of aggression against Ukraine and Russian official narratives such as the rejection of Ukrainian identity and statehood are proof that Iran’s nuclear program, and potential weaponization of it, pose an existential security risk to Azerbaijan as an independent country and the South Caucasus region, in general. Iranian imperial ambitions, coupled with a grudge against Azerbaijani independence, puts the country’s security at risk.

Azerbaijan’s close ally Turkey, which does not possess nuclear weapons, cannot serve as a counterweight for a nuclear Iran. Iran prefers a weak Azerbaijan on its northern border.

Iran also prefers to use Azerbaijan’s neighbor, Armenia, against Baku. A nuclear Iran might further embolden Armenian revanchist circles to seek a change in the status quo, which could start another war.

A nuclear-armed Iran may also increase its efforts to destabilise Azerbaijan via proxy groups, such as the Huseyniyyun Brigade, as Tehran attempts to curtail Azerbaijan’s independent foreign policy. However, a nuclear deal may still allow Iran to use the lifting of sanctions to increase its political and economic influence in Azerbaijan and the South Caucasus via soft power and proxies.

Thus, a nuclear agreement with the United States and fielding nuclear weapons both pose potential risks. The Iran-Russia 20-year strategic pact, which was signed recently, also points to the fact that both Moscow and Tehran will further cooperate and stand against a Western role in the region. Increasing Iranian-Russian military cooperation is also a point of concern. Both countries are heavily sanctioned internationally, but they do not pose an obstacle to the growing trade and military ties between the two states.

Azerbaijan’s position as a link between the West and Central Asia, bypassing both Russia and Iran, is an irritant in Moscow and Tehran. Iran’s staunch opposition to Armenia-Azerbaijan normalization is evident in its stance against the Zangezur corridor as Tehran does not want to lose leverage in the South Caucasus as Armenia’s close ally. The facilitation of the transfer of Indian weapons to Armenia and the transfer of Russian weapons to Armenia via Iranian soil illustrates the fact that the Iranian regime continues to be a source of destabilization in the region. In short, a nuclear Iran allied with Russia cannot establish a nuclear balance in the South Caucasus region; rather it will increase security risks and pose an existential threat to the independence of Azerbaijan and Georgia.

Contrary to Kenneth Waltz’s argument that a nuclear balance would lead to stability, this analysis suggests it will instead lead to instability—particularly in the South Caucasus. As Russia’s war on Ukraine shows, direct imperialist activities by a nuclear Iran cannot be precluded from the future of a nuclear-armed Iran. In short, a nuclear-armed Iran is bad for the Middle East, the South Caucasus, and the World. It will not bring Kenneth Waltz’s stability.

Rufat Ahmadzada is a graduate of City University London. His research area covers the South Caucasus and Iran. The views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

A Nuclear Iran Would Pose an Existential Threat to the South Caucasus was originally published on Global Security Review.

However, Iran’s broader regional influence and its destabilizing activities remain a fundamental concern—one that is unlikely to be addressed through an agreement focused solely on its nuclear capabilities. Preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons, dismantling its nuclear infrastructure, or even restricting its ballistic missile program does not, on its own, resolve the underlying challenge posed by Tehran’s regional behavior.

What Is Iran’s Influence Based On?

Iranian influence in the region is grounded in three main pillars. First, Iran relies on Shiite religious ideology. Iran positions itself as the leader of the global Shiite community. This sect has a social and political base in several Middle Eastern and surrounding countries. Through Shiite populations and affiliated groups, Iran infiltrates states and establishes loyal militias, enabling it to exert significant influence over these countries—or parts of them—effectively weakening their sovereignty and transforming them into subservient states.

For example, Iran wields significant influence in Iraq through the Shiite Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), in Lebanon through Hezbollah, in Yemen via the Houthis, and in Syria, where influence was exerted through Bashar al-Assad’s Alawite-led regime. Additionally, Iran has formed Shiite militias from the Shiite populations of Afghanistan, the Fatemiyoun Brigade, and Pakistan, the Zainabiyoun Brigade. Through these efforts, Iran has constructed the “Shiite Crescent.”

Second, Iran exploits broader Islamic issues. Iran strategically champions causes with Pan-Islamic appeal, most notably the Palestinian issue, to extend its influence beyond Shiite groups and into Sunni communities. Despite historical sectarian divides and conflict between Sunnis and Shiites, Iran has successfully co-opted or allied with key Sunni movements such as Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad, expanding its influence into Gaza and presenting itself as the principal defender of the Palestinian cause. This position garners support not only from across the Muslim world but also from segments of the Western left. By uniting Shiite militias (the “Shiite Crescent”) and Sunni militant groups under a common anti-Western and anti-Israel banner, Iran has forged what it calls the “Axis of Resistance.” This alliance played a central role in the outbreak of the October 7, 2023, war, which continues to this day.

Third, the regime exercises a repressive domestic grip. Maintaining and managing this vast regional network requires immense and sustained financial and military support. Despite facing long-standing and severe international sanctions and domestic economic hardship, Iran continues to fund and arm its proxies. A key factor enabling this is the authoritarian nature of the regime, which extracts national wealth and redirects it to foreign operations, while the Iranian population endures poverty, inflation, and public service failures. Popular discontent is suppressed through systematic repression, especially targeting marginalized ethnic groups such as the Kurds, Baluchis, and Arabs, who face both economic deprivation and political persecution. This repressive apparatus prevents domestic uprisings and sustains the regime’s ability to project power abroad.

Therefore, Iranian influence in the region is not primarily based on its nuclear program or ballistic missiles. Iran was able to extend its influence over Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Yemen, and Gaza without resorting to ballistic missile attacks or explicit threats involving its nuclear program. However, when Iran did employ its ballistic missiles and military power, most notably during its direct attacks on Israel on April 13, 2024, and October 1, 2024, this coincided with a period of declining regional influence. During this time, Iran experienced significant setbacks, losing ground in Syria and Gaza and suffering major blows in Lebanon and even within its own borders.

In other words, the golden age of Iranian influence occurred during a time when it refrained from directly using its ballistic missiles or overt military force. Its later use of such power came at a moment when its regional axis was already weakening. This suggests that Iran’s true influence lies not in its nuclear program or missile capabilities, but in other, less tangible sources of power—ones that are far more difficult to constrain through formal agreements. Therefore, to effectively counter Iran’s regional influence and threat, the United States must begin by addressing the three key factors discussed above.

The Shia Principle of Taqiyya

Iran is constitutionally defined as a Shia state, and its ruling regime openly adopts and promotes Shia ideological principles. One of the most well-known concepts in Shia Islam is Taqiyya, a principle that permits the concealment of one’s beliefs or intentions when facing danger, threat, or coercion. Traditionally, Taqiyya is understood as a form of self-protection in times of persecution, allowing individuals to lie or withhold the truth to preserve life and religious identity.

In the context of the Iranian regime, Taqiyya has evolved beyond personal religious practice into a broader political doctrine. It is sometimes employed as a strategic tool to justify diplomatic flexibility, ambiguity, or deception, particularly in times of weakness. As a result, securing Iran’s full compliance with international agreements may be especially challenging. The regime may commit to agreements under duress or strategic necessity, only to abandon or reinterpret those commitments once it perceives a restoration of strength. Thus, Taqiyya is not merely a religious principle but has become a core aspect of the regime’s political behavior and strategic calculus.

What Is the Solution?

One of the key factors behind Iran’s continued expansion of influence and regional destabilization is its perception that the United States is unwilling to launch a military strike against its territory. This perception significantly reduces the credibility of diplomatic pressure and sanctions. To alter this strategic calculus, a limited and targeted military strike on Iran’s nuclear and military facilities, followed by the negotiation of a specific and enforceable agreement, may be necessary.

Such a calibrated use of force would serve not only to degrade Iran’s capabilities but also to demonstrate clear consequences for noncompliance. In this context, Iran may become more amenable to concessions and more committed to upholding agreements, as it would recognize that failure to comply carries the real risk of further military escalation—potentially threatening the survival of the regime itself.

Ranj Tofik is a Non-Resident Scholar at the Middle East Policy Council, and a PhD researcher in political science at the University of Warsaw, Poland.

US–Iran Talks: Unlikely to Succeed Absent a Military Strike was originally published on Global Security Review.

As discussions of retaliation by Israel continue, the media discuss Iranian oil refineries as possible targets that might be hit. Israeli Defence minister, Yoav Gallant, stated that retaliation against Iran’s missile attacks will be “lethal and surprising.” Meanwhile, Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-linked social media accounts are already spreading reports that Tehran warned the United States that actions against Iranian oil refineries will lead the Islamic Republic to target oil facilities in Saudi Arabia, Azerbaijan, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and Kuwait. According to a Reuters report, Iran also warned the Gulf Arab states that any use of their airspace or military bases to target Iran will be unacceptable and threatened a military response.

Iran’s Strategy

Iran’s reference to Azerbaijan as a potential target, should Israel attack Iranian oil refineries, is an indication of the Islamic Republic’s growing threat to critical energy infrastructure not only in the Middle East, but also in the South Caucasus and the Caspian Sea basin region. Azerbaijan supplies 40 percent of Israel’s energy needs and Azerbaijan’s oil and gas infrastructure is the backbone of its independence in the geopolitically tense region.

Not only does Azerbaijan meet nearly 40 percent of Israel’s demand for crude oil, Azerbaijan’s state energy giant SOCAR, alongside British Petroleum and Israel’s NewMed, was awarded a licence to explore an area to the north of Israel’s Leviathan gas field in the Eastern Mediterranean. The strong bilateral and multifaceted relations between Israel and Azerbaijan are a primary concern for Iran.

In anticipation of Israeli retaliation against the Iranian ballistic missile attacks, the Iranian media continues to make unsubstantiated claims about supposed secret Israeli military bases in Azerbaijan with a ridiculous accusation that Azerbaijan is one of the origins of sabotage against the Islamic Republic. Talking about possible Israeli retaliation against Iranian oil facilities, Iranian diplomat Abbas Mousavi falsely claimed in an interview to Tejarat News that Israel deployed many planes to Azerbaijan.

In fact, since Hamas launched the brutal terrorist attacks against Israel in October 2023, Iran’s main goal is the consolidation of the members of the Organisation of Islamic States to achieve an economic blockade and diplomatic isolation from Israel. Iranian Supreme leader Ayatollah Khamenei repeatedly called on Arab and Muslim countries to impose an oil embargo on Israel. Iranian officials frequently repeat similar calls showing Tehran’s agenda behind the Hamas attacks, which aimed to disrupt economic, political, and diplomatic relations between the State of Israel and Muslim-majority nations.

Iran’s multidimensional strategy behind the Hamas attacks was based on several ambitious goals, including preventing possible normalisation between Israel and Saudi Arabia and other Arab states; derailing the Abraham Accords; preventing efforts to improve strained Turkish-Israeli ties; and trying to inflict economic and diplomatic damage on Israel-Azerbaijan strategic ties. Iran’s strategy seeks to achieve multiple goals simultaneously in both the Middle East and South Caucasus.

Iranian media outlets launched coordinated propaganda attacks against Turkey and Azerbaijan for supplying crude oil to Israel via the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline since the Hamas terrorist attacks and start of the subsequent war in Gaza. Iran-inspired, pro-Hamas Islamist, and leftist circles in Turkey staged several demonstrations where they vandalised Azerbaijani oil company, SOCAR, offices in Istanbul in an attempt to halt oil exports.

Considering the influence of the Muslim Brotherhood in Turkey, the country is a comfortable space for Iranian propaganda and hybrid activities covered by so-called Islamic narratives. Ironically, the fact that Iran is a major energy supplier to Armenia and supplied the formerly Armenian-occupied Karabakh region received no similar response from Islamists or leftists in Turkey.

Coercive Actions

Iran’s military threats against Azerbaijan increased from the end of the Second Karabakh War, when the balance of power in the South Caucasus shifted in Baku’s favor. Iran conducted several military drills near Azerbaijan’s border, putting on a show of force against the geopolitical changes in the region. In late September and early October 2021 Iran suddenly conducted military drills near Azerbaijan’s borders.

An Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesman described the exercises as a “sovereign right,” saying, “Iran will not tolerate the presence of the Zionist regime” near its borders. Iran undertook another military provocation a year later when Tehran laid pontoon bridges across the Araz River near the Azerbaijani border and crossed the river as part of war games. In March 2023, an Iranian air force fighter jet violated Azerbaijan’s airspace. The Azerbaijani Foreign Ministry summoned Iran’s ambassador, and the Azerbaijani Defence and Foreign Ministries issued a joint statement condemning the incursion.

When Israel liquidated Mohammad Reza Zahedi, a senior commander in the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps-Quds Force, in Damascus in April 2024, Iranian member of parliament, Jalal Rashidi Kochi, called for strikes on an Israeli embassy in the region, preferably in Azerbaijan. Iranian attempts to target the Israeli embassy and ambassadors in Baku were also foiled on many occasions over the years; the most recent reported attempt involved the arrest of an Afghan national in July 2023. Recently Iran has enhanced its naval capabilities in the Caspian Sea and increased naval drills, including joint drills with Russia.

Iran’s Missile and Cyber Capabilities

Iran possesses numerous capabilities to threaten critical infrastructure including energy and power in the region. Among them Tehran’s ballistic missiles and cyber tools are key. Iran maintains the largest ballistic and cruise missile force in the Middle East, capable of reaching 2,500 kilometres from its borders. Moreover, these capabilities combined with Iran’s drone arsenal can overwhelm missile defence systems. Iran’s missile attacks against Saudi oil facilities in 2019 were conducted by a combination of drones and cruise missiles.

Iran has improved its offensive cyber capabilities, too, and is capable of causing localised and temporary disruption to corporate networks for days or weeks. Drilling oil wells, pumping crude oil, and loading fuel are processes where cyberattacks can cause significant disruptions. According to an FBI report released in August 2024, Iran exploited computer network vulnerabilities to infiltrate and steal sensitive technical data from organisations in Israel and Azerbaijan. In July, cybersecurity firm Check Point reported that an Iranian hacker group named Muddy Water, affiliated with Iran’s Ministry of Intelligence and Security, increased its cyber activities against targets in Azerbaijan, Israel, Portugal, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey.

Securing Critical Infrastructure

Overall, considering Azerbaijan’s key role in the energy security of vital American allies, such as Europe, Israel, and Turkey, and its significant help in supplying energy to US-friendly states Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine, the next administration needs to reverse shortsighted Biden State Department policy. The decision not to waive Section 907 of the Freedom Support Act, banning US aid to the Azerbaijani government, damages American interests in the South Caucasus. It is in the interest of the US and Azerbaijan to expand their military and technical partnership to secure critical infrastructure in the region.

Rufat Ahmadzada is a graduate of City University London. His research area covers the South Caucasus and Iran. The views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

Iran’s Threat to Azerbaijan’s Critical Energy Infrastructure was originally published on Global Security Review.

Now, Moscow is coming to understand what life is like outside the tent. Its new military connections with Iran and North Korea, and its political-economic alliance with China, are reason for concern in the West and more than enough reason to see if there is a way to bring Russia back inside the tent.

Background

Russia as a member of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) has, unlike China, worked to prevent proliferation of nuclear weapons and technology. Where China transferred nuclear technology to Pakistan, the Russians were careful in their transfers of items that could be used to proliferate. Thus, when it sold nuclear reactors to India the agreement was that the spent fuel would be reprocessed in Russia (then the Soviet Union), removing any concerns about the spent fuel being diverted for building nuclear weapons.

The Indians have also received two Russian submarines on lease, but both vessels were returned to Russia before the leases ended. When the Russians signed an agreement to build the supersonic Brahmos missile, they insisted that the missile’s range be within the limits imposed by the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR).

Similarly, despite the long-standing ties between Moscow and Pyongyang, there were no serious transfers of nuclear capabilities to the Hermit Kingdom—although there are questions about how the technology in the SS-18 missile made it to Pyongyang. The missile was manufactured in a cash-strapped factory in Ukraine and William Broad and David Sanger argue that this possibly led to a sale by rogue actors within Ukraine; the government of Peter Poroshenko denied any knowledge of the transfer. In contrast, the Chinese provided nuclear weapons technology to Pakistan, particularly the bomb design from their second nuclear test.

While Russia stuck with the international community’s goals to prevent nuclear proliferation, the war in Ukraine and the ensuing Western sanctions changed Russia’s strategic calculus and potentially its hesitation to supply technologies to other states.

Faced with sanctions, the Russians cut deals with both Iran and North Korea for the supply of weaponry—ranging from artillery shells and drones to ballistic missiles. It is not clear what will be given in return.  Most observers believe that North Korea may receive “direct military assistance from Russia to include fighter aircraft, surface-to-air missiles, armored vehicles and ballistic missile production equipment or materials, as well as other advanced technology.”

It is the advanced technology part of the agreement that is worrying since the North Koreans may well seek technologies that increase the lethality of their strategic weaponry. This could include nuclear submarines and the technological capability to launch submarine-launched cruise missiles. It could also lead the Russians to transfer technology needed to increase the accuracy of North Korean intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) and warheads. Such transfers can take place by giving the actual technology or providing the scientific manpower to make Pyongyang’s weapons more lethal.

In the case of Iran, Tehran filled an immediate need of Moscow by providing drones in large numbers to help the Russians better deal with the changed nature of warfare in the Ukraine conflict. Like Western nations, Russia allowed its munitions stockpiles to run low. Russia is now building up to 6,000 drones annually in a new factory near the Urals. Tehran also supplied close-range ballistic missiles to further beef up Moscow’s arsenal and, in return, Moscow is reportedly upping its supply of weapons to Iran.

Russia is considering the sale of the Su-35 fighter and the S-400 anti-missile system, but the biggest contribution by Moscow could be to help improve domestically manufactured Iranian weaponry. Again, giving advanced technology to the Iranians would increase the lethality of its missile force.

The Strategic Realm

It is in the nuclear realm that the removal of restraints by Moscow would be the most damaging. Russia has abided by the provisions of the NPT and the MTCR, but if the war continues, with increasing Western provision of weaponry to Ukraine and growing sanctions on Moscow, the Russians may decide to abandon the international treaties they helped create and enforce and, instead, start to become major proliferators.

This would create a global flow of weaponry and technology that will not only build up the capabilities of hostile nations but also severely complicate regional security settings and make American intervention more costly. The worst-case scenario would be the Russians basing nuclear weapons in one of these countries—creating a new level of global insecurity. This is not as far fetched as it seems since this was done by the former Soviet Union in Cuba. That move was seen as an existential threat by the US. It is not clear what the reaction would be to a Russian nuclear fait accompli in Iran or North Korea.

Options

Following the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the West was confident that its technological superiority, economic strength, and unified resolve would lead the Russians to back down. Instead, the Russian economy is growing, the West spent close to $300 billion in arming Ukraine, and Kyiv now faces an economic and demographic disaster. It is wishful thinking to suggest that this war may end with a favorable outcome for Ukraine. Bringing the Russians back into the tent may prove difficult.

In four months, the United States will have a new administration, giving the next president some leeway for pursuing a different policy towards Moscow. Carrots, rather than just sticks, may be the best approach. Included, however, in whatever cease-fire plan is created should be a commitment from the Russians that they will continue to abide with the provisions of the NPT and MTCR and ensure that Moscow will try to prevent the flow of Russian scientific labor to North Korea and Iran, specifically.

This will require a rethink in Washington and Brussels on how to end the war and what constitutes an equitable outcome rather than a maximalist view, as suggested by some in the West. Not doing so could lead to a new set of security problems in other parts of the world that are just as crucial for the United States.

Amit Gupta, PhD, is a senior fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. The views expressed are his own.

You Think the Ukraine War Was Bad? Imagine a Rogue Russia was originally published on Global Security Review.