The EAR Report is a must read for National security professionals to stay informed about rapidly evolving global threats and the strategic implications for U.S. defense policy.

This report addresses critical developments in nuclear deterrence, missile defense, and geopolitical trends, and equips professionals with actionable insights to navigate the complexities of modern security challenges effectively.

Commentary and Quotes of the Week

• Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin: Reaffirmed the U.S.-ROK alliance and the strengthening of extended deterrence through the Nuclear Consultative Group.
  Peter Huessy: Detailed the financial and strategic implications of eliminating the ICBM leg of the U.S. nuclear triad, emphasizing the costs of alternative measures for maintaining current deterrence levels.
  Jon Finer, Deputy National Security Adviser: Highlighted Pakistan’s emerging threat with the development of long-range ballistic missile capabilities.
  Bill Gertz: Revealed China’s rapid nuclear buildup and the expansion of its missile capabilities.
  Russian Leaders: Asserted advancements in missile systems and dismissed arms control as a relic of the past.
  Rep. Chuck Fleischmann: Stressed the urgency of modernizing the U.S. nuclear deterrent, citing contributions from Tennessee’s Oak Ridge Lab.

Strategic Developments of the Week

• China’s Military Build-Up: The Pentagon report highlighted Beijing’s dramatic advancements in hypersonic missile technology, nuclear warheads, and ‘intelligentized warfare.’
  Russia’s Strategic Actions: Russia’s legislative shift regarding the Taliban and progress in missile systems underlined its geopolitical maneuvers.
  U.S. Missile Defense Challenges: Reports emphasized the lag in U.S. hypersonic missile capabilities compared to China, pressing the need for enhanced missile defense systems.
  Space and Drone Developments: New legislation and technological advances highlight the increasing role of space and drones in modern warfare.

Important Reports of the Week

1. “President Trump Must Put the Nuclear Enterprise on a Wartime Footing” by Robert Peters:
   • Advocates for accelerating nuclear arsenal modernization to restore deterrence credibility.
     Calls for a stronger commitment to stockpile stewardship and missile defense.
2. “Importance of Building Homeland Missile Defense” by Robert Joseph:
   • Reiterates the vision of a comprehensive missile defense system to counter emerging threats.
     Proposes leveraging space-based systems for more robust and efficient protection.
3. “What Happens if the United States Eliminates the ICBM Leg of the Triad?”:
   • Examines the repercussions of removing the ICBM leg, including massive financial costs for alternative deterrence methods and strategic vulnerabilities.

Download the Full Report

ICBM EAR Report for December 20th was originally published on Global Security Review.

Key Issues Include:

Korea and Russia News

1. North Korean ICBM and Military Collaboration with Russia
   • North Korea recently launched its most powerful intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) to date, signaling its intent to counter U.S.-South Korean alliances. Following this, the U.S. and South Korea held joint air drills as a show of force.
   • Reports indicate North Korean troops in Russian uniforms are heading to Ukraine, marking a potentially destabilizing support for Russia’s war efforts. North Korea may seek advanced nuclear technology from Russia as part of their cooperation.
2. Strategic Reactions and Military Developments
   • The U.S. and South Korea have pledged deeper military and technology cooperation, emphasizing nuclear defense scenarios. Meanwhile, North Korea’s alignment with Russia is raising concerns about heightened regional instability and the potential extension of the Ukraine conflict.

ICBM Report to Congress on LGM-35A Sentinel

1. Program Overview
   • The LGM-35A Sentinel, set to replace the aging Minuteman III, forms the land-based leg of the U.S. nuclear triad. The Sentinel will enhance the U.S.’s deterrent capabilities with an expected procurement of 634 missiles, modernized silos, and facilities across strategic areas
2. Funding and Development
   • The FY2025 budget includes $3.7 billion from the Department of Defense and $1.1 billion for the W87-1 warhead from the National Nuclear Security Administration. Modernization will involve upgrades to 450 silos and over 600 facilities, establishing the Sentinel as a long-term, modular system to address future threats
3. Strategic Justifications
   • As a critical element of U.S. defense, the Sentinel program is designed to meet evolving threats, preserve industrial capabilities, and ensure cost-effective lifecycle management. The Air Force targets initial deployment in 2029.

Get the full report!

ICBM EAR Report October 28th 2024 was originally published on Global Security Review.

In Jacobsen’s scenario, North Korea unexpectedly launches a limited preemptive strike against the American homeland. The United States responds with a decapitating strike against North Korea’s nuclear arsenal. Through unlikely errors, Russia believes that the United States is attacking them instead of North Korea. In response, Russia launches a large-scale strike. This leads the United States to launch everything. Bing, bang, boom, and we have Armageddon followed by nuclear winter and the death of billions. In interviews with Vanity Fair and Mother Jones, Jacobsen argues that the US has a plan to conduct nuclear warfighting, based on a series of previously adopted requirements that leave the president little leeway to modify his response. This problem is only made worse by the fact that the president has sole authority to employ nuclear weapons. To this point, Jacobsen argues that military “war mongers” have a very “aggressive culture” that has a predilection to “jam” the president toward “quickly launching a massive retaliatory strike.”

Jacobsen asserts that American intercontinental ballistic missiles are on “HAIR TRIGGER ALERT.” Why? She interviewed William Perry who used the term. Bam, nuclear weapons are on hair trigger alert and missileers have itchy trigger fingers.

While admitting that nuclear deterrence has worked for seven decades, Jacobsen warns that deterrence will fail and when it does, any use of a nuclear weapon will result in large-scale nuclear war. Why? Jacobson interviewed Paul Bracken, who participated in government sponsored wargames—four decades ago—that ended in general nuclear war. Ipso-facto, the use of one nuclear weapon leads to Armageddon.

In Jacobsen’s scenario, American missile defenses are a complete failure. Why? She interviewed Ted Postol who said they do not work—case closed. Her conclusion is that missile defense is a farce and a waste of money. And the United States is lying to itself if it thinks they will ever stop an inbound nuclear weapon.

Elsewhere in the scenario, the president is forced to launch a large-scale nuclear response against the Russians within six minutes. Why? Jacobsen was also told by Perry that the president “will not wait” and thus assumed that Ronald Reagan’s memoir, in which he made an off-hand remark about having six minutes to decide on nuclear weapons use, reflects policy. Abracadabra, the president must decide to use nuclear weapons within six minutes.

Jacobsen’s predilection for incorrectly contextualizing the statements of those she interviewed is both stunning and worrying. The conclusions she draws about the present from the statements of former, often Reagan era or earlier, officials boggles the mind. Jacobsen does not seem to grasp the fact that she or her interviewees may be wrong about the relevance of their past experience to the present. Three examples are indicative.

Problems

First, Jacobsen is wrong about the alert status of the nation’s intercontinental ballistic missile force. They are not on “HAIR TRIGGER ALERT.” The United States does not have a launch-on-warning or launch-under-attack policy/doctrine. Nothing of the sort exists. Adam Lowther and Derek Williams dismantle this argument and explain that the United States maintains a launch-under-attack option, which allows the president to employ intercontinental ballistic missiles pre-, mid-, or post-strike. The option requires nothing of the president.

A number of variables will influence this decision. What is important to remember is that there is tremendous work that goes into thinking through scenarios well before they ever arise. Thus, the idea that these weapons are on hair trigger alert is ridiculous. Years of planning and analysis take place left of launch.

Second, Jacobsen is clearly unfamiliar with the design and purpose of wargames. They are specifically designed to understand the implications of a concept or capability. This means a scenario is artificially designed to ensure participants achieve the game’s objectives. Thus, when Jacobsen assumes that because a wargame or series of wargames end in general nuclear war, that a real conflict must necessarily end in general nuclear war, she is fundamentally misunderstanding the purpose and arbitrary nature of wargames. Within the wargaming community, it is well understood that they are not predictive of the future but are instructive of potential options.

Third, missile defenses are not worthless, as Jacobsen claims. They are making steady improvements in their ability to destroy targets. Ted Postol, her primary source of information about missile defenses, was wrong about the effectiveness of Israel’s Iron Dome system. Hard data is proving that missile defenses, in this case Iron Dome, are far more effective than Postel believed.

Although there are additional areas where Jacobsen incorporates inaccurate information into her scenario, the point is clear. Annie Jacobsen’s Nuclear War: A Scenario would be far more accurately titled, Nuclear War: A Novel or Nuclear War: Disarmament Propaganda. The biggest challenge with the book is that Americans with little understanding of nuclear operations will believe the bias with which Jacobsen writes. This makes it imperative that those within the nuclear community speak out and correct the record. Nuclear deterrence is too important to turn over to a journalist with an agenda.

Peter Huessy is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. The views expressed in this article are the author’s own. 

Annie Jacobsen Gets It Wrong about Nuclear Deterrence was originally published on Global Security Review.

While specific nations to be deterred are not directly named in the DSR, China’s increased involvement in strategic competition in the region is clearly documented. The DSR also highlights the critical importance of Australia’s alliance with the United States to its security. It recognizes that the alliance will play an increasingly important role in the coming decades given increased rotations of American forces to Australia and ongoing cooperation on science and technology under agreements like Pillar II of AUKUS.

While much of the formal implementation plan to improve ADF capabilities associated with the DSR will be released in 2024 as part of the inaugural National Defence Strategy and its associated Integrated Investment Program, a few priorities for immediate action were identified including preparing to acquire nuclear-powered submarines; increased long-range strike capabilities, including the manufacture of munitions locally; and upgrades to Australia’s northern bases. The review also recognizes the role of resilience in Australia’s deterrence strategy, calling upon the nation to harness all element of national power to make Australia less susceptible to coercion by hostile nations.

Australia’s strategic environment is extremely challenging when considering deterrence of China’s large, capable, and increasingly expeditionary, conventional military forces. However, China also possesses a significant nuclear force structure which is modernizing and expanding at a dramatic pace. Assuming the current growth in forces leads to a stockpile of 1,500 operationally deployed strategic nuclear weapons by 2035. In considering methods for the ADF to deter China, Australia must find ways to address threats of nuclear escalation and develop methods to deescalate any potential limited nuclear use. It is interesting to note that the word nuclear appears in the DSR report 41 times in total, yet 36 of those instances refer to nuclear-power submarines planned for delivery under AUKUS. The critically important topic of nuclear escalation and the role of American extended deterrence is barely mentioned, being covered in two sentences of a 116-page document.

Effective deterrence of a major nuclear power like China, even assuming the presence of the American “nuclear umbrella,” will require both effective engagement between the US and Australia, and detailed thought about ways nuclear threats or limited nuclear use can affect any potential future conflict.

Recent tabletop exercises at the Center and Strategic and International Studies highlighted a lack of imaginative thinking by “Blue” players in a simulated US-China conflict over Taiwan, labeling the Blue team as “stuck in a Cold War mindset.” “Red” players, at the outbreak of the conflict, used the threat of nuclear use in an attempt to deter Blue forces from entering the war, similar to the way Putin has successfully leveraged nuclear threats to deter NATO’s increased involvement in  Ukraine. In one tabletop exercise, Red players employed a low-yield nuclear weapon against Guam as a response to conventional attacks on Red’s mainland. Understanding and developing methods to limit and manage escalation within the alliance construct, while maintaining deterrence, are especially critical for a non-nuclear weapon state like Australia.

Although increased numbers of American troops rotating through Australian bases may increase deterrence, those bases are attractive targets for long-range ballistic and cruise-missile strikes early in a conflict should conflict erupt between the US and China. Several wargames and expert analyses show that the US could lose hundreds of aircraft on the ground from attacks by Chinese conventional missiles unless new methods of base hardening, base resilience, and agile combat employment are implemented. The US and Australia need to work together to find ways to ensure the maritime and air forces of both nations are able to effectively operate through such attacks.

Missile defenses, rapid base repair capabilities, infrastructure upgrades, and methods of deception and denial form a partial list of options. Proven resilience during peacetime against such attacks on air and maritime bases will help deter those attacks in wartime.

To increase deterrence and the nation’s resilience, Australia’s government must also start an open and frank dialog with the public about the significance of the threats the nation is facing and the ways in which the ADF and other parts of government are posturing to deter those threats. This is needed to help motivate the “renewed focus on national planning for Defence preparedness” as part of the transition to national defence recommended in the DSR. This discussion must include more than conventional threats. While only the United States possess nuclear weapons, Australia has a role to play in shared extended deterrence. This includes helping the US understand what assurances Australia requires given various routes to escalation in potential future crises. Further examination of these issues and sharing finding with the public, friends, and adversaries should lead to a more stable Indo-Pacific region.

Carl Rhodes is a senior fellow with the National Institute for Deterrence Studies and is founder of Robust Policy, a Canberra firm providing high-quality analysis and policy solutions. Previously, he served 25 years with RAND Corporation including a term as director of RAND Australia.

Australia’s Defence Strategic Review and the Growing Importance of Extended Deterrence was originally published on Global Security Review.