The intense heat from the explosion would ignite fires, contributing to the destruction of the surrounding areas. The release of radioactive materials from the detonation would pose a significant health hazard to anyone in the vicinity, leading to radiation sickness and potentially long-term health effects.

The impact of the explosion would not only be physical but strategic. Cheyenne Mountain plays a crucial role in the defense of North America. Its destruction would severely impair the United States’ ability to detect and respond to potential threats, including incoming missiles and aircraft following such a strike. The US would be highly vulnerable to additional decapitation strikes on their command-and-control facilities.

Of course, the US would still have its nuclear submarines patrolling the seas. They can launch a retaliatory attack on the president’s order, but the bleak reality is that the homeland would be quite vulnerable. This is obviously a worst case scenario and highly unlikely, but it is important to think about as states strategize about decapitating nuclear strikes against the United States.

 Enhanced Ballistic Missile Defenses

 The threat of nuclear attack remains a significant concern in today’s world. Enhancing ballistic missile defenses (BMD) is crucial for the US to protect against a threat like the one described above. With the nation’s BMD system limited, there is room for significant improvement to defend against sophisticated nuclear attacks.

The United States can enhance its ballistic missile defense systems in several ways. First, the US needs to develop and deploy more advanced interceptor missiles capable of engaging incoming threats at various stages of flight, including boost, mid-course, and terminal phases. These interceptors should be faster, more agile, and have greater accuracy.

Second, the US needs to enhance sensor capabilities, including radar and infrared systems, to improve early detection and tracking of incoming missiles. This includes space-based sensors for early warning and tracking.

Third, the US should consider improving integration and networking of BMD systems to enhance coordination and effectiveness. This includes integrating various BMD systems (such as Aegis, THAAD, and Ground-based Midcourse Defense) and improving communication and data-sharing between systems.

Fourth, the US should develop and deploy countermeasures and decoys to confuse and overwhelm enemy missile defense systems, increasing the likelihood of intercepting the actual warhead. Fifth, the US should continue to collaborate with allies and partners to share technology, intelligence, and resources to enhance overall BMD capabilities and effectiveness. Lastly, the US needs to continue to invest in ongoing research and development to stay ahead of emerging threats and technologies, ensuring the BMD remains effective against evolving missile threats.

Ultimately, strengthening the BMD structure not only protects critical assets but also enhances overall national security. By continuously improving and innovating the United States can stay ahead of adversary nuclear modernization efforts. Demonstrating a clear ability to defend against nuclear strikes can enhance deterrence credibility.

 Directed Energy Weapons

 In addition to traditional BMD systems, the United States should explore the development of satellite-based directed-energy weapons (DEW). These systems, such as lasers or high-powered microwaves, offer several advantages over traditional kinetic weapons. They can engage multiple targets simultaneously at the speed of light with precision accuracy.

Laser technology is seen as the future of space deterrence due to its versatility and effectiveness. Lasers can be used to intercept and destroy incoming ballistic missiles, satellites, or other threats in space. They can also be used for precise targeting and disabling of enemy assets without causing collateral damage.

Satellites equipped with DEWs could revolutionize America’s ability to defend against nuclear threats. By positioning satellites in orbit equipped with DEWs, the United States could establish a first line of defense against incoming nuclear weapons. These satellites could intercept and neutralize nuclear weapons before they reach their targets, providing a critical layer of protection.

DEWs offer several advantages over traditional missile defense systems. They have virtually unlimited magazine capacity, meaning they can engage multiple targets without needing to reload. They also have a much faster engagement time.

Furthermore, DEWs are highly cost-effective compared to traditional missile defense systems, as they do not require expensive interceptors or launch platforms. They also have the potential to be more reliable and less prone to failure, as they have no moving parts and operate using electricity rather than chemical propellants. Of course, the technology is not sufficiently mature to field the weapons suggested.

 Conclusion

 The hypothetical scenario of a Russian SS-27 800-kiloton ICBM striking Cheyenne Mountain highlights the critical need for enhancing ballistic missile defenses. The devastating effects of such an attack underscore the importance of continuous improvement and innovation in BMD technology.

The United States must develop and deploy more advanced interceptor missiles, enhance sensor capabilities, and improve integration and networking of BMDs. Additionally, exploring the development of satellites equipped with directed-energy weapons could provide a revolutionary defense capability against nuclear threats.

Strengthening the BMD structure not only protects critical assets but also enhances overall national security. By investing in research and development and collaborating with allies and partners, the United States can stay ahead of potential adversaries’ nuclear modernization efforts and demonstrate a clear ability to defend against nuclear strikes, enhancing its deterrence capability.

Aaron Holland is an Analyst at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

Safeguarding Against Catastrophic Threats and Decapitating Strikes was originally published on Global Security Review.

This is not a proxy war from the Cold War or the Global War on Terror. The West is in a hot war with Iran, and the United States must act accordingly. American focus on containing the conflict in Israel and Gaza is undermining Israeli deterrence. An anemic campaign of limited attacks against the Houthis is failing to deter Iran in the Red Sea, damaging American credibility and promoting Iranian and Houthi prestige.

By contrast Israel understands it is in an existential fight and has an appropriate strategy.  They are systemically destroying enemy forces and can hold Iran’s high-value targets at risk.  Iran should not doubt that October 7, 2023, put its nuclear program and critical infrastructure on the target list. Israel will deal with the Iranian threat with or without American support.

For Israel, American involvement is always a two-edged sword. American politics, Western pressure, and arbitrary red lines are often liabilities that disadvantage Israeli deterrence.  In fact, Israel began a no-holds barred information campaign, targeting media and anti-Jewish forces in the US and Europe. Some Israeli voices attacked the “River to the Sea” narrative characterizing the “two-state solution” as a de facto Iranian occupation of the Jewish homeland.

Deterrence is a coercive spectrum from positive to punitive. Carrots are not working, which leaves only sticks. Curtis McGiffin argues that provocations by Iran, including more than 160 attacks on American forces since October 7, 2023, combined with anemic policies of appeasement and the bribery of Iran, irreparably damaged deterrence in the region.

McGiffin points to statements by IRGC General Hossein Salami that Iran is not afraid of war with the United States. Why should they? Iran’s conduct of grey zone war for decades, with few repercussions, only encourages further aggression. Finally, McGiffin argues that America must formally declare war if we are going to cross the Rubicon and attack targets inside Iran.

That position is debatable. After the Cold War, conventional military superiority empowered the US to act whenever there was sufficient will, constrained only by the imperative to avoid escalation with another nuclear-armed power.

Game theory can be instructive in this case. It teaches risk aversion (Prospect Theory) is a powerful incentive and a key predictor of behavior. Decision-makers will irrationally forego probable gains to avoid improbable losses. It also shows that in an iterative game, players learn from previous opponent actions. The Mullahs learned from American behavior that the US is irrationally risk-averse when it comes to conflict with Iran.

Diplomacy is insufficient without a credible threat to back it up. The United States is standing in a forest fire asking everyone to put away the matches when it needs the deterrence equivalent of backburning. This requires the President to take a significant step up the escalation ladder to re-establish deterrence. Israel is doing this while the US dithers.

Iran is a cancer that has metastasized to threaten the region and the world. America’s ineffective tit-for-tat strategy only emboldens Iran. However, since the hostage crisis (1979) and the Desert One/Operation Eagle Claw fiasco, there was/is little American appetite to deal effectively with Iran. As a result, Tehran has capitalized on American weakness at every turn.

Presidents Ronald Regan and George W. Bush deterred the nation’s enemies by inflicting unacceptable losses, backed by overwhelming military and economic capacity. Operation El Dorado Canyon missed killing Muammar Gaddafi by minutes. The US Air Force enforced no fly zones over Iraq for a decade to punish and contain Saddam Hussein. After the American removal of Saddam, Gaddafi opted out of the extended axis of evil, voluntarily eliminating his weapons of mass destruction programs and long-range ballistic missiles. Even President Bill Clinton “went downtown” bombing Serbian power plants and Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic’s cronies. Instead, Presidents Barack Obama and Joe Biden bribed Iran and put the United States only twelve days away from an Iranian nuclear weapon.

Iranian instigated attacks in the region can no longer be met with impotence and half measures. Swift decisive American action directly against Iran is now essential. Drone attacks on American forces call for the prompt destruction of Iranian drone production facilities and IRGC command and control nodes inside Iran. Harassment of international shipping and attacks on US naval vessels require the destruction of Iranian naval forces and oil-exporting infrastructure.

Chamberlain was wrong in 1939 and his disciples are wrong today. Iran is an implacable foe, and it must be de-fanged. America must make rational choices based on reality. The Mullahs began their war against the US on November 4, 1979. After 45 years, the only rational strategy is to eliminate Iran as an existential threat.

The immediate elimination of the Iranian nuclear program is a necessity. Anything less is delaying an inevitable conflict with a nuclear-armed enemy determined to kill Americans and incinerate Israel.

Colonel (Ret.) Kirk Fansher (USAF) is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. The views expressed are the author’s own.

The US Is Undermining Deterrence with Iran was originally published on Global Security Review.

While the Cold War ended with the collapse of the Soviet empire, subsequent defense cuts and the failure to sustain and enhance the American nuclear deterrent left the United States facing the prospect of two nuclear-armed peers in Russia and China, with combined nuclear arsenals approaching some 10,000 nuclear weapons—well beyond the size and capability of the American arsenal.

Behind this reversal in nuclear arms reductions lies a set of assumptions reflected in recent American nuclear posture reviews and nuclear policy that assumed nuclear reductions and restraint would be permanent and positive. For example, the recent Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States’ straightforward America’s Strategic Posture highlights differences in “understandings of the threats” with the Biden administration’s 2022 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR).

The 2022 NPR assumed greater cooperation between Russia, China, and the United States in addressing nuclear matters, especially preventing terror organizations and sponsoring states from acquiring nuclear weapons. Moscow, however, regularly violates arms treaties. China has never signed a bilateral nuclear arms agreement with the US.

With analysts projecting Russia and China will field approximately 10,000 theater and strategic nuclear weapons by 2035–2045, a significant reversal of events is taking place that is unavoidable. A chronological look at arms treaties from 1967–2010 reveals whether American assumptions about arms control stood the test of time, particularly with respect to the lasting import of such deals and effects on American security requirements. In that context, examining the implications of American arms control agreements is instructive.

First, the 1991 Presidential Nuclear Initiatives assumed that American restraint in nuclear forces and deployments would lead to the restrain of other nuclear powers. This assumption was incorrect.

Second, the critics of START I and II and the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) assumed that the Reagan nuclear build-up would trigger a similar Soviet effort and limit any deal on nuclear weapons reductions. While Gorbachev initially increased SS-20 missile deployments, increased troops in Afghanistan, walked out of the arms talks over opposition to the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), and increased assistance to Cuba and Nicaragua, Reagan eventually prevailed. Peace through strength worked, contrary to the opinion of disarmament advocates.

Third, opponents of proliferation see the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as a guarantor of sharply limiting the spread of nuclear weapons, when in fact NPT members China and Russia hid their rogue behavior and facilitated the spread of nuclear programs to Pakistan and North Korea and thus consequently to Iran, Libya, Syria, and possibly Iraq.

Fourth, arms control advocates blame the United States for North Korean, Syrian, and Iranian pursuit of nuclear weapons. This blame is neither supported by facts nor a firm understanding of the security dynamics at play for each of these countries.

Fifth, because nuclear modernization often requires concomitant nuclear arms control efforts (New START ratification for nuclear modernization) to maintain support from Congress and the White House, an adversary can refuse to enter arms control agreements as a means of compromising American nuclear modernization. Constant efforts to stall modernization would leave the United States in an increasingly weak position.

Sixth, the START II process underscored Soviet efforts to kill any American ballistic missile defenses. Such efforts were supported by the arms control community. Russian President Vladimir Putin also continues to push for termination of missile defenses, which are now a central component of integrated deterrence.

Seventh, while New START achieved modest reductions from the Strategic Offensive Reduction Treaty (SORT), the pursuit of still lower numbers as part of seeking abolition or “global zero” is likely to reach a point where strategic stability fails. A world without nuclear weapons is a world once again safe for great-power conventional wars.

Eighth, the 1999 Russian Duma’s rejection of the START II arms control treaty and the ban on multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRV) is consistent with the findings of the Strategic Posture Commission, which clearly laid out Russia’s willingness to use nuclear coercion. For the arms control community, this potential use of nuclear weapons by Russia was dismissed—again proving how wrong disarmament advocates were.

For American deterrence to reflect the lessons above, it is also necessary for the United States to jettison bad thinking that still undermines deterrence effectiveness. Many arms control advocates believe conventional arms are sufficient to retaliate against an enemy’s nuclear strike, which would allow the United States to adopt a minimum deterrent of just a few hundred nuclear weapons.

A corollary to this thinking is the view that nuclear weapons are solely for deterrence, rather than warfighting. This view undermines the credibility of deterrence by undermining American seriousness in the eyes of an adversary. Absent a willingness to fight, deterrence is not credible.

Similarly detrimental to credibility is the idea that on-alert nuclear forces are destabilizing. Nothing could be further from the truth. It is the fact that nuclear forces are on-alert that makes them a less attractive target—improving deterrence credibility.

As the Strategic Posture Commission explained, China and Russia see nuclear weapons not just as a deterrent to prevent aggression, but as weapons for theater blackmail and coercion to allow aggression to succeed and keep the United States from supporting Ukraine and Taiwan.

Americans must understand that arms control efforts between the United States and adversaries is no solution for strategic stability. Arms control just for its own sake is foolish. Its utility is only in advancing American interests.

Given the current breathtaking modernization and expansion of Russia and China’s nuclear arsenals, in conjunction with their near-alliance, Americans must carefully weigh whether any arms control proposal advances American interests.

Deterrence at the strategic level remains robust since no power has the ability to launch a disarming strike. Theater-level deterrence is much weaker, with the United States at a distinct disadvantage.

For the foreseeable future, arms control has no realistic prospects. It is even difficult to argue that nonproliferation efforts are worthwhile since the United States may need the assistance of a nuclear-armed South Korea and Japan to stabilize tension in East Asia and prevent North Korean or Chinese aggression.

Instead, the United States should press forward with modernization of the strategic nuclear triad, while also looking at ways to expand theater nuclear capabilities. Rightsizing the arsenal and developing effective ballistic missile defenses are a must. Rejecting wrong-headed ideas that impede these initiatives is also necessary.

Finally, Congress must pass a defense budget on time. Over the past four decades, defense appropriations passed on time only four times. Bipartisan budget reform measures sought by the House Budget Committee will hopefully address the issue and none too soon. There is too much riding on it.

Peter Huessy is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies, CEO of Geostrategic Analysis, and host of a forty-plus year series of seminars and symposiums on nuclear matters.

Joe Buff is a risk-mitigation actuary and former submarine technothriller author now researching modern nuclear deterrence and arms control. Views expressed by the authors in this article are their own. 

The Problem with Arms Control Assumptions was originally published on Global Security Review.