The previously concluded and now cancelled US-Iran Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) revealed a paradox at the heart of the Middle East security landscape. Both sides have been negotiating back and forth on de-escalation, a compromise on enriched uranium, and freedom of passage through the Strait of Hormuz. However, beneath these ongoing diplomatic efforts is a reality that is becoming increasingly clear. For the Iranian regime, a regional environment of managed conflict is more strategically valuable than a sustained peace agreement. This explains why, even after signing the 60-day ceasefire memo, Iran still attacked ships in the Strait of Hormuz, prompting the U.S. to respond to discourage future Iranian violence.

Iran will likely avoid a full-scale war that risks its destruction, instead preferring a continued proxy-driven, tension-filled regional environment to maintain deterrence and project power without escalation. Recent talks on uranium and safe passage through the Hormuz Strait will fuel Iran’s resistance to normalization with the U.S. and GCC.

Instability As a Strategic Infrastructure

For Iran, pushing for regional instability or proxy confrontations is not merely a temporary policy dispute. It has become embedded in the state’s architecture itself. Iran has built and framed its domestic popularity and regional legitimacy around the concept of resistance against Western pressure, particularly from the U.S. and Israel. This narrative was deeply institutionalized within Iran’s regional strategy, military doctrine, and its main controlling security establishments, the IRGC and Basij forces. In this regard, a comprehensive peace deal with the U.S. would create profound structural questions inside Iran, including the rationale of the “resistance” doctrine in place for decades, the logic of maintaining extensive regional proxy networks, and preserving a missile- and drone-heavy militarized regional posture.

In different ways, a controlled conflict has become part of the regime’s survival and operating environment. Therefore, achieving a sustainable peace agreement can entirely destabilize internal balances of power more than maintaining them. This explains why, even during periods of increased international diplomatic efforts, Iran often preserves parallel escalation mechanisms in addition to never conceding any of its nuclear program development to date. Thus, pursuing negotiations alongside adding pressure on multiple fronts is not a contradiction within Iranian strategic thinking. Instead, they are complementary tools.

The Asymmetric Leverage

Iran’s ability to threaten and demonstrate control over maritime access to the Strait of Hormuz negatively impacted global oil markets and exposed the vulnerability of international energy flows to customer states. In this respect, around one-fifth of global oil flows transit through the Strait of Hormuz, making it one of the most globally strategic water passages. Accordingly, the ongoing Hormuz crisis reinforces Tehran’s preference for controlled instability.

Iran uses the Hormuz situation to benefit itself domestically and internationally, framing it to show that strategic, asymmetric disruptions give diplomatic leverage. Even after military pressure, the U.S. remains focused on negotiations to reopen Hormuz and restore shipping stability. This is Iran’s leverage that it does not want to cede. Tehran, specifically the IRGC, which appears to be the decision-making authority, believes that maintaining control of Hormuz but avoiding escalation preserves its bargaining power, especially since hardliners see concessions to the U.S. as losses. Iran wants full control of the Strait, knowing it cannot fight the U.S. directly, and employs asymmetric leverage to influence the strategic balance.

Iran’s air force and navy remain significantly limited compared to those of the U.S. and regional GCC states. Additionally, Iran’s economy suffers under sanctions and American quarantines. As a result, Tehran has spent decades developing a different form of deterrence, including ballistic missiles, drones, proxy warfare networks, and regional escalation networks across Iraq, Lebanon, and Yemen. Among Iran’s regional proxy groups, Iran-backed Houthis in Yemen remain one of the most critical factors in Iran’s current asymmetric model of confrontation. Since the start of the U.S.-Israeli confrontation with Iran, the Houthis have so far chosen not to fully participate in ground fighting. This is particularly concerning because the Houthis are currently Iran’s most strategically positioned proxy group in the Middle East, armed with a wide range of missiles and drones, capable of inflicting strategic damage across the Red Sea and Bab el Mandeb and potentially causing another global maritime shock like Hormuz. This allows Iran to effectively deploy a multi-chokepoint strategy at any time. Alongside their threat to maritime security, the proximity of the Houthis to GCC states and the group’s history of fighting Saudi Arabia from 2015 to 2022 give Iran additional leverage to pressure the region.

This asymmetric model works best for Iran when geopolitical friction persists. Even without fully going into a conventional war with the U.S., Iran can complicate Western military planning and generate political costs for its opponents. Therefore, a stable regional order with normalized relations would significantly reduce the strategic utility of all these tools.

Deterrence and The Regime Survival Dimension

Iran’s broader regional strategy relies heavily on maintaining a “forward proxy defense” doctrine beyond its borders to project influence. This approach has served several purposes simultaneously, including creating multiple escalation fronts and increasing the political cost of directly attacking Iran. From Tehran’s perspective, a low-level regional friction prevents the emergence of a fully consolidated anti-Iranian security order.

There is also an internal political dimension that Western analyses often overlook. For example, external confrontations in the hybrid warfare narrative, which often bolster regime unity as periods of increased confrontational pressure enable the Iranian leadership to suppress dissent and rally nationalist sentiment. They frame this to their local population as the West’s war on Islam, aligning it with the state’s ideological identity, deeply rooted in anti-Western and resistance narratives. An internationally accepted peace agreement with the U.S. could lead to unwanted domestic effects for Iran, such as reduced ideological cohesion and increased demands for broader political reforms. Ironically, a limited confrontation might seem safer for regime stability than reaching a peace agreement.

Regional Peace, Security, and Iran

During the recent confrontation, which culminated in April’s ceasefire, more than 80 percent of Iran’s missiles and drones were directed at GCC states. This suggests Iran was willing to strike neighboring countries outside the immediate conflict even though they were not directly fighting with Iran. Such actions undermine regional trust and raise questions about Iran’s willingness to function as a responsible contributor to regional security.

The central paradox of any U.S.-Iran negotiations is that peace itself will threaten some of the strategic foundations upon which Iran has operated for decades. Regional instabilities and relatively managed conflicts provide Tehran with bargaining leverage, geopolitical relevance, and a degree of deterrence it seeks to demonstrate. A sustained peace deal, by contrast, risks reducing Iran’s asymmetric advantages that it has been trying to capitalize upon while also exposing its internal political and strategic vulnerabilities. The U.S. must recognize this reality or risk negotiating without a clear understanding of Iran’s strategic intentions.

Dr. Mohamed ELDoh is a business development and consulting professional in the defence and security sector. Mohamed holds a Doctorate from Grenoble École de Management, France, an MBA from the EU Business School, Spain, and an Advanced Certificate in Counterterrorism Studies from the University of St Andrews, UK. He regularly authors articles addressing defence cooperation, counterterrorism, geopolitics, and emerging security threats in the Middle East and Africa. The views of the author are his own.

Iran’s Strategic Logic of Instability was originally published on Global Security Review.

Persistent geopolitical instability surrounding the Strait of Hormuz has renewed the debate about Indo-Pacific energy security and the need to diversify supply sources. However, diversification alone may not eliminate strategic vulnerability, even with alternative suppliers beyond the Gulf for the Indo-Pacific region, because the challenge lies not only in where energy is sourced but also in the maritime networks through which it travels. 

Recent warnings from the Australian Food and Grocery Council highlight how geopolitical instability in the Middle East is already contributing to broader cost pressures across Australia’s supply chains, especially through increasing fuel and logistics costs, as an example of a region at the heart of the Indo-Pacific. 

The Indo-Pacific’s capacity to decrease its reliance on the Strait of Hormuz is limited not by geography but by a broader network of contested maritime chokepoints influenced by proxy conflicts, especially the Bab el-Mandeb corridor connecting the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden. In the event of a disruption in Hormuz, states such as Australia, Japan, South Korea, and Thailand could theoretically turn to alternative suppliers in the Americas, Africa, or the Atlantic basin. 

However, diversifying suppliers does not necessarily reduce risk. Many of these alternative supply chains still rely on the same vulnerable maritime routes, exposing them to similar transportation and security dangers. For example, Bab Al-Mandeb (Red Sea gateway) continues to face significant disruptions from Yemen-based Houthi attacks. Meanwhile, Somali pirates have become more active due to the current regional crisis involving Iran, which raises risk premiums and causes delays in the Gulf of Aden. 

As a result, proxy warfare, rather than a formal state blockade, may also limit Indo-Pacific states’ ability to rely on alternative supplies. For example, non-state actors and proxy forces (especially in Yemen), along with regional instability, can disrupt the straits without owning them. Under these conditions, proxies can exert strategic influence over maritime corridors without officially controlling them. 

This indicates a shift in the international order where effective control of maritime corridors no longer requires sovereign ownership; disruption capability alone can achieve similar strategic results. Meanwhile, strategic geography links Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb together; disruption in one can increase pressure on the other. 

Proxy maritime actors like Yemen-based Houthis disrupt the Red Sea, while Somali piracy networks remain a persistent risk that could increase costs and uncertainty for shipping transiting the Gulf of Aden. As a result, energy security diversification in the Indo-Pacific region is limited not by a lack of alternative suppliers but by the concentration of global maritime energy flows at politically contested chokepoints. Therefore, these contested chokepoints are truly a security dilemma for the Indo-Pacific’s states. 

The growing capacity of proxy actors and non-state groups to disrupt these corridors transforms maritime geography into a web of vulnerabilities, undermining the effectiveness of traditional diversification strategies. Therefore, the Indo-Pacific’s energy security strategy must consider proxy-driven disruptions within maritime chokepoint networks, rather than relying solely on supplier diversification as a resilience measure. 

To address this risk, the Australian Defense Force has participated in coalition-based maritime security operations in the Red Sea and Indian Ocean. However, its role has remained limited to multilateral frameworks rather than unilateral action. The escalating instability linked to Iran-related regional tensions and the widening insecurity from the Middle East to the Horn of Africa may increasingly pressure Australia, Japan, South Korea, and Thailand to reassess their strategic posture toward key maritime chokepoints, including the scope, depth, capacity, and autonomy of their future engagement. 

This is especially significant as Iran continues to violate the current ceasefire with the U.S. and is eyeing Bab el-Mandeb, the only chokepoint after Hormuz that connects Asia, the Middle East, and Europe with the purpose of inflicting damage on the global economy and achieve a more robust position in its negotiations with Washington. 

Unlike Australia and Thailand, countries like Japan and South Korea are highly vulnerable to these threats because they are consistently among the top liquid natural gas and crude oil importers worldwide. This has led Seoul and Tokyo to sign a strategic agreement to strengthen energy cooperation despite longstanding historical disputes. 

A collective security action may be necessary if Indo-Pacific countries are to ensure energy security and strengthen domestic resilience amid rising geopolitical instability and the growing prevalence of regionally based asymmetric warfare. State and non-state actors increasingly employ coercion, sabotage, proxy forces, and physical attacks against critical supply lines to undermine political stability and disrupt economic activity. Because global and regional energy markets, maritime trade routes, and supply chains are highly interconnected, disruptions in or around a single country can cascade across the broader region. Consequently, Indo-Pacific nations have a shared interest in strengthening collective maritime security. By working together to deter threats, reduce vulnerabilities, and secure access to vital energy resources, regional states can enhance their ability to withstand external shocks and preserve the economic and social stability upon which long-term resilience depends. 

Shad Sherko is an independent journalist and security analyst specializing in Middle Eastern defense policy, regional proxy dynamics, and cross-border insurgencies. His work focuses on contemporary security threats across the Middle East and beyond. The views of the author are his own. 

Proxy Wars Threaten Energy Security in the Indo-Pacific Amid Regional Turmoil in The Middle East was originally published on Global Security Review.

(Editor’s Note: This article was submitted before the U.S.-Iran conflict began. We intentionally left the article as “forward looking” to signify the value of the analysis.)

The Red Sea theater sits in a fragile equilibrium. Commercial shipping lines have cautiously begun returning to the Suez corridor after months of rerouting around the Cape of Good Hope. Insurance premiums remain elevated but are no longer crisis-level. Western naval task forces maintain a visible deterrent presence. Meanwhile, the Houthis continue to signal both restraint and readiness. The question is no longer whether the Red Sea crisis of 2024-2025 can return. The question is what specific trigger conditions will lead to its return. Accordingly, the escalating U.S.-Israeli-Iranian confrontation will make the Houthis resume maritime attacks, if not also targeting different spots of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC).

The earlier claims about trench networks around Hodeidah, Yemen and coastal missile positioning, whether fully verified or partly exaggerated, fit within a broader pattern: the institutionalization of a long-term defensive and deterrent posture by the Houthis along Yemen’s western coastline. When combined with February 2026 reporting that maritime traffic is resuming but threats persist, a clearer strategic picture emerges. This is not a de-escalation. It is a structured pause under tension.

The Current Operational Baseline

This month, several dynamics defined the Red Sea environment. This included the cautious resuming of shipping traffic via the Suez route; major new Houthi missile or drone strikes on international vessels were not confirmed in this window, and Western naval forces remained deployed. However, Houthi rhetoric tied potential future maritime action to broader regional developments, particularly U.S.-Iran and Israel-related escalation scenarios. In this respect, the Houthis have announced that they will resume attacks on ships in the Red Sea.

The absence of active strikes should not be misread as capacity degradation. Instead, it reflects a conditional deterrence posture.

The Houthis have demonstrated in prior cycles that they calibrate attacks based on political timing rather than purely military opportunity. That suggests that the past few months’ relative quiet has been strategic, not structural. The Houthis were only preparing more for a bigger scale of maritime attacks.

Hodeidah and Coastal Entrenchment: Defensive Depth as Strategic Signaling

Whether or not the claims of the Houthis’ trench dimensions are independently verified, the logic behind coastal fortification is consistent with Houthi behavior. Hodeidah serves multiple functions for the Houthis. It serves as a coordination hub, a political stronghold, and a strategic maritime access point as well as a symbolic center of resistance. If significant defensive works are underway or expanded, they serve three interlocking objectives.

Firstly, for the purpose of anti-assault preparation, large-scale trenches are classic anti-armor and anti-vehicle barriers. They complicate any amphibious or ground-based incursion supported by regional actors. Secondly, for the purpose of airstrike mitigation, defensive depth complicates targeting and disperses assets such as mobile launchers. When it comes to psychological signaling, massive projects communicate permanence. They project the message: “We are not a temporary militia. We are entrenched.” The current environment, characterized by paused attacks but intact infrastructure for renewed confrontation, aligns with this.

Iran-U.S. Tensions as Activation Factor

The strategic linkage between the Houthis and Iran remains central to forecasting. While the Houthis maintain operational autonomy, their Red Sea campaign historically synchronized with broader regional escalation cycles involving the U.S. and Israel. The emerging rhetoric linking maritime threats to wider geopolitical friction suggests a conditional doctrine: The Red Sea is a pressure valve for the Houthis as directed by Iran.

If the U.S.-Iran tensions spike, whether via direct strikes on Iranian assets or Israeli escalation involving Iran-backed actors, then the Red Sea becomes a low-cost, high-visibility response domain. This makes the Red Sea maritime security in 2026 structurally fragile.

Maritime Deterrence Architecture in 2026

Western naval presence in the Red Sea has shifted from reactive escort to semi-permanent deterrence architecture. The key characteristics of such a strategy included layered missile defense at sea, preemptive ISR monitoring of launch sites, rapid retaliatory strike frameworks, and European naval coordination alongside U.S. military assets.

However, this architecture carries its escalation risk. A single successful Houthi strike on a high-value commercial vessel could trigger renewed U.S. or allied airstrikes inside Yemen, re-divert global shipping flows, and force insurers to re-rate the corridor. Thus, deterrence holds, but it is deterrence under tension, not deterrence under resolution.

Forecast: Strategic Scenarios for 2026

There are multiple scenarios that one could anticipate. However, the most likely scenario would be a triggered escalation where the current regional military action involving Israeli-Iranian confrontation or direct U.S.-Iran confrontation activates Houthi maritime operations. Critical indicators from the Houthis to watch for would include repositioning of coastal missile batteries, increased drone launch activity, and explicit linkage in Houthi statements between Yemen and external theaters.

Another scenario would be the Houthis’ internal consolidation and strategic freeze. Here, the Houthis prioritize internal governance and economic stabilization over external projection. In such a scenario, regardless of any U.S.-Iran military confrontation, the Houthis’ maritime attacks remain suspended, and Red Sea threats become rhetorical rather than operational. However, structural drivers, including ideology, alignment, and leverage utility, make such a scenario highly unlikely.

Structural Realities and Final Strategic Assessment

Three enduring factors ensure persistent volatility. Firstly, the geographic leverage is critical where the Bab el-Mandeb chokepoint, a narrow passage that connects the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden, is irreplaceable in global trade. Disruption has a disproportionate economic impact. Secondly, the asymmetric cost structure of the Red Sea maritime attacks grants the Houthis leverage, where their drones and missiles are low cost, the Western defensive interception and naval deployment that are much higher cost. Thirdly, attacks in the Red Sea generate global headlines, thus providing the Houthis with a political signaling value. That makes the theater attractive for indirect signaling. Thus, even if the current situation is relatively calm in the Red Sea, the underlying incentive structure for renewed maritime disruption persists, and threats continue to increase.

The current situation does not reflect the active Red Sea crisis levels of 2024-2025. However, it reflects something equally important: institutionalized readiness. The Houthis appear neither demobilized nor strategically exhausted. Defensive consolidation around Hodeidah, if confirmed, suggests the Houthis’ preparation for future confrontation, not abandonment of maritime leverage. The Red Sea will remain quiet only so long as broader regional dynamics remain contained. The moment those dynamics fracture, most notably with the U.S.-Iranian confrontation, the maritime corridor becomes the fastest and most globally visible arena for escalation. Accordingly, the conclusion is clear: the Red Sea is not stabilizing. It is waiting.

Dr. Mohamed ELDoh is a business development and consulting professional in the defense and security sector. Mohamed holds a Doctorate degree from Grenoble École de Management – France, an MBA from the EU Business School- Spain, and an Advanced Certificate in Counterterrorism Studies from the University of St Andrews, UK. He regularly authors articles addressing defense cooperation, counterterrorism, geopolitics, and emerging security threats in the Middle East and Africa. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own. 

Red Sea Uncertainty: A 2026 Forecast for the Houthis Actions was originally published on Global Security Review.