At the time, the Soviet Union and United States committed to reducing their nuclear arsenals, eliminating an entire category of nuclear weapons, and allowing thorough onsite inspections to ensure treaty compliance. During the Cold War, the INF Treaty served as a crucial stabilizing mechanism in the global nuclear order. Historically, the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) of 1972 and 1979 were the first of several agreements between the US and the Soviet Union. As a result, both sides agreed to reduce their strategic weaponry, which included ballistic missile defenses, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and intercontinental ballistic missiles.

In 1987, Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev signed the INF Treaty. Additionally, they established inspection procedures to make sure both parties followed the agreement. Due to the treaty, 2,600 missiles were destroyed, marking a significant Cold War breakthrough. Despite decades of arms control, the US and Russia still field the largest nuclear forces. Although it is challenging to determine the exact extent of their stockpiles, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) estimates that the US possesses 5,328 warheads, while Russia has 5,580.

In August 2025, Russia declared it would no longer fulfil its commitments under the INF Treaty, citing increasing threats from the United States and other Western nations. When the US withdrew from the INF Treaty in 2019 because of Russian noncompliance with treaty limitations, Moscow stated that it would not use such weapons as long as Washington did not. This may have served as an effective ruse, but it served a purpose.

Questions are increasing about the utility of nuclear proliferation, the threat of arms racing, and the future of nuclear deterrence following the decision of Russia to fully abrogate the INF Treaty. The collapse of the INF Treaty represents a significant shift in the trajectory of international arms control.

The situation took a more dramatic turn as President Donald Trump announced that the US would move two of its nuclear-armed submarines closer to Russia in reaction to the “inflammatory statements” issued by former Russian President Dmitry Medvedev. This action highlights the challenge that arises when arms control breaks down—the potential for misunderstandings and overreactions increase.

Among nuclear-armed states, communication, predictability, and a certain measure of self-control are essential elements of nuclear deterrence. They were shaped by the INF Treaty, which placed verifiable limitations on missile sites. With the failure of the INF Treaty, useful tools were removed.

The future deployment of intermediate-range systems in regions that were shielded from them may prove an urgent strategic issue. Once at the epicenter of Cold War nuclear worries, Europe may have to host such weapons once more, but with improved accuracy, shorter travel times, and, perhaps, lower yields.

Deterrence dynamics in the Asia-Pacific are more difficult, especially between the US, China, and Russia, after the INF Treaty. The great powers are now accelerating nuclear modernization, while non-nuclear states are reconsidering their nonproliferation commitments. A replay of the Cold War–era European missile crisis has emerged with the collapse of the treaty.

Now, both Russia and the US are free to use and develop short-, medium-, and intermediate-range missiles without any official restraints. One more issue concerns the intentions of other governments, who may be influenced by the deterioration of controls on nuclear systems. States that did not previously possess nuclear weapons may choose to acquire them. Modern arms racing may be fast, less predictable, and more destabilizing due to technological advancements, such as autonomous delivery systems, hypersonic weapons, and AI-assisted targeting.

There are limited prospects for cooperative tools to mitigate these risks of escalation between the US and Russia. The two largest nuclear powers have a special duty to control and limit the scope of their competition.

Measures that encourage openness, trust, and communication between nuclear and non-nuclear governments will be crucial. In the absence of a global treaty, regional security accords, tailored to today’s security challenges, can effectively restrict risky deployments and restrain great powers from further modernizing their nuclear arsenals.

Nations in the Asia-Pacific can, for example, agree to mutual missile deployment restrictions similar to those in the INF Treaty’s verification procedures, which include regular inspections and satellite monitoring by mutual compliance. This would prevent insecure military build-ups in the region and reduce mistrust between states. Whatever course nations take, the importance of preventing escalation to nuclear use is foremost.

Nazia Sheikh is a Research Officer at the Centre for International Strategic Studies, AJK. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own. 

The Uncertain Future of Nuclear Deterrence and Proliferation was originally published on Global Security Review.

Nano aquabots are a dual-use technology that can both serve humanity and cause harm. Research on 3-lamellar morphology of miktoarm terpolymers is also dual-use technology. Manipulating the crystalline morphology in a non-fullerene acceptor (NFA) mixture to improve carrier transport and suppress energetic disorder is itself a dual-use technology. Ignoring all of the scientific language, it is important to understand that these are dual-use technologies.

All these technologies are funded in large part by the US government, in collaboration with the Chinese government and institutions. The dual-use nature of these examples is instructive. First, nano aquabots perform a variety of tasks in aquatic environments, ranging from environmental monitoring to targeted drug delivery within the human body. Weaponizing nano aquabots would lead to new and bizarre sci-fi warfare.

3-lamellar morphology of Miktoarm terpolymers have unique mechanical strength, thermal stability, and chemical resistance, which are pivotal in applications ranging from aerospace because of their lightweight yet strong components to biomedicine potentially revolutionizing certain medical treatments and interventions. The 3-lamellar morphology of these terpolymers paves the way for advancements in nanotechnology.

The primary benefit of manipulating crystalline morphology in NFA mixtures lies in the enhancement of carrier mobility. Energetic disorder refers to the variation in energy levels within a material. For example, this disorder can impede the performance of organic solar cells by trapping charge carriers and reducing their mobility. Suppression of energetic disorder advances stealth technology. It can also be used to harden electronics to withstand extreme temperatures, humidity, and other environmental stressors.

We are at the beginning of a multifaceted quantum revolution in science (MQRS). This multifaceted scientific revolution is fueled by its own discoveries in artificial intelligence, machine learning, quantum mechanics, and quantum computing. Imagine a hypothetical quantum battery that has the capacity to recycle its own energy as it continues to accelerate and deliver sustained power for exponential acceleration. The MQRS will, hypothetically, accelerate scientific discovery exponentially.

What are some of these facets that make this scientific revolution multifaceted? MQRS facets include revolutions in genetics, such as with techniques like CRISPR and gene therapy, biotechnology, nanotechnology, quantum mechanics, quantum computing, robotics, autonomous systems, space exploration, astrophysics, neuroscience, and brain-computer interfaces.

Unclassified research is available in peer reviewed academic journals such as the American Chemical Society’s (ACS) Nano, Synthetic Biology, Macromolecules, Small Science, Emerging Microbes and Infections, Immunological Reviews, Journal of Computational Physics, Advanced Science, Advanced Materials, Advanced Electronic Materials, and many more. Funding research trickles down from the Department of Energy to labs such as the Oak Ridge National Laboratory, which, since 2000, is operated by the University of Tennessee and the Battelle Memorial Institute.

Other partners and funding include the Army Research Office, the Air Force Office of Scientific Research and Basic Energy Sciences. Partners on the Chinese side include Hong Kong’s Research Grants Council, University Grants Committee, Croucher Foundation, Beijing’s National Natural Science Foundation of China directly under the administration of the PRC’s Ministry of Science and Technology, and the Foreign Technology Cooperation Plan of Guangzhou, China.

This sensitive and advanced research has the blessing of the US Congress under the US-China Science and Technology Cooperation Agreement (STCA). Under this legislation, Congress requires the Departments of State, Defense, and Commerce and the Central Intelligence Agency to report to Congress biennially on how the US-China STCA benefits the PRC economy, military, and industrial base, including the role of technology transfer and compliance with American export controls.  According to the Congressional Research Service’s (CRS), Karen M. Sutter and John F. Sargent Jr., “These reports have not been public; some that have been made public through Freedom of Information Act requests mostly do not provide the required assessments.”

The United States sees this as a tool to foster ties, address climate change, and advance science for overall well-being. According to Sutter and Sargent’s report, the benefits to American researchers is that they have access to large pools of research subjects and longitudinal health studies from China. This also means that Chinese researchers have access to American medical data, from databases such as those acquired through the 2013 BGI-Shenzhen acquisition of US-based Complete Genomics. Also noted in the CRS report, as China develops domestic scientific competencies, it increasingly seeks to restrict US access. In 2019, China cut off US access to coronavirus research, including US-funded work at the Wuhan Institute of Virology. China withheld avian influenza strains required for American vaccines.

The MQRS will potentially accelerate until it hits an unforeseen black swan of a brick wall. China’s intentions toward the United States are not of the black swan variety; instead, they are of the plain-as-day white swan variety that Americans choose to ignore. And this is at a time when risks and rewards of the MQRS are growing more pronounced.

In short, Congress should remove China from its Science and Technology Cooperation Agreement. Americans should not take part in driving Chinese technical expertise forward. American tax dollars are also assisting China’s AI-driven research in advanced fields such as energy-dissipative evolutionary deep operator neural networks. Such work has application to military purposes. It would be foolish to believe the Chinese will not use all of the technologies discussed here to further their advantage over the United States.

China wants to overturn the liberal international order. American naivete is one way to make sure they succeed.

Alex Littlefield, PhD, is the Chief of Staff at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies and a Fellow of the Institute. He spent more than two decades in Taiwan and China.

Nano Aquabots and the US-China Science and Technology Cooperation Agreement was originally published on Global Security Review.