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		<title>US–Iran Talks: Unlikely to Succeed Absent a Military Strike</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/us-iran-talks-unlikely-to-succeed-absent-a-military-strike/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Ranj Tofik]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 22 May 2025 12:21:06 +0000</pubDate>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=30785</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Indirect US-Iran talks are ongoing, with the first round held in Muscat, the capital of Oman, on April 12. Based on what was announced, the primary focus for the United States appears to be Iran’s nuclear program and preventing Tehran from acquiring nuclear weapons. Meanwhile, Iran insists that the negotiations remain strictly limited to the [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/us-iran-talks-unlikely-to-succeed-absent-a-military-strike/">US–Iran Talks: Unlikely to Succeed Absent a Military Strike</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Indirect US-Iran talks are ongoing, with the first round held in Muscat, the capital of Oman, <a href="https://nationalinterest.org/blog/middle-east-watch/the-high-stakes-of-u-s-iran-talks">on April 12</a>. Based on what was announced, the primary focus for the United States appears to be Iran’s nuclear program and preventing Tehran from acquiring nuclear weapons. Meanwhile, Iran insists that the negotiations remain strictly limited to the <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/iran-talks-with-us-to-stay-indirect-will-only-address-nuclear-issues-and-sanctions/">nuclear issue and the lifting of sanctions</a>.</p>
<p>However, Iran’s broader regional influence and its destabilizing activities remain a fundamental concern—one that is unlikely to be addressed through an agreement focused solely on its nuclear capabilities. Preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons, dismantling its nuclear infrastructure, or even restricting its ballistic missile program does not, on its own, resolve the underlying challenge posed by Tehran’s regional behavior.</p>
<p><strong>What Is Iran’s Influence Based On?</strong></p>
<p>Iranian influence in the region is grounded in three main pillars. First, Iran relies on Shiite religious ideology. Iran positions itself as the leader of the global Shiite community. This sect has a social and political base in several Middle Eastern and surrounding countries. Through Shiite populations and affiliated groups, Iran infiltrates states and establishes <a href="https://www.cfr.org/article/irans-regional-armed-network">loyal militias</a>, enabling it to exert significant influence over these countries—or parts of them—effectively weakening their sovereignty and transforming them into subservient states.</p>
<p>For example, Iran wields significant influence in Iraq through the Shiite Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), in Lebanon through Hezbollah, in Yemen via the Houthis, and in Syria, where influence was exerted through Bashar al-Assad’s Alawite-led regime. Additionally, Iran has formed Shiite militias from the Shiite populations of Afghanistan, <a href="https://www.mei.edu/publications/understanding-fatemiyoun-division-life-through-eyes-militia-member">the Fatemiyoun Brigade</a>, and Pakistan, <a href="https://amwaj.media/en/article/iran-s-pakistani-allies-in-syria-in-crosshairs-as-they-return-home">the Zainabiyoun Brigade</a>. Through these efforts, Iran has constructed the “<a href="https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/iran-and-shiite-crescent-myths-and-realities">Shiite Crescent</a>.”</p>
<p>Second, Iran exploits broader Islamic issues. Iran strategically champions causes with Pan-Islamic appeal, most notably the Palestinian issue, to extend its influence beyond Shiite groups and into Sunni communities. Despite historical sectarian divides and conflict between Sunnis and Shiites, Iran has successfully co-opted or allied with key Sunni movements such as Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad, expanding its influence into Gaza and presenting itself as the principal defender of the Palestinian cause. This position garners support not only from across the Muslim world but also from segments of the Western left. By uniting Shiite militias (the “Shiite Crescent”) and Sunni militant groups under a common anti-Western and anti-Israel banner, Iran has forged what it calls the “<a href="https://thedefensepost.com/2024/12/10/assad-ouster-breaks-iran-axis-resistance/">Axis of Resistance</a>.” This alliance played a central role in the outbreak of the October 7, 2023, war, which continues to this day.</p>
<p>Third, the regime exercises a repressive domestic grip. Maintaining and managing this vast regional network requires immense and sustained financial and military support. Despite facing long-standing and severe international sanctions and domestic economic hardship, Iran continues to fund and arm its proxies. A key factor enabling this is the <a href="https://thedefensepost.com/2025/04/10/who-benefits-iran-nuclear-deal/">authoritarian nature</a> of the regime, which extracts national wealth and redirects it to foreign operations, while the Iranian population endures poverty, inflation, and public service failures. Popular discontent is suppressed through systematic repression, especially targeting marginalized ethnic groups such as the Kurds, Baluchis, and Arabs, who face both economic deprivation and political persecution. This repressive apparatus prevents domestic uprisings and sustains the regime’s ability to project power abroad.</p>
<p>Therefore, Iranian influence in the region is not primarily based on its nuclear program or ballistic missiles. Iran was able to extend its influence over Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Yemen, and Gaza without resorting to ballistic missile attacks or explicit threats involving its nuclear program. However, when Iran did employ its ballistic missiles and military power, most notably during its direct attacks on Israel on April 13, 2024, and October 1, 2024, this coincided with a period of declining regional influence. During this time, Iran experienced significant setbacks, losing ground in Syria and Gaza and suffering major blows in Lebanon and even within its own borders.</p>
<p>In other words, the golden age of Iranian influence occurred during a time when it refrained from directly using its ballistic missiles or overt military force. Its later use of such power came at a moment when its regional axis was already weakening. This suggests that Iran’s true influence lies not in its nuclear program or missile capabilities, but in other, less tangible sources of power—ones that are far more difficult to constrain through formal agreements. Therefore, to effectively counter Iran’s regional influence and threat, the United States must begin by addressing the three key factors discussed above.</p>
<p><strong>The Shia Principle of Taqiyya</strong></p>
<p>Iran is constitutionally defined as a Shia state, and its ruling regime openly adopts and promotes Shia ideological principles. One of the most well-known concepts in Shia Islam is <a href="https://saaid.org/bahoth/152.htm">Taqiyya</a>, a principle that permits the concealment of one’s beliefs or intentions when facing danger, threat, or coercion. Traditionally, Taqiyya is understood as a form of self-protection in times of persecution, allowing individuals to lie or withhold the truth to preserve life and religious identity.</p>
<p>In the context of the Iranian regime, Taqiyya has evolved beyond personal religious practice into a broader political doctrine. It is sometimes employed as a strategic tool to justify diplomatic flexibility, ambiguity, or deception, particularly in times of weakness. As a result, securing Iran’s full compliance with international agreements may be especially challenging. The regime may commit to agreements under duress or strategic necessity, only to abandon or reinterpret those commitments once it perceives a restoration of strength. Thus, Taqiyya is not merely a religious principle but has become a core aspect of the regime’s political behavior and strategic calculus.</p>
<p><strong>What Is the Solution?</strong></p>
<p>One of the key factors behind Iran’s continued expansion of influence and regional destabilization is its perception that the United States is unwilling to launch a military strike against its territory. This perception significantly reduces the credibility of diplomatic pressure and sanctions. To alter this strategic calculus, a limited and targeted military strike on Iran’s nuclear and military facilities, followed by the negotiation of a specific and enforceable agreement, may be necessary.</p>
<p>Such a calibrated use of force would serve not only to degrade Iran’s capabilities but also to demonstrate clear consequences for noncompliance. In this context, Iran may become more amenable to concessions and more committed to upholding agreements, as it would recognize that failure to comply carries the real risk of further military escalation—potentially threatening the survival of the regime itself.</p>
<p><em>Ranj Tofik is a Non-Resident Scholar at the Middle East Policy Council, and a PhD researcher in political science at the University of Warsaw, Poland</em>.</p>
<p><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/05/U.S.-Iran-Talks-Unlikely-to-Succeed-Absent-a-Military-Strike.pdf"><img decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-29852" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1.png" alt="" width="256" height="71" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1.png 450w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1-300x83.png 300w" sizes="(max-width: 256px) 100vw, 256px" /></a></p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/us-iran-talks-unlikely-to-succeed-absent-a-military-strike/">US–Iran Talks: Unlikely to Succeed Absent a Military Strike</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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		<title>Nuclear Diplomacy or Regime Survival? Rethinking the Iran Deal</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/who-truly-benefits-from-a-us-iran-new-nukes-deal/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Loqman Radpey]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 24 Apr 2025 12:15:56 +0000</pubDate>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=30597</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>In response to President Donald Trump’s letter to Iran’s supreme leader, Ali Khamenei, proposing a new nuclear deal, Khamenei’s stance was unequivocal: rejection, dismissing it as “deception of public opinion.” Yet, within the Iranian government, conflicting signals emerged, with some officials suggesting the offer was under consideration. This strategic ambiguity is not new. Khamenei employed [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/who-truly-benefits-from-a-us-iran-new-nukes-deal/">Nuclear Diplomacy or Regime Survival? Rethinking the Iran Deal</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>In response to President Donald Trump’s <a href="https://www.axios.com/2025/03/19/trump-letter-iran-nuclear-deal">letter</a> to Iran’s supreme leader, Ali Khamenei, proposing a new nuclear deal, Khamenei’s stance was unequivocal: rejection, <a href="https://nypost.com/2025/03/19/us-news/trumps-letter-to-iran-demanded-new-nuclear-deal-very-soon-wh/">dismissing</a> it as “deception of public opinion.” Yet, within the Iranian government, conflicting signals emerged, with some <a href="https://english.aawsat.com/world/5124276-iran-behind-trump%E2%80%99s-threat-opportunity">officials</a> suggesting the offer was under <a href="https://x.com/Iran_UN/status/1898746038074155491">consideration</a>. This strategic ambiguity is not new. Khamenei employed the same tactic during negotiations for the collapsed Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), allowing him to distance himself from any fallout should the deal collapse. Ultimately, however, history has shown that under pressure, the regime will capitulate—what Iran’s leaders call “drinking the poisoned chalice.” But assuming a new deal materializes, what would it mean for the people of Iran?</p>
<p>In 2018, President Donald Trump <a href="https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefings-statements/president-donald-j-trump-ending-united-states-participation-unacceptable-iran-deal/">withdrew</a> from the JCPOA, the nuclear agreement brokered by President Barack Obama in 2015, as it “failed to protect America’s national security interests.” Trump justified his withdrawal by arguing that the agreement, as “a windfall of cash”, did not curbed Iran’s malign activities. Instead, he contended, it provided financial resources that “enriched the Iranian regime and enabled its malign behavior.”</p>
<p>For Iran’s non-Persian national and ethnic groups, the failure of the JCPOA was also due to its <a href="https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2020/05/08/jcpoa-not-improved-irans-human-rights-record/">disregard</a> for human rights and domestic oppression. Western negotiators prioritized nuclear and missiles restrictions and regional security while sidelining the people’s suffering under an authoritarian regime. The economic relief from the deal landed in the hands of regime elites, particularly the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and their affiliates. Ordinary peoples saw little benefit. Instead, the regime doubled down on its crackdown against marginalized groups, including Kurds, Baloch, and Arabs. With reduced external pressure, Tehran felt emboldened to impose its Persian-Shia ideological <a href="https://www.meforum.org/mef-observer/persia-or-iran-why-it-matters">hegemony</a> even more aggressively.</p>
<p>Now, with <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-03-04/iran-putin-to-help-trump-broker-nuclear-talks-with-tehran">talks</a> of a renewed deal <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=acvu2LBumGo">resurfacing</a>, one must ask: will this agreement, like its predecessor, serve only the regime’s interests? Trump’s letter outlined <a href="https://x.com/abdulkhaleq_uae/status/1902772134432403958?s=46">conditions</a> for sanctions relief, including an end to Iran’s nuclear weapons program, cessation of uranium enrichment, ceasing financial support to Hezbollah and halting arms transfers to the Houthis, and dismantling its militias in Iraq. However, these terms, like before, fail to address the human rights abuses within Iran. If a future deal ignores these realities, it will once again be the oppressed groups who pay the price.</p>
<p>The absence of human rights considerations in Western negotiations with Iran is not incidental—it is a <a href="https://webarchive.archive.unhcr.org/20230530075957/https:/www.refworld.org/docid/55e6bf714.html">consistent</a> pattern. Historically, the West has often prioritized short-term strategic gains over the long-term aspirations of the people in Iran. The result has been a cycle of diplomatic engagements that empower the ruling elite while leaving everyday people in a deepening state of economic hardship and political repression. Sanctions relief, while theoretically aimed at improving the people’s economy, has instead served as a financial injection for the regime’s military-industrial complex, allowing it to tighten its grip on power.</p>
<p>For Iran’s diverse population—comprising Baluchis, Kurds, Armenians, Qashqais, Azeris, Arabs, Turkmens, Gilakis, Tabaris, Talyshis, and religious groups including Jews and Bahais—a nuclear deal that fails to address their plight could be devastating. The regime’s persecution of non-Persian groups has been marked by disproportionate <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/documents/country-reports/ahrc5862-situation-human-rights-islamic-republic-iran-report-special">executions</a> of Kurds and Baluchis, arbitrary detentions, and systematic cultural suppression. Economic marginalization has left these groups disproportionately affected by unemployment, poverty, and lack of access to basic services. A deal that does not explicitly condition sanctions relief on improvements in human rights will serve as yet another tool for the government to sustain its policies of repression and forced assimilation. Moreover, the suppression of dissent extends to students, journalists, and activists who have faced severe crackdowns for expressing opposition to the regime’s policies.</p>
<p>This regime operates outside conventional norms, yet Western commentators in mainstream media, instead of acknowledging the ideological and religious motives of Iran’s Shi’ite rulers, continue to search for rational justifications that overlook the regime’s true nature. If the past is any indication, a nuclear deal without guarantees for the people of Iran will reinforce the status quo: economic benefits funneled to regime elites, intensified repression of national and ethnic minorities, and continued expansion of Iran’s regional influence at the expense of its citizens. A more “comprehensive” approach to diplomacy with Iran must incorporate human rights as a core negotiating principle. Strict oversight and accountability measures must be implemented to prevent state-controlled entities, such as the judiciary, from imposing verdicts on the people, and the IRGC from monopolizing financial resources and oppressing dissidents. Furthermore, human rights organizations and genuine opposition figures should have a voice in shaping the terms of any agreement.</p>
<p>Ultimately, the goal of any nuclear deal should also aim to create conditions that empower its people to pursue democratic aspirations. A policy that prioritizes human rights alongside the security of Israel and the US would be strategically effective in fostering long-term stability in the region.</p>
<p><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/04/Nuclear-Diplomacy-or-Regime-Survival-Rethinking-the-Iran-Deal.pdf"><img decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-29601" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/12/2025-Download-Button.png" alt="Download here." width="274" height="76" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/12/2025-Download-Button.png 450w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/12/2025-Download-Button-300x83.png 300w" sizes="(max-width: 274px) 100vw, 274px" /></a></p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/who-truly-benefits-from-a-us-iran-new-nukes-deal/">Nuclear Diplomacy or Regime Survival? Rethinking the Iran Deal</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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