The Indo-Pacific is rapidly emerging as the central theatre of global strategic competition. Unlike the Cold War in Europe, where nuclear deterrence involved two superpowers across relatively defined front lines, the Indo-Pacific presents a far more complex landscape. The region spans vast maritime distances, multiple potential flashpoints, and several nuclear-armed adversaries. North Korea continues to expand its nuclear and missile programs, China is rapidly increasing both the size and sophistication of its arsenal, and Russia maintains nuclear capabilities alongside a growing strategic presence in the Pacific.

In such an environment, the traditional model of extended deterrence, where the United States alone provides nuclear protection to its allies, may not be sufficient to address the scale and diversity of contingencies across the region. A new framework may be required, an Indo-Pacific nuclear alliance built on shared responsibility, distributed deterrence, and sovereign nuclear capabilities among key allies.

Complicating the adversary: The logic of distributed deterrence

At the core of such an alliance would ideally be sovereign nuclear deterrents for Australia, Japan, and South Korea. This model would resemble the role of the United Kingdom and France within NATO. Both maintain independent nuclear forces and sovereign decision-making, while contributing to the alliance’s broader deterrence posture.

Applying this model to the Indo-Pacific would significantly strengthen deterrence. If Australia, Japan, and South Korea each possessed sovereign nuclear capabilities, adversaries would face a far more complex strategic calculus. Rather than confronting a single decision-maker in Washington, they would need to account for multiple independent governments capable of responding to aggression.

This distributed architecture would complicate adversary planning and raise escalation risks. Any state considering coercion or military action against an Indo-Pacific democracy would have to account not only for the United States, but for several nuclear-capable regional powers with distinct strategic interests and decision-making processes.

Geography reinforces this logic. The Indo-Pacific spans an immense area, from the Korean Peninsula and Taiwan Strait to the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean approaches to Australia. The sheer distance between these theatres makes a purely centralized deterrence model increasingly difficult to sustain.

Flexible Deterrence through forward deployment and hosting

An Indo-Pacific nuclear alliance would therefore require forward deployment and hosting arrangements across the region. Australia, Japan, and South Korea could host a range of nuclear capabilities designed to provide flexible deterrent options across multiple contingencies.

These could include submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM-N) on Ohio- and Columbia-class submarines; nuclear sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCM-N) on Virginia- and AUKUS-class submarines; B83 gravity bombs for platforms such as the B-2 Spirit and B-21 Raider, alongside the rearming of the B-52 Stratofortress and B-1B Lancer; B61 nuclear bombs for the B61 nuclear bombs for aircraft including the B-2, B-21, B-52, and F-35A Lightning II; and Long-Range Stand-Off (LRSO-N) nuclear cruise missiles for the B-21 and B-52. In addition, nuclear warheads could be assigned to land-based, mobile intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) launchers.

By dispersing these capabilities across multiple allied territories, the alliance would establish a more resilient and survivable deterrent posture. It would be far more difficult for an adversary to neutralize. Hosting arrangements would also strengthen operational integration among allied forces. As in NATO’s nuclear-sharing model, partner nations could contribute dual-capable platforms capable of delivering nuclear payloads in extreme circumstances.

Australia, Japan, and South Korea could commit to dual-capable submarine (DCS), aircraft (DCA), and land-based missile launcher (DCL) missions within the alliance structure. Dual-capable aircraft would provide visible and flexible deterrence signaling. Submarine-based systems would ensure a survivable second-strike capability across the region’s vast maritime domain. While land-based mobile missile launchers would add a credible and responsive ground-based deterrent, reinforcing the threat of rapid retaliation.

Such arrangements would distribute both responsibility and capability among Indo-Pacific allies, reducing the burden on the United States while strengthening the credibility of deterrence. It would transform the region from one dependent on a single guarantor into a networked system of mutually reinforcing nuclear deterrents.

Why the Philippines should revisit extended nuclear deterrence

An Indo-Pacific nuclear alliance would also require a reassessment of the policies of other regional partners. One notable example is the Philippines. For decades, the Philippines benefited from extended nuclear deterrence under its alliance with the United States. However, that relationship was complicated when the Philippines ratified the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) in February 2021. By joining a treaty that prohibits the development, possession, and use—or threat of use—of nuclear weapons, the Philippines has distanced itself from reliance on the US nuclear umbrella.
This decision sits uneasily alongside the increasingly contested security environment in the South China Sea. If Manila wishes to strengthen its security relationship with the United States and regional partners, it may need to reconsider its position. Reintegrating into the framework of US extended nuclear deterrence would provide a stronger strategic backstop against coercion or aggression in its maritime domain.

Restoring strategic stability through credible, distributed deterrence architecture

Ultimately, the purpose of an Indo-Pacific nuclear alliance would not be to encourage proliferation for its own sake. Rather, it would be to restore strategic stability in a region where the balance of power is shifting rapidly.

Deterrence works best when it is credible, distributed, and resilient. In a region as vast and strategically complex as the Indo-Pacific, relying on a single nuclear guarantor may no longer provide the level of deterrence required to prevent conflict.

By adopting a model like the United Kingdom and France within NATO, where allied states maintain sovereign nuclear forces while contributing to a broader alliance deterrence posture, Australia, Japan, and South Korea could build a more stable and credible strategic architecture.

Such an arrangement would ensure that any adversary contemplating aggression in the Indo-Pacific would face not one nuclear power, but several, each capable of defending its sovereignty and contributing to the collective security of the region.

Natalie Treloar is the Australian Company Director of Alpha-India Consultancy, a Senior Fellow at the Indo-Pacific Studies Center (IPSC), a Senior Analyst at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies (NIDS), and a member of the Open Nuclear Network. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

Beyond a Pacific Defense Pact 4: Blueprint for an Indo-Pacific Nuclear Alliance was originally published on Global Security Review.

Two parties have watched Operation Epic Fury (OEF) from a distance. China has been taking notes. The United States Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM) has tracked munitions consumption rates of U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM). Both the PRC and INDOPACOM know that what is happening above, in, and around Tehran will impact Beijing’s plans to take Taiwan. And they know Washington plans to prevent that.

Opposing Forces

The Peoples Republic of China (PRC) strongman Xi Jinping declared Taiwan “must and will be” absorbed. He has even set a deadline of 2027 for his military to be ready to seize Taiwan. The Pentagon reports that Beijing “continues to refine multiple military options” to take Taiwan “by brute force.” Xi is assembling the capabilities to execute those options. This includes 420,000 troops, 750 fighter-jets, 300 bombers, 158 warships (including 50 landing ships) and hundreds of missile systems, all in the Taiwan Strait region.

In response, Taiwan has increased defense spending from 2% of GDP in 2019 to 3.3% of GDP in 2026, with plans to invest 5% of GDP on defense by 2030. Taiwan is using those resources to produce homegrown antiship, air-defense, land-attack and air-to-air missiles; expand production of attack-drones; and build a fleet of submarines. Taiwan recently received ATACMS missiles and HIMARS systems. Taipei is still awaiting delivery of dozens of F-16V fighters and TOW antitank systems, which is part of a $21 billion backlog of U.S. arms. Taipei also wants F-35s and additional Patriot systems. In short, Taiwan is racing to construct “a porcupine defense”—one that would make an invasion so painful as to dissuade Xi from even attempting it.

The United States Response

While Xi has been clear about his plans for Taiwan, Washington has been vague. Under the Taiwan Relations Act, neither side of the Taiwan Strait knows exactly what Washington would do in the event of war.

The INDOPACOM commander, Adm. Samuel Paparo, is doing his part to send a clear message. If Beijing attacks Taiwan, he plans to “turn the Taiwan Strait into an unmanned hellscape.” The drones and missilery of “hellscape” would come from multiple directions. Further supporting this clear message is that in 2024, the U.S. Army moved Typhon missile systems to the Philippines, and in 2025 the Pentagon created Task Force-Philippines and deployed a Marine unit armed with anti-ship systems to the Philippines. Lastly, in 2026, the Pentagon unveiled Army Rotational Force-Philippines, which will deploy missile and drone assets.

Currently the Pentagon is revitalizing airfields in the Philippines, Tinian and Wake Island; basing top-of-the-line fighters on Okinawa; and rotating B-52s through Australia. Army units on Palau have tested land-based missiles against seagoing targets. And F-35s are now carrying long-range antiship missiles tailormade for targeting a PRC invasion fleet.

Near the end of his tenure, however, commanding U.S. Army-Pacific, Gen. Robert Brown reported that his PRC counterparts “don’t fear us anymore.” This is regrettable, but understandable. America’s Navy deploys fewer than 300 ships which, like America’s commitments, are spread around the world. Those commitments expend finite assets: OEF has exposed the limitations of U.S. weapons stockpiles and production capacity, and it has forced the Pentagon to shuffle assets from the Indo-Pacific to the Middle East.

Allied Response

America’s not-so-secret weapon is its interconnected system of alliances. America’s alliances serve as force-multipliers, layers of strategic depth, and outer rings of America’s own security, which enable power projection through prepositioning, basing, overflight, and resupply. Even though U.S. allies are critical, China has no real allies.

Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi describes an attack on Taiwan as a “threat to Japan’s survival,” indicating Japan would assist the U.S. in defending the island. In hopes of preventing such a scenario, Japan has bolstered defenses across its southwestern territories, placing F-35Bs on Kyushu, anti-ship systems, air-defenses, and electronic-warfare units on islands south of Kyushu; and air-defense and missile-defense units on Yonaguni Island (70 miles east of Taiwan). In addition, Japan is fielding 22 attack submarines, acquiring 500 TLAMs, producing missiles domestically, and upconverting ships into aircraft carriers armed with F-35Bs.

Australia is partnering with the U.S. and Britain to deploy a fleet of nuclear-powered submarines, and Australia has opened its territory to U.S. Marines, submarines and B-52s.

Briain and France have stepped up in production of a key element needed for TLAM production due to China shutting off the supply. Norway is supplying the U.S. with antiship missiles and joint strike missiles. A U.S.-Israeli partnership is manufacturing loitering munitions, which are likely part of Paparo’s “hellscape.” Japan, Australia, Britain, Canada, France, and Germany have conducted freedom-of-navigation operations through the Taiwan Strait further supported by Britain, Italy, and France coordinating deployments of their aircraft carriers in the Pacific.

Enhancing A Deterrent Posture

China’s commitments and assets, conversely, are focused on its neighborhood. If Xi moves against Taiwan, his arsenal will be better positioned than the U.S. and is more sophisticated than Iran’s.

Deterring Xi from making that move will require more capability and more defense spending.

Sen. Roger Wicker has unveiled a plan to increase defense spending to 5% of GDP. Similarly, the Commission on National Defense Strategy recommends lifting defense spending to levels “commensurate with the U.S. national effort seen during the Cold War.”

Although the president recently called for more military spending, the administration’s FY2026 defense budget was just 3.2% of GDP. The Cold War average was more than twice that.

The Way Forward

It is time to maintain a policy of “strategic ambiguity” to one of strategic clarity because of the great danger it presents. The secret alliances that led to World War I remind us that there is a greater risk in leaving defense guarantees opaque. The open defense treaties that followed World War II, and prevented World War III remind us that the prudent course is clarity of commitment.

There is a blueprint for deterring war over Taiwan: Washington needs to be clear about the nature of its commitment to Taiwan. Washington needs to view alliances not as liabilities to cut, but as resources to nurture. “We cannot afford,” as Churchill once counseled, “to work on narrow margins, offering temptations to a trial of strength.”

Alan Dowd is a regular contributor to Global Security Review and a senior fellow with the Sagamore Institute, where he leads the Center for America’s Purpose. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

A Blueprint for Deterring War Over Taiwan was originally published on Global Security Review.

In PNG, the Pukpuk Treaty not only strengthens its defense relationship with Australia but also prompts a realignment of Australian strategy, influencing how major powers like China, the United States, and others engage in the region. The treaty demonstrates that small states are not merely reactive; they can take the initiative to defend their interests and manage the challenges of superpower competition.

The Pukpuk Treaty reflects how PNG is repositioning itself strategically due to limited capacity, geographic vulnerability, and internal security pressures. PNG has recognized its weaknesses in defense forces, including border patrol, sea patrols, internal security, police, and the equipment and software of its defense (training, doctrine, etc.).

The treaty will address these gaps by enhancing capacity, fostering interoperability with Australia, exploring recruitment of PNG staff into the Australian Defence Force (ADF), promoting joint training, and modernizing the military. By requesting the treaty, PNG is not merely accepting foreign assistance but choosing a partner and clearly defining the nature of cooperation, with its sovereignty as a central concern.

The political elite in PNG are using the treaty as a tool to influence the broader competition between the great powers. Part of the treaty’s design is a clear strategic counter-pressure by Australia against the rising Chinese influence in the Pacific.

Canberra is concerned that China’s growing influence through trade, investment, infrastructure, or even security arrangements with Pacific nations could pose a threat to Australia along its northern borders. The Pukpuk Treaty thus becomes a key part of Australia’s strategy to secure its neighborhood.

However, PNG is not passive; its foreign affairs ministry explicitly stated that the treaty will not include a third-party cooperation exception, and that PNG retains its constitutional right to engage in defense cooperation with other countries. This balancing act allows PNG to welcome Australian protection and investment while also trying to preserve flexibility in its foreign policy.

The Pukpuk Treaty shows how legal, constitutional, and domestic political constraints can serve as practical tools for small states to influence great powers. In Papua New Guinea, there is an ongoing debate: recently, retired Major General Jerry Singirok questioned concepts of sovereignty, non-alignment, and constitutionality, specifically whether integrating the PNG Defence Force into the ADF structures or adopting Australian military doctrine would be unconstitutional under PNG law.

Papua New Guinea also issued warnings that public consultation, parliamentary ratification, and legal safeguards are practical considerations. These constraints suggest that Australian strategic ambitions are not pursued unconditionally but require negotiation and moderation. PNG is leveraging its internal political processes to ensure its interests are protected. This demonstrates that small states are not merely vassals but hold significant agency through institutional rules, constitutional mechanisms, and civil-military relations.

The treaty reshapes how we view alliances and security in the Pacific. Currently, Australia has only a few formal mutual defense treaties. The Pukpuk Treaty is the first new treaty-level defense alliance in Australia in over 70 years. This indicates a shift from informal security cooperation, training, aid, and soft security towards more formalized mutual defense commitments.

For the Pacific, this means smaller states seeking such formal agreements gain greater bargaining power, more reliable security arrangements, and improved access to resources. It also increases the stakes in global competition. Any formal alliance is likely to provoke countermeasures by other major powers. In fact, China already warned PNG not to sign a treaty that restricts collaboration with other nations and stressed the importance of maintaining sovereignty and decision-making independence.

Being this close to Australia will limit PNG’s options, potentially tying it to Australia’s strategic interests, which may not align with those of PNG, leaving PNG vulnerable to diplomatic repercussions in its dealings with China.

There is also a constitutional risk; PNG’s legal framework might have to balance issues such as dual staffing, foreign military doctrine, foreign operational control, or access to bases. The treaty must protect PNG’s sovereignty while enabling productive cooperation. Additionally, there is a domestic political risk. A perception of lost sovereignty or involvement in an unwanted conflict could provoke public and political instability.

The case of PNG signals that small states are no longer just battlegrounds, but active creators of regional order. By taking the lead and signing such a treaty, PNG clarifies what it requires regarding defense cooperation, sovereignty safeguards, and strategic balance. Using domestic legal procedures (parliamentary ratification, constitutional review, popular debate), PNG ensures that any potential arrangement is stronger than past cooperation and aligns with its long-term interests. Other small states will observe this and may be encouraged to pursue more formal engagements and specific defense partnerships instead of informal or ad hoc arrangements.

Fawad Afridi is an MPhil Scholar at the National Defense University. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own. 

What the Pukpuk Mutual Defense Treaty Tells Us about the Pacific Security Order was originally published on Global Security Review.

Chris McInnes is Executive Director at the Air Power Institute. He is an air power and national security expert with 25 years of experience in the military, government, and industry and is also a frequent commentator and speaker at defence seminars here in Australia.

Deterrence Down Under Podcast: Australian Air Power and Deterrence with Chris McInnes was originally published on Global Security Review.

The existing US-led hub-and-spoke alliance system in the Asia-Pacific is fundamentally different than the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). In the 1950s the US investigated the possibility of establishing a regional multilateral alliance, but this soon proved infeasible. Unable to forge a Northeast Asian equivalent to NATO at the onset of the Cold War, the US opted instead for the “hub-and-spoke” architecture, where the spokes radiate out from Washington in a network of asymmetrical ties reinforcing American regional dominance. Why?

First, compared to Europe, the Asia-Pacific has very little history of multilateral institutions and alliance formation. Modern European states have a history of doing so dating back well before the Treaty of Westphalia was established in 1648. European sovereign political systems emerged out of Westphalia; Europe came to develop different notions of international community and international order, based, in part, on the concept of international law. Asia did not have such a tradition of legalistic international agreements.

Second, geography also plays a significant role in the nature of warfare, and therefore the ability of countries to come to one another’s aid. European nations border each other, but they do so in a land context. As such, not only is it easier to move around troops and military equipment, but it is faster.

The nature of geography and distance also inform countries’ threat perceptions. NATO continues to endure because of a shared common adversary—Russia. Countries neighbor each other, making for an easily delineated bloc. The distances between Southeast Asia and Northeast Asia are formidable compared to Europe. Moreover, the sheer size of China, and the formidable military power of Japan, made it harder for smaller competitors to balance against them.

There were some attempts at bridging East and West. In 1954, the Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO) was established because of the Southeast Asia Collective Defence Treaty. It included Australia, France, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Philippines, Thailand, the United Kingdom, and the US and was designed to curb the spread of communism in Asia. A major reason SEATO failed and was disbanded in 1977 was because there was a lack of a common threat perception.

What did survive was the U.S. hub-and-spoke system: the US-Japan alliance as a means of curbing any potential regional Japanese aggression after World War II, the US- South Korea alliance to protect South Korea from a North Korean invasion, and the US alliance with Australia and New Zealand (ANZUS) to protect both nations from perceived threats of communist invasion by China and Indonesia.

Central and critical to the credibility of any alliance system is how it deters conflict. This is arguably much harder to achieve in a multilateral alliance than in the current hub-and-spoke system. Conventional deterrence in the Asian maritime theater is difficult. The most significant work on conventional deterrence was done by John Mearsheimer. However, Mearsheimer’s analysis may be persuasive for eras preceding the development of nuclear weapons, but the pre-nuclear era did not involve missiles. His analysis was based on a European land context, not an Asian maritime context. As such, thinking on conventional deterrence is incomplete.

There are significant logistical challenges that come with trying to establish a multilateral alliance system in Asia. Tasks include the need to ensure the prompt replenishment of destroyed combat ships, establish defensive perimeters for fleet support, and ensure the safety of fleet replenishment oilers and dry cargo/ammunition supply ships, just to name a few.

Budget constraints brought on by sequestration (2013), coupled with longer-term financial uncertainty, was raising questions about the US Navy’s Military Sealift Command and its combat logistics force more than a decade ago. Europe was, and remains, one single geostrategic entity connected by an excellent road network. In the Asia-Pacific, Australia, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan are more dispersed, with neutral and non-aligned states between them, not to mention a growing Chinese submarine fleet.

American forces need to move around large numbers of ships, aircraft, troops, and munitions. Unless the US establishes more permanent bases on allied territory, it is not clear that the US is able to adequately deploy replacement capabilities on very short notice, especially once conflict breaks out. Whilst American declaratory policy that requires a defense of allies in Asia is sound, it needs to be backed up by raw capability, the two components of deterrence.

For more than a decade, analysts have encouraged the US to improve readiness and sustainment of the US Navy. In 2014, the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments warned of many more similar issues, including how quickly cruisers and destroyers exhaust their missiles and how adversaries will attempt to use “cheap” missiles (such as the BrahMos cruise missile) to attack US warships to get them to use their most effective defenses first,  such as the long-range SM-6 missile, and then strike with more effective weapons to destroy carriers and their escorts.

The foundation of power projection was and remains sea control. As Hugh White argues, what has contributed to making the US such a decisive power in the region is a robust sea-control capacity with low risk, and therefore little cost. The modern concept of sea control has its origins in the writings of Rear Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan. Sea control was about naval superiority, the concentration of forces, and decisive battles.

Sea control is the condition in which one has freedom of action in specified areas and for specified periods of time and, where necessary, to deny or limit its use to the enemy. Sea control is different from sea denial. The latter refers to attempts to deny an adversary’s ability to use the sea without necessarily seeking to control the sea. When it comes to Asia, China and the United States are gradually trading places when it comes to sea control.

Discussions about a multilateral alliance would arguably have to address the unavoidable question of nuclear weapons and extended nuclear deterrence (END). Discussions within NATO’s Nuclear Planning Group during the Cold War about targeting and basing helped calm nervous allies, helped hold NATO together, and, in some cases, helped stem the tide of proliferation.

Both the US–Republic of Korea Extended Deterrence Policy Committee (EDPC) and the US–Japan Extended Deterrence Dialogue were established after the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review for a similar purpose. There were growing concerns around the ability of the US to overcome China’s anti-access/area-denial capabilities and American support in the event of specific contingencies involving the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands in the East China Sea. Could these bilateral dialogues become multilateral fora? This applies just as much to conventional weapons, but where the members of the alliance are far apart from each other, the potential red lines of escalation and conflict are much less identifiable than they would be in a land context.

But the technical challenges in the credibility of American extended deterrence to Australia, Japan, and South Korea matter less than the reasons why the US would want to do nuclear strategy again, this time in East Asia, a vastly more complicated theater. What matters is interest.

Hugh White raised the uncomfortable but critical issue when he suggested that Tokyo’s desire for a closer defense relationship with Australia is all about lining Australia up to support Japan against China, and that is the way Washington and Beijing will see it, too. Tokyo and Washington believe that Australia should defend the US-led international order and refuse concessions to China’s ambitions. Australians have not decided whether they agree with the US and Japan and are predisposed to seek a compromise with China—all while retaining a strong American role.

As White argued, no possible US nuclear posture, even the best possible, would eliminate the risk that a conflict with a nuclear-armed great power like China might lead to direct nuclear attacks on US territory. This leaves America’s East Asian allies to ponder whether American interests in the Western Pacific are strong enough for Washington to justify running the risk of conflict going nuclear.

Professor Paul Bracken of Yale University expressed concerns about American alliances in Asia. He found it nearly inconceivable that the US would actually use nuclear weapons to defend Australia, Japan, or Taiwan. Bracken noted that he played out countless scenarios, and that when it came down to it, American leaders were unwilling to use nuclear weapons. Bracken went so far as to suggest that the United States may not engage in a conventional hi-tech war with China, either.

Ely Ratner’s article is thought-provoking, valuable, and timely. But there are significant challenges in alliance credibility in Asia, because interests do not align as easily as they do in Europe. As former US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles remarked in 1952, “The North Atlantic Treaty reflected a sense of common destiny as between the peoples of the west, which grew out of a community of race, religion, and political institutions, before it was finalised. But that element does not clearly exist as yet anywhere in the Pacific area.” The same is true today, seven decades later.

Christine Leah, PhD, is a fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies.  

American Alliances in East Asia: An Australian Perspective was originally published on Global Security Review.

The United Kingdom’s Defense Issues

The United Kingdom’s military spent several decades downsizing its military. Still, the UK took part in major conflicts in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, and Syria, showing that Britain continues to have some force projection capability.

Nevertheless, British Ministry of Defence (MoD) data shows recruitment shortfalls over the past five years. Recent data published by the UK Defence Journal show the biggest recruitment shortfalls are found in the army, where manpower gaps in land forces are most pronounced.

A major factor in recruiting failure was a several-year attempt to draw down spending, that included the army’s closure of half of its recruiting offices, according to the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI). A lack of recruiting offices only erodes the interaction between recruiters and the community. This lack of interaction dissuades civilians, who may not fully understand the benefits of military service, from joining.

Furthermore, an aging population, a rise in health risks, and an extremely long pipeline from recruitment to basic training can dissuade young men and women from choosing service. While Britain’s Air Force and elite Royal Marines remain formidable, further emphasis on naval power and regrowing the land forces is much needed.

Canada’s Rearmament Crisis

The Canadian Armed Forces are currently facing a readiness crisis. According to an internal overview by the Department of National Defence, only 58 percent of the military is ready to handle any situation. Canada’s lack of readiness is increasingly causing concern among the general public. War in Eastern Europe and Africa and brewing conflicts in Asia show the need for North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) member-states to bolster each region. Canada’s military is unready to face a crisis.

A major challenge is stagnation in the Air Force and Navy, where much equipment is neglected and degraded. Because logistics win wars, Canada needs to recruit and train support personnel such as technicians, maintenance, supply, and communications personnel.

Australia’s Defense Issues

Australia, a rising regional power in the Indo-Pacific, also faces challenges for the Australian Defence Forces. Being a member of the trilateral security partnership between Australia, the UK, and the US (AUKUS), Australia is currently awaiting the construction and transfer of three to five Virginia-class submarines from the United States, which may not come in time for Pillar II of the AUKUS agreement, due to stagnant American naval production rates.

Only 80 percent of the 69,000 recruits needed to enhance the Australian Defence Forces have either signed up or met recruiting requirements. Simultaneously, younger Australians feel they have better economic and social opportunities in the private sector than in the military, drawing potential recruits away.

Continuously growing defense spending over several decades will be critical in maintaining readiness. Decades of neglecting defense forced the Australian military into a position where it must catch up to other mid-sized powers like Japan and South Korea. Furthermore, as the Australian Strategic Policy Institute noted, confidence in the military remains low. Thus, efforts to change this view are needed in the information sphere if public institutions are to effectively remilitarize, in lieu of rising threats.

Recommendations for Each Country

The United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia face major recruitment and militarization woes. However, steps can be taken for all three countries to push towards modernization and expansion. This is particularly important if these Anglo nations are to remain a close alliance.

British recruitment woes correlate with the lack of recruitment offices. The British Ministry of Defence must grow and lobby for more offices and events where promising youth can learn and gather information about military service. Furthermore, efforts are needed in the more neglected Royal Navy and Army.

The British have an opportunity to take a leadership position on the continent. Growing the British military will also support defense exports and further enhance and expand the military—albeit with an effort to increase the MOD’s budget.

Canada’s efforts must include broader government support for the military as Canadians question the credibility of a government that drew down the military to ineffectiveness. The Canadian Defence Ministry can also take lessons from NATO partners, such as Poland, Romania, Finland, and others, who are modernizing successfully.

Australia’s expansion of the military must take a two-pronged approach. First, show potential recruits the benefits of military service. Second, the government must instill a sense of patriotism and respect for the Armed Forces. The government can focus on brewing threats in the Indo-Pacific, which will eventually reach Australia, while explaining the benefits of military service.

The Commonwealth countries of the United Kingdom, Australia, and Canada all have capable yet stagnant militaries. Addressing problems with recruitment, logistics, and maintenance can reduce stagnation and help restore these nations’ military strength. As close allies of the United States, their success matters.

Julian McBride is a former US Marine. He is a forensic anthropologist and independent journalist.

Commonwealth Defense and Recruitment Hurdles was originally published on Global Security Review.

While certification is contingent on the US Navy’s ability to maintain its own submarine production rate, which is struggling to meet the planned two Virginia-class submarines per year, Australia would benefit greatly from their acquisition. Overall, it is worth noting that AUKUS Pillar I and Pillar II are likely to significantly enhance US undersea capabilities in the long term. Pillar I includes the rotational presence of one UK Astute-class submarine and up to four US Virginia-class submarines at HMAS Stirling, Western Australia, from 2027. HMAS Stirling provides the United States with greater access for the forward presence of nuclear-powered submarines in the Indo-Pacific.

Indo-Pacific access is further expanded via the new submarine base that is planned for the east coast of Australia by 2043. The authorized consolidated Commonwealth-owned Defence Precinct at Western Australia’s Henderson shipyard will provide contingency-docking and depot-level maintenance for AUKUS submarines by 2033, potentially alleviating some of the burden on US-based maintenance facilities. Pillar II will provide the advanced technology necessary to enhance US, UK, and Australian undersea capabilities, particularly for longer term advantages in mobility, survivability, lethality, and sustainability of allied forces.

Conversely, the SLCM-N is likely a significant factor in retaining American undersea capabilities. The SLCM-N will provide the US with flexible deterrence options in austere Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific theatres, particularly as the US needs to provide extended nuclear deterrence to 32 NATO allies plus Australia, Japan, and South Korea. There are three options to consider when attempting to deter China, North Korea, and Russia.

First, the United States can provide Australia three to five conventionally armed Virginia-class submarines. This option is likely to significantly degrade American undersea capabilities through a lack of flexible response options for strategic deterrence and extended nuclear deterrence. Plus, Australia will need to manage three classes of submarines: the Collins-class, the AUKUS-class, and the SSN-AUKUS under this option.

Second, Australia can field a dual-capable submarines (DCS) mission for Australian Virginia-class submarines. This option requires the establishment of a nuclear planning group (NPG) to plan for a DCS mission for Australian Virginia-class submarines. These submarines would be capable of carrying the SLCM-N. This nuclear-armed option is unlikely to degrade US undersea capabilities, as Australia could support some US missions in the Indo-Pacific and provide flexible deterrence options. Australia will still need to manage three submarine classes under this option.

Third, the United States does not sell Virginia-class submarines to Australia, but instead bases submarines armed with SLCM-N in Australia, either on a permanent or rotational basis. This option does not degrade US undersea capabilities. However, under this option Australia should negotiate for extended nuclear deterrence guarantees. This option is not the end of AUKUS, but Australia will need to build sovereign SSN-AUKUS submarines to fill the gap left by Australia’s aging Collins-class submarines when they are retired.

Policymakers should not be afraid to consider a flexible nuclear-armed option in light of recent and historic Russian and Chinese rhetoric on AUKUS, especially when this rhetoric concerns “non-nuclear long-range precision strike capability.” Having a nuclear-armed option would provide enough flexibility to backstop and limit conventional war.

On April 18, 2025, Russia’s envoy to Indonesia, Sergei Tolchenov, defended military ties with Jakarta and did not deny claims that Russia seeks to station long-range military aircraft at the Manuhua Air Force Base at Biak Numfor, about 1400 kilometers north of Darwin, Australia. Russia asserted that AUKUS is more of a threat to the Asia-Pacific than Russian ties with Indonesia, which are “not aimed against any third countries and poses no threat to security in the Asia-Pacific region.” Tolchenov added that challenges to regional stability

are more likely to arise from the rotational deployment of large military contingents from extra-regional states on Australian territory, including the provision of airfields for the landing of strategic bombers and port infrastructure for visits by nuclear-powered submarines. Particularly alarming are the currently discussed plans to deploy the US intermediate-range missiles in Australia, which would put ASEAN [Association of Southeast Asian Nations] countries, including Indonesia, within its range, as well as the acquisition by the Royal Australian Navy of nuclear-powered submarines under the AUKUS trilateral partnership.

These comments are consistent with Putin’s rhetoric against the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

This is not the first time Russia and China accused the US, UK, and Australia of risking an intensified arms race and military confrontation in the Indo-Pacific. A report by the China Arms Control and Disarmament Association, China Nuclear Strategic Planning Research Institute, and the Russian Energy and Security Research Centre stated, “non-nuclear long-range precision strike capability, being provided to Australia, will affect nuclear deterrence and strategic stability.” The report goes on to say that “[w]hile current non-nuclear strategic weapons cannot carry out all the missions assigned to nuclear weapons those still can produce strategic effects.” The report further criticizes AUKUS’ nuclear submarine cooperation, which the report suggests will trigger a regional submarine arms race.

Chinese and Russian threats should not limit or contain AUKUS to non-nuclear options. This is particularly true when the US has historically provided non-nuclear long-range precision-strike capability. In the past this included the F-111 Aardvark, F/A-18F Super Hornet, E/A-18G Growler, and F-35A Lightning II.

Under the UN Charter, members have “the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs.” Hence, Australia and its allies should stand by the expression, si vis pacem, para bellum. Australia and its AUKUS allies should not back down from non-nuclear long-range precision strike capability or nuclear-armed deterrence options that provide more flexible responses.

Although, the sale of Virginia-class submarines to Australia under the AUKUS agreement may be contingent on the US Navy’s ability to maintain its submarine production rate. It is worth noting that American undersea capabilities, particularly in the long term, may be greatly enhanced through other means under AUKUS Pillar I and Pillar II.

In the new era of nuclear disorder, the key to maintaining American undersea capabilities will likely be the SLCM-N deployed on Virginia-class attack submarines. The SLCM-N will provide AUKUS flexible deterrence options and limit risk of conflict in austere Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific theatres.

Natalie A. Treloar is a Senior Analyst at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. She is the Australian Company Director of Alpha–India Consultancy. Natalie formerly contracted to the Australian Department of Defence. Views expressed in this article are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views, policies, or positions of any organization, employer, or affiliated group.

SLCM-N, the Virginia-Class Submarine, and AUKUS was originally published on Global Security Review.

The international system is now firmly bipolar, with China’s global power rapidly increasing at a time when Russia regularly threatens to use nuclear weapons against the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), influencing the administration of President Donald Trump. The combined Chinese and Russian threats are leading President Trump to warn of a possible World War III.

American power is increasingly contested, bringing new operational challenges to extended deterrence. A fundamental question is now in play—should the US abandon the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) it created in 1960s and instead push its allies to field nuclear weapons?

Allies are already reconsidering their nuclear stance. In the Asia-Pacific, American ally Australia provides useful historical insights.

From the late 1940s to the early 1970s, Australia sought to acquire nuclear weapons in response to an unstable international order where it felt threatened by China. In 1967, Secretary of US Defense Robert McNamara said it would be “entirely natural” and “an obvious thing to happen” for Australia to acquire nuclear weapons in response to China developing them. He also expressed interest in establishing a collective nuclear organization for the Far East, “starting with Australia and the Philippines.”

Indeed, Secretary of State Dean Rusk earlier suggested a “US-supplied Far Eastern nuclear stockpile” open to Japan and India. In 1958, others proposed the US could base intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) in Australia, in the event the US decided to keep tight control of nuclear weapons in its own hands and actively worked to push its allies to agree to the NPT treaty.

There were similar debates around friendly nuclear proliferation in Europe around the same time. Aiming to regain leadership in Europe, the US proposed a multilateral nuclear force within NATO. While there were doubts over its military utility, the diplomatic discussions that started around sharing nuclear hardware and control did allow time to develop a European non-proliferation solution. In 1966, the NATO nuclear planning group was established, allowing some European allies to be involved in how and under which circumstances American weapons might be used.

The structural changes in the international system that prompted these earlier ideas are happening again. It is time to start thinking seriously about the next steps to take. The nuclear history noted suggests three broad approaches.

First, allies might build their own nuclear forces. The logic is that in a high-intensity conflict between the US and a nuclear power, the adversary may target American allies with nuclear weapons. Such an escalation demonstrates an adversary’s willingness to coerce allies into ceasing support for the United States.

This is the worst-case scenario that extended deterrence was created to prevent. If allies seriously doubt American credibility, fielding independent nuclear forces is a solution.  Indeed, economically challenged Pakistan and North Korea took this path already. For America’s allies, acquiring nuclear forces may be a lower cost option than growing their conventional forces.

Second, allies might work together to devise a modern multilateral nuclear force as considered in 1960s Europe. In the Pacific, Australia considered working with Britain on nuclear weapons in the late 1940s and 1950s; some still favor this effort. In that regard, Japan and Australia have recently acquired Tomahawk cruise missiles, which the US armed with nuclear warheads to deter Russia in the 1980s. Such weapons might be a starting point for an allied nuclear force in the eastern Pacific. As noted, the US considered deploying ICBMs in the Australian outback.

Third, another option, arguably better for American global leadership, is to address the allies’ deepening concerns over extended deterrence. This would involve the current administration actively reassuring allies that it still places importance on existing security treaties, increasing nuclear sharing and including more nations in nuclear planning, especially in the Pacific. Such steps would be at marginal cost to the US.

The most important might be nuclear sharing as this appears a tangible example of commitment. Of course, nuclear sharing is actually a misnomer since the US shares in the employment of certain nuclear weapons. It retains full control of the weapons prior to an authorization to strike a target.

The US could increase nuclear sharing with Pacific allies, such as Australia, Japan, and South Korea, and broaden out to other NATO nations like Poland and the Scandinavian nations, which appear to be Russia’s next target after Ukraine. These nations could then reciprocate in hosting US nuclear weapons as Belgium, Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands do now.

This discussion hinges on American ambitions for global leadership. As the Trump administration pushes allies to bare a greater share of their own security while attempting to close a $2 trillion annual deficit, the US must necessarily cut costs everywhere. Thus, American allies must take a realistic look at what President Trump is seeking to accomplish with the federal budget and understand that they must step into the breach while the US sets its house in order.

Sometimes, a great power must admit that it may be in its interests to change direction and push its allies down a new, different path. In that case, the Trump administration might declare the NPT finished and instead encourage its allies to go nuclear.

Dr. Christine Leah is a Fellow at the US National Institute for Deterrence Studies and has worked on nuclear issues at Yale, MIT, and RAND and in London, Singapore, and Canberra. She is the author of The Consequences of American Nuclear Disarmament and Australia and the Bomb. Dr. Peter Layton is Visiting Fellow at the Griffith Asia Institute and an Associate Fellow at the Royal United Services Institute. He is author of Grand Strategy and coauthor of Warfare in the Robotic Age.

Time to Proliferate Nuclear Weapons (or Not?) was originally published on Global Security Review.

The primary objective of Biden’s integrated deterrence strategy was to harmonize and unify the efforts of various government agencies and allied nations to deter aggression from China and other hostile actors. To achieve this objective, the strategy aimed to maximise the utilisation of all available tools of American power, encompassing diplomacy, intelligence, economic assistance, and force posture decisions. Integration with allies and partners was an integral component of Biden’s deterrence strategy and would be achieved by enhancing the interoperability of allied military forces and coordinating the diplomatic and economic initiatives of friendly nations.

While the goals of integrated deterrence appear sensible, many expressed concerns about the concept. Some claimed the term was not new or unique. It simply described the implementation of any effective, tailored deterrence strategy that leverage various organisations to prevent hostile actions.

American deterrence was executed in an integrated fashion throughout the Cold War by necessity, thanks to the size and significance of the Soviet threat. Concerns were also expressed that proponents of integrated deterrence overstated the ability of sanctions, diplomacy, and other non-military tools to prevent conflict. History shows that the threat of major military action has a unique strength in deterring an enemy, especially when that threat comes from a nation with a nuclear arsenal.

Regardless of one’s stance on integrated deterrence and its implementation, a coordinated US strategy that leverages the strengths of its allies should be preferred to the alternative currently being pursued in Washington. A lack of integration in deterrence matters is evident both within the US government and in its interactions with partners and allies.

Within the United States government, there are several reported disconnects between President Trump and senior members of his administration. For example, Secretary of State Marco Rubio was first informed of Trump’s proposal to take Gaza by military force and evict Palestinians while watching a press conference held by Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. Furthermore, it was recently reported that Rubio is “privately frustrated that Trump has effectively sidelined him.” More recently, Signal messages disclosed highlight significant differences between Vice President Vance and President Trump on the timing and signaling associated with strikes on Houthi targets.

This lack of vertical integration diminishes the authority that the secretary holds in meetings with both allies and adversaries. Additionally, it eliminates the potential for any exchange of ideas that could transpire within the Department of State to develop more effective policy options to present to the president.

Horizontal integration of deterrence across various departments was also weakened, partially by budgetary cuts and eliminations of entire organizations. Foreign assistance and development resources were pivotal components of the 2022 Indo-Pacific Strategy. However, extensive cuts made to the United States Agency for International Development and other government agencies by the Department of Government Efficiency did not fully consider or comprehend the regional implications or potential negative impacts on deterrence.

To date, much of Trump’s foreign policy is focused on addressing conflicts in Europe and the Middle East. A strategy for dealing with China, beyond the use of tariffs and other economic measures, is yet to be revealed. There are lessons to be learned from what has transpired with allies facing a menacing Russian threat in Europe.

President Trump consistently urges the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) member-states to significantly enhance their defence expenditures, even suggesting that 5 percent of their gross domestic product (GDP) may be an appropriate threshold. For those nations that fail to meet NATO’s spending guidelines, Trump stated that US military support under Article 5 may not be available. While NATO nations were increasing defense spending prior to Trump taking office (a 20 percent increase in 2024), Germany and the United Kingdom (UK) recently announced plans to further bolster defense budgets.

While additional insights into Trump’s approach to allies in the Indo-Pacific are anticipated in the coming weeks and months, Australia should draw upon several valuable early lessons. The first pertains to the long-standing Canberra tradition of analyzing and dissecting the statements and writings of senior officials within an American administration to comprehend policy. Maintaining cordial relations with officials at all levels of the US government remains prudent, but it is uncertain whether statements from senior administration officials can be relied upon to fully reflect Trump’s perspectives.

Furthermore, the current level of Australian defense spending, which accounts for 2 percent of GDP, will not meet Trump’s expectations for allies. A pre-emptive move to increase defense spending to 2.5 percent of GDP by 2027, similar to what was announced in February by the UK, would demonstrate Australia’s national commitment to addressing its deteriorating strategic circumstances and to contributing more towards its share of the alliance. If President Trump has made one thing clear to allies, it is that if they do not value their own defense neither will he.

Carl Rhodes is founder of Robust Policy and a senior fellow with the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. Carl hosts the Deterrence Down Under podcast and previously spent 25 years with RAND Corporation. Carl has a PhD in chemical engineering from Caltech.

Trump’s Disintegrated Deterrence and Lessons for Australia was originally published on Global Security Review.

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Deterrence Down Under Podcast: Wargaming-A Strategic Tool for Defence with Darren Huxley and John McGarry was originally published on Global Security Review.

In this episode, Christine and Natalie engage with Dr. Mariana Budjeryn, a nuclear historian, to discuss her book ‘Inheriting the Bomb’ and the complexities surrounding Ukraine’s nuclear disarmament. They explore the historical context of Ukraine’s nuclear arsenal, the narratives surrounding its disarmament, and the implications of security assurances from major powers. Mariana shares her personal reflections on the ongoing war in Ukraine, the challenges faced by nuclear facilities under occupation, and the lessons learned for international security and cooperation.

Podcast: The Complexities of Ukraine’s Nuclear Legacy was originally published on Global Security Review.

A driving factor is the rising nuclear threat posed by China, North Korea, and Russia. Such a threat requires effective nuclear deterrence. Another concern is continuing doubts as to whether America’s extended deterrence is reliable in a serious international crisis or a major shooting war.

It is true that when authoritarian states brandish their nuclear arsenals for coercion, repeatedly threatening nuclear attack, any nation would be concerned and look to its guarantor of security for help. Unfortunately, the United States is proving slow to field the kind of arsenal that can not only deter or defeat aggression against itself, but also provide that same capability for almost three dozen allies.

The US is now in a position where it must modernize and expand its own nuclear arsenal and right-size those numbers to sustain dynamic parity with adversaries. Legally and morally, there is indeed an inescapable duty to deter. For Japan and South Korea, that duty will be met by the United States or themselves.

Nuclear participation by America’s allies in Asia would be in direct contravention to US policy, and would violate both the letter and the spirit of the 1970 Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), but it would certainly prove understandable. Australia, Japan, and South Korea all signed the treaty, but a voracious and aggressive China and North Korea are proving a real threat to all three states.

Rather than take a position for or against ally nuclear participation, an overview of the main arguments on both sides of the issue are instructive.

Pros

First, recall that Australia, Japan, and South Korea all have a level of experience with the nuclear issue. Japan, of course, faced atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. But, as Japan up-arms to deter China and North Korea, Tokyo might decide to field its own nuclear weapons.

Southern and western Australia were the sites of over a dozen British nuclear weapon tests between 1952 and 1963. This is a fact too few understand.

South Korea had its own nuclear weapon research and development program during the Cold War, which was abandoned because of American pressure. South Korea does rely on nuclear power for its generation of electricity.

Second, note that these American allies do possess civilian nuclear power industries, sophisticated militaries, sizable economies, and advanced science and technology capabilities. All three countries could build nuclear weapons in relatively short order. On the positive side, the fielding of Australian, Japanese, and South Korean nuclear forces would make aggression far more complicated for China and North Korea.

The inclusion of allied nuclear forces would disperse and diversify the collective nuclear deterrent available for employment and increase the number of targets China or North Korea must strike in a conflict. Allied nuclear participation is also an alternative to overseas nuclear basing agreements, like those that existed during the Cold War. Given the lack of available American weapons, such an arrangement could prove very beneficial.

Lastly, nuclear participation would put an end to the endless debate over the credibility of  American extended deterrence. Rather, the focus would turn to integrating nuclear forces in the event of a conflict.

Cons

There are some well-known arguments for continued nuclear nonproliferation. They include the longtime prohibition in US policy and the NPT prohibition against it. There are also pragmatic concerns.

First, if a country were to withdraw from the NPT, although allowed by Article X, it would create significant diplomatic tensions between the US and the country withdrawing from the treaty. American sanctions could significantly harm the economy of Australia, Japan, or South Korea.

Second, any democratic state pursuing nuclear weapons would undermine Western efforts to halt Iran’s nuclear weapons development. Worse, it could open the floodgates of nuclear proliferation among states that are certain to prove less responsible with those weapons.

Third, China might see the pursuit of nuclear weapons by American allies as a sufficient reason to launch a “defensive” nuclear strike. China’s “active defense” strategy clearly supports the use of preventive attacks.

Fourth, the Nuclear Supplier’s Group would end all support to the civilian nuclear programs of Australia, Japan, and/or South Korea. Such a decision would cause great difficulty for power generators.

Conclusion

For Australia, American promises and the continent’s geographic position may prove sufficient to prevent a move to a nuclear weapons program. For Japan and South Korea, the threat is much closer. How these countries evaluate the threat is yet to be determined. They are signaling the United States that they want stronger assurances of American commitment.

Such assurance will prove difficult for the United States for many reasons. Neither China nor North Korea should take for granted that America’s allies will remain under the nuclear umbrella. It is only because of flagrant aggression that South Korea, and most recently, Japan, are even talking about the need for indigenous nuclear forces.

Joe Buff is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. Views expressed are his own.

The Pros and Cons of Nuclear Participation in the Pacific was originally published on Global Security Review.

Such an alliance is needed most in the Indo-Pacific region where China is attempting, with some success, to challenge the American-led rules-based international order. Growing American alliances and partnerships beyond current bilateral relationships is the solution.

A more tailored and comprehensive approach involving Australia, Japan, and South Korea should serve as the beginning of an alliance that could expand and counter Chinese efforts in more than just the military realm. Such an alliance could bolster American nuclear deterrence and assurance in the region and directly support regional stability. A need for increased security cooperation in the Indo-Pacific is a clear and obtainable objective.

Formalizing a Multilateral Treaty Organization

Creating a regional multilateral treaty-bound organization with Australia, Japan, and South Korea will institutionalize defense cooperation and bolster collective security. This organization could formally facilitate regular interoperability consultations, increase joint coalition exercises, and more effectively coordinate responses to regional threats. By formalizing these relationships, the US and its allies can ensure a cohesive and effective deterrence strategy with more eloquence throughout the Indo-Pacific.

Establishing a new treaty organization will be challenging, but the cost-benefit will be worthwhile in the long term. This formality directly supports the diplomatic leg of the diplomatic, information, military, and economic (DIME) model.

Equipping Allies with Nuclear-Capable F-35s

Expanding the sale of nuclear-capable F-35As to Australia, Japan, and South Korea represents a significant advancement in regional coverage of the US nuclear umbrella. These next-generation fighters provide a capable and credible nuclear capability to prepare allies for future conflict, allows increased power projection against potential adversaries, and bolsters the operational compatibility between American forces and allies.

By integrating these aircraft into their respective air forces, allies can contribute to a more dynamic and responsive deterrence posture if a need arises as the geopolitical environment changes. And, if the alliance expands as expected, F-35s can compensate for their range limitations by “island hopping” their way to the fight or allies can build their own aerial refueling capability.

The presence of highly mobile nuclear-capable platforms increases regional solidarity in a strategically tailored way that messages adversaries that aggression will not be tolerated. Given growing Chinese aggression, this is an important task.

Developing Supporting Infrastructure

To maximize the efficacy of these new capabilities, it is crucial to establish a robust infrastructure that supports the deployment and maintenance of nuclear-capable assets for

forward-based power projection. This includes upgrading the host nations’ airfields, maintenance facilities, and command-and-control systems.

Such infrastructure will allow seamless integration of allied forces into joint operations and ensure sustained operational readiness. The host nations will need to take charge of the economic development required to maintain the increase in capability and its continued sustainment in the long term—relieving some of the costs that would otherwise be borne by the American taxpayer.

Increasing SSBN Port Calls and Coalition Heavy Bomber Task Force Exercises

Boosting the frequency of American ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) port calls and conducting more coalition heavy bomber task force exercises will further strengthen the deterrence posture within the region. American SSBN presence provides a method to showcase a strategic, survivable deterrent, while heavy bombers enable power projection. Conducting joint operations further solidifies a multinational force’s allied resolve and compatibility.

Additionally, the United States could showcase the ability to provide a safe haven for the required heavy bomber task forces if the need arises. These activities would demonstrate an increase in enhancing regional security ties and reassuring allies of the continuation of American commitment. The United States could also sell the B1 and B2 bombers it plans to retire to its allies.

Conclusion

Strengthening American nuclear deterrence in the Indo-Pacific requires a multifaceted approach that continues to foster positive alliances and partnerships that advance capabilities. Honoring these commitments showcases allied resolve to hold adversaries at risk with well-calculated multilateral decision-making processes and regional cooperation. By equipping Australia, Japan, and South Korea with nuclear-capable F-35As, establishing the necessary infrastructure, formalizing multilateral agreements, and increasing strategic exercises with ballistic missile submarines and heavy bombers, the US and its allies can enhance deterrence.

These measures will solidify regional defense cooperation, amplify the efficacy of the nuclear umbrella, and ensure a regional multilateral response to potential nuclear threats, thereby reinforcing the American commitment to maintaining stability and countering China’s growing influence across the region.

William Atkins spent a career in the nuclear enterprise. The views expressed are his own.

Bolstering Extended Deterrence was originally published on Global Security Review.

There is some debate, however, as to their continued utility in modern times. They are costly to build, at least $13 billion, require a large complement of personnel, require an escort, and are vulnerable to attack from ballistic missiles and now hypersonic weapons. Disabling an American aircraft carrier would be a priority for enemy nations, as it would be a symbolic victory with great propaganda value for them. An aircraft carrier is simply a very attractive target that, depending upon the analyst, is more or less of an easy target. A missile strike that causes even a listing of a few degrees or propulsion damage can prevent them from being used by air assets.

While on paper supercarriers can carry up to 130 aircraft, they typically have about 70 aircraft of varying types at any given time. Some are under maintenance, some allocated to fleet protection, with the rest able to conduct offensive operations. Using rough math and averaging air wings, at any given time a carrier may have an estimated 15 aircraft in the air for offensive operations. Thus, in a large-scale conflict, it would be best for multiple carriers to work in concert, and for the navy to “surge” personnel and aircraft to deployed carriers.

The most dangerous threat to this strategy is the potential for an adversary, like China, to employ nuclear weapons against a carrier strike group. China, for example, could claim American naval assets are violating its sovereign waters, constituting an invasion, and employ nuclear weapons against the carrier strike group, hundreds of miles from land.

Such a scenario is certainly not a high probability but is a reasonable concern with an uncertain outcome. The ability of fleet defenses to prevent such a strike is uncertain. However, this risk does not negate the utility of carriers, in general. In fact, there may be some utility in building at least two supercarriers with even longer flight decks than the Gerald R. Ford class.

There are two areas where carriers have a possible future: carrying large swarms of long-legged drones and serving as mid-point logistical platforms. Such supercarriers could also host anti-satellite weapons and ballistic missile interceptors, changing the boundaries and layers of continental missile defense, as needed.

Ostensibly, a drone-focused carrier can serve as a waystation for land-based drones and even host drone operators. With advancements in remotely operated underwater vehicles (ROUV), it would make sense to redesign a new class of assault ships that can launch them. These can also be built cheaper and crewed by fewer personnel, with the goal of having more. In fact, they can be designed to be mostly unmanned and operate within the protection of a carrier strike group.

For supercarriers, their use behind the main lines of combat, between strike groups and mainland bases, has the potential to make them mobile bases for the purposes described above. Should a peer conflict begin in the Indo-Pacific, their use would be between Japan or Australia, and Hawaii, or as an alternative to American bases in the Pacific should China, for example, strike these bases.

The future use of aircraft carriers may be by American allies, whom, if trained, could deploy their own aircraft from American ships. South Korea and Japan, for example, have airfields in the region but, if struck by North Korea or China, may need an alternative hub to refuel and rearm. If land-based aircraft and airfields are at risk, it makes sense to have alternatives.

Contemplating and integrating the capabilities described is certainly well outside the US Navy’s current operational concept. American naval strategy is well established and slow to change, but, if former Indo-PACOM commander Admiral (Ret.) John Aquilino’s “hellscape” concept of a future asymmetric battlefield in the Indo-Pacific were to ever become a reality, rethinking the use of aircraft carriers may become a necessity.

Michael Fincher is a Fellow of the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. The views expressed are his own.

Rethinking Aircraft Carriers was originally published on Global Security Review.

They continue similar priorities and themes to the previous coalition government’s 2020 Defence Strategic Update and Force Structure Plan on the space domain. As with those documents, the 2024 NDS and IIP highlight the importance of space as a critical enabler for terrestrial military operations and an operational domain in a multi-domain approach to a strategy of deterrence by denial.

Furthermore, they identify three broad capability areas for further development.  These include (1) the provision of space support, notably through satellite communications to be provided by Australian-owned satellites through project JP9102 in geosynchronous orbit; (2) the establishment of enhanced space domain awareness, with the establishment of a Deep Space Advanced Radar Capability (DARC) at Exmouth in Western Australia—part of a global network of three such sensors—in collaboration with the US and UK; and (3) the development of space control capabilities.

This last aspect of the NDS and IIP opens some intriguing possibilities for future development that could be announced in subsequent policy documents, with the next NDS and IIP due in 2026. It also raises the possibility that space could start to play a larger role as a priority area in AUKUS Pillar 2. Already, the agreement to establish DARC is seen as part of AUKUS and will extend Australia’s ability to undertake space domain awareness out to geosynchronous orbit (GEO) at 36,500 kilometers. That complements the existing C-Band radar and space surveillance telescope already located at Exmouth and will dramatically enhance the ability of Australia to undertake space surveillance under Operation Dyurra. This is an essential requirement for Australia to undertake the space control mission, so it would make sense to bring this role into AUKUS Pillar 2 as well and see the two missions as integrated.

Just how Australia will undertake space control needs further clarification. There is only the following paragraph in the IIP, which states that space control will include “measures to enhance Defence’s space control capability to deny attempts to interfere with, or attack, Australia’s use of the space domain. These will help ensure the ADF is able to continue using the space capabilities it needs to support its operations.”

Australia has signed the ban on undertaking destructive testing of direct-ascent anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons as part of steps to promote responsible action in space, and it is extremely unlikely that Australia would pursue destructive “kinetic kill”’ ASATs, either direct-ascent or co-orbital in design. Exactly what Australia could pursue in terms of space control is open to speculation at this stage. Defence has undertaken work toward a space-electronic warfare capability under Defence Project DEF 9358, and this would be consistent with the 2024 IIP’s stated approach to space control, as well as the 2020 Force Structure Plan.

A “soft kill” capability, which is either ground-based or co-orbital, that could deliver scalable and reversible effects without creating space debris would contribute directly to the need for space control in a manner that is also consistent with Australian approaches to responsible actions in space. In the same way, other non-kinetic approaches—directed-energy or cyber—might open up opportunities for Australia to develop space control in the future.

The 2022 Defence Space Strategy, released by Defence Space Command, makes clear the importance of assured access to space. This can be achieved in part through resilience of space support, including through defending satellites on-orbit via space control. But it also can be strengthened through enhancing sovereign launch capability. It is in this area where the 2024 NDS and IIP misses a valuable opportunity to integrate the space needs of defense with the growing commercial space sector.

There is no mention whatsoever of Australia’s vibrant commercial space sector in the 2024 NDS and IIP. It is almost as if the view from Defence is that this growing sector does not exist. Yet, Australia’s space sector is fast emerging as the basis for an end-to-end ecosystem, comprising not only the ground segment, but also satellite design and manufacturing through to sovereign launch capabilities.

Indeed, Australia is truly blessed in geographic terms for sovereign launch, with launch sites in the north located close to the equator to take full advantage of Earth’s rotational energy for cheaper cost per kilogram into equatorial low-earth orbit, and launch sites along the south of the continent that are well placed to access polar and sun synchronous orbits. Australia’s launch geography is a key factor prompting the signing of a Technology Safeguards Agreement with the United States on launches and returns.

Defence missed this opportunity to strengthen space resilience through supporting sovereign launch of small satellites that could complement large satellites in GEO, such as those envisaged for JP9102 with proliferated LEO (pLEO) constellations of small satellites for satellite communications and earth observation, to support both civil and defense needs. It missed the clear benefits of sovereign launch to reinforce assured access to space, through rapid augmentation of existing space capabilities in a crisis—or reconstitution of those capabilities in the event of an adversary employing counterspace capabilities against Australian satellites. It missed the opportunity for Australia to take a new step forward to do more to burden share in orbit with allies and strengthen the resilience of space support in the face of counterspace threats from China and Russia.

As the NDS and IIP are biennial documents, the opportunity is still there for Defence to embrace a bolder vision for Australia in space in the next release in 2026, whilst government more fully supports the growth of the commercial space sector. The question is whether Defence and the government will have the vision and determination to do something new. They have begun to think in these terms, given their support for developing space control capabilities, but they can do so much more.

Malcolm Davis, PhD, is a Senior Analyst at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute.  

Where Next for Australia’s Defence Force in Space? was originally published on Global Security Review.

While specific nations to be deterred are not directly named in the DSR, China’s increased involvement in strategic competition in the region is clearly documented. The DSR also highlights the critical importance of Australia’s alliance with the United States to its security. It recognizes that the alliance will play an increasingly important role in the coming decades given increased rotations of American forces to Australia and ongoing cooperation on science and technology under agreements like Pillar II of AUKUS.

While much of the formal implementation plan to improve ADF capabilities associated with the DSR will be released in 2024 as part of the inaugural National Defence Strategy and its associated Integrated Investment Program, a few priorities for immediate action were identified including preparing to acquire nuclear-powered submarines; increased long-range strike capabilities, including the manufacture of munitions locally; and upgrades to Australia’s northern bases. The review also recognizes the role of resilience in Australia’s deterrence strategy, calling upon the nation to harness all element of national power to make Australia less susceptible to coercion by hostile nations.

Australia’s strategic environment is extremely challenging when considering deterrence of China’s large, capable, and increasingly expeditionary, conventional military forces. However, China also possesses a significant nuclear force structure which is modernizing and expanding at a dramatic pace. Assuming the current growth in forces leads to a stockpile of 1,500 operationally deployed strategic nuclear weapons by 2035. In considering methods for the ADF to deter China, Australia must find ways to address threats of nuclear escalation and develop methods to deescalate any potential limited nuclear use. It is interesting to note that the word nuclear appears in the DSR report 41 times in total, yet 36 of those instances refer to nuclear-power submarines planned for delivery under AUKUS. The critically important topic of nuclear escalation and the role of American extended deterrence is barely mentioned, being covered in two sentences of a 116-page document.

Effective deterrence of a major nuclear power like China, even assuming the presence of the American “nuclear umbrella,” will require both effective engagement between the US and Australia, and detailed thought about ways nuclear threats or limited nuclear use can affect any potential future conflict.

Recent tabletop exercises at the Center and Strategic and International Studies highlighted a lack of imaginative thinking by “Blue” players in a simulated US-China conflict over Taiwan, labeling the Blue team as “stuck in a Cold War mindset.” “Red” players, at the outbreak of the conflict, used the threat of nuclear use in an attempt to deter Blue forces from entering the war, similar to the way Putin has successfully leveraged nuclear threats to deter NATO’s increased involvement in  Ukraine. In one tabletop exercise, Red players employed a low-yield nuclear weapon against Guam as a response to conventional attacks on Red’s mainland. Understanding and developing methods to limit and manage escalation within the alliance construct, while maintaining deterrence, are especially critical for a non-nuclear weapon state like Australia.

Although increased numbers of American troops rotating through Australian bases may increase deterrence, those bases are attractive targets for long-range ballistic and cruise-missile strikes early in a conflict should conflict erupt between the US and China. Several wargames and expert analyses show that the US could lose hundreds of aircraft on the ground from attacks by Chinese conventional missiles unless new methods of base hardening, base resilience, and agile combat employment are implemented. The US and Australia need to work together to find ways to ensure the maritime and air forces of both nations are able to effectively operate through such attacks.

Missile defenses, rapid base repair capabilities, infrastructure upgrades, and methods of deception and denial form a partial list of options. Proven resilience during peacetime against such attacks on air and maritime bases will help deter those attacks in wartime.

To increase deterrence and the nation’s resilience, Australia’s government must also start an open and frank dialog with the public about the significance of the threats the nation is facing and the ways in which the ADF and other parts of government are posturing to deter those threats. This is needed to help motivate the “renewed focus on national planning for Defence preparedness” as part of the transition to national defence recommended in the DSR. This discussion must include more than conventional threats. While only the United States possess nuclear weapons, Australia has a role to play in shared extended deterrence. This includes helping the US understand what assurances Australia requires given various routes to escalation in potential future crises. Further examination of these issues and sharing finding with the public, friends, and adversaries should lead to a more stable Indo-Pacific region.

Carl Rhodes is a senior fellow with the National Institute for Deterrence Studies and is founder of Robust Policy, a Canberra firm providing high-quality analysis and policy solutions. Previously, he served 25 years with RAND Corporation including a term as director of RAND Australia.

Australia’s Defence Strategic Review and the Growing Importance of Extended Deterrence was originally published on Global Security Review.

In contrast to its predecessors, the Trump administration has brought about some relevant changes to U.S. foreign policy towards the People’s Republic of China. According to the 2018 National Defense Strategy, “inter-state strategic competition” has reappeared as the principal threat to U.S. national security.

Similarly, the 2017 National Security Strategy contends that China—together with Russia—threatens to challenge “American power, influence, and interests, attempting to erode American security and prosperity.” In short, China must be considered a “strategic competitor” and a “revisionist power” as it is promoting a worldview utterly “antithetical” to U.S. values and interests.

Each subsequent strategic and operational document released by the Trump administration since the National Security Strategy (2018 Nuclear Posture Review; 2018 Design for Maintaining Maritime Superiority 2.0; 2019 Missile Defense Review) has chorused those conclusions. After unveiling the 2017 NSS, the White House imposed tariffs on China in response to allegedly unfair trade practices.

[bs-quote quote=”Beijing is a revisionist power, but it is not necessarily a subversive actor on the global stage.” style=”style-6″ align=”left”][/bs-quote]

The United States first imposed tariffs on $3 billion worth of goods and then enacted measures on another $50 billion. In September of 2018, the U.S. imposed a 10% tariff on approximately $200 billion worth of Chinese goods, with a possibility of a rise to 25% in January 2019. The U.S. and China negotiated a temporary truce over further protectionist escalation at the G-20 Summit in Buenos Aires in December 2018, averting an increase in tariffs on Chinese exports. Nevertheless, competition between the U.S. and China is expected to endure, primarily in the economic and technological realms, forcing Washington and Beijing into an uneasy peace.

After four decades of economic growth, China today is a great power, eager to pursue its strategic interests. On a global level, however, China is bound by structures, institutions, procedures, and rules that have been promoted by the United States since 1945, and ultimately standardized after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War.

Regionally, Chinese expansionism is constrained by the U.S.-led hub-and-spoke security system that binds the United States with its allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific region (primarily Japan, the Republic of Korea, the Philippines, Taiwan, Australia, and New Zealand). Policymakers should keep the following four points in mind when developing China policies—these four “nots” are essential for understanding Chinese behavior, goals, and interests.

1. The center of political authority in China is NOT Xi Jinping; it’s the Chinese Communist Party. This is not to downplay the role Xi has played in fueling China’s global ambitions—rather, since 1978, it has been the Party that ultimately drives China’s foreign policy and grand strategic goals. It has always been since 1978. If Xi wants to implement a new vision or global agenda, he nevertheless needs the Party’s approval. Additionally, as Rush Doshi contends, concepts usually attributed to Xi such as “national rejuvenation,” “strategic opportunity,” and “China’s great power status,” were laid down before Xi rose to the apex of the CCP in November 2012.
2. China’s revisionist behavior is NOT revolutionary; It’s incremental and selective. As Robert Gilpin’s hegemonic stability theory states, there are two plausible paths of systemic revisionism: incremental and revolutionary. Incrementalism aims to implement “continuous adjustments within the framework of the existing system,” while revolution occurs with “intermittent abrupt changes.” Empowered by forty-years of unprecedented economic growth, Beijing eventually became more assertive and demanding of what it perceives is a more accommodating and beneficial international order, but stopped short of attempting a sweeping and radical restructuring of the global order. Thus, as Evan Feigenbaum states, China is carrying out revisionist policies through an incremental and selective approach rather than a revolutionary one.
3. China is NOT a peer competitor to the U.S. at present, but it could be in the future. Today, Chinese economic growth has run aground as Xi Jinping pursues structural reforms to shepherd the country into a more sustainable and domestic-consumption-driven path, a move which will inevitably stimy economic growth. Furthermore, a formidable strand of literature (see Stephen Brooks and William Wohlforth, Michael Beckley and Andrea and Mauro Gilli) has flourished in recent years stressing China’s deficiencies while outlining obstacles to reaching parity with the United States. Stephen Brooks and William Wohlforth accurately identify national military, economic and technological capabilities that are “tailored for superpower status,” but conclude that “the one-superpower [the U.S.] system is not on the cusp of structural change” and that “there has been no transformation in its fundamental operating dynamics,” despite Chinese advances.
4. China is NOT out-of-the-way; it’s in-the-way. Globalization and forty years of normalized diplomatic relations have intertwined Beijing and Washington on multiple fronts: currency reserves, trade, investments, industrial complementarity, cultural exchanges, international security matters in which both parties have interests, and more. As Michael Swaine appraised, disentangling—or decoupling—a relationship of such complexity, while addressing critical nodes, will require more than labeling China as an existential threat and discarding China’s contribution to global security and prosperity.

Beijing is a revisionist power, but it is not necessarily a subversive actor on the global stage. Indeed, as the U.K. Parliament’s Foreign Affairs Committee recently assessed, “China is a force for order, but not liberal order.” For its part, the Trump Administration is advancing a Free and Open Indo-Pacific strategy that, despite promoting strong global cohesion in the face of China’s rise, displays a proclivity for unilateralism. Policymakers should consider the four “nots” as a starting point for developing a long-term strategy for countering Chinese revisionism.

The Four “Nots” to Correctly Interpreting China’s Rise was originally published on Global Security Review.

What’s Happening?

As part of a renewed pushback against Chinese influence, India announced in February that it would allocate $361 million for aid to the Maldives, a fourfold increase from 2018-19.

Key Insights

• Beijing and New Delhi are competing for influence throughout the Indian Ocean, an area which has traditionally been a part of India’s sphere of influence but has recently seen a surge of Chinese economic and military activity.
• Indian Ocean countries such as the Maldives owe a substantial debt to China; New Delhi worries that debt-trap diplomacy could lead to Chinese military bases in the region.
• India will bolster its economic and military efforts in its near abroad while continuing to call on like-minded allies to play a larger role in countering Chinese influence in the region.

The Maldives: Trouble in Paradise an Opportunity for India

Dispensing foreign aid is hardly the primary concern of Indian policymakers. Faced with debilitating poverty levels, the South Asian nation still receives aid from a number of countries such as the UK and the US. Yet the announcement of a new foreign aid component for the 2019-2020 budget has triggered the interest of Indian foreign policy pundits because of one notable outlier. Compared to 2018-2019, aid to the Maldives has seen a 460% increase, with $361 million being allocated to the island nation. The budget boost follows New Delhi’s declaration in December 2018 that it would provide $1.4 billion in financial assistance to Malé, after a meeting between Maldives President Ibrahim Mohamed Solih and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi.

Recent political upheaval in the Maldives provides the backdrop for these decisions. The newly elected Solih defeated pro-China authoritarian leader Abdulla Yameen in a surprise election result in October 2018. Solih’s victory was clearly a welcome relief for politicians in New Delhi who described the victory as a ‘triumph of democratic forces’.

During Yameen’s five-year rule, the Maldives strengthened ties with China, solidifying a free trade deal and welcoming considerable investment while sidelining Indian concerns over the relationship. Yet the spending spree was no free lunch. The Maldives accumulated between $1.5 billion and $3 billion in debt to Chinese lenders due to an infrastructure construction boom. Solih is now actively trying to reduce this debt. India’s financial assistance will go a long way towards alleviating Malé’s financial distress. It also represents New Delhi’s intention to forge closer ties with neighboring countries and signals a broader pivot back to the Indian Ocean.

The Red Dragon in the Indian Ocean

Rather than being India’s canary in the coal mine, the Maldives represents just one aspect of China’s increasing presence across the Indian Ocean. Through its flagship Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) – which India vehemently opposes – Beijing has sought to strengthen its economic and diplomatic relations with Indian Ocean nations. China sees this as a ‘win-win’ opportunity for all parties involved to enhance development and connectivity and denies any form of nefarious motive behind the sprawling scheme. Yet India doesn’t see the BRI as wholeheartedly benign. Instead, New Delhi believes that Beijing is putting some countries in significant debt stress to gain leverage for the ultimate purpose of pursuing its own strategic aims, a concept known as  ‘debt-trap diplomacy’.

Perhaps the best-known example of Chinese debt-trap diplomacy is in Sri Lanka. Colombo built Hambantota port on the southern coast using Chinese loans that it ultimately couldn’t repay, resulting in a debt-equity swap that left the port under the control of state-owned enterprise China Merchants Group on a 99-year lease. The fear for Indian policymakers is that this port will eventually be used as a military facility for Chinese naval vessels, as part of a scheme to ultimately establish a ‘String of Pearls’ – a series of Chinese military bases across the Indian Ocean – that would threaten India’s lines of communication and ability to project force in the event of a military crisis.

China’s opening of a military base in Djibouti in 2017, its operation of the Gwadar Port in Pakistan, and its increased naval presence throughout the Indian Ocean to protect sea lines of communication and enhance anti-piracy efforts are perceived by India to be a threatening combination. Coupled with reports that the Maldives, Sri Lanka, and Pakistan are all facing high BRI-related debt distress, India is extremely concerned that these countries could become beholden to China’s will in the future.

Battles for Influence, Calls for Allies

Perceptions of China have soured in the Maldives since Solih came to power. The cheap loan binge by former president Yameen has come to an end and the hangover is starting to set in. Solih has already pledged to pull out of the free trade deal with China, claiming that deal was ‘very one-sided’.

The competition for influence is unlikely to be confined to the Maldives, with Sri Lanka on the radar for both nations. Rival bailout bids have been tabled for the debt-stressed country: the Reserve Bank of India agreed to a $400 million currency swap arrangement with the Central Bank of Sri Lanka in January 2019, while the Bank of China allegedly offered a $300 million loan. In this respect, Sri Lanka presumably welcomes competition from the bigger powers if it results in a better outcome for debt reduction, and will more than likely hedge between the two nations rather than simply picking sides.

India will increasingly call on like-minded allies to play a larger role in countering Chinese presence in the Indian Ocean. The French naval destroyer FNS Cassardrecently docked into a military port in Mumbai after India and France solidified a Joint Strategic Vision deal to increase co-operation between the two countries. Australian Foreign Minister Marise Payne also reminded audiences at the Raisina Dialogue – a multilateral geopolitical conference held in New Delhi – that Australia remained committed to securing the Indian Ocean through close collaboration with joint naval exercises and support for regional institutions.

Expect this kind of diplomatic signaling to continue and strengthen in the future, with the possibility of a revival in more military exercises within the ‘Quad’ group, a security cooperation arrangement between the US, Japan, Australia, and India. Extra funding may also be dedicated to promoting and implementing the Asia-Africa Growth Corridor, a sea corridor promoting development across the Indian Ocean and into Africa that India has developed with Japan to rival BRI.

On the flip side, China will double down somewhere that India can’t compete: Pakistan. The $62 billion China Pakistan-Economic Corridor (CPEC), with the Gwadar port as the flagship project, has come under increased scrutiny due to concerns among the new Pakistani leadership about the country’s debt levels. As other countries across the Indian Ocean begin to doubt the viability of some BRI projects, China can’t afford for its close strategic relationship with Pakistan to sour. Expect Beijing to continue pouring investments into the country. The addition of Saudi Arabia and the UAE to participate in CPEC allows China to diversify its risks whilst also strengthening its relationships with the Middle Eastern countries. More partners could join that align with China’s strategic goals, with Iran pointing out that it too had ambitions to take part.

India’s renewed influence in the Maldives shows that foreign policymakers in New Delhi are aware that for the country to remain a significant force in the Indian Ocean, they need to focus on a few key objectives. These include maintaining close ties to nearby countries by offering incentives and assistance, calling on powerful allies to support its efforts across the Indian Ocean, and also displaying independent expressions of force projection. The ensuing competition with China over influence in the Indian Ocean will likely only intensify over the coming months and years.

New Delhi’s Foreign Policy in the Indian Ocean was originally published on Global Security Review.

English is gradually replacing Russian as the most common foreign language spoken in Mongolia, as Western corporations control increasingly large segments of the Mongolian mining industry. The mineral sector is the most essential part of the Mongolian economy. The former Soviet satellite state has approximately ten percent world’s known coal reserves.

Two companies dominate the Mongolian mining industry—Oyu Tolgoi and Tavan Tolgoi. Oyu Tolgoi, two-thirds of which is owned by Canadian and British-Australian firms, is the dominant player in the Mongolian mining sector. Despite its poor environmental record, the Canadian mining giant Rio Tinto is increasingly influential within Mongolia. Following a 2013 disagreement between the company and the Mongolian government, Ulaanbaatar was forced to fire Tserenbat Sedvachig, the executive director of Erdenes Oyu Tolgoi, the state-owned company that controls the remaining third of Oyu Tolgoi.

The second major corporation in the Mongolian mining industry is the state-owned Tavan Tolgoi. Mongolian lawmakers recently approved a plan to sell up to thirty percent of the Tavan Tolgoi coal mine, with the government officials expressing their hopes that Rio Tinto will have to maintain a level of “working cooperation” with the Mongolian mining giant.

Mining accounts for approximately one-third of Mongolia’s GDP. Mineral commodities comprise a little over eighty-nine percent of the country’s total exports. Although Western corporations like Rio Tinto maintain a strong level of influence over the country’s economy, China imports the majority of Mongolian exports. In contrast, Russia’s involvement in the Mongolian economy plummeted in the aftermath of the Soviet Union’s collapse.

By the 1990s, Mongolian trade with Russia declined by around eighty percent, as China’s diplomatic relationship with and economic influence over Mongolia increased. In recent years, however, Russia has sought to rebuild its ties with Mongolia to enhance its standing as a regional power. The Russian government wrote off ninety-eight percent of Mongolia’s state debt, and an agreement was signed to build an oil pipeline from Russia to China through Mongolia.

The Mongolian public retains a certain amount of nostalgia for Russia, and a recent flight of Western investment has reinforced such sentiments. During the Soviet era, Mongolia was considered the USSR’s unofficial 16th republic, with most people in the country being able to speak and understand Russian.

Today, the Russian language is far less popular with Mongolians, especially among the youth. Furthermore, even though the Cyrillic alphabet is the country’s official alphabet, young Mongolians increasingly use the Latin alphabet on their phones and social media. Nearly half of all comments made by young Mongolian Facebook users are written in the Latin alphabet, with the remaining portion being in Cyrillic. Going forward, Ulaanbaatar may make an effort to standardize the use of the Latin alphabet, which has been the trend in many former Soviet republics or Soviet aligned-states that used the Cyrillic script in an official capacity.

Russia is not only losing economic influence in Mongolia, but it is also losing cultural influence. English has replaced Russian as the most common foreign language used by many young Mongolians. This adoption is fueled by both migration and the desire to integrate further into the global economy. Even though a significant number of Mongolian schools and universities continue to teach Russian to their students, the presence of Russian culture in the country will continue to decline.

Russian Influence in Mongolia is Declining was originally published on Global Security Review.

In Afghanistan, the U.S. and its allies have deployed cutting-edge aerial intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities. What is missing, however, is good human intelligence (HUMINT) collection capabilities. Afghans have been entrusted with the task of HUMINT collection, but multiple Taliban infiltration and sabotage operations illustrate the need for comprehensive reform of Afghanistan’s intelligence apparatus.

The Afghan intelligence community requires a robust overhaul. This includes investment in both human and technical capabilities alongside a comprehensive reform program. Afghanistan’s intelligence community is comprised of the National Directorate of Security (NDS), Police Intelligence (PI) and Military Intelligence (MI). Some coordination centers, including Tawheed, NASRAT, and the Presidential Information Coordination Center (PICC) connect and share strategic, operational, and tactical intelligence between the individual agencies.

Regarding organizational hierarchy, the Afghan intelligence community is structured like a pyramid, with the powerful National Directorate of Security at the top. The NDS oversees Afghanistan’s overall intelligence machinery as it pertains to both internal and external security.

Though vested with substantial powers, the Afghan intelligence community has become heavily politicized and suffers from a lack of investment coupled with an old and inefficient bureaucracy. Afghanistan’s intelligence collection efforts are primarily focused on gathering HUMINT through long-standing networks of tribes, local commanders, traders, and government employees. This HUMINT is augmented with basic signals intelligence (SIGINT) collection capabilities.

The Five Eyes countries (the U.S., U.K., Canada, Australia, and New Zealand) have done much to transform the Afghan intelligence community. However, more needs to be done to create professional, disciplined, and adequately equipped intelligence services. At present, arbitrary political appointments, a lack of professional intelligence schools, and the ongoing politicization of Afghanistan’s intelligence agencies have profoundly undermined their institutional integrity and credibility.

The Institutional History of Afghan Intelligence

Intelligence collection and analysis as organized tradecraft is a relatively new phenomenon in Afghanistan. It started with the creation of the Edara e Zabt Ahwaalaat of the 18^th century King Abdul Rahman Khan. The founding father of modern Afghan intelligence is former Prime Minister and President Sardar Dawood Khan; he transformed Edara Zabt Ahwalaat Sedarat to establish the first-ever State Intelligence Services—Edara Estikhabarat Dawlati. This agency was later ideologically refined as communist governments took power with the help of the Soviet KGB, and renamed as KAM, AGSA, and KHAAD.

Today, a significant number of Afghan intelligence agents and officers are graduates of KGB training centers in Russia and former Soviet republics or satellite states such as Uzbekistan, East Germany, and the former Yugoslavia. Furthermore, police and military intelligence agencies were established during the communist period to conduct surveillance on political opponents, conduct counterintelligence operations and gather intelligence on criminals and crime syndicates in major urban centers.

The institutional history of the Afghan intelligence community has created legal and policy frameworks that are in dire need of reform. Updating and revising these frameworks to define and clarify the authorities, responsibilities, and roles of the various intelligence agencies is essential to safeguard their legitimacy, integrity, and professionalism. At present, there is considerable overlap between the mandates and activities of Afghanistan’s military and civilian intelligence, especially in the areas of intelligence on criminal or terrorist activities, tactical-level intelligence, and strategic intelligence. These overlaps need to be clarified through a comprehensive, cross-agency review, which will serve as a road map for subsequent updates and revisions to the legal and policy frameworks used by the Afghan intelligence services.

Furthermore, robust investment is required to upgrade and equip intelligence training schools in the military and civilian sectors. These schools should be the Afghan intelligence community’s sole supplier of human capital to ensure job security, professionalism, and discipline while avoiding any politicization of the intelligence services. The only political appointees in positions of authority in the Afghan intelligence community should be the Director of the NDS and his first deputy; both should have a term limit of two to three years. The career professionals in the services must be immune from political appointments, while service chiefs and NDS personnel who have been discharged from service should be prohibited from engaging in any political or business activity for ten years. This will ensure that sensitive information they may have had access to will not be used for political or financial gain.

There is also the fact that the NDS is spread too thin. As such, there is a dire need to establish three new intelligence agencies: a foreign intelligence agency, a counter-intelligence agency, and a joint intelligence committee consisting of the various intelligence service chiefs chaired by the President of Afghanistan. This improved institutional arrangement will clarify the roles and responsibilities of each agency, improve oversight, increase inter-agency coordination, and enable each agency to better focus on its core mission.

The Intelligence Cycle and Modus Operandi

Afghanistan’s intelligence services currently lack a coherent methodology governing the collection and analysis of intelligence, and the delivery of final intelligence products. Little attention is paid to analyzing and corroborating raw intelligence, which is often presented as a final product. These shortcomings are primarily due to a lack of a coherent institutional culture and the absence of a system of intelligence development. The modus operandi of the three existing services needs to be upgraded with the right systems, procedures, and personnel. This process can start with the implementation of a robust intelligence development cycle, and clarification as to the roles and responsibilities of various agencies, and of departments within each agency.

Furthermore, the Afghan intelligence community would benefit from higher numbers of western-trained intelligence officers. Retirement incentives should be offered to older, KGB-trained officers. At the same time, existing intelligence training schools in Afghanistan need to update their curricula and increase their enrollment as older officers retire and demand for new officers rises.

Information Sharing and Coordination

While secrecy and information compartmentalization are fundamental aspects of the intelligence tradecraft, timely and effective sharing and coordination of information is an ongoing challenge for any intelligence service. While many improvements have been made with the establishment of coordination centers such as TAWHEED, PICC, and NASRAT, more needs to be done at the tactical and operational levels.

The fall of the provinces of Kunduz and Ghazni are examples of intelligence sharing failures in Afghanistan. Agencies were unable to coordinate and share intelligence regarding imminent Taliban attacks promptly. Information needs to be distributed in an efficient and timely manner to those with the proper capabilities to address the issue. Optimized inter- and intra-agency information sharing capabilities will change the face of the Afghan war.

Foreign Partnerships

Partnerships with external intelligence services are essential. Given Afghanistan’s geopolitical circumstances, the Afghan intelligence community can not afford to rely on a single partnership. Instead, it should diversify its foreign partnerships while distinguishing between strategic and non-strategic partners. The United States and the other Five Eye countries are examples of strategic partners.

The Afghan intelligence services should structure its foreign partnerships in three tiers. The first tier would be Afghanistan’s principal partners, such as the U.S. and the Five Eyes countries. The second tier should be comprised of the intelligence services of India, Russia, China, and neighboring countries. The third tier would include the rest of the world.

Paramilitary Forces

Like all intelligence agencies, Afghanistan retains a paramilitary force that is tasked with carrying out quick and effective counter-terrorism operations. These forces have been essential for actions taken against the Taliban, foreign terrorists, and Daesh (Islamic State, ISIS, ISIL). In the event of a reorganization or restructuring of the Afghan intelligence community, these forces and their operational capabilities should be maintained due to their critical role in counter-terrorism.

There is a critical need to improve inter-agency coordination when it comes to operational targeting, planning, and execution with other branches of Afghanistan’s security services. Due to the sensitive nature of operations carried out by paramilitary forces, there are often duplicate or overlapping operations. However, structures such as the Joint Services Operations Command (JSOC) can play an essential role in avoiding redundancies regarding efforts and resources.

SIGINT vs. HUMINT in Hybrid Warfare

The Afghan conflict has changed from insurgenct-proxy warfare to a hybrid war much like the ongoing conflict in the Donetsk and Donbass regions of Ukraine. Alongside covert involvement by Russia and Iran, Pakistan has employed a combination of proxy groups, psychological warfare operations (PsyOps), and economic blockades against Afghan forces, while simultaneously discrediting U.S. and NATO operations in the country. Much of the SIGINT Afghanistan has access to is provided by the U.S.-led coalition forces.

Afghanistan’s intelligence services primarily focus on developing intelligence products utilizing HUMINT capabilities and assets, albeit without much success given the significant number of attacks in major cities and military installations. A robust overhaul is needed to reform and develop full-spectrum capabilities that will enable Afghan government forces to counter hybrid warfare tactics employed by the Taliban and their foreign backers. Integrating HUMINT and SIGINT is a critical step that will improve the efficacy of intelligence products on the battlefield. The Afghan war won’t be won by drones, PC-12s, and other aerial capabilities alone; ground-based networks and sources can have a significant impact when coupled with the proper capabilities and resources.

Oversight and Control

During the eighties and nineties, the Afghan intelligence services—KAM, AGSA, and KHAD—were notorious for atrocities such as arbitrary arrests, mass executions, and forced disappearances. The predecessor of these agencies, Edara e Zabt Ahwaalaat Sedarat, was a tool used for domestic surveillance of political opponents and dissidents of Afghanistan’s kings. Accordingly, intelligence and spycraft are looked at with suspicion by the Afghan people, as it brings back memories of KAM, AGSA, and KHAAD. Thus far, the NDS has been successful, to an extent, in its efforts to improve its reputation, but much more needs to be done.

The Afghan intelligence community’s budget is in need of a robust legal and policy framework to ensure accountability, both operationally and fiscally. In a democratic state, intelligence agencies are required to operate within the rule of law and uphold values like human rights. To their credit, the National Directorate of Security and its sister agencies have done much in this area, but more is required to improve their reputational standing. Measures such as quarterly reports to the parliamentary intelligence committee, ensuring access to detainees by domestic and international human rights organizations, and robust oversight by and reporting to the presidency and the National Security Council are all measures that would contribute to an increase in public and international confidence in Afghanistan’s intelligence apparatus.

Information Trade and Budget Controls

Information is an asset, and if corroborated and verifiable, can be a game changer for Afghanistan. However, there is much more disinformation and rumors than solid, actionable intelligence. Raw data that is not put through a proper intelligence cycle before being included in a final intelligence product is virtually useless. In the intelligence tradecraft, most of the raw information turns out to be rumors and uncorroborated hearsay.

Meanwhile, large sums of money are spent to develop sources and produce intelligence products with little parliamentary or presidential oversight. The operational budgets of all three existing services under parliamentary and presidential oversight need to be assessed using a cost-benefit analysis that weighs the value of final intelligence products against the costs required to develop those products. While a degree of secrecy surrounding the budgets of intelligence services is warranted, there must be proper oversight to provide a check-and-balance mechanism to monitor corruption, inefficiency, and ensure a positive return on investment.

Intelligence in War: Fixing and Fitting Intelligence in the Afghan War was originally published on Global Security Review.

What’s Happening?

The U.S. is engaging in an adverse competition with China that, absent a negotiated understanding, will become increasingly difficult to manage and may spill out of control.

Key Insights

• U.S. perceptions of and approach towards China are turning hostile with an ideological undertone that may fuel misperception and miscalculation.
• Beijing is not yet ready to confront Washington in the same way that the U.S. is now beginning to view its relationship with China.
• A cold war between China and the U.S. today will be far more difficult to manage than the contest between the U.S. and the USSR.

A New Normal

In recent years, several bodies and prominent individuals in Washington have instigated a series of measures that have shifted U.S. perception and strategic posture toward China. They included the release of National Security Strategy (NSS) and National Defense Strategy (NDS), Secretary of Defense James Mattis’s remarks at the Shangri-La Dialogue, the White House’s China technology report, President Donald Trump’s trade war with China, the National Defense Authorisation Act 2019 (NDAA) and most recently Vice President Mike Pence’s speech at the Hudson Institute.

The aforementioned reports and speeches share an outlook that U.S.-China relations are turning increasingly competitive at a time when Beijing has been accused of committing more and more actions perceived as fundamentally incompatible with Washington’s interests and values. Pence’s speech, in particular, summarised China’s “whole-of-government approach” by pointing out its malign activities.

In the U.S.:

• Influence operations
• Cyber-operations
• Technological espionage
• Intellectual property theft
• Investment in critical national assets
• Predatory economics

In the region:

• Eroding U.S. military advantages and its alliance system
• Committing aggressive acts in the South China Sea

In China:

• “A sharp U-turn toward control and oppression.”
• The “Great Firewall of China”
• The “Orwellian system” of “social credit system.”
• Religious crackdown
• Suppression in secessionist regions

Pence’s speech is not surprising given the gradual change in American attitudes toward China. But by invoking the failures of past administrations to integrate China into the U.S.-led international order, he reflected a new normal for the U.S.: it will no longer “be intimidated” by China and “will not stand down.” Furthermore, Pence’s speech was given in the context of the NDAA, which received bipartisan support in Congress, meaning that the turn is not a short-lived phenomenon and is likely to last beyond Trump’s presidential term.

Strategic Competition Turning Adversarial

While ‘strategic competition’ has become the Trump administration’s preferred label to frame Washington’s relations with Beijing, the U.S. has been sending signals that it views the relationship as increasingly adversarial and zero-sum. For example, the NDS acknowledges China’s quest for “Indo-Pacific regional hegemony in the near-term and displacement of the United States to achieve global preeminence in the future.”

The U.S. has sought to prevent this and is preparing forces not only to deter but to win a war against China. Such reaction and response have called into question whether Beijing is merely a ‘competitor’ or is, in fact, emerging as a threat that warrants a more aggressive response. As Anthony H. Cordesman from the CSIS warns, “it is becoming steadily harder to distinguish between efforts designed to limit or contain the other state and those that might lead to actual conflict.”

More dangerously, the ‘strategic competition’ label is feeding an ideological narrative that divides Americans and Chinese into ‘us’ and ‘them.’ Robert Keohane and Jeff Kogan, for example, advocate that Washington “nurture a uniquely American social identity and a national narrative [t]hat will require othering authoritarian and illiberal countries.” The NSS and NDS have, in line, developed an image of China as a “revisionist power” bent on shaping “a world consistent with their authoritarian model” and “antithetical to U.S. values and interests.”

However, ideological narratives have the tendency to facilitate simple-minded worldviews and reduce the foreign ‘other’ to stereotypes, which fuels misperception and unnecessary distrust, and are instrumental to opportunist leaders especially during critical junctures of domestic political transition. Pence’s speech was partly fuelled by suspicion rather than facts; his accusation that China is “influencing the [U.S.] midterms [elections]” was contradicted by the Department of Homeland Security and has led to speculation that he was shoring up domestic support to fuel his neoconservative agenda.

An Emerging Cold War?

The adversarial undertone in U.S.-China relations has generated speculation of an emerging ‘cold war’ (see here and here). However, a ‘cold war’ will first require both parties to develop opposing perceptions of each other and Beijing seemingly remains ambiguous as to how it views itself and its relations with Washington. For now, China is caught between simultaneously pursuing peaceful development and its ambitions of territorial reunification and great-power respect. The former requires maintaining a conducive environment for prosperity, including peaceful relations with the U.S. and its neighbors. But the latter requires acting tough on issues where sovereignty and autonomy are challenged, leading to more assertive and aggressive conduct in international affairs.

During the 19th Party Congress, Chinese President Xi Jinping sought to address these two agendas—but only as separate issues. He has yet to affirm which one is accorded greater priority. Without addressing the contradiction between peace and assertiveness, it is difficult to see how China can formally clarify its perception of the U.S. as either a strategic partner or an ideological threat; the U.S. has both contributed immensely to China’s rise and engaged in actions hostile to Beijing’s aspirations. Professor Chen Dingding posits that there are currently three dominant views in Beijing regarding Washington’s future China policy: containment, competition, and cooperation. The question is how far China will tolerate U.S. policies suggestive of a containment strategy before it pushes back with “calls for active Chinese measures to counterbalance possible U.S. aggressive actions in a possible all-out conflict.”

Moreover, any talk of a ‘cold war’ is unlikely to manifest in the same manner as that between the U.S. and the USSR, which was contested globally through the policies of containment and comprehensive economic decoupling. The world is not currently moving towards bipolar global blocs with close-to-no economic interaction; both China and the U.S. are far too connected to each other and to the global economy. While they currently engage in a trade war, the U.S. is (outwardly) seeking to revise the rules of the game rather than abandon the policy of engagement.

It is difficult to assume that China will simply collapse under the weight of U.S. containment as the USSR did in 1991—its relative economic strength vis-a-vis the U.S. is already greater than that of the Soviet Union at its peak. Furthermore, as Graham Allison notes, “if the U.S. leads [in containing China], who will follow”? U.S. allies and partners have significant interests in maintaining strong relations with both powers—usually in the form of economic ties with China and security commitments with the U.S.—and do not want to make a choice between the two.

Instability in the New Era

However, U.S.-China relations proceed, they are unlikely to remain as stable as the U.S.-USSR bipolar era, which had over time developed a series of tacit and formal signaling and normative arrangements that worked towards ameliorating what could have had been a series of escalatory outbreaks. Today, the structures of the international system are substantially different. The multipolar dynamic, with its uneven distribution of power and influence, creates a greater risk of miscalculation. Rapid technological changes (advanced conventional weapons, cyberwarfare and artificial intelligence) will also make competition increasingly difficult to manage as the global rules and norms fail to keep pace.

Both the U.S. and China will need to manage their differences lest the rivalry transforms into a downward spiral of confrontation. However, the outlook is foreboding. If President Trump withdraws from the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty amidst accusations of unfair Chinese and Russian practices, he will set a precedent that could undermine the future stability of global arms control and plunge the world into another arms race.

Cold War? Towards an Era of Adverse U.S.-China Competition was originally published on Global Security Review.

A Chinese cybersecurity expert might have let the “cat out of the bag.” Writing in the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Daily, the author highlights how a component of Bitcoin technology known as “blockchain” (区块链) will have “military applications,” adding “there is no doubt that the future of media war must rely on a specific network media to start.”

More troubling though is that it was written specifically for the Chinese military as a specific call to action: “the media battle of wars will become an important form of future military struggles. If we do not take precautions in keeping with the pace of the times, we will be subject to control everywhere.” The PLA author is 100 percent correct, but does this mean the West should allow China take control of the “media battle of wars”?

Whichever countries successfully harness this emerging blockchain technology for military and intelligence operations in the 21st century will likely determine their future level of international influence and power. What exactly is blockchain and what are its implications for gray zone warfare?

To the layman, discussions on some new Bitcoin technology (e.g., blockchain) influencing military and intelligence operations in a pivotal way may sound preposterous. However, blockchain when integrating into a specific national strategy has the potential to fundamentally alter the future of relations between states, societies, and citizens. If properly utilized as a national security instrument by the Chinese (and others), it can undermine Western governments by subverting standard mechanisms that detect criminal and subversive activities.

The Importance of Blockchain

To those unfamiliar with the subject, “blockchain is considered the main technological innovation of Bitcoin.” The rise of cryptocurrencies, such as Bitcoin, and the ability to authenticate and provide payment anonymously in a secure way relies on a “distributed ledger technology” enabled by blockchain. As identified by three Chinese researchers in a 2016 article titled  “Blockchain technology and its potential military value” (区块链技术及其潜在的军事价值]) in National Defense Science & Technology, the authors highlight the value of blockchain technology, noting the numerous security ramifications, especially in the realm of defensive and offensive operations. Also, as written in a China Management Informationization article, blockchain supports “trustworthiness, reliability, openness, consensus mechanism and smart contract” in business transactions and other dealings where discrete payments are needed.

Scholars in India are similarly concerned about blockchain supporting the conduct of military operations, with one author recognizing that as governments and individuals develop quantum computing abilities, blockchain will make it easy to hack into highly secure networks. Such writings by foreign scholars suggest that blockchain will change the way countries alter the battlespace in their favor without even being detected. However, it is ironic that China recently announced a ban on cryptocurrencies, while their experts are advocating for ways in which to weaponize Bitcoin technology for war.

Blockchain presents an opportunity for numerous uses in the military and intelligence communities. The technology neatly into the paradigm of warfare in the ’Gray Zone,’ where Chinese aggression defines the “ambiguity — about the ultimate objectives, the participants, whether international treaties and norms have been violated, and the role that military forces should play in response.” The uncertain nature of gray zone warfare is what makes blockchain so appealing as a tool. Adversarial governments and extremist groups can utilize it – with little fear of being caught “red-handed” – to further their interests at the expense of other countries unwilling or unable to stop it.

Blockchain in the Gray Zone: China Attacking Western Civil Society?

A U.S. Naval Officer, writing for The Jamestown Foundation, is rightly concerned that blockchain technology “has been recognized as having intrinsic value and utility for Chinese defense issues,” and “would align with the civil-military application goals tied to the broad informatization (信息化) campaign” espoused in China’s 2015 Military Strategy.

If we accept the notion that China is a rising power, then we should also accept that – much like other historical “rising powers” – China will increasingly want to exercise its instruments of national power in military, economic, and political spheres. If China is seeking to increase its regional hegemony in the Pacific, and gray zone actions in the South China Sea are any indication of future behavior, then recent gray zone attacks against Australia and New Zealand indicate how blockchain might work on a global scale, and against the interests of the U.S. and her Western allies.

Research on Chinese “influence campaigns” in the Pacific by a professor in New Zealand has already drawn substantial international attention, not just for her findings, but because of what China did to her. As far as anyone can tell, her articles touched a nerve with Beijing, with Chinese agents appearing to intimidate her. The reason why China had every reason to worry about her work was that she specifically identified Chinese actions to influence opinion in Australia and New Zealand on China by subverting their political system.

The author discovered the paper trail of money leading back to China (and their corporations), whereby China was giving substantial amounts of money numerous political parties in Australia and New Zealand. China was also financially courting current (and former) government officials and public intellectuals in each country as a way of undermining public debates about China.

Their campaign has chilling ramifications for how blockchain could make future Chinese operations impossible to uncover or detect, as they will likely continue their subversive operations against any countries that might oppose their rise to power.

What I am about to propose is purely speculative, but if we perceive the “Sharp Power” actions by China as an attempt to undermine civil society and democracy in the West, then the “Gray Zone” war is about to escalate and shift in favor of China.

Speculative blockchain uses could entail:

1. For espionage purposes, China could securely pay significant sums of money to trusted agents in Western societies that would be effectively untraceable. Such Chinese intelligence agents could – depending on the blockchain encrypted communications – pursue actions meant to sow disunity or political polarization. This could come in the form of providing significant monetary contributions to extremist political parties on the left and right side. This would be quite a remarkable strategy and shift in tactics because instead of trying to support civil society groups and organizations towards the preferences of China, such an approach would just overall weaken the country as polarized politics would make it difficult to respond to growing Chinese power because Western politicians would be too divided and fragmented to mobilize an adequate response.
2. Blockchain security protocols, if properly implemented by Chinese intelligence and security agencies would essentially make their state secrets impenetrable. While I am not suggesting that the West should be trying to electronically infiltrate Chinese systems in an offensive fashion, it would at least serve as a future deterrent to Chinese cyber actions. Already China has been identified on numerous occasions for conducting information collection operations (i.e., stealing classified and sensitive business information) that have relied on cyber warfare tactics to steal technology from Western governments, militaries, and commercial companies (to include the military-industrial complex). 
3. If the West were to attempt an information war within China, the authentication protocols provided by blockchain would make it nearly impossible to create and spread “fake news.” However, if the West did not use blockchain defensively, then China could create confusion in Western societies by distributing “fake news” through trusted Western media outlets. This could damage public debates about societal problems and international politics as each side of the political spectrum could be “duped” into believing false grievances and cleavages, which would undermine the policymaking process throughout all levels of government.

Each of these hypothetical scenarios suggests are within the realm of possibility. China could integrate blockchain into their security and intelligence operations as a way of leveraging American structures against the U.S. and her allies.

Conclusion

Disruptive blockchain technology is coming – whether or not we want it. There are staggering implications for gray zone warfare, especially from China and other hostile adversaries using Bitcoin technologies against the U.S. and her allies. Western defense communities will need to handle this and acknowledge the troubling reality that gray zone warfare will be harder to detect and deter. Moreover, besides state threats, Bitcoin technologies also make it easier for terrorist groups and violent non-state actors (e.g., criminals, gangs, etc.) to operate as it is almost impossible for security

Luckily, the West is not entirely unprepared about blockchain applicability for military uses: the Pentagon is looking into securing databases, the American Defense Advanced Research Project Agency (DARPA) is developing a secure battlefield communication system, and Estonia has rebuilt its government around the technology. These are promising signs, but whoever weaponizes blockchain the fastest (i.e., establishing supremacy in this emerging technology), will undoubtedly achieve the sought after Monroe Doctrine in Cyber Space.

However, much is left to be done with trying to modernize defense systems in the West using blockchain. Moreover, there is a need to ‘harden’ and ‘strengthen’ civil society against foreign subversion that might rely on blockchain to create and spread fake news (i.e., propaganda). Additionally, the prospect of untraceable monetary donations to influence important individuals, politics, and policies in the West, poses tremendous challenges to the workings of liberal Western democracies.

While my three blockchain examples were hypothetical, there is no evidence to suggest this has occurred yet. Unfortunately, from a logical and intuitive position, these are entirely within the realm of reality, especially in a gray zone war context of the 21st century. Hard military power appears to be exercised less by rising powers such as China, and thus far, Chinese behavior in the international community appears bent on shaping narratives, politics, and negotiations in favor of their own interests.

Is China Weaponizing Blockchain Technology for Gray Zone Warfare? was originally published on Global Security Review.

The Donald J. Trump administration has adopted the term Indo-Pacific to describe its larger strategic area of interest across the pan-Asian region. Fully realizing this strategy’s potential will require reconciling differences over the boundaries of the Indo-Pacific and what can and should be done across this enormous geography.

The term’s descriptive value matters strategically. As Australian national-security strategist Rory Medcalf wrote in 2013, the term Indo-Pacific recognizes deepened connections between the Indian Ocean region and the Western Pacific. China’s increasingly active presence in the Indian Ocean (e.g., a military base in Djibouti and intensified ties with countries such as Sri Lanka and the Maldives) illustrates a new reality in this maritime space.

As important, the Indo-Pacific framework inherently places India at the heart, rather than as an appendage to a concept of Asia focused on East Asia. Indeed, as Carnegie India’s C. Raja Mohan has written, the concept of Indian centrality revives a colonial-era framework that situated India in the middle of a larger maritime strategic space. This larger maritime area, described as the “confluence of the two seas” by Japanese Prime Minister Abe during a 2007 speech to the Indian parliament, has important implications.

It’s hard not to see India’s inherent relevance in this broader region—a country on the brink of becoming the world’s most populous; a stable democracy with the world’s sixth-largest economy, third-largest military by personnel strength, and fifth-largest defense budget; and a commitment to rule of law and the liberal international order.

Oceans Apart?

The Trump administration has elevated the Indo-Pacific to a top-level regional priority, as suggested by its placement in the 2017 National Security Strategy (NSS) [PDF]. The strategy describes the Indo-Pacific as a region in which “a geopolitical competition between free and repressive visions of world order is taking place” and where “China is using economic inducements and penalties, influence operations, and implied military threats to persuade other states to heed its political and security agenda.”

While the NSS calls for working in concert with U.S. allies and partners, including boosting “quadrilateral cooperation with Japan, Australia, and India,” otherwise known as the Quad, the newly formulated strategy also welcomes India’s rise as a “leading global power” and emphasizes expanded defense ties with New Delhi. Notably, the framework appears focused on pulling India more intensively into regional activities to its east but does not necessarily take into account India’s own interests in the Indian Ocean.

The NSS defines the Indo-Pacific region [PDF] as stretching from “the west coast of India to the western shores of the United States” (page 46). This section has no reference to Indian Ocean maritime space, including the area off the east coast of Africa, the Arabian Sea, and the Bay of Bengal. In this light, the Indo-Pacific described by the Trump administration has a lot more Pacific than it does Indo. Meanwhile, India’s sense of the region includes the larger maritime space to its west. The members of the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA), a minilateral organization India co-created with South Africa to better institutionalize consultation across this poorly linked area, includes countries spanning this geography.

In Search of an Agenda

If the NSS hinted at the challenges across this amorphous region, the Trump administration’s statements to date have not clarified its plan. Trump’s Indo-Pacific strategy speech, delivered during his November 2017 visit to Vietnam for the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum’s CEO summit, provided the highest-level vision of what the strategy intends to cover. He called for fair and reciprocal trade and infrastructure investment from the World Bank and Asian Development Bank, and he affirmed the importance of rule of law, individual rights, and freedom of navigation. Still, the speech relayed no specific indication of how the administration would support these priorities in any manner that differs from the past, and it did not specify a U.S. approach to a more comprehensive Indo-Pacific geography.

Last October’s foreign policy speech delivered by then Secretary of State Rex Tillerson ahead of a visit to India—one of the few policy speeches during his brief tenure—placed heavy emphasis on working closely with India on defense and security across the Indo-Pacific, as well as providing alternatives to the “predatory economics” of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). However, no specific initiatives have since emerged.

This issue of “seams,” or arbitrary bureaucratic separations, bedevils Washington’s ability to cover the Indo-Pacific adequately. This is certainly true within the State Department, where the bureaus of East Asia and the Pacific, South and Central Asia, Near Eastern Affairs, and African Affairs would all be required to cover countries in the larger region. Or take the divisions within the Defense Department’s combatant commands. U.S. Pacific Command covers the Asia Pacific, Southeast Asia, and the South Asian countries of Bangladesh, India, the Maldives, Nepal, and Sri Lanka. But it does not cover Afghanistan and Pakistan, which are part of U.S. Central Command, nor does it encompass the islands in the Indian Ocean off the east coast of Africa, which are contained within the U.S. Africa Command area of responsibility.

For its part, India seeks further coordination with the United States not only on the eastern portion of the region—Southeast and Northeast Asia—but also to its west, spanning Pakistan, Afghanistan, the Gulf, the islands of the Indian Ocean, and the eastern coast of Africa. Finding a way to better integrate India into the larger pan-Asian region to the east, as well as better cooperating on issues that are of significant concern to India, such as counterterrorism and maritime security to the west, could go a long way toward creating an Indo-Pacific strategy that aligns with both U.S. and Indian interests.

How to Realize a Fully Indo-Pacific Strategy

First, a compelling Indo-Pacific strategy needs to incorporate an economic through-line that offers an alternative to China’s expansive regional economic framework. The U.S. withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) eliminated Washington’s proactive model for trade. Both China and India advocate an alternative trade grouping, the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP)—an agreement of more limited ambition but whose presence, without the prospect of U.S. leadership, underscores how the United States has withered its ability to shape regional trade rules of the road. The Trump administration should reconsider joining the TPP, especially given the leadership gains it would engender from reengaging with partner countries. A TPP-rooted economic strategy for the broader region could ultimately incentivize India to join the trade pact.

Second, and closely related, Washington should champion Indian membership in APEC as a show of good faith on Indian priorities. India, with a more than $2 trillion economy, has been denied entry for more than twenty years, and its exclusion makes little strategic sense. Keeping India on the outside of a multilateral organization vital to economic activity across Asia undermines the strategic goal of expanding the Asia-Pacific framework to a larger Indo-Pacific region. An APEC with India included would expand the organization’s geography to more accurately reflect the centers of economic activity at scale, and it would be a concrete step toward realizing an Indo-Pacific region.

Third, the Trump administration should develop clear infrastructure investment initiatives with India, Japan, Australia, and others to provide transparent financing alternatives to China’s BRI, as Tillerson proposed. This is an excellent idea, but it lacks an implementation strategy. U.S. Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin initially rejected capital base expansion for the World Bank but thankfully changed his position, which should permit the United States to partner with other countries on infrastructure finance within a multilateral framework.

Existing U.S.-India-Japan consultations include a working group on infrastructure, which could identify opportunities. Tokyo and New Delhi have been working closely on this front through the Asia-Africa Growth Corridor partnership, whose vision for cross-regional connectivity [PDF] is designed to link the larger Indian Ocean region via infrastructure development, skills training, people-to-people exchange, and cooperative projects in areas including agriculture, health, and disaster management.

Fourth, Washington should take seriously the priorities and suggestions emerging from the IORA platform. The United States became an IORA dialogue partner in 2012, and it could more actively rely on the body as a forum for ideas and new Indo-Pacific-wide initiatives. Australia, India, and Indonesia are active members; the group also includes Kenya, Somalia, South Africa, and Tanzania; and U.S. allies France, Germany, Japan, and the United Kingdom are dialogue partners. The IORA has a wide range of focus areas, from maritime security and disaster management to the blue economy, which comprises economic activity centered on the oceans, and women’s empowerment, so it should not be difficult to develop test projects amenable to all.

Fifth, diplomatic coordination should be increased not only among the Quad countries but also throughout the larger region. It could encompass regional counternarcotics and counterterrorism efforts or relate to specific political or humanitarian crises, such as those in the Maldives and along the Bangladesh-Myanmar border. Such a framework will require, within the U.S. system, reaching across bureaucratic boundaries. (The announcement that an Indian defense attaché will be posted at the U.S. Naval Forces Central Command in Bahrain indicates a move in this direction.)

Successive U.S. administrations have strengthened ties with India and developed strategic frameworks for a broad U.S.-India partnership. The Trump administration’s Indo-Pacific emphasis could be its most consequential strategic initiative, building on the work done by the Obama administration’s U.S.-India Joint Strategic Vision for the Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean Region. But it will need—very soon—to identify and implement some specific projects for the grand strategy to become reality.

The U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy Needs More Indian Ocean was originally published on Global Security Review.

The real question is, how? The post-World War II international order that enabled today’s political, economic, and security arrangements and institutions is in question as power diffuses worldwide, shuffling seats at the table of global decision making.

Today, aspiring powers seek to adjust the rules of the international order and alter the global context in a way beneficial to their interests.

This complicates any reform of international institutions such as the UN Security Council or the Bretton-Woods institutions, also brings into question whether political, civil and human rights—hallmarks of liberal values and US leadership since 1945—will continue to be so.

Norms that were believed to be settled are increasingly threatened if present trends hold, and consensus to implement and follow standards can be difficult to build as Russia, China, and Iran seek to shape regions and international norms in their favor. Some features of the evolving global order are apparent:

Rising and Declining Powers Exert Their Influence

Competition is on the increase as China and Russia seek to exert more considerable influence over their neighboring regions and encourage an order wherein US influence doesn’t dominate.

Although nations and organizations will continue to shape citizen anticipation about the future order, citizen and sub-national concerns will increasingly push states to the stage that international and domestic politics won’t be separable.

This may result in the near term in waning responsibilities to security concepts and human rights among several nations, even as many individuals and smaller groups advocate for ideas through platforms, venues, and institutions.

Authoritarian regimes are likely to reinterpret and manipulate human rights norms increasingly.  This may probably lead to decreasing consensus in the international arena on the extraterritorial obligations of nations, which might have implications for domestic societies and the resolution of humanitarian conflicts.

International Norms are Changing

The norms and practices emerging around climate change—and their influence on global and state development policies—are the more than likely candidates for fostering a twenty-first-century set of universal principles.  Majorities in 40 nations, according to a poll by Pew, say that climate change is a significant issue, with a median of 54 percent saying it’s an issue.

The near-term likelihood of international competition leading to doubt and global disorder will stay raised as long as ad-hoc internationalism persists.

As dominant nations limit cooperation to a subset of issues while asserting their interests in regional matters, international norms and institutions are likely to hamper and the global system to fragment in favor of contested regional spheres of influence.

A Multipolar Global Order Doesn’t Mean the West is “in Retreat” was originally published on Global Security Review.

Over the past year, both the Australian and New Zealand governments have faced reports that the Chinese government has gained influence in their political systems, universities, and media markets. So far only Canberra has responded firmly. Australia’s domestic intelligence agency, the ASIO, wrote in its annual report to parliament this year that it believed foreign governments are trying to extend their influence [PDF] in Australian society, posing “a threat to our sovereignty, the ­integrity of our national institutions, and the exercise of our citizens’ rights.”

Specifically, the intelligence service believes businesspeople with strong ties to Beijing and a desire to push pro-China views have been donating millions to the country’s two major political parties. The agency had already delivered a warning in 2015 to the country’s largest political parties about what Fairfax Media called “Chinese interference in Australian politics via massive cash donations.” Despite the warnings, significant political figures in Australia continued to take hundreds of thousands of dollars from these donors. A new analysis by Melbourne Law School’s Dollars and Democracy Database found that, between 2000 and 2016, about 80 percent of foreign political donations to Australia’s parties came from China.

China’s influence campaign appears to have extended further in Australia. China’s state security forces have reportedly engaged in a battle to monitor Chinese nationals, including many students, there—even warning them not to offer any criticism of Beijing lest their relatives in China be harmed. The ASIO and senior officials around Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull have begun questioning whether the threat of monitoring students and tactics taken by Chinese officials to scrutinize teaching on China in classrooms has censored debate about China within Australian higher education. The intelligence service’s head, Duncan Lewis, told parliament in October that Canberra has to be “very conscious of the possibilities of foreign interference in our universities.”

Chinese state media have created joint ventures in recent years with prominent Australian Chinese-language news outlets, ensuring that they publish stories from Beijing’s state press. Beijing has also established centers for Chinese language and cultural studies, including Confucius Institutes, that some academics have claimed censor criticism of Beijing. The Guardian recently reported that one of these institutes was established within an Australian state government, sparking concern among some intelligence specialists that a Chinese state-linked actor was working in the Australian government.

These reported moves to influence political debate in Australia come at a time when Chinese leader Xi Jinping is overseeing a strategic shift in how Beijing interacts with the world. Unlike his predecessors, Xi is not shy of announcing that Beijing intends to wield global power—power he wants to use to push China’s strategic and economic objectives and to have influence in other states’ domestic politics. China’s increasingly bold approach is rattling Australian politics and leading Canberra to rethink its laws on foreign funds flowing into politics, business, and educational institutions. For its part, China rejects the claims of interference surfacing in Australia, New Zealand and elsewhere, calling them “disgraceful” and “symptoms of McCarthyism” in an editorial published in the Global Times in December.

Influence Campaign in New Zealand?

New Zealand faces a similar challenge. Earlier this year, Anne-Marie Brady, a professor at the University of Canterbury, released a bombshell report documenting numerous ways Beijing has gained influence in New Zealand politics. Brady reported that Beijing has worked to place pro-China individuals in the leadership of ethnic Chinese associations in New Zealand, and has managed donations to the country’s political parties.

Brady believes these strategies have been effective in convincing Wellington to adopt what it calls a “no surprises” China policy of only raising controversial issues in private with Beijing. Meanwhile, the Financial Times and the New Zealand news outlet Newsroom reported this year that Yang Jian, a leading member of parliament from the National Party, had a military intelligence background in China that he failed to disclose when he immigrated to New Zealand and that he has pursued close ties with an organ of the Communist Party in Beijing. Yang has reportedly pushed the National Party—which led New Zealand’s government between 2008 and this year—to implement closer links with Beijing.

China has significant reasons for launching and expanding political influence campaigns in Australia and New Zealand, two democratic societies that are open to trade, immigration, and foreign cultural influences. The two countries have in recent years become increasingly economically dependent on China. China is Australia’s largest trading partner. In 2008, New Zealand became the first developed nation to sign a free trade deal with China, which is now New Zealand’s biggest goods-trading partner and second-biggest services-trading partner.

Exporting the ‘China Model’ and Exploiting Open Societies

In addition to pushing for China to wield more influence in other nations, Xi has also cited Beijing as a model for other countries, a step his predecessors were wary of taking. In October, the Financial Times reported that Xi’s administration had tasked the United Front Work Department, a part of the Communist Party that handles foreign influence duties, which the Times said involved using “Chinese power to charm, co-opt, or attack well-defined groups and individuals” abroad. The U.S. Congressional-Executive Commission on China will hold a hearing this month on Beijing’s attempts to wield influence in the United States.

Under Xi, Chinese embassies around the world have increasingly been tasked with monitoring China-born students who attend foreign universities. Meanwhile, by setting up new influence programs and upgrading its global media, the Chinese government has boosted its resources for influencing journalists, cultural figures, and ethnic Chinese associations abroad. For instance, in 2012, Beijing set up the Chinese Public Diplomacy Association (CPDA), which brings journalists and opinion leaders to China for training.

Xi’s administration has devoted extensive new resources to globalizing China’s state media outside of the Asia-Pacific. In 2009, Beijing announced it was devoting $6.5 billion to upgrading its state media networks. (The United States, by comparison, spends roughly $700 million annually on state-funded international broadcasting.) Beijing is modernizing its global state television channel, CGTN. The official news agency Xinhua, meanwhile, is adding bureaus around the world, including in the United States, at a time when many major news organizations in developed democracies are shedding staff due to financial pressures.

Regional Security Overtones

China’s political influence could have significant strategic and economic ramifications. Australia is one of the United States’ closest allies. Any lasting tilt by Canberra away from Washington would have seismic consequences throughout the Asia-Pacific. Australia and New Zealand are both members of the Five Eyes intelligence-sharing network that also includes Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States, and any penetration by Beijing of senior levels of government in one Five Eyes member state would worry the others.

Wielding more significant influence in Australia and New Zealand could also allow China to apply pressure on the two nations, which are regional leaders, to stay neutral on disputes in Southeast Asia. In recent years, New Zealand leaders have become reticent about disputes in the South China Sea. Australia has thus far declined to join U.S.-led freedom of navigation operations there and has repeatedly stated that it will not take a side in disputes over the sea. And if more people in Australia, New Zealand, or other countries consume information that derives from Chinese state media, it could reshape narratives about Chinese policies in those nations.

In one notable instance, prominent former Labor Party Senator Sam Dastyari told the Chinese media last year that Australia should not involve itself in China’s activities in the South China Sea—even though Beijing claims nearly the entirety of the sea. After Dastyari made the remark, media outlets revealed that he took this position after a major, pro-China donor who had paid Dastyari’s legal bills in the past had threatened to pull a $400,000 donation to the Labor Party. Amid the controversy, Dastyari quit his post this month, and the Washington Post reported that Peter Dutton, the health minister, accused Dastyari of “being a ‘double agent’ of China.” Australia’s ethnic Chinese associations also apply pressure regarding the South China Sea. The Sydney Morning Herald reported in 2016 that, before Malcolm Turnbull made his first visit to China as prime minister, “some sixty Chinese community leaders in Australia gathered in Sydney urging him to watch his words when discussing the South China Sea in Beijing.”

Public polling, meanwhile, suggests that China’s efforts in Australia and New Zealand may be working. In a Pew Research Center study released this year, China was viewed favorably by 64 percent of Australians, up from 57 percent two years ago. And a poll this year by Massey University and the New Zealand news website Stuff showed that, if given a choice to build closer bilateral ties with the United States, the United Kingdom, or China, a plurality of New Zealanders would choose China.

Managing Bilateral Tensions

While Australia has begun to develop a robust response, it faces the challenge of protecting its strategic interests while being careful not to stigmatize Chinese-Australians. In addition to Australia’s top intelligence agency increasing its investigations into Chinese influence, the Australian Foreign Investment Review Board has begun applying greater due diligence to investments. Australia’s ruling political coalition will pass legislation banning foreign donations to political parties and activist groups in the country, and force anyone representing foreign interests in Australia to register as such, in a manner similar to the U.S. Foreign Agents Registration Act.

New Zealand has been slower to develop a clear response. Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern has reportedly refused to comment on the prospect of the country’s spy agency launching a probe into Chinese political influence in New Zealand. The Financial Times reported in December of this year that briefings provided to Ardern by New Zealand national security chiefs have raised fresh concerns about political interference coming from Beijing.

Even for Australia, reckoning with forms of influence other than funding political parties or individual politicians will be hard. Many soft power efforts are seen by publics as benign, and as having positive cultural benefits.

Still, in Australia, it seems unclear whether China’s efforts will have the long-term effect of actually bolstering bilateral ties, or will instead lead to cooling between Canberra and Beijing. Australia is stepping up its defenses against China—perhaps not what Beijing wanted. As the Turnbull government has spoken out about some of Beijing’s influence efforts, and Canberra has moved to pass laws on foreign donations to politicians, Chinese elites have become increasingly skeptical of and even angry at Australia, as the Lowy Institute reported last week. This growing mistrust means that China’s influence strategy there could backfire.

Australia & New Zealand Face China’s Influence was originally published on Global Security Review.