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	<title>Topic:asymmetric tactics &#8212; Global Security Review %</title>
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		<title>Assessing the Credibility of Manned Platforms in Contemporary Drone-Rich Combat Environment</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/assessing-the-credibility-of-manned-platforms-in-contemporary-drone-rich-combat-environment/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Ahmad Ibrahim]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 23 Apr 2026 12:14:19 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Archive]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Arms Control & Nonproliferation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Emerging Threats]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Government & Politics]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[active protection systems]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[aerial domain]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[air-defense missiles]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[air-to-air missiles]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[and concepts discussed throughout the paper. The keywords below capture the core topics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[and evolving strategies highlighted in the document.manned platforms]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[armored vehicles]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[asymmetric tactics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[ballistic missiles]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Black Sea conflict]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[blue waters]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[CIWS]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[combined arms]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[contextual warfare.]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[cope cages]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[cruise missiles]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[DART projectiles]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[DEAD]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[decoy systems]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[defensive technologies]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[drone swarms]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[drones]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[electronic countermeasures]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[FPV drones]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[HELs]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[high-energy lasers]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[houthis]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[human decision-making]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[I approached your request by analyzing the main themes]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[jammers]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[kamikaze drones]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[MUM-T]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[naval domain]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[torpedo]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[UAS]]></category>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=32615</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Published: April 23, 2026 Proliferation of unmanned systems in modern warfare has popularized the notion that traditional platforms have reached the end of their operational relevance. Particularly, the Russia-Ukraine war has deepened the perception that small, agile, and inexpensive drones have rendered manned platforms in land, air, and sea domain obsolete. This argument gains credibility [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/assessing-the-credibility-of-manned-platforms-in-contemporary-drone-rich-combat-environment/">Assessing the Credibility of Manned Platforms in Contemporary Drone-Rich Combat Environment</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>Published: April 23, 2026</em></p>
<p>Proliferation of unmanned systems in modern warfare has popularized the notion that traditional platforms have reached the end of their operational relevance. Particularly, the Russia-Ukraine war has deepened the perception that small, agile, and inexpensive drones have rendered manned platforms in land, air, and sea domain obsolete.</p>
<p>This argument gains credibility while assessing drones’ performance against <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/04/20/world/europe/tanks-ukraine-drones-abrams.html#:~:text=So%20are%20tanks%20obsolete?,lethal%20weapon%20in%20ground%20warfare.&amp;text=But%20he%20added%20that%20the,Thomas%20Gibbons%2DNeff%20contributed%20reporting.">manned armored vehicles</a> which are now <a href="https://www.newstatesman.com/politics/2022/02/watch-boris-johnson-claimed-the-days-of-big-tank-battles-in-europe-were-over">routinely labelled</a> as outdated systems against drone-enabled precision strikes. Yet, what is often depicted in the media is only one side of the coin. Drones often fail to find targets, are intercepted, or manage to hit their target, thus not achieving intended results. Despite proliferation of first-person view (FPV) drones, armored vehicles continue to play a vital role in maneuver warfare and protected mobility. Modern armor strategies have evolved to include combined arms and dispersion rather than mass for increasing survivability and combat efficiency. In the Russia-Ukraine war, several <a href="https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/are-tanks-obsolete-on-modern-battlefield-not-exactly-sa-021226">rudimentary measures</a> like installation of cope cages atop turrets, have been implemented by both militaries to enhance the survivability rate of tanks against kamikaze drones. Vehicle mounted <a href="https://cepa.org/article/the-era-of-the-cautious-tank/">jammers</a> have also shown promising results. Defensive technologies, like active protection systems (APS) and electronic countermeasures (ECM), have proven their efficiency against FPV drones. Thus, it can be argued that drones have not turned armored vehicles obsolete; they have forced them to evolve into more refined systems.</p>
<p>Similarly, in the aerial domain, many analysts perceive unmanned aerial systems (UAS) as <a href="https://insidefpv.com/blogs/blogs/drones-vs-traditional-air-power-a-cost-effective-alternative?srsltid=AfmBOooNnjAILgfsJl-1ToeY9xoM5SzrM8nUFh76C5ocJlV2k1adUv-P">cost effective alternative</a> vis-à-vis manned aircraft. Yes, UASs have shown impressive evolution. From dropping laser-guided bombs (LGBs) to firing <a href="https://baykartech.com/en/press/turkiye-successfully-test-fires-mini-intelligent-cruise-missile/">cruise missiles</a>, <a href="https://www.twz.com/air/turkeys-fighter-like-kizilelma-drone-shot-down-aerial-target-with-radar-guided-missile">air-to-air missiles</a>, <a href="https://www.navalnews.com/event-news/sea-air-space-2025/2025/04/anduril-unveils-copperhead-m-a-torpedo-designed-specifically-for-drones/">torpedo</a>, and <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidhambling/2024/09/17/russian-dolls-fpv-drone-carrying-drones-are-now-in-action-in-ukraine/">even smaller drones</a>, drones have come a long way in changing warfare. Increasingly, drones have pushed manned aircraft aside as a more efficient option for operational engagement. In Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, Azerbaijan <a href="https://www.militarystrategymagazine.com/article/drones-in-the-nagorno-karabakh-war-analyzing-the-data/">innovatively employed</a> aerial drones to expose Armenian air-defenses’ positions making them vulnerable to subsequent Azerbaijan’s targeted strikes. This unique use of drones as a crucial component of SEAD/DEAD (Suppression &amp; Destruction of Enemy Air Defenses) kill chain marked a watershed moment in modern warfare.</p>
<p>However, the <a href="https://insidefpv.com/blogs/blogs/drones-vs-traditional-air-power-a-cost-effective-alternative?srsltid=AfmBOooNnjAILgfsJl-1ToeY9xoM5SzrM8nUFh76C5ocJlV2k1adUv-P">inherent limitations</a> of drones are obvious too. UASs are more susceptibility to electronic warfare (EW) disruption <strong>and</strong> have unproven records in complex battlespace with dynamics rules of engagement (ROEs). Claims that unmanned systems will soon replace fighter jets overlook the enduring advantages of human decision-making in contested and escalation-sensitive environments. Manned aircraft provide operational flexibility and command judgment that are yet to be replicated through automation alone. The developmental trajectory suggests that instead of perceiving UAVs as one-one-one substitute for piloted aircraft, the future lies in Manned-Unmanned Teaming (MUM-T) where manned aircraft will serve as command nodes while accompanied unmanned systems will provide mass, persistence, and attainability.</p>
<p>In the naval domain, the successfully employment of kamikaze surface and aerial drones by Ukraine in the Black Sea conflict is now frequently cited as an indicator that large surface combatants will soon turn into relics of past. Besides <a href="https://kyivindependent.com/these-are-most-important-russian-ships-destroyed-by-ukraine/">sinking multiple Russian warships</a> in the Black Sea, Ukraine has even damaged a Russian Kilo class submarine stationed at Novorossiysk harbor using an <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2025/12/15/europe/ukraine-underwater-drone-submarine-novorossiysk-russia-intl">underwater suicide drone</a>. The Russian Black Sea Fleet, despite having overwhelming superiority over Ukrainian counterpart, has failed to establish sea-control in the Black Sea primarily due to remarkable performance of Ukrainian naval drones.</p>
<p>Similarly, in the Red Sea crisis, the Houthis’ rudimentary drones have challenged the operational persistence of Western naval powers. Kamikaze drones have compelled <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/11/23/us-warship-cruising-red-sea-shoots-down-attack-drones-fired-from-yemen">American</a>, <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-68122944">British</a>, <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20231210-french-frigate-downs-drones-over-red-sea-military">French</a>, and <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/german-warship-part-eu-red-sea-mission-shoots-down-two-drones-2024-02-28/">German</a> warships to deplete expensive air-defense missiles, which in some cases resulted in <a href="https://www.twz.com/news-features/navy-warships-have-to-leave-the-red-sea-fight-for-weeks-to-reload-their-missiles-navy-secretary-says">pre-mature withdrawal</a>. Close-in Weapon Systems (CIWS) is usually considered a potent point of defense against all types of aerial threats in the maritime domain. However, both gun-based and missile-based CIWS have limited magazine capacity and engagement range. This suggests that against a more capable adversary, drone swarms can saturate warships’ defenses and can cause mission-kill by damaging critical instruments onboard, rendering them inoperable for extended time duration.</p>
<p>Although naval drones have added an additional layer of threat for warships, they do not, in themselves, render them obsolete. Novel defensive capabilities for countering drone threats are already in the developmental phase. Few systems have been deployed and evaluated in real combat. For example, on 03 March 2024, an Italian <em>Andrea Doria</em> class destroyer <a href="https://www.twz.com/sea/italian-destroyer-guns-down-houthi-drone-with-76mm-super-rapid-cannon">shot down</a> an incoming kamikaze drone threat in Red Sea using <a href="https://www.leonardo.com/en/press-release-detail/-/detail/the-strales-76mm-system-with-dart-guided-ammunition">DART projectiles</a> fired from 76mm deck gun, a move far more economically feasible than air-to-surface missile. Similarly, <a href="https://www.twz.com/sea/uss-preble-used-helios-laser-to-zap-four-drones-in-expanding-testing">high-energy lasers (HELs)</a> onboard warships are being tested for countering drones. Besides kinetic defensive application, <a href="https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2024/12/french-navy-counters-uav-for-the-first-time-thanks-to-jamming-solution/">soft-kill measures</a> such as jammers and decoy systems are also emerging as critical components of warships defensive suite.</p>
<p>In addition, the Black Sea and the Red Sea are enclosed bodies of water, offering limited operational space for naval forces and providing tactical advantage to drone-based asymmetric tactics. In blue waters, however, the effectiveness of such drones would diminish considerably. In open seas, it is unlikely that even mass formations of drones would be able to penetrate modern naval armadas. Although suicide drones can be used in formation with cruise and ballistic missiles to <a href="https://www.aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/at-least-50-iranian-missiles-hit-israel-during-12-day-conflict/3613692">outclass adversary air-defenses</a>, but repeating such a feat against time-sensitive and well protected high-value naval ships would be a very challenging undertaking. Thus, it can be argued that sea drones can be employed as enablers or force-multipliers in conjunction with other systems, but not as decisive instruments of naval warfare.</p>
<p>The future of warfare will not be defined by the triumph of drones over manned platforms. Today, drones have turned into a potent tool of warfare and are also an integral part of the kill-chain of modern militaries around the globe. However, limitations cannot be ignored. In practice, drones work less as independent war-winning weapons but are enablers and force-multipliers. In the age of viral narratives and simplified conclusions, misperceptions regarding military technologies are bound to persist. No single military system determines the outcome of war, and no single innovation renders all others irrelevant. Military power is cumulative and contextual.</p>
<p><em>Ahmad Ibrahim is a Research Associate at Maritime Centre of Excellence (MCE), Pakistan Navy War College (PNWC), Lahore. The views of the author are his own.</em></p>
<p><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/Assessing-the-Credibility-of-Manned-Platforms-in-Contemporary-Drone-Rich-Combat-Environment.pdf"><img decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-32606" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/2026-Download-Button26.png" alt="" width="216" height="60" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/2026-Download-Button26.png 450w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/2026-Download-Button26-300x83.png 300w" sizes="(max-width: 216px) 100vw, 216px" /></a></p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/assessing-the-credibility-of-manned-platforms-in-contemporary-drone-rich-combat-environment/">Assessing the Credibility of Manned Platforms in Contemporary Drone-Rich Combat Environment</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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		<title>Striking from Afar: The Strategic Edge of Standoff Warfare</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/striking-from-afar-the-strategic-edge-of-standoff-warfare/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Joshua Thibert]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 22 Oct 2024 12:15:27 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Archive]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[anti-access/area denial]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[China]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[collateral damage]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[cruise missiles]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Cyberattacks]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[decentralized tactics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[defense budgets]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[defense strategies. ​]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[drones]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[electronic warfare]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[escalation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[high-value equipment]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Hybrid Warfare]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[Iran]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[long-range weapon systems]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[low-observable technologies]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[military doctrines]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[military personnel]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[NATO]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[persian gulf]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[precision strikes]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[psychological impact]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[reconnaissance]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Russia]]></category>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=29176</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Standoff warfare has emerged as a pivotal approach in modern warfare. By keeping forces beyond the reach of adversaries and utilizing long-range offensive capabilities, nations aim to maintain a tactical advantage while minimizing risk to personnel and equipment. This article delves into the pros and cons of standoff warfare and examines its potential as a [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/striking-from-afar-the-strategic-edge-of-standoff-warfare/">Striking from Afar: The Strategic Edge of Standoff Warfare</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Standoff warfare has emerged as a pivotal approach in modern warfare. By keeping forces beyond the reach of adversaries and utilizing long-range offensive capabilities, nations aim to maintain a tactical advantage while minimizing risk to personnel and equipment. This article delves into the pros and cons of standoff warfare and examines its potential as a preferred strategy against formidable adversaries like China, Russia, and Iran.</p>
<p>Standoff warfare is characterized by the use of long-range weapon systems, such as cruise missiles, drones, and precision-guided munitions, to engage targets from a safe distance. This approach leverages advanced surveillance, reconnaissance, and targeting technologies to identify and strike enemy assets without direct engagement.</p>
<p><strong>Advantages of Standoff Warfare</strong></p>
<p>One of the primary advantages of standoff warfare is the significant reduction in the risk to military personnel. By operating from a distance, forces are less exposed to direct enemy fire and ambushes, leading to fewer casualties and increased morale. By keeping forces out of the immediate reach of the enemy, standoff warfare helps preserve valuable military assets. This approach ensures that high-value equipment and personnel are available for prolonged engagements and future conflicts.</p>
<p>Modern long-range weapons are highly accurate, allowing for precision strikes on strategic targets. This capability enhances operational efficiency by focusing on high-value targets and minimizing collateral damage, which is crucial in maintaining public support and adhering to international laws of warfare.</p>
<p>The ability to strike from a distance can have a significant psychological impact on the enemy. The constant threat of unexpected precision attack can demoralize opposing forces and disrupt their operational planning and execution.</p>
<p>Standoff warfare allows for rapid deployment and response to emerging threats. With assets positioned at a safe distance, commanders can quickly adapt to changing battlefield conditions and execute strikes without the need for extensive mobilization.</p>
<p><strong>Disadvantages of Standoff Warfare</strong></p>
<p>Standoff warfare relies heavily on advanced technologies for surveillance, targeting, and weapon delivery. This dependence can be a vulnerability if these systems are disrupted by electronic warfare, cyberattacks, or other countermeasures.</p>
<p>The development, procurement, and maintenance of long-range weapon systems and associated technologies are expensive. The financial burden of sustaining a standoff warfare capability can strain defense budgets and divert resources from other critical areas.</p>
<p>Standoff warfare is most effective against concentrated, high-value targets. When facing adversaries employing dispersed, decentralized tactics, the efficiency of long-range strikes diminishes, necessitating alternative approaches.</p>
<p>Accurate intelligence and targeting data are crucial for successful standoff operations. The reliance on real-time, high-fidelity information can be a limitation if there are gaps in intelligence or if adversaries employ deception and concealment strategies.</p>
<p>The use of long-range strikes can be perceived as highly provocative and potentially escalatory in a conflict. Adversaries may respond with retaliatory measures, leading to a cycle of escalation that can spiral out of control.</p>
<p><strong>China</strong></p>
<p>China’s military modernization and expansion pose a significant challenge to American and allied forces in the Indo-Pacific region. China’s development of anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) capabilities, including long-range missiles, sophisticated air defenses, and naval assets, necessitates a robust standoff strategy.</p>
<p>Standoff warfare allows the US and its allies to engage Chinese assets from a distance, mitigating the risk posed by China’s A2/AD systems. The ability to strike from afar can disrupt Chinese operations, degrade critical infrastructure, and maintain freedom of navigation in contested areas.</p>
<p>China’s advancements in electronic warfare, cyber capabilities, and counter-space operations could undermine the effectiveness of standoff warfare. Additionally, the vast expanse of the Indo-Pacific region presents logistical challenges for sustaining long-range operations.</p>
<p><strong>Russia</strong></p>
<p>Russia’s military doctrine emphasizes hybrid warfare, combining conventional and unconventional tactics. Its integrated air defense systems, long-range missile capabilities, and electronic warfare proficiency make it a formidable adversary.</p>
<p>Standoff warfare enables NATO forces to counter Russian aggression by targeting key military installations, command-and-control centers, and logistical hubs from a safe distance. Precision strikes can degrade Russia’s offensive capabilities and hinder its operational tempo.</p>
<p>Russia’s integrated air defenses and advanced electronic warfare capabilities pose significant challenges to standoff operations. The risk of miscalculation and escalation is also high, given the proximity of NATO forces to Russian borders and the potential for rapid conflict escalation.</p>
<p><strong>Iran</strong></p>
<p>Iran’s strategic posture relies on asymmetric tactics, including the use of proxy forces, ballistic missiles, and naval assets in the Persian Gulf. Its ability to disrupt critical waterways and target regional adversaries necessitates a nuanced approach.</p>
<p>Standoff warfare allows the US and its allies to target Iranian missile launch sites, naval assets, and command structures with minimal risk to their forces. This approach can help deter Iranian aggression and protect vital shipping lanes in the region.</p>
<p>Iran’s use of underground facilities, mobile missile launchers, and dispersed assets presents challenges for effective targeting. Additionally, the potential for retaliatory actions against regional allies and American interests necessitates careful consideration of the broader geopolitical implications.</p>
<p><strong>Conclusion</strong></p>
<p>Standoff warfare continues to offer significant advantages in terms of force protection, precision, and operational flexibility. However, its effectiveness is contingent on technological superiority, accurate intelligence, and the ability to adapt to evolving threats. Against adversaries like China, Russia, and Iran, standoff warfare provides a valuable tool for countering their respective military capabilities. Nonetheless, it must be integrated into a comprehensive strategy that addresses the unique challenges posed by each adversary and mitigates the risks of escalation and technological vulnerabilities. As hypersonic, low-observable, and other advancing technologies continue to develop, they will force the need for rapid evolutions of military doctrines which will need to consider the role of standoff warfare as a critical component of modern defense strategies.</p>
<p><em>Joshua Thibert is a Contributing Senior Analyst at the </em><a href="https://thinkdeterrence.com/"><em>National Institute for Deterrence Studies (NIDS)</em></a><em> with nearly 30 years of comprehensive expertise, his background encompasses roles as a former counterintelligence special agent within the Department of Defense and as a practitioner in compliance, security, and risk management in the private sector. His extensive academic and practitioner experience spans strategic intelligence, multiple domains within defense and strategic studies, and critical infrastructure protection.</em></p>
<p><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/Striking-from-Afar-The-Strategic-Edge-of-Stand-Off-Warfare.pdf"><img decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-28926 size-medium" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/Download-This-Publication-300x83.png" alt="" width="300" height="83" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/Download-This-Publication-300x83.png 300w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/Download-This-Publication.png 450w" sizes="(max-width: 300px) 100vw, 300px" /></a></p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/striking-from-afar-the-strategic-edge-of-standoff-warfare/">Striking from Afar: The Strategic Edge of Standoff Warfare</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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