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	<title>Topic:Assad regime &#8212; Global Security Review %</title>
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		<title>Forecasting Syria’s Military and Political Future</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/forecasting-syrias-military-and-political-future/</link>
					<comments>https://globalsecurityreview.com/forecasting-syrias-military-and-political-future/#comments</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Mohamed ELDoh]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 10 Mar 2025 12:07:23 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Archive]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Strategic Adversaries]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Assad regime]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[fragmentation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[geopolitical trends ​]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Gulf Arab states]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Hmeimim airbase]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[instability]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[international competition]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Iran]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Israel]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Kurdish forces]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Mediterranean]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Middle East]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[military]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[militias]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[opposition groups]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[political]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[power vacuum]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[proxy conflicts]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[regional competition]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Russia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[security risks]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[stability]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[strategic interests]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Syria]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Tartus naval facility]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Turkey]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[uncertainty]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[Western influence]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=30236</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>The fall of the Assad regime has marked a watershed moment in the Syrian armed conflict, fundamentally ushering in a new phase of military and political uncertainty. This development intensified regional and international competition for influence in Syria, with profound implications for the country’s stability and the broader Middle East. Critical factors are already shaping [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/forecasting-syrias-military-and-political-future/">Forecasting Syria’s Military and Political Future</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The fall of the Assad regime has marked a watershed moment in the Syrian armed conflict, fundamentally ushering in a new phase of military and political uncertainty. This development intensified regional and international competition for influence in Syria, with profound implications for the country’s stability and the broader Middle East. Critical factors are already shaping Syria’s future in the post-Assad era.</p>
<p>The collapse of the regime created a tremendous power vacuum, with various actors vying for control over Syria’s fragmented political and military landscape along with the main aim of shaping the country’s trajectory. Iran remains deeply entrenched in Syria through its network of allied militias and its strategic interests in the region. Tehran’s ability to sustain its presence and influence will depend on its capacity to mobilize resources and navigate mounting international and regional opposition.</p>
<p>In a post-Assad context, Iran may seek to carve out autonomous zones of influence, particularly in areas of strategic importance such as southern Syria and the corridor connecting Damascus to Lebanon. However, with the Assad regime no longer in power, the United States and Israel are likely to intensify their efforts to prevent Iran from filling the power vacuum. This could include targeted military actions, support for opposition groups, and diplomatic pressure on Iran and its allies. These countermeasures will play a very important role in shaping the balance of power in Syria and limiting Tehran’s ability to consolidate its position.</p>
<p>In the same vein, ISIS is likely to re-emerge again in the Syrian scene, which has already prompted US Central Command forces to <a href="https://www.centcom.mil/MEDIA/PRESS-RELEASES/Press-Release-View/Article/3989696/us-central-command-conducts-dozens-of-airstrikes-to-eliminate-isis-camps-in-cen/">conduct</a> a series of airstrikes to eliminate ISIS camps in central Syria. The existing fragmentation among opposition forces over the past years is likely to continue and despite the fall of Assad’s regime, the absence of a centralized authority has exacerbated divisions among Syria’s opposition groups, including factions with divergent political and ideological agendas.</p>
<p>External support for these groups will be a decisive factor in determining whether they can coalesce into a viable political and military force or remain fragmented, thereby prolonging instability. In this respect, the role of international and regional powers in supporting different opposition groups in Syria will be detrimental about how the tense situation in Syria unfolds.</p>
<p>Regional actors including Turkey, Israel, Iran, and Gulf Arab states are poised to play a more prominent role in Syria’s post-Assad future. Turkey has already expanded its influence in northern Syria, while Gulf states may seek to assert their presence by supporting moderate factions. However, Turkish involvement is more complicated, given that Turkey aims to take control of influencing Syria. The ongoing armed conflict between Turkish forces and <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/12/08/world/middleeast/syria-turkey-kurds.html">Kurdish</a> controlled Syrian cities in the North is likely to intensify.</p>
<p>In this regard, it is worth noting that Kurdish forces in Syria were originally <a href="https://apnews.com/article/syria-war-assad-kurds-rebels-turkey-us-2b4af609c4dcf853ac6d7a22d3dccf5d">supported</a> by the US and considered one of the main local allies in the fight against ISIS. The interplay among these powers will significantly influence Syria’s trajectory and the broader regional order.</p>
<p>Russia’s evolving strategy for Syria is still worthy of consideration. Russia’s role in Syria has become more precarious following the fall of the Assad regime. Moscow already faces many challenges of recalibrating its strategy to safeguard its regional interests, which include maintaining access to its naval bases in the Mediterranean, countering Western influence, and preserving its role as an influential actor in the Middle East. The Kremlin’s ability to adapt to the new reality will determine its long-term relevance in Syria. Despite speculations that Russia is likely to negotiate maintaining naval bases with the controlling opposition force led by Al-Jolani, it can be also assumed that Turkey will be the main negotiator with Russia with regard to allowing Russian forces access to Syrian soil.</p>
<p>Overall, the fall of the Assad regime represents a major setback for Russia, which had invested heavily in propping up the Syrian government as a cornerstone of its Middle East strategy over the past decade. Accordingly, Moscow now faces a host of strategic challenges.</p>
<p>With the Assad regime gone, Russia has lost a key partner that provided it with a foothold in the Middle East. This development undermines Moscow’s ability to project power in the region and challenges its status as a dominant player in the Syrian conflict. Russia must now contend with the risk of its influence being marginalized by other actors, including Turkey, and the US.</p>
<p>Russia’s airbase in Hmeimim and its naval facility in Tartus are critical to its military strategy in the Eastern Mediterranean. Therefore, the fall of the Assad regime has exposed these facilities to heightened security risks, including potential attacks by opposition forces or Islamist groups. Protecting these assets will require significant resources and a re-evaluation of Russia’s military posture in Syria, which can be challenging for Russia given its existing war with Ukraine.</p>
<p>The collapse of the Assad regime diminished Russia’s ability to dictate the terms of international engagement in Syria. Without a stable Syrian government to anchor its strategy, Moscow will struggle to assert its influence in negotiations over Syria’s future. This loss of leverage could weaken Russia’s position not only in Syria but also in broader Middle Eastern geopolitics.</p>
<p><strong>Scenarios for Syria’s Post-Assad Future</strong></p>
<p>The fall of the Assad regime presents a range of possible outcomes, each with distinct implications for regional and international actors. These scenarios may include the following.</p>
<p><strong>Continued Fragmentation</strong></p>
<p>The most likely short-term scenario is the persistence of fragmentation, with various factions and militias controlling different parts of the country. This will lead to prolonged instability and create opportunities for external actors to widen their influence.</p>
<p>For Russia, this scenario presents both challenges and opportunities, as it seeks to secure its interests while navigating a highly complex landscape. The same applies to Turkey. Turkey is, however, well-positioned to expand its influence, particularly in northern Syria, where it already established a significant military presence. This scenario could lead to increased friction with Russia, as Ankara’s ambitions conflict with Moscow’s strategic objectives in Syria. Furthermore, armed conflict between Turkey and Kurdish controlled areas, which are supported by the US, are likely to escalate.</p>
<p>Accordingly, the situation in Syria represents a new challenge to the Trump administration regarding its Middle East engagement policy. On one hand, President Donald Trump has <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-12-17/trump-sees-turkey-as-key-player-shaping-syria-s-future-after-assad-s-fall">indicated</a> that Turkey holds the key to Syria’s future. On the other hand, the US already <a href="https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/u-s-fears-military-buildup-by-turkey-signals-preparations-for-incursion-into-syria-1c2e88e9">fears</a> that the ongoing military build-up by Turkey, along the Syrian border, signals that Turkey is preparing for a large-scale invasion to areas held by the American-backed Syrian Kurds.</p>
<p><strong>Iranian Consolidation</strong></p>
<p>Despite the recent Israeli strikes on Iran and its proxies in the region, including Lebanon and Syria, Iran may still seek to fill the power vacuum by strengthening its alliances with local militias, establishing a dominant presence in key areas. Such a scenario would be of a key concern for other regional and international powers and lead to increased military confrontations.</p>
<p>For decades, Syria was under the influence of Iran. Syrian ground routes were among the main routes of supply of armaments by Iran to Hezbollah. Regardless of Iran’s current weak state, Iran is unlikely to give up on its influence in Syria. However, it is very likely that Iran-back militias will continue to take a central role in countering any stabilization endeavours in Syria.</p>
<p><strong>Emergence of a New Central Authority VS Escalation of Proxy Conflicts</strong></p>
<p>While very unlikely in the short term, the emergence of a new central authority that can unify the country would fundamentally reshape Syria’s future. Such an outcome will depend on significant international support and political compromise.</p>
<p>On the other hand, and more likely, the power vacuum in Syria will increase the likelihood of Syria becoming a battleground for proxy conflicts among regional and international powers. Regardless of the opposition forces’ success in overthrowing the Assad regime, still many member of these opposition forces emerged from extremist groups, which prompted Israel to <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/live/2024/12/10/world/syria-news-assad-rebels">strike</a> most of Syria’s military assets following the country’s take over by Al-Jolani.</p>
<p>The rise of ISIS bases in Syria also presents an imminent threat to the region, prompting US CENTCOM to <a href="https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/4005902/centcom-strikes-isis-new-carrier-group-enters-region/">conduct</a> precision airstrikes targeting ISIS camps and operatives in the region. Pentagon Press Secretary Air Force Major General Pat Ryder stated that the US military presence and primary focus remains on &#8220;supporting the defeat of ISIS mission more proactively in terms of disrupting and degrading any potential external operations.&#8221;</p>
<p>The post-Assad era in Syria is defined by uncertainty, with a host of internal and external factors shaping the country’s trajectory. For Russia and Iran, the fall of the Assad regime represents a major strategic challenge, forcing it to rethink its approach and adapt to a rapidly changing landscape in Syria and the Middle East.</p>
<p>As regional and global actors vie for influence in Syria, the country’s fate will remain a key barometer of broader geopolitical trends. The decisions made by international actors in the coming months and years will not only shape Syria’s future but also redefine the balance of power in the region.</p>
<p><em>Dr. Mohamed ELDoh is a business development and consulting professional in the defense and security sector.</em></p>
<p><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/Forecasting-Syrias-Military-and-Political-Future-2.pdf"><img decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-29852" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1.png" alt="" width="338" height="94" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1.png 450w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1-300x83.png 300w" sizes="(max-width: 338px) 100vw, 338px" /></a></p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/forecasting-syrias-military-and-political-future/">Forecasting Syria’s Military and Political Future</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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		<title>Is This the Right Moment to Act Against Iran on All Fronts?</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/is-this-the-right-moment-to-act-against-iran-on-all-fronts/</link>
					<comments>https://globalsecurityreview.com/is-this-the-right-moment-to-act-against-iran-on-all-fronts/#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Mohamed ELDoh]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 21 Jan 2025 13:38:38 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Archive]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Arms Control & Nonproliferation]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[maximum pressure campaign.]]></category>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=29859</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>The Middle East experienced significant geopolitical shifts over the past year. In October 2023, Hamas launched a surprise attack on Israel, resulting in approximately 1,200 Israeli deaths. Israel’s subsequent military response led to an estimated 40,000 Palestinian casualties, predominantly in Gaza. The conflict caused widespread destruction and displacement, exacerbating the long-standing humanitarian crisis in the region. It [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/is-this-the-right-moment-to-act-against-iran-on-all-fronts/">Is This the Right Moment to Act Against Iran on All Fronts?</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The Middle East experienced significant geopolitical shifts over the past year. In October 2023, Hamas launched a surprise attack on Israel, resulting in <a href="https://www.state.gov/anniversary-of-october-7th-attack/#:~:text=Today%2C%20we%20mark%20a%20devastating,of%20Jews%20since%20the%20Holocaust.">approximately</a> 1,200 Israeli deaths. Israel’s subsequent military response led to an <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2024/12/1158206">estimated</a> 40,000 Palestinian casualties, predominantly in Gaza.</p>
<p>The conflict caused widespread destruction and displacement, exacerbating the long-standing humanitarian crisis in the region. It then extended into Lebanon, where Iran-backed Hezbollah engaged in hostilities against Israel. On November 27, 2024, following months of intense confrontations, the US brokered a 60-day ceasefire, allowing thousands of displaced individuals to return to southern Lebanon. However, the ceasefire’s durability remains <a href="https://apnews.com/article/lebanon-hezbollah-israel-war-ceasefire-tyre-ae002af23c7ec9e19a0cea08fecc9f62">uncertain</a>, with speculation concerning potential violations and the broader implications for regional stability.</p>
<p>In Syria, rebels led by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) capitalized on regional unrest to seize control of key areas, including Aleppo, Idlib, and Hama. The Assad regime’s traditional allies—Iran, Hezbollah, and Russia—were preoccupied with their own conflicts, allowing the Assad regime’s overthrow. HTS, which is presumably anti-Iran, is making Syria more difficult for Iran to influence. Iranian influence allowed the regime to transit armaments to Hezbollah in Lebanon.</p>
<p>Over the past year, Israel intensified its military operations to degrade Iran’s proxy forces across the Middle East, employing a combination of airstrikes, special operations, and strategic assassinations. On October 26, 2024, Israel <a href="https://news.sky.com/story/operation-days-of-repentance-how-israels-strike-on-iran-unfolded-13243562">launched</a> Operation Days of Repentance, targeting over 20 locations in Iran, Iraq, and Syria. This operation significantly damaged Iran’s capabilities for missile production and utilization of its air defense systems.</p>
<p>This also included the destruction of long-range surface-to-air missile batteries and detection radars. Israeli operations employed targeted assassinations to eliminate key figures within Iran’s proxy networks, including Hassan Nasrallah, who was eliminated in an airstrike in Beirut on September 27, 2024, along with other senior officials. Previously, on July 31, 2024, in an operation attributed to Israel, another notable assassination in Tehran, Iran, eliminated Ismail Haniyeh, the political leader of Hamas.</p>
<p>Furthermore, Israeli special forces conducted covert special operations and missions to disrupt Iran’s proxy activities. For instance, in September 2024, Israeli commandos <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/09/13/world/middleeast/israel-raid-syria-hezbollah.html">raided</a> an underground facility near Masyaf, Syria, known for its weapons development and potential use by Iran and Hezbollah to produce precision-guided missiles. Israeli forces also <a href="https://www.ynetnews.com/article/bjynx00hb1g">captured</a> Ali Soleiman al-Assi in southern Syria in November, accusing him of aiding Iranian intelligence efforts.</p>
<p>Despite the systematic degradation of Iran’s proxy forces in the region, Iran <a href="https://apnews.com/article/iran-nuclear-iaea-mideast-wars-israel-7450481f9e42ea5b786c5d672ec382a1">continues</a> to advance its nuclear program, posing a significant threat to the region. The head of France’s foreign intelligence agency <a href="https://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2024-11-29/iran-nuclear-proliferation-critical-threat-in-coming-months-french-spy-chief-says">stated</a> that Iran’s nuclear proliferation poses a serious threat in the coming months, and both France and the United Kingdom are developing strategies to counter this threat.</p>
<p>However, the current geopolitical and military dynamics may present a unique opportunity for Israel to strike Iran, with a focus on neutralizing its nuclear and regional threats. A combination of factors, particularly the expectation of a West-backed Israeli military action to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons, can underpin the reasoning.</p>
<p><strong>Degraded Proxy Capabilities</strong></p>
<p>In the past few months, Israel has effectively degraded the operational strength of Iranian-affiliated groups such as Hezbollah, Hamas, and Shia militias in Syria and Iraq. Moreover, the precise eliminations of various leadership divisions within Hezbollah and Hamas significantly undermine the command frameworks of Iran’s affiliates and their capacity to orchestrate operations.</p>
<p>Furthermore, Israeli precision strikes and covert operations effectively dismantled essential facilities supporting these groups, thereby diminishing their capacity for swift counteractions. With its proxies weakened, Iran is likely encountering difficulties in coordinating a robust regional strategy.</p>
<p>Israeli operations significantly <a href="https://www.businessinsider.com/israel-showed-power-of-f-35s-iran-strikes-uk-admiral-2024-12">degraded</a> Iran’s air defense systems, including their Russian <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ipJ80yH2BfI">S-300</a>s and other advanced defense platforms. This leaves critical facilities, including nuclear sites like Natanz and Fordow, more exposed to precision strikes aimed at eliminating Iran’s nuclear threat. Some Western experts believe that a successful strike now could potentially delay Iran’s nuclear ambitions for many years.</p>
<p>Domestically, Iran is also facing severe economic challenges, including unemployment, inflation, and widespread dissatisfaction among its population, which was further fuelled by protests over the past two years as a result of the dire <a href="https://www.iranintl.com/en/202411173173">economic</a> situation of the country as well as the increasing <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2024/03/1147681">repression</a> by the regime. Ongoing protests and internal dissent are already straining the regime’s resources. Analysts believe that Iran’s leadership is significantly preoccupied with maintaining internal stability rather than launching a significant retaliatory campaign.</p>
<p>Overall, reports indicate that Iran’s national funds are nearly depleted, along with most of its financial resources being drained by its support to military and proxy activities. In addition, <a href="https://manaramagazine.org/2024/11/the-challenges-of-gas-and-electricity-imbalance-in-iran/#:~:text=However%2C%20the%20country%20grapples%20with,energy%20deficit%20by%20next%20summer.">energy</a> shortages, including electricity and gas, have fueled Iran’s economic crisis, thus, severely impacting its citizens and therefore further increasing civil unrest towards the regime.</p>
<p>That said, there is already a growing gap between the government and the public. This gap spans economic, political, and social aspects along with the increasing dissatisfaction over the government’s inability to address internal civil needs in parallel to the increasing repression by the regime.</p>
<p>Iran’s nuclear program is progressing at a rapid pace, with the emergence of reports indicating the <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/11/29/iran-plans-to-install-6000-centrifuges-to-enrich-uranium-iaea-says">installation</a> of advanced centrifuges and uranium enrichment nearing the weapons-grade levels. Israel and the West may be seeing this as a narrowing window of opportunity to act decisively before Iran develops a nuclear weapon or possesses weapons-grade uranium. The possibility of delaying a firm action could allow Iran to fortify its facilities further or even achieve a nuclear breakout.</p>
<p>Iran’s foreign minister recently <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/nov/28/iran-says-it-could-end-ban-on-possessing-nuclear-weapons-if-sanctions-reimposed">stated</a> that if the West proceeds with the threat of reimposing all United Nations sanctions, Iran is likely to move toward possessing its own nuclear weapons. This statement raises concerns about the effectiveness of the sanctions against Iran over the past years in advancing its nuclear objectives.</p>
<p>The ceasefire with Hezbollah and reduced clashes with Hamas is expected to establish a brief respite in regional conflicts. However, the US and European allies are growing increasingly exasperated with Iran’s unwillingness to engage on its nuclear program, which could render decisive action more acceptable on the diplomatic front. Arab nations, while cautious, share concerns about Iran’s regional influence and the progress in the development of its nuclear capabilities.</p>
<p>Although Iran held a new round of nuclear talks with France, Germany, and the United Kingdom on November 29, 2024, talks resulted in <a href="https://www.iranintl.com/en/202411296711">minimal</a> progress and no immediate course of action. This underscores the fact that diplomatic discussions with Iran yielded nothing in recent years, except for Iran’s continued advancement in its nuclear aspirations.</p>
<p>Furthermore, this will likely increase Europe’s shift towards adopting a hard-line position regarding engagement with Iran on nuclear issues. In this respect, it was reported that US President-elect Donald Trump is weighing <a href="https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/trump-iran-plan-nuclear-weapons-def26f1d">options</a> in countering Iran’s nuclear developments, including the option for a preventive airstrike.</p>
<p>Recent Israeli successes against Iran and its proxies created strategic momentum. Waiting too long could allow Iran to rebuild its defenses and recover its regional proxies to actively engage in attrition warfare with American and Israeli forces in the Middle East. This could occur while potentially working covertly in strengthening its own nuclear program. In this respect, some security analysts may argue that a Western-supported Israeli strike would leverage the latter’s current military and intelligence superiority in countering Iran’s regional proxies.</p>
<p>While highlighting these opportunities, it is also important to anticipate the possible risks, including the regional escalation involving Hezbollah, Yemen’s Houthis, Iraqi militias, and Syria. The risk of fully strained international relations with Iran also exists, especially if a strike triggers widespread civilian casualties or destabilizes global oil markets. Furthermore, a military action could arguably accelerate Iran’s nuclear ambitions clandestinely.</p>
<p>Those advocating for prompt action are likely to contend that the dangers of failing to act against Iran surpass the dangers of launching a pre-emptive strike before it is too late, putting Iran in a position to acquire nuclear weapons or nuclear-grade enriched uranium. It can be argued that the current moment is a fleeting alignment of weakened Iranian proxies, vulnerable defenses, and growing nuclear threats, making it a strategically opportune time to act decisively in pressuring Iran to refrain from pursuing its nuclear program. Finally, with President’s Trump return, it can be assumed that the new US administration may not have the immediate intention to pursue diplomacy with Iran, instead it would be more likely that a “maximum pressure” campaign would be adopted.</p>
<p><em>Mohamed ELDoh, PhD, is a business development and consulting professional in the defense and security sector. He regularly authors articles addressing defense cooperation, counterterrorism, geopolitics, and emerging security threats in the Middle East and Africa.</em></p>
<p><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/Is-This-the-Right-Moment-to-Act-Against-Iran-on-All-Fronts.pdf"><img decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-29852 size-medium" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1-300x83.png" alt="" width="300" height="83" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1-300x83.png 300w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1.png 450w" sizes="(max-width: 300px) 100vw, 300px" /></a></p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/is-this-the-right-moment-to-act-against-iran-on-all-fronts/">Is This the Right Moment to Act Against Iran on All Fronts?</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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		<title>ICBM EAR Report December 8th</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/icbm-ear-report-december-8th/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Peter Huessy]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 20 Dec 2024 13:11:55 +0000</pubDate>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=29631</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Executive Summary: Week of December 8, 2024 This report asserts that the United States is at a critical inflection point in global security,  facing mounting threats from an increasingly assertive China, a resurgent Russia, and a shifting nuclear landscape characterized by rapid technological advancements and diminished international agreements. This week we underscore the critical juncture [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/icbm-ear-report-december-8th/">ICBM EAR Report December 8th</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong>Executive Summary: Week of December 8, 2024</strong></p>
<p>This report asserts that the United States is at a critical inflection point in global security,  facing mounting threats from an increasingly assertive China, a resurgent Russia, and a shifting nuclear landscape characterized by rapid technological advancements and diminished international agreements. This week we underscore the critical juncture at which the US finds itself—facing nuclear, economic, and strategic challenges requiring unwavering resolve and bipartisan cooperation.  Here are some highlights:</p>
<p><strong>Quotes of the Week</strong></p>
<ol>
<li><strong>Chelsey Wiley (IISS):</strong> <em>“US–China tensions could lead to heightened security concerns for allies.”</em>
<ul>
<li>Editor’s note: The focus must remain on countering China&#8217;s threats, not shifting blame to the US.</li>
</ul>
</li>
<li><strong>Admiral Tony Radakin (UK):</strong> <em>“The third nuclear era is more complex, with proliferating technologies and absent security architectures.”</em></li>
<li><strong>Palantir CEO:</strong> <em>“Adversaries need to wake up scared; peace comes through strength.”</em></li>
<li><strong>Rep. Chuck Fleischmann (R-TN):</strong> <em>“Modernizing our nuclear deterrent ensures the US remains the global superpower.”</em></li>
</ol>
<p><strong>Essay of the Week</strong></p>
<p><strong>&#8220;Call it Chinese Communist Imperialism&#8221; by Christopher Ford (NIPP)</strong></p>
<ul>
<li>Explores China&#8217;s military expansion and its quest for global influence.</li>
<li>Highlights its nuclear ambitions and parallels with historical imperialism.</li>
<li>Advocates for robust US policies to counter these threats.</li>
</ul>
<p><strong>Congressional Update</strong></p>
<ul>
<li><strong>FY25 NDAA:</strong> Approved at $895 billion, fully funding nuclear initiatives and strengthening deterrence.</li>
<li>Key provisions:
<ul>
<li>Full funding for ICBMs and submarine components of the TRIAD.</li>
<li>Establishment of a unified Assistant Secretary for Nuclear Matters.</li>
</ul>
</li>
<li><strong>New Congressional Members:</strong>
<ul>
<li>78 new members, with significant additions to defense committees.</li>
<li>Focus on battleground states with strategic implications for military readiness.</li>
</ul>
</li>
</ul>
<p><strong>Strategic Developments</strong></p>
<ol>
<li><strong>China’s Nuclear Expansion:</strong>
<ul>
<li>Accelerating development of fast-breeder reactors for weapons-grade plutonium.</li>
<li>Collaboration with Russia raises global security concerns.</li>
</ul>
</li>
<li><strong>CSIS Wargaming:</strong>
<ul>
<li>Highlights the risk of nuclear escalation in a Taiwan conflict.</li>
<li>Diplomacy and readiness key to preventing catastrophe.</li>
</ul>
</li>
<li><strong>Third Nuclear Age:</strong>
<ul>
<li>UK and US emphasize increasing complexity in global nuclear threats from China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea.</li>
</ul>
</li>
</ol>
<p><strong>Reagan Defense Forum: Key Takeaways</strong></p>
<ol>
<li><strong>Panel 1: Indo-Pacific Challenges</strong>
<ul>
<li>Admiral Paparo stressed the urgency of deterrence in the face of China’s ambitions toward Taiwan.</li>
<li>Marine Corps General Eric Smith: <em>“What would you pay not to lose a war? Everything and anything.”</em></li>
</ul>
</li>
<li><strong>Panel 2: Innovation in Defense</strong>
<ul>
<li>Heidi Shu: Encouraged bolstering supply chains and supporting small, innovative companies.</li>
<li>Senator Todd Young: Warned about biological threats and vulnerabilities tied to US-China economic ties.</li>
</ul>
</li>
<li><strong>Peace Through Strength:</strong>
<ul>
<li>Reinforced the need for defense investment to deter adversaries and maintain global stability.</li>
<li>Palantir CEO emphasized America’s role as a dominant power, inspiring both fear in adversaries and confidence in allies.</li>
</ul>
</li>
</ol>
<h3><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/12/ICBM-EAR-Week-of-December-8th.pdf"><span style="color: #0000ff;">Read The Full Report</span></a></h3>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/icbm-ear-report-december-8th/">ICBM EAR Report December 8th</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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		<title>Why and How ISIS Leaders Might Exploit Putin’s Nuclear Compellence to Destroy Russia</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/why-and-how-isis-leaders-might-exploit-putins-nuclear-compellence-to-destroy-russia/</link>
					<comments>https://globalsecurityreview.com/why-and-how-isis-leaders-might-exploit-putins-nuclear-compellence-to-destroy-russia/#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Johnathan Rodriguez Cefalu&nbsp;&&nbsp;Oksana Bairachna]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 17 Oct 2024 12:15:53 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Archive]]></category>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=29119</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>In September 2024, Russian President Vladimir Putin signaled a significant shift in Russia’s nuclear posture. He indicated that any conventional attack on Russian soil, particularly with the backing of a nuclear power like the United States or the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), could be treated as justification for a nuclear response. These efforts at [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/why-and-how-isis-leaders-might-exploit-putins-nuclear-compellence-to-destroy-russia/">Why and How ISIS Leaders Might Exploit Putin’s Nuclear Compellence to Destroy Russia</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>In September 2024, Russian President Vladimir Putin signaled a significant shift in Russia’s nuclear posture. He <a href="https://www.stripes.com/search/?q=putin+nuclear+country+support+ukraine+aggressor&amp;type=storyline&amp;contextPublication=true">indicated</a> that any conventional attack on Russian soil, particularly with the backing of a nuclear power like the United States or the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), could be treated as justification for a nuclear response.</p>
<p>These efforts at nuclear compellence, using the threat of escalation to coerce NATO to limit its support for Ukraine, introduce dangerous loopholes that can be exploited by non-state jihadi actors such as ISIS and al-Qaeda, who possess no stake in global stability and are religiously motivated to see the downfall of a global order they view as sinful. These loopholes can be exploited via a false flag attack by imitating what appears to be (but is not) a NATO-backed conventional weapons attack on Moscow with the deliberate intent of triggering a nuclear war.</p>
<p>Jihadi terrorists, unlike state actors, do not seek to maintain a status quo. They are apocalyptically motivated, seeking to bring about the conditions for their version of an Islamic caliphate.</p>
<p>ISIS, al-Qaeda, and aligned groups are motivated by a destructive, apocalyptic worldview. In a <a href="https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/terrorists-chemical-biological-radiological-nuclear-endro-sunarso/">2007 video</a>, Osama bin Laden had promised to use massive weapons to upend the global status quo, destroy the capitalist hegemony, and help create an Islamic caliphate, while Saudi cleric Nasir al-Fahd said, “If Muslims cannot defeat the kafir in a different way, it is permissible to use weapons of mass destruction, even if it kills all of them and wipes them and their descendants off the face of the Earth.”</p>
<p>ISIS aims to weaken and ultimately destroy state actors, including Russia, which they view as an enemy for its role in propping up the Assad regime in Syria. Furthermore, ISIS has a history of calling for attacks on Russia, specifically in retaliation for Russia’s military involvement in Syria and its broader <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/26326421">fight against Islamist movements</a> in the North Caucasus. If their leaders or the leaders of al-Qaeda can exploit a loophole to trigger a large-scale conflict between Russia and NATO, they might see this as a means to cripple both powers, creating a vacuum wherein they can establish their Caliphate.</p>
<p>One of the most disturbing scenarios arises from the possibility of ISIS orchestrating a false flag conventional weapons attack that manages to trigger a nuclear response and thus leads to all-out nuclear war. In today’s interconnected global landscape, terrorist groups can exploit modern technologies, cyber capabilities, and regional instability to mislead major powers. A well-executed false flag attack could deceive both NATO and Russia into believing they are under attack from the other, prompting a rapid escalation into a nuclear conflagration.</p>
<p>Imagine a scenario where ISIS or an affiliated group, through bribery or threats, gains control of a missile system from a third-party state or rogue military element and manages to smuggle this system into a NATO nation with porous border security, such as Romania. From this site, they launch a salvo of conventional missiles at Moscow, which the Russian government might interpret as either a NATO-supported attack or at least an action by rogue members of the NATO chain of command. Russia would be unlikely to consider the possibility that the launch was in fact performed by an uninvolved third party such as ISIS.</p>
<p>Within Putin’s revised nuclear doctrine, a sufficiently embarrassing non-nuclear strike on Russian territory could provoke a nuclear retaliation. This scenario becomes even more plausible if Russia believes the attack was coordinated by a NATO member or supported with NATO-provided weaponry. Thus, a false flag operation can exploit the lowered red lines Putin has established, triggering a nuclear launch by Russia, which would in turn be met with massive nuclear relation by NATO and America—leading to wider nuclear conflict.</p>
<p>ISIS’s leaders are not known for long-term survival planning, especially in the event of a global catastrophe like nuclear war. Their ideology prioritizes martyrdom and the apocalyptic fulfillment of their religious vision over practical concerns about survival in a post-nuclear world. If a NATO-Russia nuclear conflict were to lead to a nuclear winter—an environmental catastrophe that would devastate agriculture and global ecosystems—ISIS may believe that their movement, or at least their ideological successors, would survive through divine intervention or sheer resilience.</p>
<p>ISIS’s apocalyptic vision and willingness to exploit global chaos makes them a serious threat to global security, especially in the context of Russia’s current nuclear posture. Russian and NATO forces must work to enhance intelligence-sharing and establish clearer lines of communication to avoid falling victim to such a false flag operation. Furthermore, global powers must consider the broader implications of lowering nuclear thresholds in an age where non-state actors can exploit such vulnerabilities. Robust systems for verifying the origins of attacks, improved missile defense technologies, and clear diplomatic channels are essential to prevent any false flag attempt from succeeding.</p>
<p>For Russian military strategists, in particular, understanding the apocalyptic motivations of groups like ISIS is crucial. Putin’s strategy of nuclear compellence might seem effective in deterring NATO’s involvement in Ukraine, but it also opens dangerous new avenues for manipulation by non-state actors. By setting conditions where even a conventional attack could provoke a nuclear response, Russia risks falling into a trap set by terrorist groups that wish to bring about the universal Caliphate and wipe the global slate clean. This cannot happen.</p>
<p><strong><em>Jonathan Rodriguez Cefalu</em></strong><em> is a researcher of security vulnerabilities in artificial intelligence systems and was the first discoverer of a critical vulnerability called “prompt injection,” which enables hijacking the actions and instructions of numerous AI systems. Jonathan discovered prompt injection as part of his work as co-founder of an AI safety &amp; security firm called Preamble. <strong>Oksana Bairachna</strong> is an associate professor of management at the Odesa National University of Technology (ONTU) and a contributor to Preamble’s research on global strategic stability.</em></p>
<p><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/Why-and-How-ISIS-Leaders-Might-Exploit-Putins-Nuclear-Compellence-to-Destroy-Russia-1.pdf">  </a><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/Why-and-How-ISIS-Leaders-Might-Exploit-Putins-Nuclear-Compellence-to-Destroy-Russia-1.pdf"><img decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-28926 size-medium" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/Download-This-Publication-300x83.png" alt="" width="300" height="83" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/Download-This-Publication-300x83.png 300w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/Download-This-Publication.png 450w" sizes="(max-width: 300px) 100vw, 300px" /></a><a href="https://youtu.be/zEE4hc1ks6o" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="alignright wp-image-29155" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/@Episode-Button.png" alt="" width="252" height="84" /></a></p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/why-and-how-isis-leaders-might-exploit-putins-nuclear-compellence-to-destroy-russia/">Why and How ISIS Leaders Might Exploit Putin’s Nuclear Compellence to Destroy Russia</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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