In the past three years, the war in Ukraine has marked a decisive turning point in global security. Low-cost, mass-produced unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) have become the decisive factor on the battlefield, fundamentally altering the economics of modern warfare. Expensive, low-volume traditional weapon systems are increasingly being neutralized by drones priced at just a few thousand dollars. This inversion has established a new guiding principle of defense: countering low-cost threats with low-cost means. This shift extends beyond state-on-state conflict. Affordable drone technology is expanding the military potential of small and medium-sized nations. At the same time, it multiplies the operational capacity of non-state actors, terrorist organizations, extremist groups, insurgent movements, and criminal networks that are turning what was once an expensive domain into an accessible tool of asymmetric warfare.

The Economic Inversion of Warfare

Traditional defense procurement has long relied on high unit costs and limited production runs. A single main battle tank or advanced air-defense missile can cost tens of millions of dollars. Yet, inexpensive drones costing as little as $500 have repeatedly destroyed or disabled assets worth millions. A commercially modified quadcopter or loitering munition can achieve effects once reserved for precision-guided munitions costing orders of magnitude more. The result is a dramatically altered cost-exchange ratio that favors the attacker. This forces even well-funded militaries to reconsider force structures and procurement chains. For smaller nations with constrained budgets, affordable and scalable drone systems offer a way to build credible denial capabilities without disproportionate spending.

Ukrainian Technology Transfer

A recent example of technology diffusion is the strategic investment announced on March 31, 2026, by Japan’s Terra Drone Corporation in Ukraine’s Amazing Drones LLC through its subsidiary Terra Inspectioneering. The partnership includes the launch of the Terra A1 interceptor drone: an electrically propelled system with a 32 km range, maximum speed of 300 km/h, 15-minute flight time, low noise and heat signature, and the ability to perform airspace surveillance, target detection, and neutralization in a single sortie.

Empowering Non-State Actors and Implications for the Asia-Pacific Region

The most destabilizing aspect is the accessibility of these systems to non-state actors. Terrorist and extremist organizations no longer require state sponsors or complex supply chains. Commercial components, open-source software, and simple assembly have lowered the barrier to entry, allowing insurgent groups, criminal syndicates, and ideological extremists to field effective aerial capabilities.In the Asia-Pacific, where vast maritime spaces, porous borders, and multiple gray-zone disputes already exist, the proliferation of cheap drones carries specific risks. Small terrorist cells or insurgent movements could use first-person view (FPV) drones or loitering munitions to disrupt shipping lanes, attack critical infrastructure, or conduct targeted operations with minimal logistical needs. The same technology that enables smaller states to deter larger neighbors also equips criminal networks and extremist groups to challenge law-enforcement or rival factions in remote areas. The combination of low cost, commercial availability, and rapid adaptability means that non-state actors in the region can now sustain prolonged asymmetric campaigns. Reports from other conflict zones show terrorist and insurgent groups already employing commercial UAVs for resupply and precision strikes, and similar patterns are emerging in Southeast Asia and the Pacific islands.

In Southeast Asia, the risks are particularly acute. The Philippines’ ongoing insurgencies in Mindanao and the porous maritime borders of the Sulu Sea already see small extremist cells experimenting with commercial drones for reconnaissance and occasional strikes. Similar patterns are visible in Myanmar’s borderlands, where insurgent groups have modified off-the-shelf UAVs for logistics and targeted operations. In the Malacca Strait and South China Sea gray zones, low-cost drone swarms could disrupt vital shipping lanes or harass naval patrols with minimal investment. These developments lower the threshold for violence: a terrorist or criminal network with a few thousand dollars can now field persistent aerial surveillance or precision munitions that once required state-level resources. The combination of vast ungoverned maritime spaces and readily available commercial technology creates ideal conditions for prolonged asymmetric campaigns by non-state actors across the region.

Conclusion

The convergence of economic inversion, widespread accessibility, and rapid technology transfer has created a more volatile global security environment. In the Asia-Pacific—a region defined by strategic chokepoints, unresolved territorial disputes, and active non-state threats, the democratization of lethal drone capabilities lowers the threshold for conflict and expands the operational reach of terrorist, extremist, insurgent, and criminal organizations. Policymakers can no longer rely solely on high-end systems. The principle of “countering cheap threats with cheap means” has become the new baseline for credible defense. Without scalable, affordable countermeasures and domestic production ecosystems, states risk ceding initiatives not only to peer competitors but also to far smaller and resource‑constrained actors operating in the region’s gray zones. The economics of war have changed, and the Asia-Pacific region is one where the consequences of the new economics will play out.

Andrey Koval is a defense planner working on issues of military effectiveness and long-duration conflict. The views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

The New Economics of War: Cheap Drones, Asymmetric Threats, and the Democratization of Destruction was originally published on Global Security Review.

In PNG, the Pukpuk Treaty not only strengthens its defense relationship with Australia but also prompts a realignment of Australian strategy, influencing how major powers like China, the United States, and others engage in the region. The treaty demonstrates that small states are not merely reactive; they can take the initiative to defend their interests and manage the challenges of superpower competition.

The Pukpuk Treaty reflects how PNG is repositioning itself strategically due to limited capacity, geographic vulnerability, and internal security pressures. PNG has recognized its weaknesses in defense forces, including border patrol, sea patrols, internal security, police, and the equipment and software of its defense (training, doctrine, etc.).

The treaty will address these gaps by enhancing capacity, fostering interoperability with Australia, exploring recruitment of PNG staff into the Australian Defence Force (ADF), promoting joint training, and modernizing the military. By requesting the treaty, PNG is not merely accepting foreign assistance but choosing a partner and clearly defining the nature of cooperation, with its sovereignty as a central concern.

The political elite in PNG are using the treaty as a tool to influence the broader competition between the great powers. Part of the treaty’s design is a clear strategic counter-pressure by Australia against the rising Chinese influence in the Pacific.

Canberra is concerned that China’s growing influence through trade, investment, infrastructure, or even security arrangements with Pacific nations could pose a threat to Australia along its northern borders. The Pukpuk Treaty thus becomes a key part of Australia’s strategy to secure its neighborhood.

However, PNG is not passive; its foreign affairs ministry explicitly stated that the treaty will not include a third-party cooperation exception, and that PNG retains its constitutional right to engage in defense cooperation with other countries. This balancing act allows PNG to welcome Australian protection and investment while also trying to preserve flexibility in its foreign policy.

The Pukpuk Treaty shows how legal, constitutional, and domestic political constraints can serve as practical tools for small states to influence great powers. In Papua New Guinea, there is an ongoing debate: recently, retired Major General Jerry Singirok questioned concepts of sovereignty, non-alignment, and constitutionality, specifically whether integrating the PNG Defence Force into the ADF structures or adopting Australian military doctrine would be unconstitutional under PNG law.

Papua New Guinea also issued warnings that public consultation, parliamentary ratification, and legal safeguards are practical considerations. These constraints suggest that Australian strategic ambitions are not pursued unconditionally but require negotiation and moderation. PNG is leveraging its internal political processes to ensure its interests are protected. This demonstrates that small states are not merely vassals but hold significant agency through institutional rules, constitutional mechanisms, and civil-military relations.

The treaty reshapes how we view alliances and security in the Pacific. Currently, Australia has only a few formal mutual defense treaties. The Pukpuk Treaty is the first new treaty-level defense alliance in Australia in over 70 years. This indicates a shift from informal security cooperation, training, aid, and soft security towards more formalized mutual defense commitments.

For the Pacific, this means smaller states seeking such formal agreements gain greater bargaining power, more reliable security arrangements, and improved access to resources. It also increases the stakes in global competition. Any formal alliance is likely to provoke countermeasures by other major powers. In fact, China already warned PNG not to sign a treaty that restricts collaboration with other nations and stressed the importance of maintaining sovereignty and decision-making independence.

Being this close to Australia will limit PNG’s options, potentially tying it to Australia’s strategic interests, which may not align with those of PNG, leaving PNG vulnerable to diplomatic repercussions in its dealings with China.

There is also a constitutional risk; PNG’s legal framework might have to balance issues such as dual staffing, foreign military doctrine, foreign operational control, or access to bases. The treaty must protect PNG’s sovereignty while enabling productive cooperation. Additionally, there is a domestic political risk. A perception of lost sovereignty or involvement in an unwanted conflict could provoke public and political instability.

The case of PNG signals that small states are no longer just battlegrounds, but active creators of regional order. By taking the lead and signing such a treaty, PNG clarifies what it requires regarding defense cooperation, sovereignty safeguards, and strategic balance. Using domestic legal procedures (parliamentary ratification, constitutional review, popular debate), PNG ensures that any potential arrangement is stronger than past cooperation and aligns with its long-term interests. Other small states will observe this and may be encouraged to pursue more formal engagements and specific defense partnerships instead of informal or ad hoc arrangements.

Fawad Afridi is an MPhil Scholar at the National Defense University. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own. 

What the Pukpuk Mutual Defense Treaty Tells Us about the Pacific Security Order was originally published on Global Security Review.

The existing US-led hub-and-spoke alliance system in the Asia-Pacific is fundamentally different than the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). In the 1950s the US investigated the possibility of establishing a regional multilateral alliance, but this soon proved infeasible. Unable to forge a Northeast Asian equivalent to NATO at the onset of the Cold War, the US opted instead for the “hub-and-spoke” architecture, where the spokes radiate out from Washington in a network of asymmetrical ties reinforcing American regional dominance. Why?

First, compared to Europe, the Asia-Pacific has very little history of multilateral institutions and alliance formation. Modern European states have a history of doing so dating back well before the Treaty of Westphalia was established in 1648. European sovereign political systems emerged out of Westphalia; Europe came to develop different notions of international community and international order, based, in part, on the concept of international law. Asia did not have such a tradition of legalistic international agreements.

Second, geography also plays a significant role in the nature of warfare, and therefore the ability of countries to come to one another’s aid. European nations border each other, but they do so in a land context. As such, not only is it easier to move around troops and military equipment, but it is faster.

The nature of geography and distance also inform countries’ threat perceptions. NATO continues to endure because of a shared common adversary—Russia. Countries neighbor each other, making for an easily delineated bloc. The distances between Southeast Asia and Northeast Asia are formidable compared to Europe. Moreover, the sheer size of China, and the formidable military power of Japan, made it harder for smaller competitors to balance against them.

There were some attempts at bridging East and West. In 1954, the Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO) was established because of the Southeast Asia Collective Defence Treaty. It included Australia, France, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Philippines, Thailand, the United Kingdom, and the US and was designed to curb the spread of communism in Asia. A major reason SEATO failed and was disbanded in 1977 was because there was a lack of a common threat perception.

What did survive was the U.S. hub-and-spoke system: the US-Japan alliance as a means of curbing any potential regional Japanese aggression after World War II, the US- South Korea alliance to protect South Korea from a North Korean invasion, and the US alliance with Australia and New Zealand (ANZUS) to protect both nations from perceived threats of communist invasion by China and Indonesia.

Central and critical to the credibility of any alliance system is how it deters conflict. This is arguably much harder to achieve in a multilateral alliance than in the current hub-and-spoke system. Conventional deterrence in the Asian maritime theater is difficult. The most significant work on conventional deterrence was done by John Mearsheimer. However, Mearsheimer’s analysis may be persuasive for eras preceding the development of nuclear weapons, but the pre-nuclear era did not involve missiles. His analysis was based on a European land context, not an Asian maritime context. As such, thinking on conventional deterrence is incomplete.

There are significant logistical challenges that come with trying to establish a multilateral alliance system in Asia. Tasks include the need to ensure the prompt replenishment of destroyed combat ships, establish defensive perimeters for fleet support, and ensure the safety of fleet replenishment oilers and dry cargo/ammunition supply ships, just to name a few.

Budget constraints brought on by sequestration (2013), coupled with longer-term financial uncertainty, was raising questions about the US Navy’s Military Sealift Command and its combat logistics force more than a decade ago. Europe was, and remains, one single geostrategic entity connected by an excellent road network. In the Asia-Pacific, Australia, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan are more dispersed, with neutral and non-aligned states between them, not to mention a growing Chinese submarine fleet.

American forces need to move around large numbers of ships, aircraft, troops, and munitions. Unless the US establishes more permanent bases on allied territory, it is not clear that the US is able to adequately deploy replacement capabilities on very short notice, especially once conflict breaks out. Whilst American declaratory policy that requires a defense of allies in Asia is sound, it needs to be backed up by raw capability, the two components of deterrence.

For more than a decade, analysts have encouraged the US to improve readiness and sustainment of the US Navy. In 2014, the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments warned of many more similar issues, including how quickly cruisers and destroyers exhaust their missiles and how adversaries will attempt to use “cheap” missiles (such as the BrahMos cruise missile) to attack US warships to get them to use their most effective defenses first,  such as the long-range SM-6 missile, and then strike with more effective weapons to destroy carriers and their escorts.

The foundation of power projection was and remains sea control. As Hugh White argues, what has contributed to making the US such a decisive power in the region is a robust sea-control capacity with low risk, and therefore little cost. The modern concept of sea control has its origins in the writings of Rear Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan. Sea control was about naval superiority, the concentration of forces, and decisive battles.

Sea control is the condition in which one has freedom of action in specified areas and for specified periods of time and, where necessary, to deny or limit its use to the enemy. Sea control is different from sea denial. The latter refers to attempts to deny an adversary’s ability to use the sea without necessarily seeking to control the sea. When it comes to Asia, China and the United States are gradually trading places when it comes to sea control.

Discussions about a multilateral alliance would arguably have to address the unavoidable question of nuclear weapons and extended nuclear deterrence (END). Discussions within NATO’s Nuclear Planning Group during the Cold War about targeting and basing helped calm nervous allies, helped hold NATO together, and, in some cases, helped stem the tide of proliferation.

Both the US–Republic of Korea Extended Deterrence Policy Committee (EDPC) and the US–Japan Extended Deterrence Dialogue were established after the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review for a similar purpose. There were growing concerns around the ability of the US to overcome China’s anti-access/area-denial capabilities and American support in the event of specific contingencies involving the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands in the East China Sea. Could these bilateral dialogues become multilateral fora? This applies just as much to conventional weapons, but where the members of the alliance are far apart from each other, the potential red lines of escalation and conflict are much less identifiable than they would be in a land context.

But the technical challenges in the credibility of American extended deterrence to Australia, Japan, and South Korea matter less than the reasons why the US would want to do nuclear strategy again, this time in East Asia, a vastly more complicated theater. What matters is interest.

Hugh White raised the uncomfortable but critical issue when he suggested that Tokyo’s desire for a closer defense relationship with Australia is all about lining Australia up to support Japan against China, and that is the way Washington and Beijing will see it, too. Tokyo and Washington believe that Australia should defend the US-led international order and refuse concessions to China’s ambitions. Australians have not decided whether they agree with the US and Japan and are predisposed to seek a compromise with China—all while retaining a strong American role.

As White argued, no possible US nuclear posture, even the best possible, would eliminate the risk that a conflict with a nuclear-armed great power like China might lead to direct nuclear attacks on US territory. This leaves America’s East Asian allies to ponder whether American interests in the Western Pacific are strong enough for Washington to justify running the risk of conflict going nuclear.

Professor Paul Bracken of Yale University expressed concerns about American alliances in Asia. He found it nearly inconceivable that the US would actually use nuclear weapons to defend Australia, Japan, or Taiwan. Bracken noted that he played out countless scenarios, and that when it came down to it, American leaders were unwilling to use nuclear weapons. Bracken went so far as to suggest that the United States may not engage in a conventional hi-tech war with China, either.

Ely Ratner’s article is thought-provoking, valuable, and timely. But there are significant challenges in alliance credibility in Asia, because interests do not align as easily as they do in Europe. As former US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles remarked in 1952, “The North Atlantic Treaty reflected a sense of common destiny as between the peoples of the west, which grew out of a community of race, religion, and political institutions, before it was finalised. But that element does not clearly exist as yet anywhere in the Pacific area.” The same is true today, seven decades later.

Christine Leah, PhD, is a fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies.  

American Alliances in East Asia: An Australian Perspective was originally published on Global Security Review.

The international system is now firmly bipolar, with China’s global power rapidly increasing at a time when Russia regularly threatens to use nuclear weapons against the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), influencing the administration of President Donald Trump. The combined Chinese and Russian threats are leading President Trump to warn of a possible World War III.

American power is increasingly contested, bringing new operational challenges to extended deterrence. A fundamental question is now in play—should the US abandon the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) it created in 1960s and instead push its allies to field nuclear weapons?

Allies are already reconsidering their nuclear stance. In the Asia-Pacific, American ally Australia provides useful historical insights.

From the late 1940s to the early 1970s, Australia sought to acquire nuclear weapons in response to an unstable international order where it felt threatened by China. In 1967, Secretary of US Defense Robert McNamara said it would be “entirely natural” and “an obvious thing to happen” for Australia to acquire nuclear weapons in response to China developing them. He also expressed interest in establishing a collective nuclear organization for the Far East, “starting with Australia and the Philippines.”

Indeed, Secretary of State Dean Rusk earlier suggested a “US-supplied Far Eastern nuclear stockpile” open to Japan and India. In 1958, others proposed the US could base intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) in Australia, in the event the US decided to keep tight control of nuclear weapons in its own hands and actively worked to push its allies to agree to the NPT treaty.

There were similar debates around friendly nuclear proliferation in Europe around the same time. Aiming to regain leadership in Europe, the US proposed a multilateral nuclear force within NATO. While there were doubts over its military utility, the diplomatic discussions that started around sharing nuclear hardware and control did allow time to develop a European non-proliferation solution. In 1966, the NATO nuclear planning group was established, allowing some European allies to be involved in how and under which circumstances American weapons might be used.

The structural changes in the international system that prompted these earlier ideas are happening again. It is time to start thinking seriously about the next steps to take. The nuclear history noted suggests three broad approaches.

First, allies might build their own nuclear forces. The logic is that in a high-intensity conflict between the US and a nuclear power, the adversary may target American allies with nuclear weapons. Such an escalation demonstrates an adversary’s willingness to coerce allies into ceasing support for the United States.

This is the worst-case scenario that extended deterrence was created to prevent. If allies seriously doubt American credibility, fielding independent nuclear forces is a solution.  Indeed, economically challenged Pakistan and North Korea took this path already. For America’s allies, acquiring nuclear forces may be a lower cost option than growing their conventional forces.

Second, allies might work together to devise a modern multilateral nuclear force as considered in 1960s Europe. In the Pacific, Australia considered working with Britain on nuclear weapons in the late 1940s and 1950s; some still favor this effort. In that regard, Japan and Australia have recently acquired Tomahawk cruise missiles, which the US armed with nuclear warheads to deter Russia in the 1980s. Such weapons might be a starting point for an allied nuclear force in the eastern Pacific. As noted, the US considered deploying ICBMs in the Australian outback.

Third, another option, arguably better for American global leadership, is to address the allies’ deepening concerns over extended deterrence. This would involve the current administration actively reassuring allies that it still places importance on existing security treaties, increasing nuclear sharing and including more nations in nuclear planning, especially in the Pacific. Such steps would be at marginal cost to the US.

The most important might be nuclear sharing as this appears a tangible example of commitment. Of course, nuclear sharing is actually a misnomer since the US shares in the employment of certain nuclear weapons. It retains full control of the weapons prior to an authorization to strike a target.

The US could increase nuclear sharing with Pacific allies, such as Australia, Japan, and South Korea, and broaden out to other NATO nations like Poland and the Scandinavian nations, which appear to be Russia’s next target after Ukraine. These nations could then reciprocate in hosting US nuclear weapons as Belgium, Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands do now.

This discussion hinges on American ambitions for global leadership. As the Trump administration pushes allies to bare a greater share of their own security while attempting to close a $2 trillion annual deficit, the US must necessarily cut costs everywhere. Thus, American allies must take a realistic look at what President Trump is seeking to accomplish with the federal budget and understand that they must step into the breach while the US sets its house in order.

Sometimes, a great power must admit that it may be in its interests to change direction and push its allies down a new, different path. In that case, the Trump administration might declare the NPT finished and instead encourage its allies to go nuclear.

Dr. Christine Leah is a Fellow at the US National Institute for Deterrence Studies and has worked on nuclear issues at Yale, MIT, and RAND and in London, Singapore, and Canberra. She is the author of The Consequences of American Nuclear Disarmament and Australia and the Bomb. Dr. Peter Layton is Visiting Fellow at the Griffith Asia Institute and an Associate Fellow at the Royal United Services Institute. He is author of Grand Strategy and coauthor of Warfare in the Robotic Age.

Time to Proliferate Nuclear Weapons (or Not?) was originally published on Global Security Review.

A decade ago, Paul Bracken warned of such possibilities in his book, The Second Nuclear Age. Because deterrence theory went out of vogue for so long in the West, analysts are now woefully unprepared to think about these challenges and their implications. Today, all possible threats to our Western notions of peace and stability have been jumbled into one giant intellectual recycling bin of deterrence theory. It is time to talk much more seriously about (1) the role of nuclear weapons in deterrence and (2) the role of nuclear deterrence in a new era of nuclear disorder in the Asia-Pacific.

Nuclear weapons play a unique and unprecedented role in how nations think about geopolitical order. They have fundamentally altered how countries think about alliances and the nature of international order. William Walker wrote about the establishment, in the late 1960s, of a nuclear order based on managed systems of deterrence and abstinence. The former was a system “whereby a recognized set of states would continue using nuclear weapons to prevent war and maintain stability, but in a manner that was increasingly controlled and rule-bound,” and in which there was a degree of familiarity in essentially dyadic deterrence relationships.

Nuclear abstinence consisted of a system “whereby other states give up sovereign rights to develop, hold, and use such weapons in return for economic, security, and other benefits,” concomitantly with the provision of nuclear umbrellas and a stable Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT). It is a system whereby not only the possession, but also the use of nuclear weapons is controlled. According to Walker, the stability and robustness of these two systems would provide the rationale for many states in the international system to abstain from acquiring weapons and for states to rely on the US for their national survival.

There are several elements that gradually developed after the second world war that characterized this nuclear order—dissuading countries from developing nuclear weapons. First, the number of nuclear weapon states is relatively small. Second, nuclear weapons are no longer considered merely bigger and better conventional weapons. Third, there are strong norms against possession and the use of nuclear weapons. Fourth, there are no direct and immediate military threats to US allies. Fifth, war between major powers is relatively unlikely.

This and the prospects for nuclear proliferation are relatively limited. The Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) proposed in the late 1960s eventually attract more and more states, thus contributing to a norm against nuclear proliferation. It also contributed to nuclear and conventional arms control as concepts and policies in the international community. The world was able to more easily navigate crises and confrontations as thinking evolved about strategic theory and concepts and their application to real world politics and diplomacy.

The international (nuclear) order held together. It is now slowly eroding. China is modernizing its conventional and nuclear forces, all while growing increasingly bellicose and regularly threatening to invade Taiwan.

Russia annexed Crimea in 2014. The West did nothing and never imagined this would be followed by a full-scale invasion eight years later—with regular Russian threats to use nuclear weapons.

Now, Australian academic Peter Layton is writing about “this nuclear threat business.” Until recently, this behavior was reserved for rogue states like North Korea. Such behavior was beneath great powers such as Russia and the United States. Not only does the West have to think about deterrence in a multipolar setting, but it must face nuclear dictators.

Nuclear arsenals in Asia are also expanding. From China’s rapid nuclear expansion to questions about the future of Pakistan’s nuclear posture, the future is uncertain. There are renewed questions about the future of South Korea and nuclear weapons.

Arms control is also breaking down. Much to the chagrin of arms control careerists, who argue for unilateral, bilateral, and trilateral nuclear arms control as a public good sui generis, arms control is not carrying the day. Bereft of the intellectual foundations of deterrence that guided impressive negotiations in SALT I and II, and even START I, discussing nuclear strategy is now taboo in the West.

The nuclear order that existed during the Cold War and the post–Cold War peace dividend, especially in the Asia-Pacific, is eroding rapidly. For many nuclear historians, this trend is not new. Now is the time to grieve the loss of the utopian dream and think seriously about how to navigate this new era of disorder and the role of nuclear weapons in deterring war and promoting peace.

Christine Leah, PhD, is a Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own. 

Nuclear Order and Disorder in the Asia-Pacific was originally published on Global Security Review.

Today, China enjoys a positional advantage within the First Island Chain, which allows the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to enjoy interior lines of communication and supply to move forces more efficiently along an inner arc, compared to American-led coalition forces that will operate on an outer arc. This strategic advantage facilitates faster mobilization and concentration of military power by the PLA, enhancing its ability to project force within the region.

To counter China’s geographic advantage, Andrew F. Krepinevich Jr. argues in Archipelagic Defense 2.0 that the United States and its coalition partners should prioritize establishing robust fixed defenses at critical points along the First Island Chain (an arc of islands stretching from Japan to the Philippines). These fixed defenses can stock deep magazines, harden positions, and complicate PLA scouting efforts. By situating ground forces on key islands these defenses can slow down if not prevent China’s aggressive mobility and provocation capabilities.

The islands of the First Island Chain, along with the flanking states (South Korea in the north and Vietnam in the south), form natural chokepoints that can impede China’s access to open seas. Coalition forces can play a crucial role in enhancing defense by focusing on these chokepoints. Deploying undersea sensor networks, submarines, unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs), antiship missiles, and mines can effectively limit PLA naval and air operations.

Ground forces can significantly contribute to the defense of maritime chokepoints as well. By establishing strongholds at key locations, they can free up more mobile forces for counter-concentration efforts. This static defense strategy, coupled with mobile strike capabilities, creates a layered defense system that complicates the PLA’s operational planning and execution.

On March 8, 2024, the Philippines Secretary of National Defense Gilberto C. Teodoro Jr. emphasized the importance of the Comprehensive Archipelagic Defense Concept (CADC). The CADC leverages the positional advantage of the Philippine section of the First Island Chain. This arc forms a natural barrier against Chinese maritime expansion, and its strategic significance lies in its potential to restrict the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) movements.

The Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) between the Philippines and the United States could do more to enhance archipelagic defense. The Balikatan Exercise in April 2024 exemplifies the ongoing military cooperation aimed at strengthening defense capabilities in the region.

However, recent developments, such as the planned construction of a new port in the Batanes Islands, without US help, highlight the Philippines’ efforts to bolster its infrastructure and defense independently. This move, while avoiding direct US involvement, ensures that the Philippines remains vigilant and prepared to counter potential threats from Chinese expansion. The strategic importance of the Batanes Islands is that it is located less than 200 kilometers from Taiwan and separated by the Bashi Channel. These islands, along with Itbayat and Basco in the Luzon Strait, form critical chokepoints in the western Pacific and the South China Sea. In the event of Chinese aggression towards Taiwan or the Philippines, controlling these islands becomes paramount.

For its part, China has built bases on three atolls (Subi Reef, Fiery Cross Reef, and Mischief Reef) and Taiping Island (Itu Aba Island) and is continually harming Filipino sailors and ships within the sovereign territory of the Philippines. Further, Chinese military activities near Japan are increasing such as when the PLAN sent survey ships, like the Chen Jingrun, into Japan’s uncontested waters between the Iriomote and Yonaguni Islands.

The addition of the tenth dash to the nine-dash line is China’s claim to Senkaku, which necessitates a comprehensive archipelagic defense strategy. The Philippines and Japan, in collaboration with the US and its allies, must enhance fixed defenses, leverage positional advantages, and fortify critical chokepoints within the First Island Chain. By doing so, they can effectively counterbalance China’s assertive maritime claims and increasing hostility.

The CADC, supported by initiatives like the EDCA represents the beginning of a much-needed effort towards safeguarding the Philippines’ national sovereignty and maintaining the balance of power in the Asia-Pacific region. As geopolitical dynamics continue to work against Taiwan’s de facto independence, the US must work closely with Japan and the Philippines to harden the Yonaguni Islands that stretch from the south of Japan to the north of Taiwan and the Batanes Islands that reach from the north of the Philippines to the south of Taiwan.

These Philippine and Japanese territories off Taiwan’s coast are particularly valuable entry points because of the Ryukyu Trench and the Philippine Sea Plate which provide easy access to the Pacific Ocean. If Taiwan falls to China, the US and its Pacific allies should already be in a position to plan for the next phase of China’s aggression as it will not stop with Taiwan.

If the US, together with the Philippines and Japan, fail to fortify these strategic island networks, American Pacific power will be pushed back to Hawaii. Allies will also face an authoritarian and mercantilist regional order that they do not wish to see return. China can be contained, but the time to act is now.

Alexis Littlefield, PhD, is Chief of Staff at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies and a Fellow of the Institute. He lived in Taiwan and China for two decades. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

Increasing the Archipelagic Defense from the Philippines to Japan was originally published on Global Security Review.

The world is now reminded of the normality of war in human existence by the aggression of revisionist Russia and China. The United States, leader of the free world, must once again deter the aggression of authoritarian regimes. This time, however, the United States is no longer in the same dominant position it once held.

American nuclear deterrence plays a critical role in managing the modern international system—the latest iteration of which is tripolar. Whilst many analysts in the arms control and disarmament community accuse those in the deterrence community of “Cold War thinking,” they make grossly inaccurate assertions that poorly reflect reality. The Cold War, which placed much of the world on the precipice of a nuclear exchange, generated unprecedented strategic thinking about how to manage great-power relationships and deter war between them.

The concepts underpinning deterrence: second strike, damage limitation, escalation control, delegation authority, and many others, are concepts that remain relevant today and require a careful re-thinking as the tripolar era moves forward. The implications of new technologies like effective missile defenses, hypersonic glide vehicles, and drones may change perceptions in unexpected ways.

Members of the academic and think tank communities were warning governments over a decade ago about the impending return of great-power competition in both Europe and the Asia-Pacific. There is a benefit to studying history. It is the ability to see trends without assuming they are certain to repeat themselves. The constancy of human nature, however, makes Thucydides’ admonitions equally useful today as they were 2,500 years ago.

It is time to re-think how to apply the classic strategic theories and concepts that aided in navigating the first nuclear age. They can aid the West in successfully navigating this era of tripolar superpower competition.

The bipolar Cold War construct was a unique development in history. This construct of two nuclear-armed superpowers competing for global influence was the new dynamic of what international great-power competition looked like historically. What appeared to be a global competition, was, in practice, a regional one focused on Western Europe and NATO, with second- and third-order effects for the rest of the world. The Asia-Pacific primarily received the leftovers in terms of the consequences and interests in the Cold War.

Thinking about concepts such as strategic stability, deterrence, extended deterrence, and arms control (developed during the Cold War) as the West contemplates confrontation across both Europe and the Asia-Pacific is a challenge. This is especially important as China ramps up its aggressive activity in the South China Sea, expands its nuclear arsenal, and builds a military specifically designed to defeat the United States.

The prospect of war between the great powers raises the question of how America’s post-war alliances, formed at the dawn of the nuclear age, might endure and function in such a world. Strategic concepts and connotations of the first nuclear age will have to be re-conceptualized to formulate strategies that reassure allies and deter adversaries. Ultimately, the credibility of American extended deterrence may not endure as the world enters a period akin to what William Walker termed nuclear disorder.

Walker suggests that the establishment, in the late 1960s, of nuclear order was based on managed systems of deterrence and abstinence. The former was a system whereby a recognized set of states would continue using nuclear weapons to prevent war and maintain stability, but in a manner that was increasingly controlled and rule bound. There was a degree of familiarity in the dyadic deterrence relationship of the United States and the Soviet Union.

Nuclear abstinence consisted of a system whereby other states give up sovereign rights to develop, hold, and use such weapons in return for economic, security, and other benefits. This took place concomitantly with the provision of a nuclear umbrella and a stable Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). It is a system whereby not only the possession but also the use of nuclear weapons is controlled. According to Walker, the stability and robustness of these two systems provided the rationale for many states in the international system to abstain from acquiring weapons and for several key states to rely on American extended deterrence for their national survival.

There are several elements that characterise the nuclear order underpinning the structural foundations for the credibility of that extended deterrence. First, the number of nuclear weapons states is relatively small. Second, nuclear weapons are no longer considered bigger and better conventional weapons—as they once were. Third, there are strong norms against possession and use of nuclear weapons. Fourth, there are no existential threats to American allies. Fifth, war between major powers is relatively unlikely—even with Russian threats.

In the mid-2000s nuclear order began unravelling. That process increased in speed with the invasion of Ukraine and China’s nuclear breakout. With this came a need to re-think the strategic theory and concepts that helped navigate the first nuclear age. After all, the future lasts a long time.

There are still many known unknowns and potentially even more unknown unknowns. What is known is that no other weapon has the gravitational force of nuclear weapons. Thus, it is important to adapt strategic theory and concepts to deal with a dangerous era of international politics that is not well understood. Despite idealist claims that war and nuclear weapons can or will cease to exist, conflict is a fundamental element of humanity, and the technology to do so continues to proliferate. Getting smarter at deterring it should be the goal. Nuclear weapons and strategic theory help achieve that objective.

Christine Leah, PhD is a Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. The views expressed are her own.

Nuclear Weapons and Trilateral Superpower Competition was originally published on Global Security Review.

“America’s Strategic Posture Report: Get Behind It” by Jonathan Trexel highlights the urgent need for the US to revise its strategic posture in response to escalating global threats. It emphasizes the changing international security environment, underscoring the necessity for the US to adapt its defense planning. The report suggests enhancing conventional, nuclear, and strategic defense forces to address these threats, including those from Russia, China, North Korea, and Iran. The recommendations also cover aspects like modernizing nuclear weapons, missile defense systems, and developing offensive and defensive space assets. The author argues for the urgent adoption of these measures to maintain national and global security.

“Congressional Dysfunction Impacts American Defense in the Pacific” by Christophe Bosquillon highlights concerns about American defense strategy in the Pacific, specifically due to congressional delays in funding the Compacts of Free Association (COFA) with Pacific island-states. The article underscores the strategic importance of these island-states, such as Palau, for American defense, particularly against China. Bosquillon argues that congressional inaction undermines American commitments in the region, potentially inviting Chinese influence and jeopardizing American security interests in the Pacific.

“Deterrence in Space: It’s Not Complicated” by Michael J. Listner examines the concept of space deterrence, arguing it’s a simple yet often over-complicated idea. He discusses the importance of understanding different perspectives on deterrence, especially from adversaries like Russia and China. Listner emphasizes the need for the US to have the capability and will to apply force in space. He critiques the reliance on resilience as a method of deterrence, stating it’s not a substitute for actual defensive and offensive capabilities in space. The article advocates for a straightforward approach to deterrence in space, stressing the importance of capability, will, and communication.

“Japanese Space Strategy: Deploying a Credible Deterrent” by Christophe Bosquillon analyzes Japan’s evolving space strategy in the context of regional security challenges, particularly threats from North Korea and China. The article discusses Japan’s shift from pacifist policies to developing credible deterrence in space, including the use of anti-satellite capabilities and enhancing space situational awareness. It underscores the importance of Japan’s cooperation with the US for security in the Indo-Pacific region and highlights the challenges Japan faces in establishing a credible deterrent in space.

“Nano Aquabots and the US-China Science and Technology Cooperation Agreement” by Alexis Littlefield explores the dual-use nature of nano aquabots and other advanced technologies, emphasizing the risks and benefits of the US-China Science and Technology Cooperation Agreement. Littlefield discusses how these technologies, while beneficial for society, can also be weaponized. The article critically examines the implications of US government-funded research in collaboration with China, highlighting concerns about intellectual property transfer and national security. The author’s perspective sheds light on the complexities of international science and technology agreements and their impact on strategic interests.

“Russia and the Growing Danger of Satellite Cyber-Attacks” by Alexis Schlotterback highlights the increasing threat of Russian cyber operations targeting satellites. The article explores various satellite cyberattack methods such as data interception, data corruption, and seizure of control. It emphasizes Russia’s advanced capabilities in cyber warfare, including the use of GPS jammers and potential hacking of American satellite control systems. The discussion includes the need for enhanced security measures in satellite infrastructure to protect against these threats.

“The Comprehensive Strategy for the Space Force: The Good and Bad” by Christopher Stone critically evaluates the US Space Force’s strategy as outlined in a congressional report. Stone highlights the positives, such as acknowledging the Space Force’s role in supporting terrestrial forces. However, he points out significant gaps, arguing that the Space Force should focus more on warfighting capabilities to counter growing space threats from China and Russia, rather than merely supporting other forces. He emphasizes the need for combat-credible space forces capable of offensive and defensive operations, asserting that this should be the primary mission of the Space Force.

“The Danger of Minimum Deterrence” by Peter Huessy critiques the concept of minimal deterrence in nuclear strategy. Huessy argues that reducing the US nuclear arsenal to a minimal level undermines the credibility of the U.S. nuclear umbrella, impacts the deterrence of conventional conflict, and ignores the need for strategic stability. He emphasizes that a robust nuclear arsenal is crucial for credible deterrence and argues against the reduction of nuclear forces as part of a path to disarmament.

“The Faux Nuclear Arms Race that Isn’t” by Adam Lowther and Col (Ret) Curtis McGiffin challenges the notion of a new nuclear arms race, arguing that the current situation is not comparable to the Cold War era. They critique the assertion of an arms race, highlighting the significant reduction in nuclear weapons since the Cold War and the lack of expansion in US nuclear capabilities. The authors emphasize the importance of arms control agreements that align with US interests, and they critique the viewpoint that more nuclear weapons are inherently destabilizing, suggesting that strength, not weakness, deters conflict.

“The Pentagon’s China Military Report: Why Americans Should Be Alarmed” by Curtis McGiffin and Adam Lowther is a critical analysis of the Department of Defense’s 2023 report on China’s military developments. The authors highlight the significant increase in China’s nuclear capabilities and potential first-strike aspirations, which contradict its “No First Use” policy. They argue that the US needs a coherent strategy to counter this threat, emphasizing the urgency for more robust American deterrence measures in response to China’s rapid military expansion.

“The Strategic Posture Commission and the China Breakout” by Peter Huessy discusses the rapid expansion of China’s nuclear capabilities and its implications for US strategic posture. Huessy highlights the significant growth of China’s nuclear arsenal and the development of advanced delivery systems. He emphasizes the need for the US to enhance its nuclear deterrence and missile defense capabilities in response to China’s expanding nuclear force. The article urges the US to consider strategic adjustments to maintain a credible deterrent against the evolving threat posed by China.

“The Value of Panda Diplomacy” by Alexis Littlefield explores the geopolitical symbolism of pandas in Sino-American relations. The article discusses how pandas leased to zoos, such as Tian Tian and Mei Xiang in Washington DC, represent diplomatic ties between China and the US. The return of these pandas to China signifies a shift in relations, especially in the context of China’s global influence and the Belt and Road Initiative. Littlefield examines the broader implications of these changes, suggesting pandas as indicators of China’s international relationships.

“Understanding the Strategic Posture Commission Report” by Peter Huessy addresses the Congressional Commission’s findings on the strategic challenges posed by China and Russia. It highlights the United States’ unpreparedness in nuclear deterrence against these peer adversaries. The report recommends strengthening the nuclear triad, deploying air and missile defense systems, and increasing cooperation with allies. It emphasizes the urgency of these recommendations and the need for phased modernization of US nuclear capabilities, considering the evolving strategic environment and the growing threats from China and Russia.

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Global Security Review 2023 Article Compendium was originally published on Global Security Review.

Some commentators believe the submarine launched nuclear cruise missile (SLCM-N) is a better approach. Others believe the existing low-yield submarine launched ballistic missile (W76-2) and the new air launched cruise missile are all that is needed to assure allies well into the future.

One issue with the W76-2 is the fact that an adversary cannot tell the difference between a low- or high-yield weapon until after it detonates. The low-yield cruise missile element avoids that problem but only offers a unilateral American solution to potential NATO inability to quickly responding with observably non-strategic nuclear weapons.

The former Polish prime minister’s recent comments about his desire to host nuclear weapons in Poland, was based on his concern that conventional forces may fail to convince Russia that Poland has the will or capability to retaliate to Russian aggression. When then-prime minister, Mateusz Morawiecki, said he wants to “act quickly”  to begin hosting US nuclear weapons, it was this concern that drove his thinking, which leads back to the opening proposition; build the needed facilities.

Alternatively, the Biden administration made a non-weapon based assurance move with South Korea by involving them more in nuclear planning. The development of military facilities for nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles is, however, a way for allies to draw attention to their willingness to respond to existential or nuclear attack, which can be done almost entirely on their own.

If Poland, South Korea, or other US nuclear umbrella beneficiaries are serious about sending a stronger message to their adversaries (and the United States) they can demonstrate resolve through the suggested defense spending. Constructing weapons storage and security system (WS3)sites with the same, or greater, security and survivability as those built across Central Europe in the 1980s eliminates at least one argument against direct participation in nuclear sharing.

Specific design criteria necessary to calculate just how survivable WS3 sites are or how much the cost to build is of course classified. A feel for cost from publicly available congressional testimony is possible. Government accountability office products and a blue ribbon panel report. Congressional testimony puts nuclear weapon storage improvements at about $50 million per base, each with several individual nuclear storage units. This is in line with the cost of building new F-35 hardened shelters. At least a thousand hardened shelters already exist across Europe and the Pacific, so the actual cost for adding just the WS3 element might actually be lower.

The presence of American nuclear weapons on NATO territory is what sets it apart from other bilateral extended deterrence promises. Although German officials publicly talk about removing nuclear weapons from their territory to reduce the chances of becoming a nuclear target, the idea is always rejected. However, just voicing this opinion begs the questions, would Germany allow allies to sortie nuclear weapons from their airbases and, more importantly, is that friction exploitable? The Morawiecki  seemed to think so. The most credible threat of nuclear retaliation is of course for the Poles to have their own nuke, but that is neither plausible nor desirable for all involved.

The next most credible threat would be Polish pilots flying Polish F-35s out of Polish airfields to deliver NATO assigned weapons requiring the United States do nothing but provide the codes. The same logic would apply in Asia, improving deterrence for South Korea, Japan, or even Singapore. Because the F-35 was born nuclear capable, each country with a squadron of them and WS3 sites is just one US policy decision and a nuclear code box away from being able to deliver a nuclear strike.

Training all NATO F-35 pilots to deliver nuclear weapons was recently recommended as a low-cost means of improving deterrence. Even if NATO stores no greater number of weapons nor are any re-introduced to the Pacific, the simple fact that capability improved sends a “clear and visible signal” of partner resolve. Partners who build WS3 sites and already have F-35s take virtually all the cost, time, and training issues out of hosting American nuclear weapons.

Building a WS3 site is not only about sharing the financial burden, but it also shows backbone by making one’s airfields an even more important target for the adversary trying to take even one inch of territory. Bringing (almost) all the necessary elements of a nuclear retaliatory capability within one’s border virtually eliminates the age-old worry of whether the US is willing to trade New York for Paris. It is true that extended deterrence partners may have to do without one or even two F-35s to afford the several WS3 sites necessary to preclude their easy targeting. But spending that money and accepting the risk shows that America’s partners see credible nuclear retaliation as valuable.

Even without weapons in hand, simply having nuclear certified storage capacity turns F-35 partner nations into nascent nuclear self-defense capable states. This approach costs the US nothing, discourages nuclear technology proliferation, and does not necessitate expanding American stockpiles.

Partner nations building WS3 sites go a long way toward showing their belief in the value of nuclear deterrence and nuclear sharing. Increasing the number of targets an aggressor must destroy to deny nuclear retaliation decreases the likelihood of the aggressor going nuclear in the first place.

Perhaps fielding a slew of secure and hardened nuclear weapons storage sites is a deterrence dream, but if they build them, perhaps the weapons will come. At worst this investment creates a classical deterrence threat by leaving something to chance with the future “upload” possibility for a more amenable American presidential administration.

If You Build It, They Might Come was originally published on Global Security Review.

Alternatively, credible deterrence may be more readily achieved through the threat of low-yield nuclear weapons actively dispersed throughout the Asia-Pacific. Specifically, it is achieved through the threat of nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCM-N) deployed aboard American submarines. However, the risk of nuclear escalation and the undisclosed conditions under which Xi Jinping could use force need to be factored into American deterrence posture. These conditions likely include any attempts to introduce nuclear weapons into the Taiwan issue and any American security guarantees for the self-governing island.

Preparedness is not a well-covered concept in academic literature and is therefore not as well understood by most civilian strategic thinkers. It is chiefly a military concept for thinking about force generation and deployment. Preparedness is the sustainable capacity to apply capabilities to accomplish government-directed tasks over time. It is composed of readiness and sustainability. Readiness is the ability of a capability to be applied to a specific activity within a nominated time frame for a specified period of time to achieve a desired effect. Sustainability is the ability of a force to maintain the necessary level of combat power for the duration required to achieve its objectives.

There is a fundamental difference between conventional and nuclear preparedness. Conventional forces for theater missions need significant time for mobilization and deployment to signal intent. In contrast, nuclear-armed forces are always “on,” that is deterrence of some form is already operational and credibly signalling intent. Nuclear deterrence provides an operational level of capability (O-LOC) that is readily useable and presents the immediate threat of devastating damage, as opposed to unready conventional deterrence.

Conventional deterrence has significant inadequacies, as Richard K. Betts kindly points out. First, success in conventional operations is likely to be overestimated due to uncertainty in the balance of forces, political constraints, and conditions of engagement. Second, an extreme imbalance of forces is critical to successful outcomes of the initial phase. Third, the deterrence factor of military capabilities depends on political factors, namely the motives and beliefs of the adversary. Fourth, extremely high confidence in conventional options is required to provide the same level of deterrence as the threat of nuclear retaliation. Finally, conventional deterrence raises the risk of escalation to nuclear war. The United States’ Asia-Pacific deterrence posture must factor these shortfalls of conventional deterrence, especially when further undermined by the momentous logistical challenges associated with operating in a vast Asia-Pacific maritime environment.

During the Cold War, nuclear weapons were integral to American and allied preparedness. Credible and reliable deterrence in the Cold War can be attributed to McNamara’s resilient, flexible, and survivable American forces. Continuous nuclear modernization programs throughout the Cold War generated large numbers of strategic platforms and weapons that enabled adaptability in American force development and plans. The Cold War also highlighted the importance of a viable industrial infrastructure that is required to produce strategic forces and provide deterrence, assurance, dissuasion, and damage limitation.

As the Cold War competition ended, the US and Russia gradually decreased their sizeable and diverse nuclear arsenals. From 1987 to 2005, arms control treaties played a central role in reducing nuclear arsenals. Many in the West believed that nuclear deterrence was a thing of the past.

However, this decline in the American arsenal presents a problem today. There is a renaissance in geopolitical competition 101, and the US now faces two nuclear-armed peers—China and Russia. Although, China’s growing military challenge to regional stability was obvious for some time, it is only in the past few years that the US acknowledged China as a peer competitor. In addition to Russia threatening the use of nuclear weapons in Ukraine, China is diversifying and increasing its nuclear arsenal, presumably in an attempt to gain parity with the US and undermine overall American deterrence and extended deterrence capabilities. It was American nuclear preparedness that helped keep the Cold War cold.

Russia and China are substantially increasing their nuclear preparedness. The US and its allies must acknowledge this reality and adjust, with credible options, their nuclear preparedness. This is especially true in relation to the concept of extended deterrence in the Asia-Pacific, which never got nearly enough attention as Europe did during the Cold War.

However, there is a lack of credible confirmation that the US still views nuclear weapons as a central pillar of deterrence and strategic ambiguity, especially in the Asia-Pacific. In fact, there is quite the opposite with the introduction of “integrated deterrence” in 2022. This concept (which is really just a buzzword) of integrated deterrence actually minimizes the role of nuclear weapons in American grand strategy. The concept has negative implications for preparedness posture settings in the Asia-Pacific that are necessary to deter and defeat PRC aggression against Taiwan, Japan, South Korea, and Australia.

This compares to Western Europe during the Cold War, which was never satisfied with purely conventional deterrence and wanted American nuclear weapons to provide immediate, reliable, and credible deterrence. The US and its allies must consider the sheer logistical difficulties of conventional deterrence in a maritime environment as vast as the Asia-Pacific. Logistical challenges for conventional deterrence over significant and contested distances, including tasks to guarantee prompt replenishment of disabled combat ships, establish defensive perimeters for fleet support and ensure the safety of fleet replenishment oilers and dry-cargo/ammunition supply ships. Furthermore, significant budget constraints since 2013, coupled with longer-term financial and industrial base uncertainty, raise significant questions about the future of the US Navy’s long-term ability to project power and maintain sea-control (as opposed to sea-denial) in the Asia-Pacific region.

Europe was, and remains, one single geostrategic entity connected by land. Thus, collective deterrence was relatively easy. Whereas, in the Asia-Pacific, Japan, South Korea, Australia, and Taiwan are significantly more dispersed and separated by long sea-lines-of-communication, with neutral and non-aligned states dotted between them. American forces will need to move significant numbers of vessels, aircraft, troops, supplies, and munitions across these vastly dispersed and contested distances.

There is also the difficulty of concentrating large numbers of strike aircraft at locations other than on aircraft carriers. Whereas, penetrating long-range stealth bombers may offer an advantage because of their range, they may not be sufficient to perform all warfighting and deterrence tasks.

A lack of diverse permanent bases on allied soil greatly increases the demands and stress on an aerial fleet and the logistics involved in keeping American forces adequately supplied. It also makes for significantly longer transit times for ships and submarines to and from distant resupply points. Submarines and many surface combatants are currently unable to replenish their missile magazines without sailing back to the United States. Indeed, it is only now that American planners are starting to think very seriously about the logistics and operational issues of extended deterrence in Asia, which were never given much attention because American seapower in this region was never contested.

As the earlier discussion illustrates, significant logistical challenges associated with conventional deterrence in a maritime environment as vast as the Asia-Pacific call into question reliance on conventional systems to deter aggression at different rungs of the escalation ladder. Low-yield nuclear weapons, such as the SLCM-N, are the most likely solution to the deterrence credibility challenge. An American—and allied—deterrence posture that poses the problem of nuclear escalation in the Asia-Pacific is likely to credibly deter Chinese nuclear escalation. Absent such an effort, China may see the opportunity President Xi is looking for.

Christine M. Leah is a fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. Natalie Treloar is at Alpha-India Consultancy. They are based in Australia. The views presented here are their own.

Nuclear Weapons and Military Preparedness in the Asia-Pacific was originally published on Global Security Review.