Contemporary disagreements between the U.S. and its NATO allies have intensified over political, economic, and security issues. Disputes over trade, tariffs, defense spending, and expeditionary support reveal an unhealthy frustration with burden-sharing demands and a strategic recalibration rather than a wholesale fear of U.S. abandonment. Some European leaders’ reactions to U.S. demands for burden-sharing and strategic reciprocity have ranged from performative indignation to explicit efforts to redefine NATO on more European terms and push America out of the alliance. 

The complaint of an underfunded NATO is not new; it is a recurring theme in American strategic discourse. In 2002, President Bush called for NATO reform with new capabilities and interoperability. In 2016, President Obama used the term ‘free riders’ to argue that Europe must take more responsibility. Recently, German Chancellor Friedrich Merz admitted, “We have been free riders in the past, and the Americans guaranteed our freedom and our security.” 

This friction highlights the main operational tension NATO 3.0 seeks to address. At the June 2026 NATO Defense Ministerial in Brussels, U.S. Secretary of War Pete Hegseth described NATO 3.0 as “modeled on NATO 1.0 that won the Cold War, with allies leading Europe’s defense.” He said NATO should be “a hard-edged war-fighting organization.” He also described NATO 2.0 as the post-Cold War effort “no longer focused on defending Europe” but on “climate change and defense austerity.” While some may sneer at these descriptions, they are hard to argue against. NATO 3.0 is likely to be a bold reboot, with European countries leading their defenses while the U.S. shifts focus to the Indo-Pacific and homeland defense, remaining a strategic and nuclear safety net. 

The U.S. is reducing or redeploying its forces to pre-2022 levels and urging a more self-reliant Europe. This does not mean weakening NATO; instead, it aims for a stronger, Europe-focused defense to support NATO’s long-term sustainability. A capable Europe could enhance deterrence and security by lessening its reliance on large-scale U.S. intervention, but European military growth should complement, not replace, American power. 

To resemble NATO 1.0, Hegseth’s NATO 3.0 must understand and embrace the future role of nuclear weapons. The key difference is the size and scope of nuclear arsenals, with fewer weapons overall. While Russia’s non-strategic nuclear arsenal remains more than ten times larger than NATO’s, the aggregate nuclear stockpiles have declined by more than 80 percent since 1992. Smaller arsenals render each remaining weapon more significant and more vulnerable, making allied nuclear forces increasingly valuable instruments of deterrence. NATO 3.0’s success depends on three focus areas. 

First, NATO must abandon the presumption that a smaller nuclear arsenal can effectively deter Russia. Equally flawed is the belief that maintaining fewer weapons automatically signals reduced threat to Moscow. Deterrence credibility does not rest on symbolic restraint; it relies on perceived capability and willingness to impose unacceptable costs. In today’s competitive nuclear environment, NATO needs more—not less—nuclear capability in Europe, to ensure credible deterrence. Smaller arsenals make each weapon’s survivability more critical, increasing the risk of vulnerability, technical failure, or denied retaliation. A strong nuclear posture enhances resilience, confidence, and the capacity to absorb loss whilst ensuring NATO can deter nuclear coercion and attack. 

Expanding NATO’s nuclear capacity involves more than adding American weapons. Macron’s idea of “forward deterrence” seeks to integrate France’s nuclear forces into European security without formal guarantees. While the U.S. shares its arsenal with allies, France would retain sole control over its nuclear weapons, targeting, and use. Macron states France’s core interests may include defending against attacks on European partners that could threaten French sovereignty. Poland, interested in the French offer, also seeks its own nuclear capability. President Nawrocki recently emphasized strengthening Poland’s security “even with nuclear potential.” More nuclear-armed states in the alliance could be necessary to deter Russia and reassure uneasy allies. 

Second, NATO 3.0 must focus its nuclear deterrent on active escalation management and theater warfighting. During the NATO 1.0 era, Cold War doctrines like “Massive Retaliation” relied on the threat of overwhelming nuclear strikes in response to acts of aggression rather than protracted war. Later doctrines such as “Assured Destruction,” which largely focused on direct US-USSR deterrence, and “Flexible Response,” which tested allies’ willingness to fight a third conventional war on the Continent, demanded a significant and costly increase in Europe’s conventional forces. 

NATO 3.0 requires a keen focus on European-centric escalation management. Since adversaries see low-yield theater nuclear weapons as usable coercive tools in an “escalate to de-escalate” strategy, NATO must have an abundant, diverse, and flexible nuclear arsenal. Maintaining credible low- and high-yield options and non-nuclear systems allows NATO 3.0 to match any rung on the escalation ladder, thereby reinforcing crisis stability. 

Third, NATO 3.0 must emphasize both forward based and strategic U.S. nuclear forces for extended deterrence, which is crucial for alliance security. NATO 1.0’s success depended on America’s nuclear umbrella, with ample modern forces and deployments reassuring allies, deterring enemies, and preserving the alliance. NATO remains a nuclear alliance. However, complacency and reliance on aging U.S. arsenals during NATO 2.0 led to budget cuts, reduced force postures, and misaligned goals.  

Going forward, NATO 3.0 will require greater nuclear capability to deter effectively. The American nuclear umbrella deters nuclear coercion against U.S. allies by providing a credible strategic deterrent that France and the UK cannot single-handedly offer against an assertive Russia with the largest, most diverse nuclear stockpile in the world. British and French arsenals are combined eight times smaller than Russia’s, leaving NATO countries like Poland, Finland, and the Baltic states more vulnerable to Russian intimidation or invasion. If NATO and the U.S. are driven apart, the remaining alliance states will need to rapidly grow their nuclear forces. However, a strong American nuclear arsenal, supported by credible, mutual commitments, remains crucial to binding the alliance, reassuring partners, deterring enemies, and preserving strategic stability. 

Rather than signaling the end of the transatlantic alliance, NATO 3.0 would mark a new phase, one that adapts to an aggressive, revanchist Russia and a shifting global power balance. NATO 3.0 may be one in which the United States remains Europe’s principal strategic partner and nuclear guarantor, while Europe assumes far greater responsibility for its own conventional defense. This reflects strategic growth, not alliance end. Despite $40 trillion in debt, the U.S. remains the only great power capable of countering China and North Korea, threats not contained in Article 6 of NATO’s charter. Expecting allies to bear a greater share of defense responsibilities is sound policy and demonstrates empowered trust within NATO. 

Colonel Curtis McGiffin (U.S. Air Force, Ret.) is Vice President for Education at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies, President of MCG Horizons LLC, and a visiting professor at Missouri State University’s School of Defense and Strategic Studies. He has three decades of experience in uniform and DoD civil service, is the co-editor of the book “Learning to Love the Bomb,” and is the co-host of the weekly The NIDS View podcast. The views and opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the author and MCG Horizons LLC, and do not necessarily reflect the views of any other organization. 

NATO 3.0 and the Nuclear Arsenal It Requires was originally published on Global Security Review.

With the New START’s expiration on February 5, 2026, the world has entered a new era in nuclear arms control, reflecting the evolving realities of the contemporary nuclear order. The United States believes that nuclear limits on warheads and launchers imposed under the New START no longer serve its interests, or those of its nuclear adversaries, highlighting Washington’s lack of appetite for a renewed bilateral arrangement. Dr. Christopher Yeaw, the U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for the Bureau of Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, shared the U.S. perspective at the Conference on Disarmament (CD), shifting from exclusive U.S.-Russia strategic constraints toward a more inclusive yet complex multilateral framework that could shape the future of global nuclear stability. This transition shows a broader shift in arms control policy of the U.S., emphasizing the need for a new arms control arrangement that reflects a transition from a bilateral framework to a multilateral charter, holding all five nuclear-weapon states under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (P-5) equally responsible for making serious efforts toward nuclear disarmament.

While addressing the CD, Dr. Yeaw used the shortcomings of the New START to advance a broader strategic argument rather than merely listing Russian violations. By emphasizing Russia’s sizeable stockpile of non-strategic (theatre) nuclear weapons that are estimated to be around 2,000 warheads and the production of novel systems like nuclear-armed Skyfall cruise missile and the nuclear powered Poseidon torpedo, Washington aimed to highlight that New START was overly focused on deployed strategic warheads and completely overlooked the full range of modern nuclear risks.

Dr. Yeaw further linked these loopholes with China’s emergence as a major nuclear actor, arguing that the New START bilateral structure left a structural gap by excluding Beijing at a time of unprecedented expansion in its nuclear arsenal. While projecting on China’s official defense white papers, he cautioned that Beijing could attain strategic parity in the next four to five years and may possess fissile material sufficient for more than 1,000 warheads by 2030, which was roughly 200 at the time the treaty was signed in 2010. Additionally, he highlighted concerns about Russian cooperation on China’s CFR-600 reactors, framing this collaboration as further complicating U.S. threat perceptions. Through these arguments, Washington justifies a shift from a bilateral arms control framework with Russia toward a multilateral platform that includes additional nuclear stakeholders, reflecting a recalibration of the U.S. arms control policy in the contemporary multipolar nuclear landscape.

The U.S. believes that New START’s expiration arrived at the fortuitous time, urging all states, not just the nuclear-weapon states, to strive for a better arms control framework. Under the new proposal, Washington aims to transition from a bilateral arms control agreement with Russia to a multilateral platform as a necessary next step in ongoing arms control discussions. Such a multilateral format can prevent an unmitigated nuclear arms race, restrain the build-up of nuclear arms, and address issues surrounding non-NPT states with nuclear weapons. In a multilateral format, the Trump administration says all options are on the table as it discusses the future of nuclear arms control in the current security environment. Washington wants to conduct negotiations on strategic stability and arms control on multiple avenues, including the P5 forum where NPT-recognized nuclear-weapon states already meet to discuss issues of strategic importance. The Trump administration maintains that all five nuclear-weapon states (P5) are under an obligation to negotiate nuclear disarmament in good faith under Article 6 of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), and that disarmament efforts are not limited to those states with the largest arsenals. Under this new proposal, the U.S. wants nuclear weapon states like Russia and China to participate in a multilateral process for effective debate on the elements of arms control arrangements.

In the evolving multipolar nuclear order, bringing together all five nuclear-weapon states to the NPT – Russia, China, France, the United Kingdom, and the U.S. admits that today’s strategic stability extends beyond Russia-U.S. dynamics. This forum could prove effective in preserving normative commitments under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. However, asymmetries in nuclear capabilities and divergent threat perceptions limit the viability of such a multilateral forum. The U.S. and Russia still possess 80 percent of the global nuclear arsenal, while Beijing would resist numerical limits without prior reductions by the U.S. and Russia. France may support such a multilateral dialogue with other P5 states, maintaining its independent nuclear deterrent. However, Paris would likely resist any binding multilateral commitments that could limit its small arsenal. The United Kingdom may support the U.S. initiative for expanding P5 engagement.

The imperative of arms control is encouraging, but given the evolving global nuclear order, where New START failed to achieve its objectives, it is difficult to see how the proposed multilateral, modernized approach might succeed soon. In this scenario, a multilateral forum like the P5 would remain a consultative platform rather than serve as a substitute for enforcing arms control agreements.

In conclusion, after New START’s expiration, the U.S. has moved from bilateral arms control with Russia to a broader multilateral strategy, encouraging all NPT nuclear-weapon states, through forums like the P5, to share responsibility for strategic stability. This favors a more flexible approach to multilateral engagements over the binding bilateral constraints of the past in a changing security environment.

Nawal Nawaz is a researcher at the Centre for International Strategic Studies (CISS) in Islamabad. She is pursuing her MPhil in Strategic Studies at the National Defence University in Islamabad, focusing on nuclear deterrence, arms control, and regional strategic stability.

From Bilateralism to Multilateralism: Washington’s Push for Strategic Stability Through the P5 was originally published on Global Security Review.