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		<title>Arms Control is No Panacea, But It Helps</title>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Stephen Cimbala]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 22 Jun 2026 12:16:30 +0000</pubDate>
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					<description><![CDATA[<p>Published: June 22, 2026  Some eighty years after the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the global community still struggles with the strategic, political, and ethical implications of nuclear arms races. The Cold War’s bipolar competition once defined the global nuclear dynamics, but today’s landscape is more complex, involving multiple nuclear-armed states, emerging technologies, and shifting [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/arms-control-is-no-panacea-but-it-helps/">Arms Control is No Panacea, But It Helps</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><i><span data-contrast="auto">Published:</span></i><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335559739&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}"> June 22, 2026</span><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335559739&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}"> </span></p>
<p><span data-contrast="auto">Some eighty years after the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the global community still struggles with the strategic, political, and ethical implications of nuclear arms races. The Cold War’s bipolar competition once defined the global nuclear dynamics, but today’s landscape is more complex, involving multiple nuclear-armed states, emerging technologies, and shifting geopolitical alliances.</span><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335559739&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}"> </span><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335559739&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}"> </span></p>
<p><b><span data-contrast="auto">From Bipolar to Multipolar Competition and Arms Racing</span></b><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335559739&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}"> </span><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335559739&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}"> </span></p>
<p><span data-contrast="auto">During the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union </span><a href="https://books.google.com/books/about/The_Evolution_of_Nuclear_Strategy.html?id=cq3WvwEACAAJ"><span data-contrast="none">engaged in</span></a><span data-contrast="auto"> a massive arms buildup driven by deterrence theory, ideological rivalry, and fears of vulnerability. The end of the Cold War lowered tensions and decreased the number of nuclear weapons, but it did not eliminate them completely. Instead, the </span><a href="https://www.sipri.org/yearbook/2024"><span data-contrast="none">global system has evolved</span></a><span data-contrast="auto"> into a multipolar environment with nine nuclear-armed states, each with distinct strategic cultures and security concerns. Although most states in the United Nations have endorsed the principle of nuclear disarmament, no current nuclear weapons state has embraced the concept or taken even small steps in that direction.</span><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335559739&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}"> </span><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335559739&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}"> </span></p>
<p><b><span data-contrast="auto">New Drivers of Competition</span></b><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335559739&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}"> </span><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335559739&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}"> </span></p>
<p><span data-contrast="auto">The current nuclear environment is shaped by a mix of technological advances, growing regional rivalries, diminishing arms control agreements, and renewed great-power competition. Unlike the organized bipolar order of the Cold War, today’s strategic landscape is becoming more multipolar, faster-paced, and less predictable based on emerging factors.</span><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335559739&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}"> </span></p>
<p><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335559739&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}"> </span><span data-contrast="auto">Technological innovation:</span><span data-contrast="auto"> Hypersonic weapons, cyber capabilities, artificial intelligence, and missile defense systems introduce </span><a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/26777846"><span data-contrast="none">new uncertainties</span></a><span data-contrast="auto"> about the survivability of nuclear arsenals. Another source of potential instability is the growing effectiveness of conventional weapons for long</span>‑<span data-contrast="auto">range precision strike, with destructive capabilities that might provoke a responsive nuclear first use or first strike. In addition, modern information and manufacturing systems, compared to earlier generations, shorten the timelines between concept and prototype, and between prototype and mass production.</span><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335559739&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}"> </span><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335559739&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}"> </span></p>
<p><span data-contrast="auto">Regional rivalries:</span><span data-contrast="auto"> Regional military competition </span><a href="https://books.google.com/books/about/Nuclear_Strategy_in_the_Modern_Era.html?id=1GmYDwAAQBAJ"><span data-contrast="none">between India and Pakistan</span></a><span data-contrast="auto">, North Korea and South Korea, China and India, and among China, North Korea, Japan, and the United States, threatens to escalate conventional war into nuclear first use, and even short of crossing the nuclear threshold, exacerbate regional and global nuclear tensions.</span><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335559739&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}"> </span><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335559739&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}"> </span></p>
<p><span data-contrast="auto">Erosion of arms control:</span><span data-contrast="auto"> The termination of nuclear arms control agreements, such as the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty and the New START Treaty, has created a situation of arms control anomie that invites competitive distrust among nuclear powers and increases uncertainty about their nuclear</span>‑<span data-contrast="auto">strategic thinking.</span><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335559739&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}"> </span><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335559739&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}"> </span></p>
<p><span data-contrast="auto">Great</span>‑<span data-contrast="auto">power competition:</span><span data-contrast="auto"> The almost </span><a href="https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/FP_20190930_china_nuclear_weapons_talmadge-2.pdf"><span data-contrast="none">inevitable arrival of China</span></a><span data-contrast="auto"> as a third nuclear superpower creates an additional axis of uncertainty compared to the two</span>‑<span data-contrast="auto">sided Cold War rivalry between the Soviet Union and the United States. China&#8217;s involvement in a tripartite format for exchanging strategic thinking on nuclear weapons and arms control is an important, albeit challenging, imperative for all three states and their military leaders.</span><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335559739&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}"> </span><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335559739&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}"> </span></p>
<p><b><span data-contrast="auto">Risks and Consequences of Renewed Arms Races</span></b><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335559739&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}"> </span><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335559739&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}"> </span></p>
<p><span data-contrast="auto">The modern nuclear landscape is increasingly defined not only by military competition but also by growing concerns over strategic stability, economic sustainability, and ethical responsibility.</span><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335559739&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}"> </span><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335559739&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}"> </span></p>
<p><span data-contrast="auto">Strategic Instability:</span><span data-contrast="auto"> As states pursue more sophisticated and diversified arsenals, the risk of miscalculation grows. Technologies that compress decision</span>‑<span data-contrast="auto">making time—such as hypersonic glide vehicles or AI</span>‑<span data-contrast="auto">enabled early</span>‑<span data-contrast="auto">warning systems—</span><a href="https://books.google.com/books/about/The_Second_Nuclear_Age.html?id=zkhRjTumZTkC"><span data-contrast="none">could increase the likelihood</span></a><span data-contrast="auto"> of accidental or preemptive nuclear use. AI</span>‑<span data-contrast="auto">enhanced technology for intelligence, warning, and estimation of others’ options and intentions will become standardized among great powers, raising the issue of shared guardrails in military applications of AI technology for crisis management.</span><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335559739&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}"> </span><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335559739&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}"> </span></p>
<p><span data-contrast="auto">Economic and Opportunity Costs:</span><span data-contrast="auto"> Nuclear modernization programs require enormous financial investments. For many states, the pursuit of nuclear capabilities reflects a tradeoff between perceived security benefits and long</span>‑<span data-contrast="auto">term societal needs. Even within the umbrella of defense needs per se, there are important tradeoffs among preferred weapons systems and supporting infrastructure. For example, in the case of the United States, the </span><a href="https://www.cbo.gov/system/files/2026-05/62379-golden-dome.pdf."><span data-contrast="none">costs</span></a><span data-contrast="auto"> of developing and deploying the proposed Golden Dome antimissile defense system may compete with the demands of military services for new generations of offensive strategic nuclear weapons.</span><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335559739&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}"> </span><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335559739&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}"> </span></p>
<p><span data-contrast="auto">Normative and Ethical Concerns:</span><span data-contrast="auto"> The continued reliance on nuclear weapons raises profound ethical questions. The humanitarian consequences of any nuclear exchange—intentional or accidental—</span><a href="https://www.icrc.org/en/document/nuclear-weapons-averting-global-catastrophe"><span data-contrast="none">would be catastrophic</span></a><span data-contrast="auto">. The potential erosion of norms against nuclear testing and against cavalier threats of nuclear first use threatens decades of progress toward the avoidance and management of nuclear crises.</span><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335559739&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}"> </span><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335559739&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}"> </span></p>
<p><b><span data-contrast="auto">Future Pathways: Escalation or Restraint?</span></b><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335559739&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}"> </span><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335559739&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}"> </span></p>
<p><span data-contrast="auto">As nuclear and non-nuclear systems become increasingly entangled, states, international institutions, and civil society organizations will play an important role in developing risk-reduction measures, strengthening strategic dialogue, and preserving norms to prevent nuclear escalation and maintain global stability.</span><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335559739&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}"> </span><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335559739&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}"> </span></p>
<p><span data-contrast="auto">Technological Governance:</span><span data-contrast="auto"> Technological “black swans” have the potential to upend previously understood mechanisms for reassuring nuclear-weapon states against fears of preemptive nuclear attack. As AI, </span><a href="https://books.google.com/books/about/Hacking_the_Bomb.html?id=hshQDwAAQBAJ"><span data-contrast="none">cyber operations</span></a><span data-contrast="auto">, and autonomous systems become intertwined with nuclear command and control, states may need new norms or agreements to prevent destabilizing uses. Establishing shared understandings of “red lines” in cyber</span>‑<span data-contrast="auto">nuclear interactions could be a starting point.</span><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335559739&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}"> </span><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335559739&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}"> </span></p>
<p><span data-contrast="auto">Regional Security Architectures:</span><span data-contrast="auto"> In regions with acute nuclear tensions, tailored diplomatic frameworks may help reduce risks. Confidence</span>‑<span data-contrast="auto">building measures in South Asia, renewed dialogue on the Korean Peninsula, and discussions on European security could all contribute to stability. The containment of growth in the numbers and lethality of non</span>‑<span data-contrast="auto">strategic or tactical nuclear weapons, in the context of preserving regional deterrence and security, is of immediate importance.</span><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335559739&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}"> </span><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335559739&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}"> </span></p>
<p><span data-contrast="auto">The Role of Civil Society and International Institutions:</span><span data-contrast="auto"> Nongovernmental organizations, academic institutions, and international bodies continue to play a vital role in shaping public discourse, conducting research, and advocating for risk-reduction measures. Their influence may be especially crucial as formal diplomatic channels encounter political obstacles. One challenge is the relative shortage of nuclear deterrence and arms control studies in research university departments nowadays, compared to the Cold War and immediate post-Cold War periods.</span><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335559739&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}"> </span><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335559739&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}"> </span></p>
<p><b><span data-contrast="auto">Conclusion</span></b><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335559739&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}"> </span><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335559739&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}"> </span></p>
<p><span data-contrast="auto">In the twenty-first century, nuclear arms racing is no longer defined by the relatively stable bipolar logic of the Cold War, but by a far more complex and uncertain multipolar environment shaped by emerging technologies, regional rivalries, weakened arms control structures, and renewed great-power competition. The combination of emerging technology and increasingly sophisticated strike systems has </span><a href="https://warontherocks.com/america-needs-a-dead-hand/"><span data-contrast="none">compressed decision-making timelines</span></a><span data-contrast="auto"> and introduced new risks of miscalculation, escalation, and strategic instability among nuclear-armed states. At the same time, the financial costs of nuclear arsenals and the potential catastrophic humanitarian consequences of any nuclear exchange continue to raise profound ethical and political questions about unchecked nuclear capacities.</span><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335559739&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}"> </span><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335559739&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}"> </span></p>
<p><span data-contrast="auto">Preventing future nuclear crises will require renewed commitments to arms control, technological governance, regional confidence-building measures, and sustained dialogue among both states and nonstate actors. In an era when formal diplomatic channels are increasingly strained, international institutions, academic communities, and civil society organizations may help preserve norms of restraint and advance practical risk-reduction measures. Ultimately, the challenge facing the international community is not only how to manage nuclear competition, but how to prevent technological change, geopolitical rivalry, and strategic mistrust from producing a new era of nuclear instability with potentially irreversible consequences.</span><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335559739&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}"> </span><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335559739&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}"> </span></p>
<p><i><span data-contrast="auto">Stephen J. Cimbala is Distinguished Professor of Political Science at Penn State Brandywine and the author of numerous works on nuclear deterrence, arms control, and military strategy. He is a senior fellow at NIDS and a recent contributor to the Routledge Handbook of Soviet and Russian Military Studies edited by Dr. Alexander Hill (Routledge: 2025). The views of the author are his own.</span></i><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335559739&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}"> </span></p>
<p><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/06/Arms-Control-is-No-Panacea-But-It-Helps.pdf"><img decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-32606" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/2026-Download-Button26.png" alt="" width="198" height="55" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/2026-Download-Button26.png 450w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/2026-Download-Button26-300x83.png 300w" sizes="(max-width: 198px) 100vw, 198px" /></a></p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/arms-control-is-no-panacea-but-it-helps/">Arms Control is No Panacea, But It Helps</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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		<title>Understanding the Third Nuclear Age: Why 2026 Matters</title>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Harsa Kakar]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 03 Mar 2026 13:16:09 +0000</pubDate>
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					<description><![CDATA[<p>Experts call the current state of the world the third nuclear age, embodied by various emerging technologies. It is characterized by expanding nuclear arsenals, diminishing arms control agreements, and technological developments that have made it increasingly difficult to distinguish between war and catastrophic disasters. These changes necessitate not only an examination of the weapons being [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/understanding-the-third-nuclear-age-why-2026-matters/">Understanding the Third Nuclear Age: Why 2026 Matters</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><a href="https://www.taylorfrancis.com/books/oa-mono/10.4324/9781003570707/global-third-nuclear-age-andrew-futter-paul-bracken-ludovica-castelli-cameron-hunter-olamide-samuel-francesca-silvestri-benjamin-zala">Experts</a> call the current state of the world the third nuclear age, embodied by various emerging technologies. It is characterized by expanding nuclear arsenals, diminishing arms control agreements, and technological developments that have made it increasingly difficult to distinguish between war and catastrophic disasters. These changes necessitate not only an examination of the weapons being developed, but also of the disintegrating global rules-based order they reveal. The <a href="https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/us-modernization-2024-update">modernization</a> of existing stockpiles and the <a href="https://www.sipri.org/media/press-release/2025/nuclear-risks-grow-new-arms-race-looms-new-sipri-yearbook-out-now">expansion</a> of nuclear weapons capabilities by emerging nations will require bold diplomatic steps, rather than aggressive actions, if the world is to move forward.</p>
<p><strong>What Is the Third Nuclear Age?</strong></p>
<p>The world can be divided into three eras of nuclear weapons history, each defined by distinct weapons dynamics and geopolitical relationships, and distinguished by major proliferation or treaty events of its time.</p>
<p>The first nuclear era was characterized by a bipolar rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War, from 1945 to the late 1980s. At its peak, the number of warheads held by both countries is <a href="https://ourworldindata.org/nuclear-weapons">estimated</a> to have reached around 60,000 in 1986. This era was marked by limited arms control agreements and significant arms racing.</p>
<p>The second nuclear era, spanning from 1991 to 2013, saw significant disarmament through bilateral U.S.–Russia treaties such as <a href="https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/start-i-glance">START I</a> and <a href="https://www.state.gov/new-start-treaty">New START</a>, which reduced global warhead numbers by a considerable amount. However, this period was also marked by nuclear proliferation efforts by regional actors, including the <a href="https://tdhj.org/blog/post/nuclear-southern-asia/">nuclearization</a> of South Asia, particularly India, followed by Pakistan, and then North Korea’s <a href="https://kls.law.columbia.edu/content/north-koreas-nuclear-program-history">decision</a> to pursue nuclear weapons.</p>
<p>Beginning in 2014, the third nuclear era emerged, typified by the current, chaotic, multipolar environment. Russia has unilaterally suspended participation in New START monitoring and verification, a treaty that expired on February 5<sup>th</sup>, 2026. Both the <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00963402.2024.2420550">United Kingdom</a> and <a href="https://thebulletin.org/premium/2025-07/french-nuclear-weapons-2025/">France</a> have commenced modernization and expansion of their nuclear forces. <a href="https://thebulletin.org/premium/2025-03/chinese-nuclear-weapons-2025/">China</a> is rapidly nearing an estimated 600 warheads, <a href="https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/arms-control-and-proliferation-profile-north-korea">North Korea</a> continues to test intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), and <a href="https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/nuclear-weapons-who-has-what-glance">Russia</a> has modernized its weapons systems and deployed short-range nuclear weapons in Belarus. <a href="https://www.cfr.org/articles/what-are-irans-nuclear-and-missile-capabilities">Iran</a> continues to signal that it is nearing the nuclear threshold, opacity persists regarding <a href="https://armscontrolcenter.org/countries/israel/">Israel</a>’s nuclear capabilities, and the <a href="https://www.stimson.org/2025/four-days-in-may-the-india-pakistan-crisis-of-2025/">May 2025 conflict</a> between India and Pakistan has created multiple additional flashpoints, all of which underscore the need for new international multilateral guardrails.</p>
<p><strong>Current Global Nuclear Trends</strong></p>
<p>The United States has <a href="https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2024-12/features/trump-united-states-and-new-nuclear-arms-race">initiated</a> a $1.7 trillion nuclear triad modernization plan, which includes submarines, bombers, and land-based missiles. Russia has been testing nuclear-powered cruise missiles such as <a href="https://www.iiss.org/online-analysis/missile-dialogue-initiative/2025/11/russias-burevestnik-and-poseidon-tests/#:~:text=Burevestnik%20flew,running%20for%20a%20sustained%20period.">Burevestnik</a>, while China is expanding its nuclear weapons capability at a rapid pace amid rising tensions over Taiwan.</p>
<p>In addition, strategic non-nuclear weapons, including hypersonic systems, AI-driven command structures, and missile defense, are contributing to an escalatory environment in which the nuclear ladder has become increasingly slippery to climb and equally difficult to descend. The <a href="https://thebulletin.org/doomsday-clock/">Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists</a> has set its “Doomsday Clock” at 89 seconds to midnight, the closest it has ever been since 1947, reflecting its assessment that the erosion of arms control, the expansion of nuclear capabilities, and the persistence of conflict have significantly increased the risk of nuclear catastrophe.</p>
<p><strong>Escalating Global Nuclear Challenges</strong></p>
<p>The U.S.-Russia arms control negotiations have ceased over Ukraine, and President Putin has <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/11/19/world/europe/putin-russia-nuclear-weapons-missiles.html">reduced</a> stated nuclear use thresholds. At the same time, U.S. military <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/1/29/how-does-us-military-build-up-off-iran-compare-to-the-june-2025-strikes">strikes</a> against Iran have alarmed some observers who argue that such actions undermine norms governing sovereignty. NATO countries are increasingly <a href="https://www.nato.int/en/what-we-do/deterrence-and-defence/natos-nuclear-deterrence-policy-and-forces">exploring</a> their own European deterrence capabilities.</p>
<p>A defining feature of the third nuclear age is the growing complexity of the strategic environment and the inability to manage global risks through simple bilateral frameworks.</p>
<p>Technological advancements that accelerate escalation risks include <a href="https://armscontrolcenter.org/fact-sheet-hypersonic-weapons/">hypersonic weapons</a> that challenge missile defense systems, <a href="https://gjia.georgetown.edu/2024/07/12/war-artificial-intelligence-and-the-future-of-conflict/">artificial intelligence</a> that may misinterpret launch indicators, and <a href="https://digitalfrontlines.io/2023/05/25/the-evolution-of-cyber-operations-in-armed-conflict/">cyber operations</a> that could inadvertently contribute to nuclear escalation—echoing historical false-alarm incidents in <a href="https://armscontrolcenter.org/the-soviet-false-alarm-incident-and-able-archer-83/">1983</a>. Meanwhile, China’s evolving relationship with Russia further complicates U.S. efforts to deter aggression across both Europe and the Asia-Pacific.</p>
<p><strong>The Way Forward</strong></p>
<p>With New START having expired, significant future limits on the number of nuclear weapons possessed by major powers appear unlikely, accelerating competition and instability. By the mid-2030s, the convergence of nuclear and advanced conventional capabilities may become normalized as tools of coercion rather than deterrence, while additional states may seek nuclear weapons should nonproliferation barriers erode. The <a href="https://thebulletin.org/doomsday-clock/2026-statement/">Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists</a> has identified the emergence of the “third nuclear age” as the top global risk in 2026.</p>
<p>Accordingly, new mechanisms for arms control and nuclear disarmament consistent with commitments made by major nuclear-weapon states under the <a href="http://disarmament.unoda.org/en/our-work/weapons-mass-destruction/nuclear-weapons/treaty-non-proliferation-nuclear-weapons">NPT framework</a> are urgently required. These include enhanced verification technologies, AI-assisted monitoring, restraints on the development of destabilizing new weapons, and sustained strategic-stability dialogue aimed at separating and disentangling nuclear and conventional escalation pathways. Additional measures to promote norms of responsible nuclear behavior are also necessary, although <a href="https://banmonitor.org/tpnw-status">opposition</a> from the five permanent members of the UN Security Council remains a significant barrier to progress. Ensuring the global security of radioactive materials must remain a priority.</p>
<p>The third nuclear age has placed humanity in unprecedented danger. Existing disarmament mechanisms have proven ineffective as new rivalries emerge, and technological changes accelerate. History demonstrates that diplomacy can work: New START reduced nuclear arsenals to their lowest levels since the early years of the first nuclear era. Today’s leaders must again prioritize cooperation and restraint, or risk allowing miscalculation to turn expanding arsenals into catastrophe. The alternative is too terrible to ignore.</p>
<p><em>Ms. Harsa Kakar is an Assistant Research Fellow at the Balochistan Think Tank Network (BTTN), Quetta. Views expressed in this article are the author&#8217;s own. </em></p>
<p><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/Understanding-the-Third-Nuclear-Age-Why-2026-Matters.pdf"><img decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-32091" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/2026-Download-Button.png" alt="" width="202" height="56" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/2026-Download-Button.png 450w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/2026-Download-Button-300x83.png 300w" sizes="(max-width: 202px) 100vw, 202px" /></a></p>
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<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/understanding-the-third-nuclear-age-why-2026-matters/">Understanding the Third Nuclear Age: Why 2026 Matters</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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		<title>ICBM EAR Report for 22 Feb 2025</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/icbm-ear-report-for-22-feb-2025/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Peter Huessy]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 26 Feb 2025 13:23:04 +0000</pubDate>
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					<description><![CDATA[<p>This report, prepared by Peter Huessy for the week of February 22, 2025, covers various aspects of nuclear deterrence, defense budget developments, and geopolitical threats. Key topics include the Biden administration&#8217;s approach to nuclear escalation, Senator McConnell&#8217;s retirement and his views on restoring deterrence, and Russian official Medvedev&#8217;s nuclear threats. The House and Senate have [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/icbm-ear-report-for-22-feb-2025/">ICBM EAR Report for 22 Feb 2025</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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<p>This report, prepared by Peter Huessy for the week of February 22, 2025, covers various aspects of nuclear deterrence, defense budget developments, and geopolitical threats.</p>
<div class="QnABodyStyle__markdownText___b9_I4">
<p>Key topics include the Biden administration&#8217;s approach to nuclear escalation, Senator McConnell&#8217;s retirement and his views on restoring deterrence, and Russian official Medvedev&#8217;s nuclear threats.</p>
</div>
<div class="QnABodyStyle__markdownText___b9_I4">The House and Senate have added $100-150 billion over ten years to defense, focusing on expanding the Navy, strengthening the defense industrial base, and modernizing strategic nuclear forces.</div>
<p>​<br />
SecDef Hegseth seeks an additional $50 billion for top priorities, excluding nuclear deterrence from budget cuts.</p>
<p>The report highlights the importance of concurrent modernization work at the three ICBM bases, which could save billions.</p>
<div class="QnABodyStyle__markdownText___b9_I4">
<p>It also discusses the U.S. Air Force missileers&#8217; critical role in nuclear deterrence, the ethical and psychological aspects of their job, and the challenges of retaining diverse personnel.</p>
</div>
<div class="QnABodyStyle__markdownText___b9_I4">The Christian Science Monitor provides an in-depth look at the missileers&#8217; responsibilities and the evolving nuclear landscape.</div>
<div class="QnABodyStyle__markdownText___b9_I4">
<p>Regarding North Korea, USAF General Jason Armagost emphasized that the U.S. can respond overwhelmingly to a North Korean ICBM attack, underscoring the strength of the U.S. nuclear deterrence system.</p>
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<p>The report also touches on the potential for arms control negotiations with Russia and China, with President Trump expressing a desire for &#8220;denuclearization.&#8221;</p>
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<div class="QnABodyStyle__markdownText___b9_I4">
<p>However, the feasibility of such agreements remains uncertain, given the geopolitical complexities and the need for the U.S. to maintain a competitive edge in military capabilities.</p>
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<p><strong>MUST READ: </strong> The most awe-inspiring piece of the report is about  &#8220;RESPONSIBILITY&#8221; from the Christian Science Monitor, dated February 14, 2025, which provides an in-depth look at the lives and duties of U.S. Air Force missileers stationed at F.E. Warren Air Force Base.</p>
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<p><img fetchpriority="high" decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-30165" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/02/ICBM-Launch-Panel.png" alt="" width="341" height="228" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/02/ICBM-Launch-Panel.png 470w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/02/ICBM-Launch-Panel-300x200.png 300w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/02/ICBM-Launch-Panel-360x240.png 360w" sizes="(max-width: 341px) 100vw, 341px" /></p>
<ul>
<li class="QnABodyStyle__markdownText___b9_I4">It highlights their critical role in nuclear deterrence, the gravity of their mission, and the personal and ethical complexities they face.</li>
<li class="QnABodyStyle__markdownText___b9_I4">The article follows missileers during their 24-hour shifts, emphasizing their readiness and strict operational protocols.</li>
<li class="QnABodyStyle__markdownText___b9_I4">It also explores the mental burden and moral dilemmas they encounter, particularly in the context of faith.</li>
<li class="QnABodyStyle__markdownText___b9_I4">The piece touches on the historical context of missileers, their continued relevance, and the growing nuclear threats from Russia, China, and Iran.</li>
<li class="QnABodyStyle__markdownText___b9_I4">Additionally, it discusses the challenges of attracting and retaining personnel, especially women and minorities, within this demanding career field.</li>
<li class="QnABodyStyle__markdownText___b9_I4">The article underscores the human element of nuclear deterrence, the operational challenges of aging systems, and the evolving nuclear landscape.</li>
</ul>
<p>Overall, the report underscores the need for robust defense investments, the challenges of modernizing nuclear forces, and the geopolitical threats posed by adversaries like Russia, China, and North Korea.</p>
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<div><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/02/ICBM-EAR-of-Week-of-2-17^^.Prepared-by-Peter-Huessy.pdf"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-29877" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/ICBM-EAR-REPORT.png" alt="" width="346" height="96" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/ICBM-EAR-REPORT.png 450w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/ICBM-EAR-REPORT-300x83.png 300w" sizes="(max-width: 346px) 100vw, 346px" /></a></div>
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<p>​</p>
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<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/icbm-ear-report-for-22-feb-2025/">ICBM EAR Report for 22 Feb 2025</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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