Under the 1967 United Nations Outer Space Treaty, states recognize that the exploration and use of outer space should be carried out for peaceful purposes, for the benefit and in the interests of all countries, and as the province of all mankind. Yet decades of reluctance to establish an enforceable framework for responsible behavior in space have left the domain governed by outdated rules and significant legal ambiguity. While diplomats continue to negotiate, military space programs continue to advance, widening the gap between treaty principles and operational reality. The result is a dangerous strategic environment in which technological capabilities are advancing far more rapidly than the international legal framework designed to regulate them.

Russia and China have proposed a treaty that would prohibit the testing of weapons in space. The United States has rejected the proposal, citing vague language and the absence of credible verification and enforcement mechanisms. Those concerns are legitimate, but they also expose an unfortunate situation. The United States has been testing anti-satellite capabilities since the 1980s and continues to develop them. Russia and China, have likewise expanded their own anti-satellite programs while simultaneously advocating for the peaceful use of outer space. This contradiction illustrates one of the defining challenges of modern space diplomacy. The nations capable of establishing a space weapons program are also the ones preventing a meaningful international agreement to restrain one. Every major space power argues that its own activities are defensive while portraying those of its competitors as destabilizing, making genuine progress increasingly difficult.

Even if governments genuinely sought a comprehensive agreement, practical obstacles remain. Many technologies with military applications in space also serve legitimate commercial purposes, making it difficult to distinguish between civilian and military systems. Systems capable of disrupting satellite communications, for example, often rely on the same underlying technologies used in commercial telecommunications. Rendezvous and proximity operations can be used to inspect or repair satellites, but the same capabilities could also be employed to interfere with or disable another nation’s spacecraft. Without an internationally accepted definition of what constitutes a space weapon, any treaty regulating weapons in space will struggle to establish meaningful legal obligations. This dual-use nature of space technology complicates verification efforts and makes traditional arms control models far more difficult to apply than they were during the Cold War.

A nuclear weapon detonation in orbital space presents consequences unlike those of conventional military actions because of its indiscriminate, long-lasting, and unpredictable nature. A large detonation could disable or destroy many satellites in a single event while enhancing radiation belts for years or even decades. The resulting debris and radiation could make certain orbital regions unusable, limiting access not only for military satellites but also for civilian and commercial spacecraft. Since modern societies depend on satellites for communications, navigation, weather forecasting, financial transactions, emergency response, precision agriculture,

and countless other essential services,  the effect is far beyond military operations, affecting virtually every nation and every individual. In early 2022, Russia launched a satellite into an unusual orbit, prompting analysts to speculate that the activity was connected to its reported nuclear anti-satellite weapons program. The 1967 Outer Space Treaty, prohibits placing nuclear weapons in orbit or otherwise stationing them in outer space. However, the treaty was written during the early years of the Space Age, and it is a growing vulnerability made more dangerous by the inability of the international community to modernize the rules governing space before a crisis forces the issue. This is just one example of the limits of the treaty.

International space law was largely written in 1967, when only two countries operated satellites and outer space was viewed primarily as a scientific frontier. It was never designed for today’s environment, where governments, commercial companies, and private organizations operate thousands of satellites that underpin the global economy. The legal framework has failed to keep pace with these technological and geopolitical realities, leaving the international community increasingly reliant on norms and voluntary commitments that lack meaningful enforcement.

A comprehensive treaty prohibiting all space weapons is unlikely soon. That does not mean meaningful progress is impossible. Countries could formalize a ban on destructive anti-satellite missile testing, building upon voluntary commitments that several nations have already adopted. Transforming those political pledges into binding international obligations would represent a realistic first step. Likewise, civilian satellite systems could receive legal protections like those afforded under international humanitarian law to hospitals, electrical grids, and other civilian infrastructure during armed conflict. States could also expand voluntary exchanges of space situational awareness data, improving transparency regarding objects in orbit while creating the trust and technical foundation necessary for future arms control negotiations. Incremental agreements may lack the ambition of a comprehensive treaty, but history demonstrates that confidence-building measures often lay the groundwork for broader and more durable arms control frameworks.

The United Nations Open-ended Working Group on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space held the third session in July 2026. The meeting made progress by deepening negotiations and narrowing discussion around threats, legal frameworks, and potential future rules for military activities in space, but it did not conclude with a binding agreement. If negotiations continue to stall, however, the costs of inaction will not be borne solely by the governments responsible for the impasse. They will be borne by every society that depends on space-based infrastructure, which means virtually the entire world.

Outer space is a shared domain that, in principle, belongs to all humanity. Allowing it to become a militarized arena governed by outdated laws and diplomatic paralysis is not inevitable. It is a policy choice. By failing to act, the international community is making that choice by default.

The author is Research Officer at Balochistan Think Tank Network at BUITEMS Quetta. He can be reached at muneebnasar@yahoo.com. The views of the author are his own.

Space: The Ungoverned Orbit was originally published on Global Security Review.

Throughout military history, few deception operations have rivaled the strategic brilliance of Operation Fortitude. Conducted before the Allied invasion of Normandy in June 1944, Fortitude did not seek to conceal Allied military power. Instead, it sought to shape German perceptions of that power. Through carefully synchronized deception, including false radio traffic, inflatable armored formations, double agents, manipulated logistics, and controlled information, the Allies persuaded Adolf Hitler that the principal invasion would occur at the Pas-de-Calais rather than Normandy. German forces remained fixed in the wrong location long after Allied forces had established the beachhead, creating operational opportunities that contributed materially to the success of Operation Overlord. 

The enduring lesson of Fortitude is not merely that deception works. Rather, it demonstrates that victory often belongs to the force that best influences the enemy’s decision-making process. This principle has profound implications for the emerging space domain. 

As strategic competition has extended beyond Earth’s atmosphere, the U.S. Space Force (USSF) and U.S. Space Command (USSPACECOM) should understand that the credible deterrence requires more than resilient satellite constellations, defensive architectures, and even offensive counterspace capabilities. It requires a deliberate and integrated doctrine of strategic deception designed to shape an adversary’s perceptions of U.S. space-force posture before current low-threshold attacks and other adversary operations in orbit and beyond lead to larger conflict, while continuing throughout all phases of military space warfighting operations. 

A modern “Space Fortitude” would not attempt to make American space capabilities invisible or seem invincible. Instead, it would seek to make America’s adversaries confidently wrong…wrong about everything to the point that fear and uncertainty would prevent attack escalation in space from happening within U.S. critical space infrastructure. 

Strategic Culture Matters 

Any discussion of deception in future space conflict must begin with an appreciation of strategic culture. Chinese military thought has long viewed deception as an essential component of warfare rather than a supporting activity. From the teachings attributed to Sun Tzu to contemporary doctrine emphasizing information dominance, systems confrontation, and cognitive competition, the objective is often to influence an opponent’s decision-making before physical combat determines the outcome. 

For this reason, U.S. space deterrence and related force posturing cannot simply mirror Cold War approaches developed against the Soviet Union. Effective deterrence must be informed by how Chinese leaders perceive escalation, operational surprise, military initiative, and acceptable risk. 

Understanding an adversary’s strategic culture enables planners to design operations that exploit predictable cognitive biases. Deception is effective only when it persuades an opponent to reach the wrong conclusion independently. A deception campaign that ignores how Chinese commanders and Communist Part leaders process information is unlikely to succeed regardless of its technical sophistication. 

Consequently, a Space Fortitude should begin with intelligence. Intelligence should net be merely concerning satellites and launch facilities, but intelligence should focus on Chinese military education, command relationships, doctrinal preferences, decision timelines, leadership fears, and cultural assumptions concerning initiative and operational momentum. 

The objective behind having a Space Fortitude as part of strategic and operational planning for U.S. space forces is to achieve cognitive superiority ahead of space superiority. Before an adversary can be defeated in orbit, it must first be forced to question what it believes it knows about U.S. intentions, capabilities, vulnerabilities, and operational priorities. In this sense, deception becomes more than a supporting function; it becomes a central instrument for shaping the battlespace before physical conflict begins. 

Space Maneuver Warfare Requires Cognitive Maneuver Superiority 

American discussions of space operations have traditionally emphasized orbital mechanics, resilience, satellite proliferation, and launch capacity. These remain important capabilities. However, space maneuver warfare has never been solely about physical movement. Its true objective is to create uncertainty within the enemy command structure while preserving freedom of action for friendly forces. Applied to space operations, maneuver warfare becomes as psychological as technical. 

Instead of concentrating exclusively on maneuvering satellites, American forces should seek to maneuver the enemy’s decision cycle. Just as Fortitude caused Germany to defend the wrong coastline, Space Fortitude should encourage an opponent to defend, or attack, the wrong space-based architecture. If successful, an adversary creates operational and possibly strategic advantages for us and our allies. Commanders should then be prepared to get answers to this set of questions that facilitate the advantage: 

• Which constellations does China believe are operationally decisive? 

• Which orbital and cis-lunar activities appear routine but support combat operations? 

• Which launches communicate genuine military intent? 

• Which signatures encourage an adversary to misallocate scarce anti-satellite weapons? 

Damage Limitation with Deception 

One of the other important side objectives of deterrence is assuring damage limitation in case of deterrence failure. Traditional discussions often portray damage limitation in terms of missile defense, active defenses, hardened infrastructure, or rapid reconstitution. These capabilities remain indispensable. Yet deception offers another form of damage limitation that deserves equal consideration. 

If, for example, an adversary expends finite direct-ascent anti-satellite missiles against decoys, attacks redundant networks mistaken for primary command systems, jams communications supporting nonessential functions, or conducts cyber operations against fabricated targets, those resources cannot simultaneously threaten truly critical capabilities, especially those directly linked to societal and economic foundations of the homeland. Every weapon wasted against a false objective is one less weapon available against operationally decisive systems. The purpose is not simply survival. It is preserving combat power by shaping enemy targeting decisions before the first engagement begins. Damage limitation therefore becomes both technical and cognitive. 

Possible Components of a Space Fortitude Deception Campaign 

Like its World War II predecessor, a successful Space Fortitude would integrate multiple instruments of national power into a coherent deception campaign rather than relying upon isolated tactical actions terrestrially or in space. Such a campaign would need to begin before crisis conditions emerge and continue through all phases of military space-warfighting operations, ensuring that diplomatic signals, public messaging, orbital activity, cyber effects, and electromagnetic signatures reinforce the same misleading narrative. The objective would be to create a persistent and believable pattern of activity that causes an adversary to misread U.S. priorities, misallocate resources, and hesitate before escalating conflict in or through the space domain. 

Orbital Deception 

Future spacecraft should include purpose-built decoy satellites capable of mimicking operational signatures associated with high-value national security assets. Routine orbital maneuver patterns may intentionally suggest false mission priorities, while distributed architectures obscure which nodes perform essential command-and-control functions. These can also be changed over time to create confusion about which modes of operation are indeed the primary or essential operational activities. 

Electromagnetic Deception 

Electronic emissions remain among the richest sources of intelligence available to sophisticated adversaries. Carefully managed communications, intermittent transmission schedules, and intentionally misleading electromagnetic signatures could complicate enemy targeting while reinforcing broader deception objectives. 

Cyber Deception 

Modern conflict extends into digital infrastructure supporting space operations. Carefully designed network architectures incorporating deception environments, false command pathways, and monitored decoy systems can consume adversary resources, expose hostile techniques, and reinforce misleading operational assessments. Artificial intelligence could provide a key tool for future implementation. 

Information Deception 

Public messaging also influences adversary perceptions. This is one area usually ignored or forgotten by military planners and policymakers. Launch announcements, demonstrations, international partnerships, commercial activities, and carefully selected public disclosures collectively contribute to the strategic narrative observed by foreign intelligence services. Information operations should therefore be synchronized with military objectives rather than treated as separate communication efforts. 

Integrated Planning 

No deception campaign succeeds through military action alone. Future Space Fortitude planning should integrate the efforts of the USSF, USSPACECOM, the Intelligence Community, commercial satellite operators, cyber organizations, and diplomatic channels into a unified strategic design. Only synchronized actions create believable deception. This will take considerable interagency coordination as well as sound policy directives that delegate authorities accordingly to commanders and other leadership to ensure that it succeeds. 

Deterrence/Uncertainty Teaming  

Deterrence is often described as convincing an adversary that aggression will fail. Equally important is convincing him that he cannot confidently predict how America will respond or act pre-emptively, thereby confusing their decision on what capabilities must be neutralized first. This uncertainty imposes caution. 

If Chinese military planners and their CCP political leadership cannot confidently distinguish decisive systems from expendable systems, operational networks from decoys, or genuine preparations from carefully crafted deception, they face greater risk in initiating or escalating conflict. Their planning becomes more complex, their resource allocation less efficient, and their confidence diminished. Such uncertainty strengthens deterrence before hostilities begin. 

Conclusion: Winning the Battle Before the First Shot 

Operation Fortitude succeeded because it manipulated German decisions rather than merely disguising Allied forces. The future contest for space superiority will likewise depend not only upon technology but upon cognition. The nation that best shapes its adversary’s understanding of reality gains advantages that cannot be measured solely by satellite inventories or launch rates. 

A doctrine of deception in space would complement, not replace, credible offensive counterspace capabilities, resilient architectures, rapid reconstitution, missile defenses, and allied integration. By combining these material capabilities with a deliberate cognitive campaign to influence adversary perceptions, the U.S. could complicate enemy planning, preserve space combat power, and enhance damage limitation while reinforcing deterrence. 

Ultimately, the highest achievement of military deception is not simply preventing an adversary from seeing the truth. It is persuading him to act decisively on a false understanding of reality. In an era of strategic competition extending into cislunar space and beyond, that may become one of the most decisive forms of space power projection available to the United States and the free world. 

Christopher Stone previously served as Special Assistant to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space Policy (2018–2019). His insights and opinions reflect independent analysis of space deterrence challenges and do not reflect the opinions of the Department of War or United States Government. The views of the author are his own. 

Space Fortitude: Applying the Lessons of Operation Fortitude to Space Deterrence and Warfighting was originally published on Global Security Review.

In South Asia, India’s expanding space program—featuring anti-satellite weapons (ASAT) to spy and surveillance satellites—is not motivated by technological ambitions but is instead a function of its deep strategic culture. Indian scholar Rajesh Basrur’s concept of deep Indian strategic culture is an apt lens to study India’s space politics. India’s space odyssey reflects its quest for autonomy and prestige, the two essential components of its deep strategic culture.

Basrur identifies two levels of strategic culture: ‘mutable strategic culture’ that can shift over time and ‘deep strategic culture’ that is a set of core strategic preferences derived from historical experiences. According to Basrur’s statement in his book chapter on Indian Strategic Culture, defining a deep strategic culture is “tricky, perhaps tautological since it is a recognition that is post facto (a long-term attribute is deep until it is not!).”  Still, he defines deep strategic culture as “patterns that are sustained unchanged over a long period of time (in the present context, since independence), irrespective of changing circumstance.” He further underscores the two most enduring pillars of Indian strategic culture as a persistent preference for strategic autonomy and a long-standing quest for status on the global stage.

India’s space politics is thus a reflection of its deep-rooted desire to achieve strategic autonomy. India has heavily invested in dual-use technologies, such as navigation satellites (NavlC) and communication satellites (GSAT). India leverages these dual-use technologies as a strategic enabler that allows real-time monitoring and surveillance of the South Asian region and beyond. Moreover, the indigenous development of launch vehicles like the PSLV (Polar Satellite Launch Vehicle) and GSLV (Geosynchronous Satellite Launch Vehicle) is adaptable for military purposes.

The Mission Shakti ASAT Test is evidence of using an indigenous launch vehicle for the delivery of kinetic anti-satellite weapons. It underscores the operational autonomy in space without reliance on external partners or even against them. The pattern of international space cooperation of India is also driven by its deep strategic culture. India engages with both the US and Russia as per its strategic needs. This multi-alignment strategy aims to get access to modern technology, expertise, and partnerships without committing to any one side.

Another deeply interwoven element of Indian strategic culture in its space politics is the pursuit of status. India leverages space as a key domain to achieve recognition as a technologically advanced and influential major power. India demonstrates its status through high-profile space missions, such as Chandrayaan, Mangalyaan, and the upcoming Gaganyaan mission. These missions garner international attention and enhance India’s prestige, signaling to the international community that the country has ambitious space aims.

Furthermore, to enhance prestige and status, India participates in international space forums of exploration and governance like the Artemis Accords, the TRUST initiative, and the Initiative on Critical and Emerging Technologies (iCET). India harnesses these platforms to advance its national interests by gaining greater visibility, access to dual-use technologies, and opportunities for space exploration. India also leverages these forums for high-accuracy real-time data that allows it to do regional surveillance and monitoring.

Indian space politics is not only about capability but also about demonstrating it in ways that enhance its international standing. All this is not occurring in isolation but in a region with a fragile balance of power maintained by nuclear deterrence. This translation of Indian strategic culture into astropolitics has regional and global implications. At the regional level, India’s increasingly offensive space uses, such as surveillance, missile guidance, and precision strikes, are creating a security dilemma for its neighbors. This disrupts the regional balance of power and will motivate Pakistan to enter an arms race or to equip itself with non-military means to compete with India.

At the international level, India is actively involved in cooperation with both the U.S. and Russia; however, India’s multi-alignment strategy is not working as per its expectations. There are structural constraints at the heart of the implementation of Indian astropolitics. India is dependent upon the U.S. for advanced space technologies, intelligence, and commercial space opportunities. It erodes the very basic tenet of Indian astropolitics, strategic autonomy. Moreover, India and Russia have a joint historical space and defense ecosystem, which has become politically sensitive amidst international sanctions on Russia. The dual-track or multi-alignment strategy of India increases strategic ambiguity.

In a nutshell, strategic autonomy sounds sophisticated, but it is practically unlikely since alliances and power blocs are the pivot of international relations. The contemporary strategic rift between the United States and India is evidence of the backfiring of multi-alignment as the U.S. criticizes India on its strategy and close ties with Russia. If this strategic split expands, it reduces India’s technological options, putting serious constraints on its space program that is dependent upon both the U.S. and Russia. India’s strategic ambiguity exposes it to structural pressures and regional security dilemmas by reinforcing perceptions of India as a destabilizing actor in an already fragile strategic environment.

Areesha Manzoor is a Research Assistant at the Centre for International Strategic Studies, Islamabad, researching space politics. Her authorship includes articles and research papers on space politics. The views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

India’s Deep Strategic Culture Beyond the Skies was originally published on Global Security Review.

First, SDI was not an actual defense initiative as much as it was a response to the Soviet Union’s rapidly growing strategic nuclear offensive forces and their own anti-satellite space forces. As William Van Cleave wrote in his 1986 report,

The Soviet Union has long been developing a multifaceted ballistic missile defense and, in fact, has already begun deploying such a defense. The Soviets have also began exploiting space for military purposes nearly two decades ago. They have already deployed anti-satellite (ASAT) space weapons. The overriding threat to American security today—that is, a rapid growth in offensive nuclear and conventional weapons systems—has come about precisely because the Soviet Union has been racing to build a weapons system, while the United States has not.

The same can be said of China today and is true of Golden Dome.

While there are plenty of Chinese, Russian, and Western arms control advocates criticizing Golden Dome as weaponization of space and an imbalance of forces, they all fail to note that Golden Dome is a response to the current imbalance of nuclear and space forces that advantages China and Russia. The utility of nuclear weapons, coupled with the advancement of hypersonic and space-to-ground attack options in the hands of the nation’s enemies grew in recent years.

The Chinese are in the midst of a breakout in the size and capability of their nuclear forces. Both China and Russia are engaging in a similar effort with their space attack forces. Both deployed ASAT and other space weapons systems that not only threaten American critical space infrastructure, but the homeland itself. As such, Golden Dome is a response to the already de-stabilizing activities of the Chinese and Russians. They, not the United States, are actively building weapons systems, especially in space.

Second, the narrative that SDI was a weapons development program is false. President Reagan’s speech directing SDI called it a research or “study” program. The 1985 Report to Congress on the Strategic Defense Initiative said that “it should be stressed that SDI is a research program that seeks to provide the technical knowledge required to support a decision on whether to develop and later deploy advanced defensive systems. It is not a program to deploy those weapons.”

President Trump understands this by his comments that while Reagan pursued SDI, “[he] didn’t have the technology.” However, Golden Dome is, in fact, a weapons deployment program. As his directive in the executive order states, “The United States will provide for the common defense of its citizens and the nation by deploying and maintaining a next-generation missile defense shield…[including] the development and deployment of proliferated space-based interceptors capable of boost-phase intercept,” among other sensors, trackers, and other weapons capable of defeating various threats from hypersonic, ballistic, and cruise missiles. While SDI was a study for a future decision to deploy space-based missile defenses, Golden Dome is the decision to deploy before Trump leaves office.

Finally, another false narrative in the anti–Golden Dome commentaries is that the system will be full of “untested technology.” This is not the case. If anyone looks at the systems listed in the executive order from January 2025, one will see that several of the sensors and layers are already in the current programs of record, many of which have already started deployment in orbit.

While some of the systems, such as the space-based interceptor, are not deployed yet, the technology for intercepting such missiles is in various forms of testing and/or use—for decades. Just because SDI had grand visions of lasers bouncing off mirrors or large chemical lasers in space, does not mean that Golden Dome’s space-based interceptors must be based on those concepts. Current anti-ballistic missile tech gained considerable ground over the past four decades and is ready for deployment sooner than later.

Vulnerability is not an option. Protecting Americans and the homeland from space and missile attack is a strategic imperative that must not fail. Congress must ignore the false narratives of the late 20th century. The threat is real, the technology is real. It is time to field Golden Dome for America.

Christopher Stone is Senior Fellow for Space Deterrence at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies in Washington, DC. He is the former Special Assistant to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space Policy. The views and positions are those of the author and do not reflect the positions and opinions of the Department of Defense or the author’s employer.

A Second Look at the Critiques and Narratives Against Golden Dome for America was originally published on Global Security Review.

5GW includes information dominance and manipulation, social engineering, economic coercion, cyber sabotage, and hybrid influence operations. It thrives on ambiguity, exploiting vulnerabilities without traditional combat. In 5GW, the lines between war and peace are blurred. No declarations, no clear enemies, just a relentless assault on stability. The goal is not to conquer land or destroy armies, but to cripple a nation’s spirit, economy, and infrastructure from within.

One of the most potent asymmetric tools of 5GW is economic manipulation. Palau, a serene archipelago of over 500 islands, were untouched by war until 2017. Palau dared to reject Beijing’s “One China Policy.” This move sent shockwaves through its fragile economy in the form of economic strangulation. In a masterstroke of economic coercion, China’s state-backed tour operators erased Palau from the Web.

Travel agencies stopped selling trips. Online searches yielded no results. Palau’s tourism industry, which accounted for 45 percent of gross domestic product (GDP), collapsed. Hotels emptied, airlines shut down, and the once-thriving economy suffocated.

This was not an anomaly, but a pattern. In 2016, South Korea agreed to facilitate the American THAAD missile defense system. China retaliated not with weapons but with economic muscle. Mysterious “fire and safety” violations suddenly appeared in South Korean businesses across China. A nine-month ban on Chinese tourism cost Seoul $6.5 billion. Retail giants like Lotte crumbled, thousands lost jobs, and yet, no war was declared.

The more interconnected the world economy becomes, the more vulnerable nations are to economic blackmail. Even Venezuela, despite its fiery anti-American rhetoric, was bound to the US economy. In 2018, despite Washington branding Nicolás Maduro a dictator and Caracas calling the US a “white supremacist regime,” the two nations still had $24 billion in trade, a quarter of Venezuela’s GDP.

Yet, when Washington imposed sweeping financial sanctions, Venezuela’s economy shrunk by 35 percent in a single year. After all, the United States does not just impose sanctions; it controls the very financial system that runs the world. The US dollar is the bloodline of global trade, and those who defy it find themselves cut off from international markets, unable to access capital or even conduct basic transactions. However, economic warfare breeds resistance.

Russia and China saw the writing on the wall. Between 2017 and 2020, Moscow slashed its holdings of US Treasury securities from $105 billion to just $3.8 billion and shifted towards China’s Cross-Border Interbank Payment System (CIPS), sidestepping American financial hegemony.

The true commanding heights of global dominance lie at the intersection of technology, finance, and unchecked ambition. China is not just selling 5G networks, it is embedding itself into the nervous system of global communication. On the other hand, the US does not just dominate finance, it controls the SWIFT banking system, ensuring economic warfare is just a sanction away. Similarly, corporations do not just innovate, they monopolize, influence, and quietly dictate policy behind closed doors.

“Surge forward, killing as you go, to blaze us a trail of blood.” A battle cry? Indeed. Not from a general on the battlefield, but from Ren Zhengfei, the founder of Huawei, a company waging a war not just against competitors but against entire nations. Britain’s telecom networks are suspected to have Chinese backdoors.

Information is now what oil was in the 1970s, a critical commodity to be controlled. Today, data is the new crude, and the battle to monopolize its flow has already begun. Quantum computing, AI, and machine learning are the new oil rigs, and the nations that dominate these technologies will dictate the future. Unlike oil, information is easily stolen, manipulated, or even weaponized in ways no physical resource ever could.

The first lethal autonomous drone strike in Libya, recorded in March 2020, was a grim reminder of what is to come. A suicide drone, powered by AI, needed no human command—just a target. Fire and forget was the name of the game. Imagine the next phase: terrorist organizations deploying AI-powered swarms, able to strike with precision, invulnerability, and zero risk to human operatives. They would not negotiate, would not retreat, and would prove hard to stop.  

In a world where biological warfare is outlawed, the selective control of food, aid, and healthcare has replaced mass destruction with slow, calculated suffocation. Nations can now deny access to the very essentials of life to break their adversaries in a siege without walls and a war without battlefields. Over 40 percent of the world’s population faces water scarcity, and by 2030, drought could displace 700 million people. The Turkish-backed militias that had control over the Alouk water station in Syria in 2020 was a stark reminder—when resources are weaponized, suffering becomes policy.

Interestingly, the battle of perception is gaining momentum more than ever. In an era of clickbait headlines and disinformation campaigns, lies travel faster than truth. The Massachusetts Institute of Technology found that false news spreads 70 percent faster than real news. From the Soviet KGB planting the rumor in the 1980s that the US government created AIDS to modern deepfake propaganda, deception is the new artillery.

Even culture is not immune. Hollywood exported American ideals, Bollywood spread Indian influence, and K-pop turned South Korea into a global powerhouse. For instance, the Cold War was not just won by missiles, it was won when a West German band sang “Wind of Change,” which then became the anthem of the Berlin Wall’s collapse.

If hunger, water, and financial systems hare already weaponized, the next battlefield is clear—space and the seabed. Subsea communication cables are responsible for carrying 97 percent of global data traffic and are the arteries of the modern economy. They enable over $10 trillion in financial transactions every single day. Yet, these vital lifelines remain shockingly unprotected and are vulnerable to sabotage, espionage, and strategic disruption. A targeted attack on just a handful of these cables could cripple stock markets, paralyze banking systems, and sever military command structures—all without a single warship being deployed.

Meanwhile, the race for space dominance is accelerating. From $63.66 billion in 2024 to an estimated $74.4 billion by 2028, the global military satellite market is growing, fueled by the realization that power no longer lies in boots on the ground, but in eyes in the sky. Satellites provide precision-strike capabilities, secure communication, and real-time battlefield intelligence. The Pentagon warns that the US is already vulnerable, with China and Russia developing anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons.

In this realm, one can say that modern states wage wars without battlefields, where the goal is not to destroy but to subdue—crippling economies, infiltrating cyber networks, and manipulating narratives without a single shot fired. What is never openly begun is rarely officially ended. In 5th-generation warfare, silence is a weapon, perception is the battlefield, and survival means accepting that war never truly ends.

Syeda Fizzah Shuja is a Research Associate at Pakistan Navy War College and an Mphil scholar in Peace and Counter Terrorism. Her work focuses on hybrid warfare and maritime terrorism. She can be contacted at fizzasyed2k@gmail.com.

The 5GW Playbook: Silent Wars and Invisible Battlefields was originally published on Global Security Review.

The perception of adversaries that western democracies are increasingly dependent on space for joint and integrated military operations gives them an incentive to threaten access to the assets that enable this capability prior to beginning of a conflict. The United States and its allies, including Australia, are now responding to this changing strategic dynamic, with a much greater focus on the challenges of undertaking space control as an important new task, along with the potential opportunities of establishing dedicated space forces.

The Policy Path to Space Control

In 2020, the then Morrison-led Coalition government sought for the Australian Defence Force (ADF) to play a more ambitious role in space. The release of the 2020 Defence Strategic Update and the accompanying Force Structure Plan represented the first significant formal policy recognition of the importance of space control and the importance of space as an operational domain. The 2020 Force Structure Plan stated that:

Defence will need capabilities that directly contribute to war fighting outcomes in the space domain using terrestrial and/or space-based systems. The Government’s plans include the development of options to enhance ADF space control through capabilities to counter emerging space threats to Australia’s free use of the space domain and that assure our continued access to space-based intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance.

It also aligned with the establishment of the Australian Space Agency in 2018 and the rapid growth of an Australian commercial space sector. This marked a truly fundamental shift from Australia’s previous approach of passive dependency on foreign states and commercial providers for space capabilities. Australia sought to become an active participant in a rapidly growing global space market, but also recognized that space access must be assured and protected in a contested and congested space domain.

The establishment of Australia’s Space Command (known initially as Defence Space Command) on January 18, 2022, also saw the release of the Defence Space Strategy which lists space control capabilities as a key objective towards “enhancing Defence’s space capability to assure joint force access in a congested, contested and competitive space environment.” The Space Command document states that “Defence will continue to identify space control gaps and opportunities to develop a credible Space Control capability, and space capability developers will actively seek to improve resilience of the space capabilities.” That would align with the decision by the following Albanese Labor government.

The Albanese government, which came to power in May 2022, largely sustained the previous coalition government’s approach to the ADF’s role in space. The 2023 Defence Strategic Review (DSR) sought to highlight the importance of the space domain, “re-posturing” Space Command into Joint Capabilities Group. The subsequent 2024 National Defence Strategy (NDS) and Integrated Investment Program (IIP) lifted planned government investment for the ADF in the space domain from about $7 billion (Australian dollars) under the previous Morrison-led coalition government to between $9 billion and $12 billion, though the vast bulk of this extra funding would not appear until late in the current decade. On space control, the Albanese government largely followed the lead of the previous Morrison liberal-national coalition, with the 2024 IIP stating planned spending will include “measures to enhance Defence’s space control capability to deny attempts to interfere with, or attack, Australia’s use of the space domain. These will help ensure the ADF is able to continue using the space capabilities it needs to support its operations.”

Capability Options for ADF Space Control

If Australia is to acquire a space control capability, it is certain to be a
“soft kill” system that disables or denies rather than physically destroys a target. The Albanese government signed a ban on destructive testing of direct-ascent ASAT systems on October 27, 2022, and any acquisition of a “kinetic kill direct-ascent ASAT would violate such a ban.” A kinetic kill ASAT capability is not consistent with Australia’s policy of sustainable use of space.

In 2021 the Morrison government announced a new defence project (DEF-9358) that would explore options for a ground-based space electronic warfare capability. Such an approach would be consistent with a preference for reversible or scalable effects that disable or deny rather than destroy.

Space-based “co-orbital” space control could conceivably include space electronic warfare technologies such as on-orbit jamming or even high-power microwave weapons for electronic attack in orbit. It is also conceivable that a ground-based electro-optical laser dazzling capability could be considered, with Australian commercial space companies demonstrating capability expertise in such a system. Finally, ground-based cyber capabilities could be exploited in space control operations against both satellites in orbit and ground facilities undertaking satellite telemetry, tracking, and control (TT&C).

Such soft-kill defensive, and potentially offensive, space control capabilities would contribute to assuring ADF space access by denying an adversary the ability to attack critical space support capabilities, such as ADF satellites for communications and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. This is consistent with the military strategy of deterrence by denial as laid out in the 2024 NDS. Other measures could be taken that include hardening key space support capabilities and potentially “silent spares” deployed in orbit.

To significantly strengthen ADF space resilience, the opportunity for the ADF to exploit emerging Australian commercial space launch capabilities is important. Embracing space lift as a means to assure sovereign space access makes eminent sense, given Australia’s geographic advantages for launch. By developing a responsive sovereign launch capability that can deliver small satellites into orbit, Australia can augment space support for the ADF and its allies in a crisis, or, if necessary, reconstitute lost capability in the aftermath of a counterspace attack.

Next Steps

Looking forward, the 2024 NDS established a biennial defence policy process, and the 2026 NDS and IIP represent the next best opportunity for Defence to more clearly conceptualize its approach to space control. Doctrinal documents within Space Command already suggest a role for space control, but greater detail is needed. Most importantly, there needs to be a public and unclassified policy explaining how the ADF will undertake this important task alongside allies and partners. Space control, like space domain awareness, represents an opportunity for the ADF to undertake a next step in its use of the space domain, beyond simply capability assurance and satellite communications, which was the perceived role of space in the 2023 DSR. In a contested space domain, Australia must burden share to a much greater degree in orbit and in acquiring the means to undertake space control tasks. This represents an important next step towards that outcome.

Malcolm Davis is a Senior Analyst in Defence Strategy and Capability at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute. Views expressed are the author’s own. 

The Case for Space Control: An Australian Perspective was originally published on Global Security Review.