The strategy emerged from a moment of truth. Years of military overstretch, industrial erosion, and fiscal strain have collided with domestic anxieties over migration, trade imbalances, and energy security. The document acknowledges, indirectly, that the United States can no longer afford to be everywhere, doing everything, for everyone. In response, it narrows the definition of what truly matters for the United States––the Western Hemisphere.

The Western Hemisphere is elevated as the primary theater of concern by invoking a 200-year-old policy of the Monroe Doctrine that rejects external influence close to home. The Middle East is quietly downgraded, its strategic relevance diminished by American energy independence. Europe, which was once a central theater to Washington’s worldview, is urged to take primary responsibility for its own security and political future by restoring stability within the region.

The strategy is not one of isolationism, as the NSS is careful to reject that label. As per the document, the United States will continue to prevent adversaries from dominating key regions. Nowhere is this commitment clearer than in the Indo-Pacific, where China is described as a main competitor. But while the ends remain familiar, the means have changed. The burden of maintaining or reinforcing regional balance is no longer something Washington is willing, or claims it should ever have been expected, to carry alone.

The Indo-Pacific strategy outlined in the NSS revolves around the First Island Chain, the arc of territory stretching from Japan through Taiwan to the Philippines. This geography is cast as the front line of any future conflict in East Asia. The United States pledges to build a force capable of denying aggression anywhere along this chain; however, it also emphasizes that such denial must be collective. Diplomacy will be used to press allies to increase defense spending and investment in deterrence-focused capabilities. In effect, the strategy seeks to integrate partnered militaries into a dense denial network in which primary responsibility lies with regional partners, with the U.S. aiding through commercial matters, technology sharing, and defense procurement.

There is a cold logic to this approach. If successful, it would complicate any Chinese military campaign, raising costs through layered defenses, maritime surveillance, anti-ship missiles, cyber capabilities, and hardened infrastructure. It would allow the United States to concentrate on high-end enablers such as artificial intelligence, quantum computing, and missile defense, while others invest in the less glamorous but more geographically exposed components of deterrence. This move can be seen as a reconfiguration designed to make competition with China cheaper and more sustainable for Washington.

Nevertheless, for America’s partners, the strategy feels less like empowerment and more like exposure. Japan offers the clearest example. Tokyo is amid a historic military buildup. Its defense budget now exceeds 9 trillion yen and is on track to reach 2 percent of its GDP, a threshold once unthinkable in a country shaped by postwar pacifism. Japan is acquiring long-range standoff missiles, expanding coastal defenses, and revising its security doctrines to prepare for contingencies that explicitly include Taiwan. These steps reflect genuine threat perceptions, particularly as Chinese military activity intensifies near Japanese territory. But they also reveal how burden shifting works in practice, and Japan is expected to bear frontline risks in a conflict whose escalation dynamics it might not be able to fully control.

South Korea’s dilemma is even starker. Long praised as a model non-proliferation state, Seoul built its security on trust in the American nuclear umbrella. That trust is now fraying. North Korea’s arsenal has grown more sophisticated, and its missiles are more mobile and survivable. At the same time, the South Koreans are increasingly skeptical that Washington would risk Los Angeles or New York to save Seoul, particularly amid U.S. political polarization and the personalization of foreign policy under President Donald Trump. The NSS urges partners to spend more and do more for collective defense, but it cannot dispel the fundamental fear that extended deterrence may fail at the moment of truth. The result is a once-taboo debate over whether South Korea needs its own nuclear weapons, a debate that speaks volumes about how burden shifting erodes confidence even as it seeks to strengthen deterrence.

The Philippines illustrates another facet of this strategy. Cast as a frontline state in the South China Sea, Manila is offered expanded U.S. access under the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement. The benefits are tangible; however, the risks are also profound. Philippine lawmakers have openly questioned whether hosting U.S. forces makes the country a target without ensuring reciprocal American vulnerability. There is a lingering fear of becoming a buffer state, absorbing grey-zone pressure while great powers manage escalation elsewhere. These developments urged Manila to deepen ties with Washington, but simultaneously diversify partnerships with Japan, France, India, and regional neighbors to avoid being locked into a proxy role.

These anxieties are compounded by the broader signals the NSS sends about American leadership. The document features President Trump with unusual prominence, underscoring how closely U.S. strategy is now associated with a single, mercurial figure. Its harsh treatment of European allies will not go unnoticed in Asia, where confidence in U.S. commitments has always rested as much on perception as on capability. The strategy also stated that “the outsized influence of larger, richer, and stronger nations is a timeless truth of international relations.” This assertion is most striking because it indicates that international order rests on the rule of the major powers. This framing implicitly places major powers (Washington, Moscow, and Beijing) in an exclusive tier of decisive actors and reminds the middle powers that their agency has limits. For allies asked to shoulder greater burdens, such language offers little reassurance.

A familiar Asia strategy thus sits alongside a more disquieting and unsettled redefinition of global leadership. The United States still seeks to shape outcomes, deter adversaries, and preserve its primacy. But it increasingly does so by asking others to stand closer to the fire. Whether allies will continue to accept that role, without firmer guarantees and clearer commitments, may determine not only the future of the Indo-Pacific but the credibility of American power itself.

Sidra Shaukat is a Research Officer at the Strategic Vision Institute (SVI), a leading Pakistani think tank focused on nuclear and strategic affairs. Her research and commentary have addressed peaceful uses of nuclear technologies, Pakistan’s Nuclear Regulatory Authority, nuclear diplomacy, and broader geostrategic developments in South Asia, Europe, and the Middle East across various platforms. A full list of her publications is available on SVI’s website. Views Expressed in this article are author’s own.

America’s Managed Retreat: How the 2025 U.S. National Security Strategy Shifts the Burden to Allies was originally published on Global Security Review.

Since the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the world followed the course laid out by the United States. The crumbling foundations of arms control and disarmament regimes, Russian invasion of Ukraine, the aggressive economic and diplomatic rise of China, and new multilateral arrangements by emerging states are all contributing factors to an ongoing reshaping of the global power dynamic that is challenging American leadership.

The uncertainty created by global institutions that are not effectively coping with Russian aggression, Chinese expansionism, and American retreat is exacerbating the threat of nuclear weapons use. This uncertainly is also causing some states to wonder if they need to pursue their own safety—in the form of nuclear proliferation. After all, the open threat of nuclear weapons use is occurring for the first time in the lives of many national leaders.

In the bipolar world that existed at the time, rivals were kept from attacking each other by competing in small technological battles over nuclear delivery vehicles, not the destructive power of their weapons. But, with the withdrawal of the Cold War era’s arms control arrangements, the threat of arms racing increased as the United States took a clear lead in conventional warfighting technology.

The ever-increasing distrust among rivals, coupled with the weakening of international institutions, is a central cause for the erosion of trust in the current world order. The perception of declining American power and interest in maintaining global order fuels a sense of self-reliance in the security realm, particularly for emerging powers. Careful not to criticize the United States publicly, Japan and South Korea, for example, wonder how reliable American extended nuclear deterrence remains in the wake of Chinese and Russian aggression that seems unchecked.

Closer to home, North Korea is already an established nuclear power and a looming threat that requires a robust defensive mechanism. A fear of extinction is ever present because reliance on a third party for security is always a risky endeavor.

On the other hand, active conflicts in the Middle East cannot be ignored. This is particularly true when a known nuclear state and an aspiring nuclear state are rivals and engaged in a shooting war.

Iran is known to have enriched uranium to at least 60 percent, and may soon, or perhaps already has, enriched uranium to weapons grade. Fortunately, Israel seems willing to rely on its conventional capabilities to win against Iran. This is a positive outcome in the midst of active conflict.

Repeated attempts to halt the Iranian nuclear program by the United States and Israel are proving insufficient. Wisely, Iran is abstaining from fielding a nuclear weapon, but this decision could change in the near future.

Efforts to prevent Iran from building nuclear weapons with the “Iran Nuclear Deal” (commonly known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)) were never supported by the left or right in the United States. Thus, President Trump ended the deal during his first term. American withdrawal from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty in 2019, due to Russian cheating; cessation of talks on New START since 2021; American withdrawal from the Open Skies Treaty (OST) in 2020, due to Russian cheating; and the unresolved deadlock on the proposed Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) leave advocates of arms control unhappy.

The sense of mistrust that pervades also prevents confidence-building measures from playing any role. Emerging powers are also questioning the concept of a nuclear umbrella in the wake of President Trump’s clear desire to force Europe to bare a much greater share of their own security. Ukraine, the victim of Russian aggression, once inherited Soviet nuclear weapons, which they gave back in 1994 in return for security assurances—only to see Russia violate those guarantees at little expense.

At this current juncture, stability is hard to maintain. Erosion of trust in the United States is evident. Weakening and non-existent nonproliferation regimes are of great concern. States that once rested easy in American security guarantees are now thinking differently when it comes to their own survivability, security, and territorial integrity.

Ineffective international institutions have also become a driving factor in undermining the global narrative surrounding the validity international policing in crises. In such circumstances, states with potential capabilities are now looking to themselves more than ever before. Whether the world is headed for a period of anarchy or a new hegemon is uncertain. What is certain is that everyone will feel the results.

Muhammad Usama Khalid is a Research Officer at Balochistan Think Tank Network (BTTN), BUITEMS, Quetta.

How Global Instability Fuels the Nuclear Arms Race was originally published on Global Security Review.

In this still frequently neglected or covered-up existential rivalry, the two sides face equally monumental but decidedly asymmetrical consequences. Should Beijing lose, the CCP will likely fall and fade. The Chinese nation, people, and state, even with the same name, will survive and likely thrive. Should Washington lose, however, not only will the American system of government likely fail, but the American way of life and national independence will diminish as American power and influence is superseded by a domineering PRC.

After long delays, hesitations, and self-delusions, a rare American consensus emerged to focus on the epic PRC-USA competition and fending off China’s effort to spread illiberal Chinese power. Given its vast well of resources, extensive network of alliances, great pool of talent, still functional democratic decision-making mechanism, and vibrant marketplace of ideas, the United States is coming up with cost-effective measures to win this competition, likely cheaper and more peaceful than what was required during the Cold War.

Critically, the United States should aim to achieve three hierarchical objectives in the PRC-USA race. They are ranked in descending order of importance. First, prevent the CCP from reordering the world by taking over global leadership. Second, prepare for but deter an all-out war with the PRC. Third, work toward a sociopolitical and ideological transformation of the PRC into a constructive peer. In the end, the US must ensure that Beijing is unwilling and/or unable to replace American leadership in the world.

The United States and its allies should curb the idealistic but toxic enthusiasm for globalization and world governance. The evolving ideals of the right to intervene (RTI) in other sovereign countries for the responsibility to protect (RTP) other country’s citizens, for example, should remain an inspiring ideal rather than a legal norm. Extremely rare and absolutely necessary cases of RTI and RTP are acceptable.

Americans must unapologetically strengthen the United States by maintaining dominance in economics, military power, education, and innovation. It must also remain a nation that is admired for its freedoms at home. It is in the greater interest of the world (including the Chinese people) to put America First, make America strong, rebuild America back better, and let America lead again. These campaign slogans were not only useful for presidential campaigns in 2016, 2020, and 2024, but they are important in reminding the rest of the world what is in their own best interest—a strong America.

These ideas should be delinked from the shortsightedness of isolationism and disassociated from any particular politician. The US must succeed in the international competition for power. It must also use its immense power judiciously to be ever more cost-effective.

A quick look at Taiwan may be a good illustration. Taiwan is critical for Beijing and the primary point of contention in the PRC-USA rivalry. The ROC (Republic of China) was a major US ally after World War II. However, the ROC’s international status was literally traded away by the United States over 40 years ago. The desire to enlist the PRC in the fight to win the Cold War against the Soviet Union proved more important.

Taiwan subsequently evolved to become the first democratic Chinese polity of and, in many ways, a leader across Asia. It has also drifted away from the monolithic Chinese world, to seek its own self-rule, autonomy, and independence.

The CCP, for its own political interest rather than the Chinese national interest, desires to absorb Taiwan with bribery, tricks, intimidation and force. Should Beijing accomplish that goal, it would achieve a major objective of its “great power” strategy, making a giant leap to dominate the Asia-Pacific and score a significant victory over the US and its allies.

The United States must not let Taiwan fall to Beijing. This is not because of the island’s beauty (its old name Formosa means beautiful island in Portuguese). Nor is it because of the advanced microchips that Taiwan makes. It is because the United States cannot allow the CCP to win the PRC-USA rivalry. American interests and the interests of a free world dictate that the US must ensure Beijing does not take Taiwan over the will of the Taiwanese people.

Without fundamental sociopolitical reform at home, even peaceful unification of Taiwan and the PRC should be objectionable to the United States. It sends the wrong signal to every nation watching the outcome of this competition. Winning the PRC-USA rivalry is much more important than the Beijing-Taipei dispute.

The United States must use its power well in defending Taiwan against the PRC. Between peaceful unification of the island with the Chinese Mainland in a framework of democratic federation on the one end, and Sino-American military conflict in response to an invasion of an independent Taiwan on the other end, there are many options. The US can employ numerous and inexpensive options like destroying the “Great Firewall of China,” providing smart weapons to Taiwan, fighting at the time and place of American choosing, and altering the nuclear balance in East Asia. The list can go on.

Imagination, wisdom, persistence, and perseverance, more than mere force and material power, will enable the United States to safeguard world order. The Taiwanese people are counting on an American victory in the PRC-USA rivalry.

Fei-Ling Wang, PhD, is a Professor at the Sam Nunn School of International Affairs at the Georgia Institute of Technology. Views expressed in this article are his own.

The PRC-USA Rivalry and Taiwan was originally published on Global Security Review.