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		<title>Hemispheric Defense: An Idea Whose Time Has Come</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/hemispheric-defense-an-idea-whose-time-has-come/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Amit Gupta]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 29 May 2025 12:17:37 +0000</pubDate>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=30830</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>The transatlantic elites of Washington and Brussels are upset with President Donald Trump for what they see as strategic retrenchment. The reality is, it is time to implement a hemispheric defense for economic, strategic, alliance, and manpower reasons. This calls for a very different American foreign policy. For eighty years the United States pursued a [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/hemispheric-defense-an-idea-whose-time-has-come/">Hemispheric Defense: An Idea Whose Time Has Come</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The transatlantic elites of Washington and Brussels are upset with President Donald Trump for what they see as strategic retrenchment. The reality is, it is time to implement a hemispheric defense for economic, strategic, alliance, and manpower reasons. This calls for a very different American foreign policy.</p>
<p>For eighty years the United States pursued a policy of globalism with worldwide military commands to implement this policy. It is prohibitively expensive and is becoming increasingly difficult to sustain. Observers point out that the US defense budget was $849 billion in 2024, but this is only part of the overall annual expenditure on defense. Most countries include veterans benefits in their defense budgets. The United States treats these costs differently. Today the Veterans Administration (VA) budget stands at $369.3 billion and is rising rapidly because of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, which drove healthcare and retirement costs higher.</p>
<p>As Table 1 shows, the VA budget rose about 10 percent per annum, resulting in the VA budget rising to the second largest amount of discretionary funding in the federal budget.  Further, as the breakdown of annual expenditure shows, medical costs are growing as the soldiers who went to war as young people are now in their forties and their health issues are becoming chronic while the injuries they suffered are becoming more difficult to treat due to age-related complications.</p>
<p><strong>Table 1</strong></p>
<p><strong>Veterans Administration Budget 2018</strong>–<strong>2025</strong></p>
<table style="height: 471px;" width="821">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td width="208"><strong> </strong>Year</td>
<td width="208">Amount</td>
<td width="208">Medical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="208">2018</td>
<td width="208">$197.4 billion</td>
<td width="208">$85.0 billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="208">2019</td>
<td width="208">$201.4 billion</td>
<td width="208">$90.5 billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="208">2020</td>
<td width="208">$220.1 billion</td>
<td width="208">$95.4 billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="208">2021</td>
<td width="208">$245.7 billion</td>
<td width="208">$107.7 billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="208">2022</td>
<td width="208">$273.8 billion</td>
<td width="208">$116.3 billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="208">2023</td>
<td width="208">$308.4 billion</td>
<td width="208">$138.1 billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="208">2024</td>
<td width="208">$325.1 billion</td>
<td width="208">$134.0 billion</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<p><strong>Source: US Veterans Administration (2024)</strong></p>
<p>Combined expenditures for fiscal year 2025 will surpass $1 trillion. Given America’s growing debt such expenditure is difficult to sustain, especially if Washington’s global military footprint continues to expand at a rapid pace. Finding the manpower to wage war is becoming increasingly difficult for the United States.</p>
<p>The Afghanistan and Iraq conflicts saw the United States suffer 8,492 combat fatalities.  Compared to the 58,000 deaths in Vietnam and 53,000 in Korea this number was significantly smaller. A critical reason was excellent triage care and swift evacuation of wounded soldiers from the battlefield. To get soldiers to serve in an all-volunteer force, the United States was offering $20,000 to $40,000 enlistment bonuses. Today, those numbers are even higher.</p>
<p>Further, in his autobiography, <em>Hillbilly Elegy</em>, Vice President J. D. Vance discussed how the American working class, which his family belonged to, blamed George W. Bush and Barack Obama for making them cannon fodder in Afghanistan and Iraq. This feeling, combined with the high number of walking wounded (over 50,000) who came back from the wars with physical and psychological trauma, led to a growing reluctance amongst America’s combat-age population to go to war. In such circumstances, reducing military expenditures and the nation’s global military footprint makes sense.</p>
<p>In this context, Trump’s plan for hemispheric defense is a return to the Monroe Doctrine of the nineteenth century, where the United States maintained its military supremacy over the Western hemisphere and kept out foreign powers. Defending the Western hemisphere is easy. As Otto von Bismark once said, “The Americans are a very lucky people. They’re bordered to the north and south by weak neighbors, and to the east and west by fish.”</p>
<p>In the 21st century, the United States remains the predominant naval power in the Atlantic Ocean as well as in the Eastern and South Pacific, making it difficult for any aggressor to penetrate America’s defensive walls. Fielding an American military force that is based around a blue-water Navy and a globally deployable Air Force is a cost-effective strategy because it takes away the expense of overseas bases. In fact, recognizing that in a conflict with China there could be political unwillingness in Asia to host F-35s, the first Trump administration decided to build a new generation of lower yield nuclear weapons that could be launched from cruise missile–carrying submarines.</p>
<p><strong>The Quest for Territory</strong></p>
<p>Since coming to power, Donald Trump suggested Canada become the 51st state and the purchase of Greenland. Denmark has stated that Greenland is not for sale while in Canada Trump’s statements led to a revival of Canadian nationalism and a boost in the fortunes of a very unpopular liberal party. President Trump’s motivation for such efforts is clear.</p>
<p>In terms of minerals, a United States that has full access to minerals in Canada and Greenland is on par with the mineral wealth of Russia. Acquiring Canada and Greenland would also make the United States and Russia the two most prominent Arctic states and would freeze out attempts by China to acquire influence in the region.</p>
<p>Trump’s demands caused global leaders to wonder about the rationality of such pronouncements but what he said is based in political and historical facts. The United States purchased the Virgin Islands of St. Thomas, St. Croix, and St. John from Copenhagen in 1917 and, subsequently, bought Water Island from a private Danish company in 1944. If the citizens of Greenland choose, via referenda, to join the United States, such a purchase has historical precedent.</p>
<p>In the case of Canada, the Quebecois have periodically asked for independence and Ottawa conducted referendums to see if the population of Quebec wants to secede. So far, secessionists suffer defeat each time. It is interesting to note that the Atlantic provinces of Canada—New Brunswick, Newfoundland, Nova Scotia, and Prince Edward Island—previously said that Quebec’s secession would lead to their joining the United States. British Columbia, which is divided from Canada by the Rockies and whose economy is tied to the West coast of the United States, would potentially follow suit. Canada would then consist of Ontario and the northern part of Quebec where the native population has made it clear that they have no interest in joining the Francophone nationalists.</p>
<p>The fact is that Canada has a fragile economy that could breed long-term discontent.  Further, in Quebec, the Parti Quebecois’ charismatic leader Paul St. Pierre Plamondon, who is likely to win the provincial election in April, wants a third independence referendum by 2030. If that happens, Trump’s territorial realignment may come to pass. In a world where all or part of Canada is part of the United States and Greenland is an American territory, the United States is in far less need of Europe or Asia. With only 11 percent of the American economy derived from exports, an internally focused United States is not a nation in a bad position.</p>
<p><em>Amit Gupta is a Senior Fellow in the National Institute of Deterrence Studies. The views in this article are personal. He may be contacted at amit.gupta1856@gmail.com.</em></p>
<p><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/05/Hemispheric-Defense-Trump.pdf"><img decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-29852" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1.png" alt="" width="270" height="75" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1.png 450w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1-300x83.png 300w" sizes="(max-width: 270px) 100vw, 270px" /></a></p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/hemispheric-defense-an-idea-whose-time-has-come/">Hemispheric Defense: An Idea Whose Time Has Come</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
					
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		<title>The Ukraine War: Great Power Competition</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/the-ukraine-war-great-power-competition/</link>
					<comments>https://globalsecurityreview.com/the-ukraine-war-great-power-competition/#comments</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Dawood Tanin]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 21 Oct 2024 11:45:22 +0000</pubDate>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=29149</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>As the war in Ukraine rages on, more than two years since it began, many observers are trying to determine who is winning and who will win in the end. There is no easy answer as analysists have differing criteria upon which they base their assessments. This leaves ample room for further assessment. Russia’s Strategic [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/the-ukraine-war-great-power-competition/">The Ukraine War: Great Power Competition</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>As the war in Ukraine rages on, more than two years since it began, many observers are trying to determine who is winning and who will win in the end. There is no easy answer as analysists have differing criteria upon which they base their assessments. This leaves ample room for further assessment.</p>
<p><strong>Russia’s Strategic Mistakes and Their Consequences</strong></p>
<p>Russia’s decision to attack Ukraine in 2022 was clearly a strategic blunder. Russian President Vladimir Putin believed he could seize control of Ukraine with a swift military strike, install a government aligned with Russian interests, and prevent the admission of Ukraine into the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). However, the invasion stalled and is now widely seen as a disaster for Russia.</p>
<p>Now, two years after the start of the war, Russia has neither installed a government aligned with its interests in Ukraine nor succeeded in increasing its own security. On the contrary, the war led to economic sanctions, severed Russia’s relationship with the West, and diminished Russia’s military reputation, which was once formidable to its rivals.                                           Putin also underestimated the probability that he would require assistance from China, Iran, and North Korea to maintain the fight, and, incorrectly, assumed that NATO member-states would fail to act in effective coordination and support Ukrainian independence. Russia is now trapped in a prolonged war, Russia is beholden to its junior partners, and the Russian military is now proven to be largely ineffective. NATO is now working more closely together than it has since the Soviet Union collapsed and two new countries (Finland and Sweden) are now members of the alliance. Entering the war in Ukraine was a strategic mistake for Russia, which has exposed the country as an aggressor that is driving defensive preparation in Europe.</p>
<p>The West has imposed more than 11,000 sanctions on Russia, about 3,500 Western companies left the country, and nearly 1,000 Russian elites left their country. Russia’s relations with the West have deteriorated significantly, leading to political and economic isolation from the free world.</p>
<p>These strategic mistakes not only weakened Russia’s competitive position but also revealed its wider vulnerabilities. Russia is now caught in a prolonged war from which it is difficult to exit with dignity. Recognizing this opportunity, the United States and its allies are unlikely to allow Russia to easily escape this crisis. As a result, Russia is being forced to move closer to China and regional powers such as Iran and North Korea. Although this proximity is necessary for Russia economically and strategically, it primarily benefits China and increases China’s influence in global competition. Therefore, in this geopolitical game, Russia has not only failed to achieve its goals, but has also significantly fallen behind its competitors, diminishing its prospects of emerging as a great power in the international system.</p>
<p><strong>America’s Strategic Mistakes and Their Consequences</strong></p>
<p>The war in Ukraine is not in the United States’ best interest because it distracts from America’s larger effort to deter Chinese aggression against Taiwan and elsewhere in Asia. This distraction is allowing China to expand their influence globally, especially in areas where American influence is waning.</p>
<p>Early in the war, the United States tried to weaken Russia through extensive economic sanctions. Although these sanctions damaged the Russian economy temporarily, they did not achieve American objectives in the long run as Russia found new outlets for its energy products. Unexpectedly, Western pressure brought China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia closer together, strengthening China’s position vis-à-vis Russia—making China the senior partner.</p>
<p>The increasing economic and military cooperation between these countries helped China expand its influence directly and indirectly. Because the United States was deterred by Russian nuclear threats from providing Ukraine war-winning military tools, the war has dragged on—all to the benefit of China.</p>
<p>America’s distraction by Ukraine, the conflict in Israel, the presidential election, and other issues is leading the United States to neglect long-term strategic threats. As a result, while China, avoiding direct military conflicts, is increasing its economic and technological power globally. The disastrous American withdrawal from Afghanistan is attributed by some analysts as an important reason why Vladimir Putin thought he could get away with an invasion of Ukraine—the perception of American weakness.</p>
<p>The sum of these strategic mistakes puts America in a position where Russia and the United States are weakened by the war. When America is seen as weak, anti-American groups in different parts of the world see an opportunity. The same is true of all of America’s enemies.</p>
<p><strong>China’s Opportunity in Global Competition and Its Benefits</strong></p>
<p>Unlike Russia and America, China gained a significant advantage in global competition by choosing a strategy of self-restraint and prioritizing economic growth and technological advancement since the war began. Despite predictions that China would invade Taiwan because the United States is focused on Ukraine—and Israel—China’s lack of military action is a sign of this country’s smart and accurate calculations about any such invasion. By pursuing an economic oriented approach, China is focusing on addressing its own internal economic issues while trying to outpace the United States. By focusing at the operational level, avoiding military conflicts, China is using this time to petter position itself for a war that it too sees as likely.</p>
<p>China’s strategic partnerships and economic engagement, especially with developing countries, are gradually changing the balance of global power. This change is evidenced by the increase in the number of countries that are willing to interact with China on its terms and see it as a balancer against Western influence. By capitalizing on the strategic mistakes of other great powers and presenting itself as a champion of global peace and economic development, China is positioning itself as a leader in the new world order.</p>
<p><strong>The Future Perspective of Global Competition</strong></p>
<p>However, America still remains the greatest of great powers because it still carries the most influence in world affairs. Chinese power has, however, increased, leading Chinese leaders to be more sensitive to the expression position in the international system. Contrary to the prevailing opinion, the war in Ukraine does not benefit the United States. It benefits China.</p>
<p>China continues to strengthen its position and turned the game in its favor by taking advantage of the strategy of restraint and economic growth. The United States has inadvertently helped strengthen China’s position by focusing too much on Russia and the Ukraine war. Russia is clearly falling behind its great power peers.</p>
<p>If China continues with its current policies, it should avoid conflict and continue to grow economically and in its influence over other nations. There are still opportunities to change China’s trajectory.</p>
<p>America should adjust its approach by focusing on its vital interests and associated threats—China—instead of focusing on lesser interests. Additionally, preventing the increase of China’s influence in various regions of the world, especially in Asia and Africa, should be the priority of American foreign policy. It is not too late, but the time to act is now.</p>
<p><em>Dawood Tanin is a professor of political science at a private university in Afghanistan. The views expressed are his own.</em></p>
<p><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/The-Ukraine-War-A-High-Competition-Among-Great-Powers.pdf"><img decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-28926 size-medium" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/Download-This-Publication-300x83.png" alt="" width="300" height="83" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/Download-This-Publication-300x83.png 300w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/Download-This-Publication.png 450w" sizes="(max-width: 300px) 100vw, 300px" /></a></p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/the-ukraine-war-great-power-competition/">The Ukraine War: Great Power Competition</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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