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		<title>Iran’s Missile-Drone Campaign and Its Implications for the United States’ Deterrence</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/irans-missile-drone-campaign-and-its-implications-for-the-united-states-deterrence/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Tahir Mahmood Azad]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 16 Apr 2026 12:14:53 +0000</pubDate>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=32585</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Published: April 16, 2026 The ongoing conflict involving Iran, the United States, and Israel has produced one of the most significant case studies in the evolution of contemporary warfare. Iran, a state that lacks a competitive air force and possesses limited naval power, has demonstrated that ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and unmanned aerial systems can [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/irans-missile-drone-campaign-and-its-implications-for-the-united-states-deterrence/">Iran’s Missile-Drone Campaign and Its Implications for the United States’ Deterrence</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>Published: April 16, 2026</em></p>
<p>The ongoing conflict involving Iran, the United States, and Israel has produced one of the most significant case studies in the evolution of contemporary warfare. Iran, a state that lacks a competitive air force and possesses limited naval power, has demonstrated that ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and unmanned aerial systems can offset some conventional disadvantages and impose serious costs on technologically superior adversaries. This development is not confined to the battlefield. It represents a doctrinal shift with lasting implications for American deterrence strategy, allied defense planning, and the long-term viability of current U.S. force structures. Understanding what Iran has and has not achieved is essential for making sound policy going forward.</p>
<p><strong>The Cost-Exchange Problem</strong><strong> </strong></p>
<p>At the operational level, Iran&#8217;s most consequential contribution has been exposing a structural vulnerability in layered air defense: the cost-exchange dilemma. Systems such as Patriot, THAAD, and Iron Dome were engineered to intercept high-value ballistic and cruise missile threats. When deployed against coordinated waves of low-cost drones and short-range missiles, these systems are forced to expend interceptors valued at hundreds of thousands or millions of dollars per shot against threats that cost a fraction of that amount. The arithmetic is unsustainable at scale. As analysts at the Center for Strategic and International Studies have <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/air-and-missile-defense-crossroads">noted</a>, saturation attacks can exhaust defensive inventories faster than replenishment is possible, creating windows of vulnerability that adversaries are quick to exploit. For the United States, this is not merely a technical problem, it is a strategic one that requires urgent attention in both procurement and doctrine.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/4086300/">development</a> of the Golden Dome missile defense architecture and expanded investment in directed energy and electronic warfare systems reflect growing official awareness that current interception models are not cost-competitive. These are necessary steps. However, technology alone cannot resolve a dilemma that is fundamentally about the economics of offense versus defense. Adversaries will adapt their tactics faster than procurement cycles can respond unless the U.S. also changes the strategic logic driving their calculations.</p>
<p><strong>Attrition Without Decision: The Limits of the Iranian Model</strong></p>
<p>The Iranian approach has imposed genuine costs on its adversaries, but it has not produced decisive military outcomes. This distinction is critical. Iran&#8217;s missile and drone campaigns have disrupted logistics, strained defensive inventories, and created operational uncertainty. They have not, however, defeated U.S. or Israeli military power, seized or held territory, or forced a negotiated settlement on Iranian terms. The model is one of strategic attrition, not strategic victory. Survivability and persistence are not equivalent to effectiveness, and the broader narrative of a drone revolution rendering conventional military power obsolete requires significant qualification.</p>
<p>The claim that air superiority is no longer a necessary condition for strategic effectiveness also warrants scrutiny. Air superiority remains essential for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; for close air support of ground operations; and for denying adversaries freedom of movement. What Iran&#8217;s campaign demonstrates is that a state without air superiority can still impose costs and delay adversary operations—not that air power has been rendered irrelevant. The bar for what air superiority can guarantee has been raised. Its strategic value, however, has not disappeared. Policymakers and analysts should resist the temptation to draw sweeping conclusions from a conflict that remains ongoing and whose full operational record is still emerging.</p>
<p><strong>Implications for American Deterrence</strong></p>
<p>The proliferation of precision strike capabilities across state and non-state actors undermines the assumption that technological overmatch alone is sufficient to deter conflict. When adversaries can field asymmetric capabilities that challenge U.S. and allied defenses at an acceptable cost to themselves, deterrence by denial becomes increasingly difficult to guarantee. The U.S. must prioritize cost-effective interception technologies, particularly directed energy weapons, that can neutralize mass drone and missile attacks without depleting high-value interceptor stocks. This is a resource allocation problem as much as it is an engineering one, and it demands serious engagement at the budgetary and strategic planning levels.</p>
<p>The Iranian model is also exportable, and this may prove to be its most consequential long-term dimension. States with limited defense budgets that are aligned with China or Russia can observe the operational lessons from this conflict and apply them in their own regional contexts. The proliferation of domestically produced or externally transferred missile and drone capabilities across the Middle East, South Asia, and the Indo-Pacific represents a compounding deterrence challenge. American extended deterrence commitments to allies in these regions will become harder to sustain if the cost-exchange problem is not structurally resolved. As Defense News <a href="https://cepa.org/article/how-are-drones-changing-war-the-future-of-the-battlefield/#:~:text=Real%2Dtime%20video%20feeds%20from,NATO%20and%20the%20Strategic%20Imperative">reported</a>, the proliferation of drone technology is already forcing militaries worldwide to reconsider their approach to air and missile defense.</p>
<p>There is also a crisis stability dimension that deserves serious attention. Rapid, sustained missile and drone strikes compress decision-making timelines and increase pressure for early, and potentially disproportionate, responses. In a multipolar environment where multiple actors possess similar strike capabilities, the risk of miscalculation is elevated. The U.S. should pursue updated arms control frameworks and diplomatic mechanisms to manage the proliferation of these systems alongside its technical and procurement investments. Deterrence cannot be reduced to hardware alone.</p>
<p><strong>Conclusion</strong></p>
<p>Iran&#8217;s missile and drone campaign has not rewritten the principles of warfare, but it has exposed critical assumptions underpinning American deterrence in ways that cannot be ignored. Distributed, low-cost, high-impact systems are now accessible to a wider range of actors and the gap between offensive capability and defensive cost is widening. The United States requires a</p>
<p>deterrence posture that integrates cost-effective defense, credible offensive options, active non-proliferation diplomacy, and sustained alliance management. Meeting this challenge demands strategic adaptation across doctrine, procurement, and diplomacy, not simply an incremental increase in interceptor production.</p>
<p><em>Dr. Tahir Mahmood Azad is currently a research scholar at the Department of Politics &amp; International Relations, the University of Reading, UK. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own.</em></p>
<p><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/Irans-Missile-Drone-Campaign-and-Its-Implications-for-the-United-States-Deterrence.pdf"><img decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-32091" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/2026-Download-Button.png" alt="" width="194" height="54" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/2026-Download-Button.png 450w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/2026-Download-Button-300x83.png 300w" sizes="(max-width: 194px) 100vw, 194px" /></a></p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/irans-missile-drone-campaign-and-its-implications-for-the-united-states-deterrence/">Iran’s Missile-Drone Campaign and Its Implications for the United States’ Deterrence</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
					
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		<title>The Russian View of Deep Battle: Implications for the War in Ukraine</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/the-russian-view-of-deep-battle-implications-for-the-war-in-ukraine/</link>
					<comments>https://globalsecurityreview.com/the-russian-view-of-deep-battle-implications-for-the-war-in-ukraine/#comments</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Stephen Cimbala]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 12 Jan 2026 13:09:10 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Allies & Extended Deterrence]]></category>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=32116</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Russia’s conduct of military operations in Ukraine cannot be understood without revisiting one of the most influential concepts in Soviet and Russian operational art: Deep Battle. Developed in the 1920s and 1930s by theorists such as Vladimir Triandafillov, Deep Battle emphasized striking not only the enemy’s frontline forces but also the entire depth of their [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/the-russian-view-of-deep-battle-implications-for-the-war-in-ukraine/">The Russian View of Deep Battle: Implications for the War in Ukraine</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Russia’s conduct of military operations in Ukraine cannot be understood without revisiting one of the most influential concepts in <a href="https://balagan.info/deep-battle-soviet-doctrine-for-operational-level-warfare">Soviet and Russian operational art</a>: <strong>Deep Battle</strong>. Developed in the 1920s and 1930s by theorists such as Vladimir Triandafillov, Deep Battle emphasized striking not only the enemy’s frontline forces but also the <a href="https://api.pageplace.de/preview/DT0400.9781040309209_A49868906/preview-9781040309209_A49868906.pdf">entire depth of their defensive system</a>—logistics, command nodes, reserves, and infrastructure—simultaneously. The goal was to collapse the enemy’s ability to respond, restoring maneuver to the battlefield after the static carnage of World War I.</p>
<p>Nearly a century later, Russian planners still view Deep Battle as a foundational concept. Yet the war in Ukraine has exposed the performance gap between theory and practice.</p>
<p><strong>Deep Battle in Russian Military Thought</strong></p>
<p>Deep Battle was designed as a holistic operational approach: massed firepower, rapid penetration, and exploitation by mobile formations. It required tight coordination, robust logistics, and the ability to sustain momentum across multiple echelons. Soviet forces demonstrated aspects of this during World War II, and the concept remained embedded in Russian doctrine long after.</p>
<p>Modern Russian operations—at least on paper—still aspire to this model. Analysts note that Russian commanders have attempted to regain maneuver by applying Deep Battle principles, seeking rapid breakthroughs and deep strikes to disorganize Ukrainian defenses. However, the conditions required for successful Deep Battle are far more demanding than the theory suggests.</p>
<p><strong>Why Deep Battle Has Struggled in Ukraine</strong></p>
<p>Several factors have undermined Russia’s ability to execute Deep Battle effectively. Logistical fragility has plagued Russian operations, as sustaining supply to fast-moving units proved difficult; forces entering Ukraine in 2022 quickly outran their logistics, leading to stalled advances and exposed columns. <a href="https://understandingwar.org/analysis/russia-ukraine/">Scholars argue</a> that this logistical weakness fundamentally compromised Russia’s ability to maintain operational tempo. Additionally, Ukrainian resilience and adaptability have presented unexpected challenges. Ukrainian forces have been far more agile and technologically integrated than Russian planners anticipated, employing precision fires, dispersed command structures, and Western intelligence support to blunt Russian attempts at operational shock and interrupting supply lines and replacement equipment. Their use of drone and counter-drone technology exemplifies adaptive learning that has already been noted and copied by other state militaries.</p>
<p>Russia’s attempts at Deep Battle are further hindered by insufficient force quality and added maneuver complexity, as the doctrine relies on well-trained, coordinated echelons. Russia’s reliance on mobilized troops, fragmented command structures, and heavy attrition has made synchronized deep operations difficult to sustain. The loss of air superiority has limited Russia’s ability to shape the battlefield making the battlefield more complex. As intended by doctrine, Soviet Deep Battle assumes overwhelming air support to suppress enemy depth, but contested airspace in Ukraine has prevented this crucial element.</p>
<p><strong>Where Russia Has Adapted</strong></p>
<p>Despite these challenges, Russia has applied Deep Battle concepts in modified ways. In adapting the principles of Deep Battle to modern conflict, Russia has focused on targeting Ukrainian infrastructure with long-range strikes. This campaign has prioritized attacks on energy systems and logistics nodes, aiming to disrupt Ukrainian depth and sustain pressure even without accompanying maneuver. By striking critical assets far from the front lines, Russia attempts to weaken Ukraine’s ability to resist and maintain its war effort.</p>
<p>Rather than achieving rapid breakthroughs as originally envisioned by Deep Battle doctrine, Russia has shifted to a strategy of incremental, attritional “deepening.” This approach relies on massed artillery and slow, grinding advances to steadily erode Ukrainian defenses. The result is a war of attrition where progress is measured in small territorial gains instead of dramatic operational shifts, demonstrating an adaptation of Deep Battle’s objectives without its characteristic momentum.</p>
<p>In addition to these methods, Russian military planners and observers continue to pursue efforts to reconstitute maneuver forces. Despite ongoing challenges, such as limited operational success, attempts are being made to rebuild the capacity for operational-level breakthroughs. These efforts underscore a persistent desire within Russian strategy to reclaim the maneuver warfare and deep operational reach that are central to Deep Battle theory, even as practical limitations remain.</p>
<p><strong>The Role of Nuclear Weapons in Deep Battle</strong></p>
<p>Vladimir Putin has repeatedly issued veiled or explicit warnings regarding the potential for Russian nuclear first use concerning the possibility of Russian nuclear first use in response to perceived unacceptable threats. This stance is further reflected in Russian military exercises, which have frequently included <a href="https://www.aei.org/research-products/book/riding-the-tiger/">simulated launches with tactical nuclear weapons systems</a>. However, it is important to note that some <a href="https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/Hot%20Spots/Documents/Russia/2017-07-The-Russian-Way-of-War-Grau-Bartles.pdf?ref=hermes-kalamos">Soviet assessments during the Cold War</a> adopted a realistically pessimistic outlook on the conduct of military operations in a nuclear environment, recognizing the immense challenges such conditions would impose.</p>
<p>Taken together, these perspectives highlight the duality in Russian strategic thinking: while nuclear signaling and preparation remain integral to Russia&#8217;s military posture, there is also an awareness—rooted in historical experience—of the profound difficulties associated with waging war in a nuclear-affected battlespace.</p>
<p><strong>Implications for the Future of the War</strong></p>
<p>Understanding Russia’s attachment to Deep Battle helps explain both its ambitions and its limitations. Russia will continue seeking opportunities for operational breakthroughs, even if conditions rarely allow them. The concept remains deeply embedded in Russian military culture. At the same time, Ukraine’s strategy of disrupting Russian logistics and command nodes directly targets the prerequisites of Deep Battle, making it harder for Russia to generate momentum. If Russia can rebuild its logistics, improve training, and integrate drones and electronic warfare more effectively, it may regain the ability to conduct deeper operations—but this remains uncertain. The war is likely to remain attritional because neither side currently possesses the combination of mass, mobility, and air dominance required for true Deep Battle.</p>
<p><strong>Conclusion</strong></p>
<p>Deep Battle remains a conceptual framework and historical marker for understanding Russian military behavior. But the war in Ukraine has shown that doctrine alone cannot compensate for structural weaknesses, resilient opposition, and the realities of modern precision warfare. Russia’s struggle to translate Deep Battle theory into battlefield success underscores the widening gap between its strategic aspirations and its operational capabilities.</p>
<p><em>NOTE: The author provides a grateful acknowledgment that is made to David Glantz and the late Dr. Jacob Kipp for the author’s appreciation of this topic. None bear any responsibility for arguments herein.</em></p>
<p><em>Stephen J. Cimbala is Distinguished Professor of Political Science at Penn State Brandywine and the author of numerous works on nuclear deterrence, arms control, and military strategy.  He is a senior fellow at NIDS and a recent contributor to the Routledge Handbook of Soviet and Russian Military Studies edited by Dr. Alexander Hill (Routledge: 2025).</em></p>
<p><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/The-Russian-View-of-Deep-Battle-Implications-for-the-War-in-Ukraine.pdf"><img decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-32091" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/2026-Download-Button.png" alt="" width="277" height="77" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/2026-Download-Button.png 450w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/2026-Download-Button-300x83.png 300w" sizes="(max-width: 277px) 100vw, 277px" /></a></p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/the-russian-view-of-deep-battle-implications-for-the-war-in-ukraine/">The Russian View of Deep Battle: Implications for the War in Ukraine</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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		<title>Hypersonic Horizons: The Next Generation of Air Superiority</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/hypersonic-horizons-the-next-generation-of-air-superiority/</link>
					<comments>https://globalsecurityreview.com/hypersonic-horizons-the-next-generation-of-air-superiority/#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Joshua Thibert]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 07 Nov 2024 13:29:06 +0000</pubDate>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=29302</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>The development of hypersonic technology is poised to redefine the landscape of military airpower. Hypersonic vehicles, capable of reaching speeds greater than Mach 5, offer unprecedented speed and agility, making them a game-changer in modern warfare. This article delves into the advancements, challenges, and strategic implications of hypersonic technology, highlighting how it is set to [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/hypersonic-horizons-the-next-generation-of-air-superiority/">Hypersonic Horizons: The Next Generation of Air Superiority</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The development of hypersonic technology is poised to redefine the landscape of military airpower. Hypersonic vehicles, capable of reaching speeds greater than Mach 5, offer unprecedented speed and agility, making them a <a href="https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/how-hypersonic-weapons-are-redefining-warfare">game-changer</a> in modern warfare. This article delves into the advancements, challenges, and strategic implications of hypersonic technology, highlighting how it is set to transform air superiority in the twenty-first century.</p>
<p>Hypersonic technology encompasses both aircraft and missiles that travel at speeds exceeding five times the speed of sound. These vehicles leverage advanced propulsion systems, such as scramjets (supersonic combustion ramjets), to achieve and sustain such high velocities. The potential applications of hypersonic technology are vast, ranging from rapid global strike capabilities to enhanced missile defense systems.</p>
<p>However, interest in hypersonic technology is not new. Scientific research began during the Cold War, but only in recent years have significant breakthroughs been made towards advancing hypersonic technology from theory to practicality. The primary drivers of this renewed focus include advancements in materials science, computational fluid dynamics, and propulsion technology. Nations such as the United States, <a href="https://wmdcenter.ndu.edu/Publications/Publication-View/Article/2484178/chinas-hypersonic-weapons/">China</a>, and Russia are at the forefront of hypersonic research, each vying for technological supremacy, with China and Russia attempting to challenge the status quo.</p>
<p>The strategic advantages of hypersonic technology are multifaceted. One of the most significant benefits is the ability to deliver payloads at unprecedented speeds, drastically reducing the time available for adversaries to detect, track, and intercept these threats. This capability enhances both offensive and defensive operations.</p>
<p>Hypersonic vehicles can reach their targets much faster than conventional missiles or aircraft. This rapid response capability is crucial in scenarios requiring immediate action, such as neutralizing high-value targets or responding to emerging threats. The ability to strike quickly and precisely could deter adversaries from initiating conflict, knowing that retaliation would be swift and devastating.</p>
<p>The high speed and maneuverability of hypersonic vehicles make them difficult to detect and intercept. Traditional air defense systems, designed to counter slower, more predictable threats, may struggle to adapt to the dynamic flight paths of hypersonic weapons. This enhanced survivability increases the likelihood of mission success, particularly in contested environments.</p>
<p>Hypersonic vehicles can cover vast distances in a short amount of time, providing global reach without the need for forward-deployed bases.</p>
<p>This capability is especially valuable for nations looking to project power and influence across the globe. It also reduces the logistical burden associated with maintaining overseas bases and allows for more flexible deployment strategies.</p>
<p>Despite their potential, hypersonic technologies face significant technological challenges. Overcoming these obstacles is essential for the successful development and deployment of hypersonic systems.</p>
<p>One of the primary challenges is managing the extreme heat generated during hypersonic flight. At speeds exceeding Mach 5, air friction can cause the surface temperature of a vehicle to reach several thousand degrees Celsius. Developing materials and cooling systems capable of withstanding and dissipating this heat is crucial to maintaining the structural integrity and performance of hypersonic vehicles.</p>
<p>The materials used in hypersonic vehicles must endure not only high temperatures but also extreme pressures and aerodynamic forces. Advanced composites, ceramics, and metal alloys are being developed to meet these demanding requirements. Researchers are also exploring innovative manufacturing techniques, such as additive manufacturing, to create components with enhanced durability and performance.</p>
<p>Maintaining control and accuracy at hypersonic speeds is another significant challenge. Hypersonic vehicles must navigate through rapidly changing atmospheric conditions, requiring sophisticated guidance and control systems. These systems must be able to make real-time adjustments to the vehicle’s trajectory, ensuring that it stays on course and reaches its intended target.</p>
<p>Developing reliable propulsion systems capable of sustained hypersonic flight is a major technological hurdle. Scramjets, which operate efficiently at hypersonic speeds, are still in the experimental stage. Achieving a balance between thrust, fuel efficiency, and structural integrity is critical for the success of these systems.</p>
<p>The deployment of hypersonic technology has profound strategic implications for global security. As nations race to develop and deploy hypersonic weapons, the balance of power could shift, necessitating new defense strategies and international regulations.</p>
<p>The development of hypersonic technology has the potential to trigger an arms race among major powers. Nations may feel compelled to develop their own hypersonic capabilities or invest in advanced defense systems to counter these threats. This escalation could lead to increased military spending and heightened tensions on the global stage.</p>
<p>Hypersonic weapons could enhance deterrence by providing a credible and rapid response option. However, their deployment also raises the risk of miscalculation and escalation. The speed and unpredictability of hypersonic weapons could shorten decision-making windows, increasing the likelihood of accidental or preemptive strikes. That said, the opportunity to discuss potential <a href="https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2023-03/news/us-faces-wins-losses-hypersonic-weapons">gains and losses</a> for both development and implementation of hypersonic weapons is an opportunity to help drive future strategy development.</p>
<p>Developing effective countermeasures against hypersonic threats is a priority for many nations. Advanced radar systems, directed-energy weapons, and missile defense systems are being explored as potential solutions. Integrating these technologies into existing defense frameworks is essential for maintaining a robust defense posture.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://armscontrolcenter.org/fact-sheet-hypersonic-weapons/">proliferation</a> of hypersonic technology underscores the need for international regulations and agreements. Establishing norms and guidelines for the development, testing, and deployment of hypersonic weapons could help mitigate the risks associated with their use. Diplomatic efforts to promote transparency and confidence-building measures are crucial for maintaining global stability.</p>
<p>Regardless of the <a href="https://thebulletin.org/2024/03/hypersonic-weapons-are-mediocre-its-time-to-stop-wasting-money-on-them/">naysayers</a>, hypersonic technology represents the next frontier in military airpower, offering unparalleled speed, agility, and reach. While the strategic advantages are significant, the technological challenges and strategic implications cannot be overlooked. As nations continue to invest in hypersonic research and development, the race for air superiority will intensify, shaping the future of global security. Balancing the benefits and risks of hypersonic technology will be essential for ensuring a stable and secure international environment.</p>
<p><em>Joshua Thibert is a Contributing Senior Analyst at the</em> <a href="https://thinkdeterrence.com/"><em>National Institute for Deterrence Studies (NIDS)</em></a> <em>with nearly 30 years of comprehensive expertise, his background encompasses roles as a former counterintelligence special agent within the Department of Defense and as a practitioner in compliance, security, and risk management in the private sector. His extensive academic and practitioner experience spans strategic intelligence, multiple domains within defense and strategic studies, and critical infrastructure protection.</em></p>
<p><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/11/Hypersonic-Horizons-The-Next-Generation-of-Air-Superiority.pdf"><img decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-28926 size-medium" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/Download-This-Publication-300x83.png" alt="" width="300" height="83" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/Download-This-Publication-300x83.png 300w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/Download-This-Publication.png 450w" sizes="(max-width: 300px) 100vw, 300px" /></a></p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/hypersonic-horizons-the-next-generation-of-air-superiority/">Hypersonic Horizons: The Next Generation of Air Superiority</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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