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		<title>CARRIER, CHOKEPOINT, AND COERCION: THE DYNAMICS OF IRAN-US CONFLICT</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/carrier-chokepoint-and-coercion-the-dynamics-of-iran-us-conflict/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Ahmad Ibrahim]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 09 Mar 2026 12:12:47 +0000</pubDate>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=32411</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Published: March 9, 2026 (Editor’s Note: This article was submitted before the U.S.-Iran conflict began. We intentionally left the article as “forward looking” to signify the value of the analysis.)  After successful US regime-change operations in Venezuela, Washington is aiming for similar endeavor again, this time in Middle East against Iran. Mass mobilization of US [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/carrier-chokepoint-and-coercion-the-dynamics-of-iran-us-conflict/">CARRIER, CHOKEPOINT, AND COERCION: THE DYNAMICS OF IRAN-US CONFLICT</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>Published: March 9, 2026</em></p>
<p><em>(Editor’s Note: This article was submitted before the U.S.-Iran conflict began. We intentionally left the article as “forward looking” to signify the value of the analysis.)</em><strong> </strong></p>
<p>After successful US regime-change operations in Venezuela, Washington is aiming for similar endeavor again, this time in Middle East against Iran. Mass mobilization of US military assets—most notably the deployment of naval armada in the Arabia Sea, the forward deployment of Patriot air-defense system and THAAD missile defense systems, and the sudden evacuation of non-essential personnel from regional military bases, were among advanced preparatory measures by Washington for kinetic action against Iran. Amid heightening tension, few incidents preceded US military actions. Iran <a href="https://wfin.com/fox-world-news/iran-seizes-oil-tankers-threatens-massacre-in-strait-of-hormuz-hours-before-us-talks/">seized two foreign oil-tankers</a> allegedly smuggling oil and had <a href="https://www.cbsnews.com/news/us-tanker-stena-imperative-approached-iran-gunboats-strait-of-hormuz/#:~:text=Dubai%20%E2%80%94%20British%20maritime%20security%20firm,CENTCOM%20spokesman%20Capt.">attempted to approach</a> US flagged tankers. And a US Navy F-35C shot down a <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/petersuciu/2026/02/05/the-abraham-lincoln-carrier-strike-group-is-operating-near-iran/">Shahed-139 MALE UAV</a> in the Arabian Sea.</p>
<p>Amid growing tensions, <a href="../../01_Drafts/bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-02-06/tankers-speed-through-hormuz-chokepoint-on-rising-iran-tensions#:~:text=Takeaways%20by%20Bloomberg%20AI,long%20and%20cumbersome%20to%20maneuver.">hurried</a> to leave the Persian Gulf. The US Department of Transportation Maritime Administration <a href="https://www.maritime.dot.gov/msci/2026-001-persian-gulf-strait-hormuz-and-gulf-oman-iranian-illegal-boarding-detention-seizure">issued guidelines</a> to US flagged commercial ships to keep distance from Iran’s territorial waters and reject Iranian forces permission to board ship.</p>
<p>It is apparent that Trump Administration does not want a prolonged war, rather a quick precise and decisive operation to facilitate regime change. The US Navy was expected to take the lead using carrier-based airpower and cruise-missile strikes from guided missile destroyers (DDGs) and nuclear guided missile attack submarines (SSGNs), followed by bombardment by US Air Force bombers flying from US mainland or from Diego Garcia.</p>
<p>But unlike the Venezuela operation, which was conducted in American backyard, Washington has limited territorial room available for military action against Tehran given limited territorial support by Gulf nations. Therefore, it is likely kinetic operations will be highly dependent on naval forces.</p>
<p>This makes complete sense. At sea, the US enjoys overwhelming technological superiority. The US Navy has an estimated <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1xowraSeCkY">nine warships in the region</a>. Three Independence class Littoral Combat Ships (LCS) stationed in the Persian Gulf but of limited value as these vessels have little  offensive capability.</p>
<p>The Most prominent formation is the Carrier Battle Group led by the nuclear-powered aircraft carrier <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/petersuciu/2026/02/05/the-abraham-lincoln-carrier-strike-group-is-operating-near-iran/">USS Abraham Lincoln</a> (CVN-72), with embarked <a href="https://www.seaforces.org/usnair/CVW/Carrier-Air-Wing-9.htm">Carrier Air-Wing Nine</a> (CVW-9). CVW-9 boasts F-35C Lightening-II stealth fighters, F/A-18 E/F Super Hornets attack aircraft, E/A-18G “Growler” electronic warfare jets, E-2D “Hawkeye” Airborne Early Warning Aircraft and MH-60R Sea Hawk Anti-Submarine Warfare helicopters. The Lincoln is accompanied by three Aegis-equipped Arleigh Burke class DDGs &#8211; each armed with Tomahawk cruise missiles for offensive missions and an arsenal of air-defense missiles for multi-layer defense.</p>
<p>Two additional Arleigh Burke class DDGs are deployed in Strait of Hormuz. Besides surface combatants, an unknown number of Ohio class SSGNs –equipped with a formidable payload of <a href="https://www.csp.navy.mil/SUBPAC-Commands/Submarines/Guided-Missile-Submarines/">154 land attack Tomahawk cruise missiles</a> – are also patrolling in the area.</p>
<p>In theory, this naval armada is an instrument of coercion at sea, capable of projecting power against Iran and establishing local sea-control in the Arabian Sea. The employment of force through the maritime domain against various types of targets including: military targets like air-defense systems, nuclear enrichment facilities, and missile sites; high visibility targets like economic infrastructure; and high value targets like Iran’s political leadership itself, complicate Iran’s defensive measures as US Navy can launch from multiple vectors and over vast oceanic distances.</p>
<p>Any Iranian retaliation will mirror this logic. In a low-level response, Tehran has in the past attempted assertive signaling in the maritime domain, i.e., harassing merchant shipping and <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/liveblog/2026/1/31/live-iran-announces-live-fire-naval-drills-near-us-warships-amid-tensions">conducting naval exercises</a> with Russian and Chinese partners.</p>
<p>A mid-level escalation includes counterstrikes on military assets of US and its allies in the Gulf. Facing an existential threat Iran is attempting maritime escalation, such as closing the Strait of Hormuz. Such a move represents a strategic gamble with global consequences and risks overwhelming US retaliation.</p>
<p>Iran, for its part, understands this asymmetry well. Iranian Navy, with obsolete surface and sub-surface fleet, stands no chance against US Navy in a traditional conflict. However, Iran has structured its naval strategy on sea denial rather than sea control. Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy (IRGC-N) operates hundreds of fast-attack crafts (FACs) equipped with missiles and rockets for saturated strikes against surface vessels. In addition, hundreds of coastal missiles and suicide drones have been dispersed and concealed along the Iranian coast.</p>
<p>Additionally, Iran has commissioned rudimentary specialized vessels, like <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/IRIS_Shahid_Bagheri"><em>Shahid Bagheri</em></a>, <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/IRIS_Shahid_Roudaki"><em>Shahid Roudaki</em></a> and <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/IRIS_Shahid_Mahdavi"><em>Shahid Mahdavi</em></a>, which have the capability to launch swarms of drones and containerized missiles at floating targets. Together, these assets manifest Iran’s <a href="https://www.frstrategie.org/en/publications/notes/irgc-navy-s-long-term-strategy-asymmetrical-warfare-2024">asymmetrical warfare strategy</a> in the maritime domain through which it seeks to overcome US defenses through overwhelming numbers.</p>
<p>Geography facilitates Iran’s strategy. The Strait of Hormuz remains Tehran’s most potent political leverage. At its narrowest point between the Omani Musandam Peninsula and Iran, merely <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/what-is-strait-hormuz-why-is-it-so-important-oil-2026-01-23/">33 kms wide</a> with the shipping lane just 3 kms wide in either direction. Iran’s ability to block this channel using coastal missile batteries, FACs, naval mines, midget submarines, and unmanned systems provide its greatest capability to counter any major aggression.</p>
<p>The US understands this very well. Therefore, instead of venturing in close waters, the US Navy is likely to operate mostly outside the Persian Gulf while relying on Over-The-Horizon (OTH) precision strikes using distance as a buffer.</p>
<p>A blockade of Strait of Hormuz, by Iran will have immediate ramifications at the global scale. Oil tankers carry more than <a href="https://www.strausscenter.org/strait-of-hormuz-about-the-strait/">17 million barrels of oil</a> each day through this strait which accounts for approximately 20% of global net oil consumption.  Saudi Arabia and UAE have alterative pipelines operational which can transit about <a href="https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=65504">2.6 million barrels per day</a>. However, compared to the net volume passing through Start of Hormuz, these pipelines can carry 15.29% at maximum capacity and cannot overcome the economic spillover of any disruption at the Strait of Hormuz.</p>
<p>Yet, for Iran this leverage of Strait of Hormuz is fragile and unsustainable in longer run. Israel’s comprehensive air-campaign against Iranian high value assets and subsequent <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cvg9r4q99g4o">Operations Epic Fury and Midnight Hammer</a> have already exposed major capability voids in Iranian air-defense capability. The Iranian Air Force is obsolete, and its air-defense systems – including domestic as well as Russian and Chinese systems – are mediocre at best.</p>
<p>Against a well-coordinated multi-domain offense, Iran lacks a credible and workable retaliatory option at its disposal. Yes, a large stockpile of short-range ballistic missiles and drones pose a threat, but again, Israel’s precise targeting of Iran’s ballistic missile launchers during Iran-Israel conflict indicates that US can also undertake a similar campaign at a much greater scale employing far more robust options.</p>
<p>But the central question remains: what is Washington’s endgame with Iran? Can limited air strikes realistically cripple the Iranian political regime or permanently degrade its nuclear ambitions, or are they more likely to reinforce the regime’s ideological narrative and deepen Tehran’s perceived necessity for a nuclear deterrent? There are no clear answers.</p>
<p><em>Mr. Ahmad Ibrahim is research associate at Maritime Centre of Excellence (MCE), Pakistan Navy War College (PNWC), Lahore. His areas of research include Modern Warfare, Military Technology, Conflict Studies, and Nuclear Strategy. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own. </em></p>
<p><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/Carrier-Choke-Point-and-Coercion-The-Growing-Risk-of-Iran-US-Conflict.pdf"><img decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-32091" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/2026-Download-Button.png" alt="" width="248" height="69" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/2026-Download-Button.png 450w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/2026-Download-Button-300x83.png 300w" sizes="(max-width: 248px) 100vw, 248px" /></a></p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/carrier-chokepoint-and-coercion-the-dynamics-of-iran-us-conflict/">CARRIER, CHOKEPOINT, AND COERCION: THE DYNAMICS OF IRAN-US CONFLICT</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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		<title>India’s Strategy of Escalation Dominance</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/indias-strategy-of-escalation-dominance/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Sher Ali Kakar&nbsp;&&nbsp;Atta Ullah]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 27 Oct 2025 12:44:00 +0000</pubDate>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=31745</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Recent, statements by Indian Air Force Chief Marshal AP Singh and Indian Army Chief General Upendra Dwivedi reflect how India’s military doctrine is transforming, which, in recent years, has undergone a significant shift and is marked by a more offensive and assertive approach. India continues to expand its military modernization program beyond its defense needs, [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/indias-strategy-of-escalation-dominance/">India’s Strategy of Escalation Dominance</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Recent, statements by <a href="https://www.businesstoday.in/india/story/world-should-learn-from-india-air-chief-marshal-ap-singh-on-russia-ukraine-conflict-israel-war-494869-2025-09-19">Indian Air Force Chief Marshal AP</a> Singh and <a href="https://www.dawn.com/news/1947463">Indian Army Chief General Upendra Dwivedi</a> reflect how India’s military doctrine is transforming, which, in recent years, has undergone a significant shift and is marked by a more offensive and assertive approach. India continues to expand its military modernization program beyond its defense needs, as evidenced by its ranking as the world’s <a href="https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2025-03/fs_2503_at_2024_0.pdf">second-largest</a> importer of military equipment, alongside its huge <a href="https://issi.org.pk/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/IB_Maheen_Sept_24_2024.pdf">investment</a> in indigenization.</p>
<p>India’s strategy of escalation dominance, aimed at acquiring the ability to control the pace, intensity, and outcome of a conflict at each successive rung of the escalation ladder, as well as termination on its own terms, is underway. There are indications of development of such a strategy. Conventional superiority, strategic signaling, ready-to-use nuclear forces, and crisis management are all examples. Its strategy of escalation dominance, coupled with damage limitation, is supported by multilayered missile and air defense systems and canisterization of its nuclear-capable missile for a ready-to-use force, as well as cyber and space capabilities.</p>
<p>These capabilities are considered key to a state’s <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/the-crucial-role-of-escalation-dominance-and-narrative-control-in-nuclear-deterrence/">escalation dominance strategy</a>. However, India’s <a href="https://sci-hub.se/https:/link.springer.com/book/10.1007/978-981-15-6961-6">escalation dominance</a> in South Asia is not only accelerating the intensity of the security dilemma by increasing its own security but also deepening the threat perception of the adversary—weakening the strategic stability of South Asia.</p>
<p>In 2004, India revealed its Cold Start doctrine, a limited warfighting offensive plan to achieve conventional objectives within a limited time frame. Later, two more doctrines, known as the Joint Doctrine for Indian Armed Forces and the Land Warfare Doctrine, were issued in 2017 and 2018.</p>
<p>Recently, the Indian government announced a joint exercise by the Indian Army, Navy, and Air Force, named <a href="https://www.dawn.com/news/1944192">Cold Start</a>, in the first week of October 2025. The exercise aimed to test drones and counter-drone systems that officials labelled as the biggest such drill to be conducted since the May India-Pakistan conflict.</p>
<p>On September 25, 2025, the Indian Ministry of Defense announced that India had conducted a successful flight test of a rail-based Agni-Prime intermediate-range ballistic missile (MRBM). This is the first railway-based ballistic missile, which the minister called “under a full operational scenario.” A rail-based launcher is considered a significant development since the missile can move freely across the national rail network. This  increases the flexibility of the system in terms of its <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/what-significance-north-koreas-rail-mobile-ballistic-missile-launcher">operational capability and survivability</a>, as well as its ability to be deployed quickly.</p>
<p>The development is part of India’s ongoing military modernization program by fielding more types of weapon systems. A rail-based launcher, compared to fixed silos and road mobile launchers, has the advantage of quick deployment, maneuverability, and greater chances of survivability. With the test, India has joined a select group of nations with this capability.</p>
<p>India’s counterforce capability, followed by emerging trends in its nuclear posturing and technological developments, play into Pakistan’s fears. Indian ambitions for conventional counterforce capabilities only increases Pakistan’s fears. Reportedly, India is also pursuing a missile capable of carrying a <a href="https://www.dawn.com/news/1925251">bunker-buster</a>. Its potential to cause massive destruction could cross Pakistan’s threshold for nuclear use, thereby leading to a serious crisis.</p>
<p>These ambitions require expansion of India’s nuclear arsenal in terms of more missiles, more warheads, and more fissile material to fulfill the requirements of its emerging nuclear posture, which is detrimental to regional peace and stability. India’s pursuit of an escalation dominance strategy vis-à-vis Pakistan could be perilous and lead to retaliation and war, as true escalation dominance is rarely attainable in any confrontation.</p>
<p>It is not something that is a feasible policy objective. Ending conflict on favorable terms remains a perilous policy objective. This is the capability of a state to dictate the endgame of a conflict, ensuring that peace is maintained on its own terms, not the opponent’s.</p>
<p>Nevertheless, India’s policy of escalation dominance in South Asia is escalatory, while remaining elusive. The recent four-day conflict is the latest example of India’s objectives to end the conflict on advantageous terms militarily, economically, and diplomatically. For instance, after its strike inside Pakistan, the Indian government immediately started to claim the success of Operation Sindoor, praising its <a href="https://www.deccanherald.com/india/modis-address-to-nation-key-statements-made-by-pm-on-pakistan-3536977">military capabilities</a> and technological strides.</p>
<p>On the diplomatic level, India anticipated the international community`s response to the attacks and support for the Indian stance to strengthen its regional and international standings. However, the failure of the Indian strategy was exposed at the military level when India faced tough retaliation from Pakistan, resulting in the reported loss of its six jets, besides damage to its key military installations, including its costly defense systems. At the diplomatic and economic levels, <a href="https://www.dawn.com/news/1937611">Trump</a>’s repeated claims of credit for ending the conflict question its long-held stance of strategic autonomy and rejecting third parties’ role in resolving the Kashmir dispute. After the ceasefire, Trump claimed that to end the conflict between India and Pakistan, his threat of extremely high <a href="https://www.dawn.com/news/1937611">tariffs</a> was instrumental in reaching a ceasefire agreement.</p>
<p>India has been unable to achieve the desired outcomes from the conflicts it has initiated many times over the past two decades. Latest statements from the Indian military leadership also show that India is unsatisfied with the outcomes of its strategy. It is more useful to treat escalation dominance as a philosophical aspiration than as a feasible policy objective, especially against a country that has a qualitative edge over the initiator of the crisis. Therefore, advanced technologies could be decisive in any future conflicts, but it could be that reciprocal development can offer a counter-capability in the same-domain deterrence and thus may challenge escalation dominance. Pakistan’s policy of full-spectrum deterrence is instrumental in countering Indian ambitions at every level of the escalation ladder. India’s pursuit of escalation dominance complicates the regional security dynamics, which already lack institutionalized Confidence Building Measures (CBMs), a nuclear risk-reduction mechanism, and an arms control framework aligned with the emerging technologies.</p>
<p><em><strong>Sher Ali Kakar </strong></em><em>is an Associate Director of Research with a focus on Nuclear and Strategic Affairs at Balochistan Think Tank Network (BTTN), at BUITEMS Quetta. </em><strong><em>Atta Ullah</em></strong><em> is a Research Fellow with a focus on Nuclear and Strategic Affairs at Balochistan Think Tank Network (BTTN), at BUITEMS Quetta. Views express in this article are the Author’s own.</em></p>
<p><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/Indias-Strategy-of-Escalation-Dominance.pdf"><img decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-29852" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1.png" alt="" width="238" height="66" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1.png 450w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1-300x83.png 300w" sizes="(max-width: 238px) 100vw, 238px" /></a></p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/indias-strategy-of-escalation-dominance/">India’s Strategy of Escalation Dominance</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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		<title>Shahed-136: Iran’s Long-Range Drone and Its Potential Role in a US Conflict</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/shahed-136-irans-long-range-drone-and-its-potential-role-in-a-us-conflict/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Mohammad Hassan Sangtarash]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 14 Apr 2025 12:10:36 +0000</pubDate>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=30522</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>The Shahed-136 loitering munition gained global attention due to its use in Russia’s war on Ukraine. This drone is relatively inexpensive, possesses a swarm capability, and has a precision-strike capability at extended ranges. The Shahed-136 is proving an effective weapon for the Russians. A new version, the Shahed-136B, is available for use in conflict. With [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/shahed-136-irans-long-range-drone-and-its-potential-role-in-a-us-conflict/">Shahed-136: Iran’s Long-Range Drone and Its Potential Role in a US Conflict</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/feb/02/deadly-cheap-and-widespread-how-iran-supplied-drones-are-changing-the-nature-of-warfare">Shahed-136</a> loitering munition gained global attention due to its use in Russia’s war on Ukraine. This drone is relatively inexpensive, possesses a swarm capability, and has a precision-strike capability at extended ranges. The Shahed-136 is proving an effective weapon for the Russians.</p>
<p>A new version, the <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/iran-4000km-strategic-game-changer">Shahed-136B</a>, is available for use in conflict. With an extended range of 4,000 kilometers, the increasing capability of Iran’s long-range drone raises important strategic questions as this weapon’s potential uses beyond Ukraine are considered. Consider Iran’s potential response to an American attack on its nuclear facilities, should the United States and Iran fail to reach an agreement that ends Iran’s nuclear weapons program.</p>
<p><strong>Shahed-136 in the </strong><a href="https://isis-online.org/isis-reports/detail/update-alabugas-production-rate-of-shahed-136-drones"><strong>Russia</strong></a><strong>-Ukraine War</strong></p>
<p><a href="https://www.army-technology.com/projects/shahed-136-kamikaze-uav-iran/">Iran</a> is supplying the Shahed-136 to Russia as supply of the drone is available. Russia often uses the drone to target Ukraine’s energy infrastructure and military positions. The design of this Shahed-136 allows it to bypass traditional air defense systems due to its low radar cross-section and ability to deploy in swarms—ensuring the drone will always get through, at least some portion.</p>
<p>Military officials in Ukraine and the West identified the Shahed-136 as a persistent and cost-effective threat capable of overwhelming advanced air defense systems. In the case of the Shahad-136, quantity has a quality all its own. Russia’s use of this drone is giving Iran valuable battlefield data that allows designers to refine and improve the capabilities of the Shahed-136B, which is proving an even more lethal weapon.</p>
<p><strong>Strategic Implications in a US-Iran Conflict</strong></p>
<p>If tensions between the US and Iran escalate—particularly if the US conducts strikes against Iran’s nuclear sites—the <a href="https://fararu.com/fa/news/778143/%D9%BE%D9%87%D9%BE%D8%A7%D8%AF-%D8%AA%D8%A7%D8%B2%D9%87%E2%80%8C%D9%86%D9%81%D8%B3-%D8%B3%D9%BE%D8%A7%D9%87-%D8%B4%D8%A7%D9%87%D8%AF-%DB%B1%DB%B3%DB%B6-b-%DA%86%D9%87-%D9%88%DB%8C%DA%98%DA%AF%DB%8C%E2%80%8C%D9%87%D8%A7%DB%8C%DB%8C-%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%AF">Shahed-136B</a> could become a key component of Iran’s retaliation strategy. With a 4,000-kilometer range, the Shahad-136B has the potential to strike American strategic assets across the region. With a large American presence spread across the Middle East, there are a large number of Americans and military targets that would make inviting targets. Although the Shahed-136B does not have the legs to strike targets beyond Southern Europe and the Middle East, the number of American bases and assets within the drone’s striking radius are significant.</p>
<p>Iran may also try to launch attacks from unfriendly nations in the Western hemisphere like Cuba or Venezuela or even work with Mexican drug cartels. This proximity, should such an approach work, could allow for attacks on critical targets in the United States. Iran believes the United States is seeking regime change, which will lead the regime to see any fight as a fight for survival.</p>
<p>While military analysts can debate the effectiveness and impact of such a response, the psychological effect achieved is significant. Israelis, for example, live in constant fear of attack from the air. An American attack on Iranian nuclear facilities or other assets would surely elicit an Iranian attack from Iran’s most advanced capabilities.</p>
<p>Iran has a sophisticated network of asymmetric capabilities that extend across the Middle East and Europe. This means any direct confrontation with Tehran could lead to severe and unpredictable consequences for American security. Ensuring Iran does not field a nuclear weapon may be worth the risk of an Iranian response, but it is certainly unknown just how Iran may respond and how effectively the United States and its allies can limit the effect of any response.</p>
<p>Rather than pushing the region toward war, President Donald Trump, who presents himself as a pragmatic negotiator, should consider engaging Iran in constructive dialogue. Despite the <a href="https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/iran-leader-says-us-threats-over-nuclear-program-will-get-them-nowhere/ar-AA1Bonhv?ocid=BingNewsSerp">difficulties in recent efforts</a> by President Trump to work with the Iranian regime, a return to diplomacy could prevent a devastating conflict that neither side can afford.</p>
<p>Keep in mind, the regime in Tehran feels the United States is attempting to end the regime. The desire for nuclear weapons was spurred by American forces in Iraq, Iran’s western neighbor, and Afghanistan, Iran’s northern neighbor. Ratcheting down tensions will require an American effort to create a sense of security within the Iranian leadership.</p>
<p>While the Shahed-136B is not the only tool in Iran’s toolkit, it is an example of the growing capability fielded by Iran. It is also a strategic consideration for the United States. Iran is unlikely to let any attack go unanswered.</p>
<p><em>Mohammad Hassan Sangtarash is an independent defense analyst in Tehran.</em></p>
<p><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/04/Shahed136b.pdf"><img decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-29719" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button.png" alt="" width="302" height="84" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button.png 450w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-300x83.png 300w" sizes="(max-width: 302px) 100vw, 302px" /></a></p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/shahed-136-irans-long-range-drone-and-its-potential-role-in-a-us-conflict/">Shahed-136: Iran’s Long-Range Drone and Its Potential Role in a US Conflict</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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		<title>Is This the Right Moment to Act Against Iran on All Fronts?</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/is-this-the-right-moment-to-act-against-iran-on-all-fronts/</link>
					<comments>https://globalsecurityreview.com/is-this-the-right-moment-to-act-against-iran-on-all-fronts/#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Mohamed ELDoh]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 21 Jan 2025 13:38:38 +0000</pubDate>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=29859</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>The Middle East experienced significant geopolitical shifts over the past year. In October 2023, Hamas launched a surprise attack on Israel, resulting in approximately 1,200 Israeli deaths. Israel’s subsequent military response led to an estimated 40,000 Palestinian casualties, predominantly in Gaza. The conflict caused widespread destruction and displacement, exacerbating the long-standing humanitarian crisis in the region. It [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/is-this-the-right-moment-to-act-against-iran-on-all-fronts/">Is This the Right Moment to Act Against Iran on All Fronts?</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The Middle East experienced significant geopolitical shifts over the past year. In October 2023, Hamas launched a surprise attack on Israel, resulting in <a href="https://www.state.gov/anniversary-of-october-7th-attack/#:~:text=Today%2C%20we%20mark%20a%20devastating,of%20Jews%20since%20the%20Holocaust.">approximately</a> 1,200 Israeli deaths. Israel’s subsequent military response led to an <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2024/12/1158206">estimated</a> 40,000 Palestinian casualties, predominantly in Gaza.</p>
<p>The conflict caused widespread destruction and displacement, exacerbating the long-standing humanitarian crisis in the region. It then extended into Lebanon, where Iran-backed Hezbollah engaged in hostilities against Israel. On November 27, 2024, following months of intense confrontations, the US brokered a 60-day ceasefire, allowing thousands of displaced individuals to return to southern Lebanon. However, the ceasefire’s durability remains <a href="https://apnews.com/article/lebanon-hezbollah-israel-war-ceasefire-tyre-ae002af23c7ec9e19a0cea08fecc9f62">uncertain</a>, with speculation concerning potential violations and the broader implications for regional stability.</p>
<p>In Syria, rebels led by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) capitalized on regional unrest to seize control of key areas, including Aleppo, Idlib, and Hama. The Assad regime’s traditional allies—Iran, Hezbollah, and Russia—were preoccupied with their own conflicts, allowing the Assad regime’s overthrow. HTS, which is presumably anti-Iran, is making Syria more difficult for Iran to influence. Iranian influence allowed the regime to transit armaments to Hezbollah in Lebanon.</p>
<p>Over the past year, Israel intensified its military operations to degrade Iran’s proxy forces across the Middle East, employing a combination of airstrikes, special operations, and strategic assassinations. On October 26, 2024, Israel <a href="https://news.sky.com/story/operation-days-of-repentance-how-israels-strike-on-iran-unfolded-13243562">launched</a> Operation Days of Repentance, targeting over 20 locations in Iran, Iraq, and Syria. This operation significantly damaged Iran’s capabilities for missile production and utilization of its air defense systems.</p>
<p>This also included the destruction of long-range surface-to-air missile batteries and detection radars. Israeli operations employed targeted assassinations to eliminate key figures within Iran’s proxy networks, including Hassan Nasrallah, who was eliminated in an airstrike in Beirut on September 27, 2024, along with other senior officials. Previously, on July 31, 2024, in an operation attributed to Israel, another notable assassination in Tehran, Iran, eliminated Ismail Haniyeh, the political leader of Hamas.</p>
<p>Furthermore, Israeli special forces conducted covert special operations and missions to disrupt Iran’s proxy activities. For instance, in September 2024, Israeli commandos <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/09/13/world/middleeast/israel-raid-syria-hezbollah.html">raided</a> an underground facility near Masyaf, Syria, known for its weapons development and potential use by Iran and Hezbollah to produce precision-guided missiles. Israeli forces also <a href="https://www.ynetnews.com/article/bjynx00hb1g">captured</a> Ali Soleiman al-Assi in southern Syria in November, accusing him of aiding Iranian intelligence efforts.</p>
<p>Despite the systematic degradation of Iran’s proxy forces in the region, Iran <a href="https://apnews.com/article/iran-nuclear-iaea-mideast-wars-israel-7450481f9e42ea5b786c5d672ec382a1">continues</a> to advance its nuclear program, posing a significant threat to the region. The head of France’s foreign intelligence agency <a href="https://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2024-11-29/iran-nuclear-proliferation-critical-threat-in-coming-months-french-spy-chief-says">stated</a> that Iran’s nuclear proliferation poses a serious threat in the coming months, and both France and the United Kingdom are developing strategies to counter this threat.</p>
<p>However, the current geopolitical and military dynamics may present a unique opportunity for Israel to strike Iran, with a focus on neutralizing its nuclear and regional threats. A combination of factors, particularly the expectation of a West-backed Israeli military action to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons, can underpin the reasoning.</p>
<p><strong>Degraded Proxy Capabilities</strong></p>
<p>In the past few months, Israel has effectively degraded the operational strength of Iranian-affiliated groups such as Hezbollah, Hamas, and Shia militias in Syria and Iraq. Moreover, the precise eliminations of various leadership divisions within Hezbollah and Hamas significantly undermine the command frameworks of Iran’s affiliates and their capacity to orchestrate operations.</p>
<p>Furthermore, Israeli precision strikes and covert operations effectively dismantled essential facilities supporting these groups, thereby diminishing their capacity for swift counteractions. With its proxies weakened, Iran is likely encountering difficulties in coordinating a robust regional strategy.</p>
<p>Israeli operations significantly <a href="https://www.businessinsider.com/israel-showed-power-of-f-35s-iran-strikes-uk-admiral-2024-12">degraded</a> Iran’s air defense systems, including their Russian <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ipJ80yH2BfI">S-300</a>s and other advanced defense platforms. This leaves critical facilities, including nuclear sites like Natanz and Fordow, more exposed to precision strikes aimed at eliminating Iran’s nuclear threat. Some Western experts believe that a successful strike now could potentially delay Iran’s nuclear ambitions for many years.</p>
<p>Domestically, Iran is also facing severe economic challenges, including unemployment, inflation, and widespread dissatisfaction among its population, which was further fuelled by protests over the past two years as a result of the dire <a href="https://www.iranintl.com/en/202411173173">economic</a> situation of the country as well as the increasing <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2024/03/1147681">repression</a> by the regime. Ongoing protests and internal dissent are already straining the regime’s resources. Analysts believe that Iran’s leadership is significantly preoccupied with maintaining internal stability rather than launching a significant retaliatory campaign.</p>
<p>Overall, reports indicate that Iran’s national funds are nearly depleted, along with most of its financial resources being drained by its support to military and proxy activities. In addition, <a href="https://manaramagazine.org/2024/11/the-challenges-of-gas-and-electricity-imbalance-in-iran/#:~:text=However%2C%20the%20country%20grapples%20with,energy%20deficit%20by%20next%20summer.">energy</a> shortages, including electricity and gas, have fueled Iran’s economic crisis, thus, severely impacting its citizens and therefore further increasing civil unrest towards the regime.</p>
<p>That said, there is already a growing gap between the government and the public. This gap spans economic, political, and social aspects along with the increasing dissatisfaction over the government’s inability to address internal civil needs in parallel to the increasing repression by the regime.</p>
<p>Iran’s nuclear program is progressing at a rapid pace, with the emergence of reports indicating the <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/11/29/iran-plans-to-install-6000-centrifuges-to-enrich-uranium-iaea-says">installation</a> of advanced centrifuges and uranium enrichment nearing the weapons-grade levels. Israel and the West may be seeing this as a narrowing window of opportunity to act decisively before Iran develops a nuclear weapon or possesses weapons-grade uranium. The possibility of delaying a firm action could allow Iran to fortify its facilities further or even achieve a nuclear breakout.</p>
<p>Iran’s foreign minister recently <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/nov/28/iran-says-it-could-end-ban-on-possessing-nuclear-weapons-if-sanctions-reimposed">stated</a> that if the West proceeds with the threat of reimposing all United Nations sanctions, Iran is likely to move toward possessing its own nuclear weapons. This statement raises concerns about the effectiveness of the sanctions against Iran over the past years in advancing its nuclear objectives.</p>
<p>The ceasefire with Hezbollah and reduced clashes with Hamas is expected to establish a brief respite in regional conflicts. However, the US and European allies are growing increasingly exasperated with Iran’s unwillingness to engage on its nuclear program, which could render decisive action more acceptable on the diplomatic front. Arab nations, while cautious, share concerns about Iran’s regional influence and the progress in the development of its nuclear capabilities.</p>
<p>Although Iran held a new round of nuclear talks with France, Germany, and the United Kingdom on November 29, 2024, talks resulted in <a href="https://www.iranintl.com/en/202411296711">minimal</a> progress and no immediate course of action. This underscores the fact that diplomatic discussions with Iran yielded nothing in recent years, except for Iran’s continued advancement in its nuclear aspirations.</p>
<p>Furthermore, this will likely increase Europe’s shift towards adopting a hard-line position regarding engagement with Iran on nuclear issues. In this respect, it was reported that US President-elect Donald Trump is weighing <a href="https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/trump-iran-plan-nuclear-weapons-def26f1d">options</a> in countering Iran’s nuclear developments, including the option for a preventive airstrike.</p>
<p>Recent Israeli successes against Iran and its proxies created strategic momentum. Waiting too long could allow Iran to rebuild its defenses and recover its regional proxies to actively engage in attrition warfare with American and Israeli forces in the Middle East. This could occur while potentially working covertly in strengthening its own nuclear program. In this respect, some security analysts may argue that a Western-supported Israeli strike would leverage the latter’s current military and intelligence superiority in countering Iran’s regional proxies.</p>
<p>While highlighting these opportunities, it is also important to anticipate the possible risks, including the regional escalation involving Hezbollah, Yemen’s Houthis, Iraqi militias, and Syria. The risk of fully strained international relations with Iran also exists, especially if a strike triggers widespread civilian casualties or destabilizes global oil markets. Furthermore, a military action could arguably accelerate Iran’s nuclear ambitions clandestinely.</p>
<p>Those advocating for prompt action are likely to contend that the dangers of failing to act against Iran surpass the dangers of launching a pre-emptive strike before it is too late, putting Iran in a position to acquire nuclear weapons or nuclear-grade enriched uranium. It can be argued that the current moment is a fleeting alignment of weakened Iranian proxies, vulnerable defenses, and growing nuclear threats, making it a strategically opportune time to act decisively in pressuring Iran to refrain from pursuing its nuclear program. Finally, with President’s Trump return, it can be assumed that the new US administration may not have the immediate intention to pursue diplomacy with Iran, instead it would be more likely that a “maximum pressure” campaign would be adopted.</p>
<p><em>Mohamed ELDoh, PhD, is a business development and consulting professional in the defense and security sector. He regularly authors articles addressing defense cooperation, counterterrorism, geopolitics, and emerging security threats in the Middle East and Africa.</em></p>
<p><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/Is-This-the-Right-Moment-to-Act-Against-Iran-on-All-Fronts.pdf"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-29852 size-medium" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1-300x83.png" alt="" width="300" height="83" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1-300x83.png 300w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1.png 450w" sizes="(max-width: 300px) 100vw, 300px" /></a></p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/is-this-the-right-moment-to-act-against-iran-on-all-fronts/">Is This the Right Moment to Act Against Iran on All Fronts?</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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		<title>Hypersonic Horizons: The Next Generation of Air Superiority</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/hypersonic-horizons-the-next-generation-of-air-superiority/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Joshua Thibert]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 07 Nov 2024 13:29:06 +0000</pubDate>
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					<description><![CDATA[<p>The development of hypersonic technology is poised to redefine the landscape of military airpower. Hypersonic vehicles, capable of reaching speeds greater than Mach 5, offer unprecedented speed and agility, making them a game-changer in modern warfare. This article delves into the advancements, challenges, and strategic implications of hypersonic technology, highlighting how it is set to [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/hypersonic-horizons-the-next-generation-of-air-superiority/">Hypersonic Horizons: The Next Generation of Air Superiority</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The development of hypersonic technology is poised to redefine the landscape of military airpower. Hypersonic vehicles, capable of reaching speeds greater than Mach 5, offer unprecedented speed and agility, making them a <a href="https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/how-hypersonic-weapons-are-redefining-warfare">game-changer</a> in modern warfare. This article delves into the advancements, challenges, and strategic implications of hypersonic technology, highlighting how it is set to transform air superiority in the twenty-first century.</p>
<p>Hypersonic technology encompasses both aircraft and missiles that travel at speeds exceeding five times the speed of sound. These vehicles leverage advanced propulsion systems, such as scramjets (supersonic combustion ramjets), to achieve and sustain such high velocities. The potential applications of hypersonic technology are vast, ranging from rapid global strike capabilities to enhanced missile defense systems.</p>
<p>However, interest in hypersonic technology is not new. Scientific research began during the Cold War, but only in recent years have significant breakthroughs been made towards advancing hypersonic technology from theory to practicality. The primary drivers of this renewed focus include advancements in materials science, computational fluid dynamics, and propulsion technology. Nations such as the United States, <a href="https://wmdcenter.ndu.edu/Publications/Publication-View/Article/2484178/chinas-hypersonic-weapons/">China</a>, and Russia are at the forefront of hypersonic research, each vying for technological supremacy, with China and Russia attempting to challenge the status quo.</p>
<p>The strategic advantages of hypersonic technology are multifaceted. One of the most significant benefits is the ability to deliver payloads at unprecedented speeds, drastically reducing the time available for adversaries to detect, track, and intercept these threats. This capability enhances both offensive and defensive operations.</p>
<p>Hypersonic vehicles can reach their targets much faster than conventional missiles or aircraft. This rapid response capability is crucial in scenarios requiring immediate action, such as neutralizing high-value targets or responding to emerging threats. The ability to strike quickly and precisely could deter adversaries from initiating conflict, knowing that retaliation would be swift and devastating.</p>
<p>The high speed and maneuverability of hypersonic vehicles make them difficult to detect and intercept. Traditional air defense systems, designed to counter slower, more predictable threats, may struggle to adapt to the dynamic flight paths of hypersonic weapons. This enhanced survivability increases the likelihood of mission success, particularly in contested environments.</p>
<p>Hypersonic vehicles can cover vast distances in a short amount of time, providing global reach without the need for forward-deployed bases.</p>
<p>This capability is especially valuable for nations looking to project power and influence across the globe. It also reduces the logistical burden associated with maintaining overseas bases and allows for more flexible deployment strategies.</p>
<p>Despite their potential, hypersonic technologies face significant technological challenges. Overcoming these obstacles is essential for the successful development and deployment of hypersonic systems.</p>
<p>One of the primary challenges is managing the extreme heat generated during hypersonic flight. At speeds exceeding Mach 5, air friction can cause the surface temperature of a vehicle to reach several thousand degrees Celsius. Developing materials and cooling systems capable of withstanding and dissipating this heat is crucial to maintaining the structural integrity and performance of hypersonic vehicles.</p>
<p>The materials used in hypersonic vehicles must endure not only high temperatures but also extreme pressures and aerodynamic forces. Advanced composites, ceramics, and metal alloys are being developed to meet these demanding requirements. Researchers are also exploring innovative manufacturing techniques, such as additive manufacturing, to create components with enhanced durability and performance.</p>
<p>Maintaining control and accuracy at hypersonic speeds is another significant challenge. Hypersonic vehicles must navigate through rapidly changing atmospheric conditions, requiring sophisticated guidance and control systems. These systems must be able to make real-time adjustments to the vehicle’s trajectory, ensuring that it stays on course and reaches its intended target.</p>
<p>Developing reliable propulsion systems capable of sustained hypersonic flight is a major technological hurdle. Scramjets, which operate efficiently at hypersonic speeds, are still in the experimental stage. Achieving a balance between thrust, fuel efficiency, and structural integrity is critical for the success of these systems.</p>
<p>The deployment of hypersonic technology has profound strategic implications for global security. As nations race to develop and deploy hypersonic weapons, the balance of power could shift, necessitating new defense strategies and international regulations.</p>
<p>The development of hypersonic technology has the potential to trigger an arms race among major powers. Nations may feel compelled to develop their own hypersonic capabilities or invest in advanced defense systems to counter these threats. This escalation could lead to increased military spending and heightened tensions on the global stage.</p>
<p>Hypersonic weapons could enhance deterrence by providing a credible and rapid response option. However, their deployment also raises the risk of miscalculation and escalation. The speed and unpredictability of hypersonic weapons could shorten decision-making windows, increasing the likelihood of accidental or preemptive strikes. That said, the opportunity to discuss potential <a href="https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2023-03/news/us-faces-wins-losses-hypersonic-weapons">gains and losses</a> for both development and implementation of hypersonic weapons is an opportunity to help drive future strategy development.</p>
<p>Developing effective countermeasures against hypersonic threats is a priority for many nations. Advanced radar systems, directed-energy weapons, and missile defense systems are being explored as potential solutions. Integrating these technologies into existing defense frameworks is essential for maintaining a robust defense posture.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://armscontrolcenter.org/fact-sheet-hypersonic-weapons/">proliferation</a> of hypersonic technology underscores the need for international regulations and agreements. Establishing norms and guidelines for the development, testing, and deployment of hypersonic weapons could help mitigate the risks associated with their use. Diplomatic efforts to promote transparency and confidence-building measures are crucial for maintaining global stability.</p>
<p>Regardless of the <a href="https://thebulletin.org/2024/03/hypersonic-weapons-are-mediocre-its-time-to-stop-wasting-money-on-them/">naysayers</a>, hypersonic technology represents the next frontier in military airpower, offering unparalleled speed, agility, and reach. While the strategic advantages are significant, the technological challenges and strategic implications cannot be overlooked. As nations continue to invest in hypersonic research and development, the race for air superiority will intensify, shaping the future of global security. Balancing the benefits and risks of hypersonic technology will be essential for ensuring a stable and secure international environment.</p>
<p><em>Joshua Thibert is a Contributing Senior Analyst at the</em> <a href="https://thinkdeterrence.com/"><em>National Institute for Deterrence Studies (NIDS)</em></a> <em>with nearly 30 years of comprehensive expertise, his background encompasses roles as a former counterintelligence special agent within the Department of Defense and as a practitioner in compliance, security, and risk management in the private sector. His extensive academic and practitioner experience spans strategic intelligence, multiple domains within defense and strategic studies, and critical infrastructure protection.</em></p>
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<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/hypersonic-horizons-the-next-generation-of-air-superiority/">Hypersonic Horizons: The Next Generation of Air Superiority</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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