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		<title>Navigating the AI and Nuclear Nexus</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/navigating-the-ai-and-nuclear-nexus/</link>
					<comments>https://globalsecurityreview.com/navigating-the-ai-and-nuclear-nexus/#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Muhammad Shahzad Akram]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 01 Jun 2026 12:12:47 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[AI & Deterrence]]></category>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=32727</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Published: June 1, 2026 As the world gears up for the 2026 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference, a new and multifaceted factor is complicating the global strategic calculus: Artificial Intelligence (AI). The “nuclear-AI nexus” has evolved from a niche technical interest to a prominent feature in global security discussions, with implications for every aspect [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/navigating-the-ai-and-nuclear-nexus/">Navigating the AI and Nuclear Nexus</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>Published: June 1, 2026</em></p>
<p>As the world gears up for the 2026 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference, a new and multifaceted factor is complicating the global strategic calculus: Artificial Intelligence (AI). The “<a href="http://www.nuclear-abolition.com/language/the-impact-of-artificial-intelligence-in-nuclear-decision-making/">nuclear-AI nexus</a>” has evolved from a niche technical interest to a prominent feature in global security discussions, with implications for every aspect of the NPT’s three pillars: non-proliferation, disarmament, and peaceful uses of nuclear energy. However, as experts recently cautioned at the “<a href="https://wise-materials.org/external/from-algorithms-to-atoms-machine-learning-meets-materials-science-2-2-3/">Atoms for Algorithms</a>” webinar, we need to cut through the speculative “AI hype” to ensure this technology remains a means for peace, not an avenue for unintentional escalation.</p>
<p>To regulate the nuclear-AI connection, we first need to understand the technology. As a United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research researcher, <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6MuwZJ48cic">Dr. Yasmina Fina</a> suggests, AI is not a monolithic entity, but a “construct” and a “system of systems,” made up of code, software, data, hardware, and sensors. It is a system used to fulfill certain functions, not a threat capable of usurping human decision-making. The risk is the “<a href="https://thebulletin.org/2025/12/lessons-from-the-uns-first-resolution-on-ai-in-nuclear-command-and-control/">speed and scale</a>” of AI, which can have myriad implications for performance and strategy. Moreover, Fina warns that comparing <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6MuwZJ48cic">nuclear governance to AI governance</a> is unhelpful because the technologies are not the same; nuclear materials are limited and tangible, whereas AI is ubiquitous and digital.</p>
<p>In the context of non-proliferation, AI is touted as a game-changing <a href="https://thebulletin.org/2025/12/lessons-from-the-uns-first-resolution-on-ai-in-nuclear-command-and-control/">verification tool</a>. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) could potentially use “AI agents,” semi-autonomous machines capable of processing large <a href="https://thebulletin.org/2025/12/lessons-from-the-uns-first-resolution-on-ai-in-nuclear-command-and-control/">data streams and satellite images </a>to verify the accuracy of declarations by states at a pace humans cannot match. However, <a href="https://medium.com/@ian-j-stewart/generative-ai-and-weapons-of-mass-destruction-will-ai-lead-to-proliferation-c4476580bbc6">Dr. Ian Stewart</a>, Executive Director of the CNS Washington, states that AI will not help states develop nuclear weapons they could not otherwise build, for two physical reasons: AI cannot “magic up” <a href="http://www.nuclear-abolition.com/language/the-impact-of-artificial-intelligence-in-nuclear-decision-making/">fissile material</a>, and there is no evidence that large language models can transfer the “tacit knowledge” necessary for weaponization.</p>
<p>When it comes to AI and nuclear weapons, political concerns are high. States have been reluctant to allow the IAEA to use open-source data or “black box” algorithms. Should an AI detect an event, the absence of “explainability” or how the machine arrived at its decision could lead to a crisis of <a href="https://medium.com/@ian-j-stewart/generative-ai-and-weapons-of-mass-destruction-will-ai-lead-to-proliferation-c4476580bbc6">political legitimacy</a> for the safeguards system.</p>
<p>The most fraught part of the nexus is disarmament. We are now seeing a “<a href="https://www.sipri.org/publications/2025/sipri-insights-peace-and-security/advancing-governance-nexus-artificial-intelligence-and-nuclear-weapons">race to adopt</a>” AI in military strategies due to the perceived speed advantage it offers. AI can speed up threat identification and data integration, potentially freeing up more time for decision-making (or, on the other hand, reducing decision-making cycles to the point that humans are simply rubber-stamping decisions).</p>
<p>Aliche Sultini, senior research lead at the Rhode Island School of Design, explains that AI systems create new <a href="https://thebulletin.org/2025/12/lessons-from-the-uns-first-resolution-on-ai-in-nuclear-command-and-control/">levels of uncertainty</a>. If a state cannot grasp how an adversary’s AI operates in its decision-making, it might fall into worst-case scenarios, reinforcing alert postures that prevent disarmament. To <a href="https://thebulletin.org/2025/12/lessons-from-the-uns-first-resolution-on-ai-in-nuclear-command-and-control/">support disarmament</a>, AI must be used to enhance technical verification and confidence, not to shorten the path to war. Possibly the most disruptive aspect of this interaction is the NPT’s third pillar: peaceful nuclear energy applications. According to <a href="https://docs.un.org/en/NPT/CONF.2026/PC.II/INF/7">Mr. Shota Kamishima</a> of the IAEA, an “affinity” is emerging between nuclear power and AI. We are now moving into a world where energy-hungry AI data centers need the clean, scalable, and reliable power offered by nuclear power, and where nuclear generation and maintenance are improved through AI.</p>
<p>This alliance is especially important for the rollout of <a href="https://docs.un.org/en/NPT/CONF.2026/PC.II/INF/7">Small Modular Reactors</a> (SMRs), for which AI-optimized construction schedules and supply chains are critical. By enhancing predictability and avoiding cost overruns, a major issue for nuclear construction, AI could make nuclear projects more “bankable” and thus more attractive for the global shift towards clean energy. Despite technological progress, the experts agree: human responsibility is essential. Whether it is a safeguards inspector at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) or a human commander in a nuclear-armed nation, humans are the “<a href="https://docs.un.org/en/NPT/CONF.2026/PC.II/INF/7">last line of defence</a>”.</p>
<p>“Black box” systems are incompatible with a strong safety culture. <a href="https://unidir.org/event/the-nuclear-ai-nexus-implications-for-the-three-pillars-of-the-non-proliferation-treaty-review-conference/">Governance policies</a> must ensure that AI is implemented with transparency, traceability, and “explainability”. We must also be alert to the potential for AI to be employed by “agents” to monitor sites, which could result in disinformation and the distortion of threat perception through “<a href="https://unidir.org/event/the-nuclear-ai-nexus-implications-for-the-three-pillars-of-the-non-proliferation-treaty-review-conference/">anomaly detections</a>.” As the 2026 Review Conference draws near, policymakers’ mission should be to “denoise.” <a href="https://unidir.org/event/the-nuclear-ai-nexus-implications-for-the-three-pillars-of-the-non-proliferation-treaty-review-conference/">Nuclear policy decisions</a> must not be based on science fiction or fear of competition. Rather, we should prioritize “lower stakes” opportunities where AI can help us now, such as employing AI agents to navigate the overwhelming output of the NPT process — making it searchable and highlighting inconsistencies in delegation positions.</p>
<p>The relationship between nuclear and AI is not a bug to be fixed with more software, but a circumstance to be managed by the international community. By prioritizing evidence-based policy and law, human-in-the-loop systems, and the common ground of the peaceful <a href="http://www.nuclear-abolition.com/language/the-impact-of-artificial-intelligence-in-nuclear-decision-making/">“Atoms for Algorithms”</a> alliance, we can ensure that the digital revolution supports, rather than undermines, the global nuclear order. In the end, the fate of the NPT will not be determined by algorithms, but by human intelligence.</p>
<p><em>Muhammad Shahzad Akram is a Research Officer at the Centre for International Strategic Studies, AJK. He holds an MPhil in International Relations from Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad. He is an alumnus of the Near East South Asia (NESA) Centre for Strategic Studies, National Defence University (NDU), and Washington, DC. His expertise includes cyber warfare and strategy, arms control, and disarmament. Views expressed in this article are the author&#8217;s own. </em></p>
<p><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/06/Navigating-the-AI-and-Nuclear-Nexus.pdf"><img decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-32606" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/2026-Download-Button26.png" alt="" width="216" height="60" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/2026-Download-Button26.png 450w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/2026-Download-Button26-300x83.png 300w" sizes="(max-width: 216px) 100vw, 216px" /></a></p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/navigating-the-ai-and-nuclear-nexus/">Navigating the AI and Nuclear Nexus</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
					
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		<title>The Artificial Intelligence (AI) Arms Race in South Asia</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/the-artificial-intelligence-ai-arms-race-in-south-asia/</link>
					<comments>https://globalsecurityreview.com/the-artificial-intelligence-ai-arms-race-in-south-asia/#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Vaibhav Chhimpa]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 21 Oct 2025 12:14:00 +0000</pubDate>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=31719</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>When India’s AI-powered missile defense system intercepted a simulated hypersonic threat in 2023, American analysts were surprised by the ethical framework guiding its development. In South Asia, rapid AI adoption intensifies deterrence challenges as India and Pakistan field autonomous strike capabilities. Existing arms control regimes fail to account for the region’s rivalries, asymmetric force balances, [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/the-artificial-intelligence-ai-arms-race-in-south-asia/">The Artificial Intelligence (AI) Arms Race in South Asia</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>When India’s AI-powered missile defense system intercepted a simulated hypersonic threat in 2023, American analysts were surprised by the ethical framework guiding its development. In South Asia, rapid AI adoption intensifies deterrence challenges as India and Pakistan field autonomous strike capabilities. Existing arms control regimes fail to account for the region’s rivalries, asymmetric force balances, and non-aligned traditions.</p>
<p>That gap undermines American extended deterrence because Washington cannot reassure allies or deter aggressors without accounting for South Asia’s threat calculus. AI arms developments in this region stem from colonial legacies and mistrust of great power intentions, creating a volatile strategic environment.</p>
<p><strong>India’s Governance Innovation in Defense AI</strong></p>
<p>India’s governance model integrates<a href="https://www.niti.gov.in/sites/default/files/2021-02/Responsible-AI-22022021.pdf"> civilian oversight</a> with defense research and ensures ethical deployment of AI. The Responsible AI Certification Pilot evaluated algorithms for explainability before clearance. Its <a href="https://www.niti.gov.in/national-strategy-for-ai"><em>National Strategy for AI</em></a> mandates ethical review boards for dual-use systems. Developers must document bias-mitigation measures and escalation pathways. Embedding accountability at design phase stabilizes deterrence signals by reducing inadvertent algorithmic behaviors.</p>
<p>The<a href="https://visionias.in/current-affairs/"> Evaluating Trustworthy AI</a> (ETAI) Framework advances defense AI governance. It enforces five principles: reliability, security, transparency, fairness, privacy, and sets rigorous criteria for system assessment. Chief of Defense, Staff General Anil Chauhan, stressed resilience against adversarial attacks, highlighting the challenge of balancing effectiveness and safety. By mandating continuous validation against evolving threat scenarios, ETAI prevents mission creep and maintains operational integrity under stress.</p>
<p>India’s dual use by design philosophy embeds safeguards within prototypes from inception. This contrasts with reactive models that regulate AI after deployment. Civilian launch-authorization channels separate political intent from technical execution, ensuring decisions remain under human control and reinforcing credibility in crisis moments. Regular<a href="https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/10493592"> red-team exercises</a> involving independent experts further validate system robustness and reduce risks of false positives in autonomous targeting.</p>
<p><strong>Strengthening Extended Deterrence through Cooperation</strong></p>
<p>US-India collaboration on <a href="https://bidenwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2024/06/17/joint-fact-sheet-the-united-states-and-india-continue-to-chart-an-ambitious-course-for-the-initiative-on-critical-and-emerging-technology/">AI verification</a> can reinforce extended deterrence by aligning technical standards and testing protocols. The <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/international-center-excellence-in-technology">iCET fact sheet</a> outlines secure information sharing and joint safety trials. Launched in January 2023, iCET has already enabled co-production of jet engines and transfer of advanced drone technologies. Building on this foundation, specialized working groups could develop common benchmarks for adversarial-resistance testing and automated anomaly detection.</p>
<p>A Center for Strategic and International Studies report recommends a trilateral verification cell blending American evaluation tools with India’s ethical reviews. Joint trials of autonomous air-defense algorithms would demonstrate interoperability and resolve. A shared “AI Red Flag” system would alert capitals to anomalous behaviors and reduce strategic surprise. Embedding cryptographically secure logging of decision path data ensures an immutable audit trail for post-event analysis and confidence building.</p>
<p>The INDUS-X initiative, launched during Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s 2023 US visit, integrates responsible AI principles into defense innovation. By aligning standards, both countries ensure AI systems enhance strategic stability rather than undermine it. Expanding INDUS-X to include scenario-based wargaming with allied partners can stress-test ethical frameworks and calibrate thresholds for human intervention under duress. This model can extend under the <a href="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/pdf/Lalwani%20-%20U.S.-India%20Divergence%20and%20Convergence%20.pdf">Quad framework,</a> pressuring authoritarian regimes to adopt transparency measures.</p>
<p><strong>Institutionalizing Global AI Arms Control</strong></p>
<p>A formal arms control dialogue should adopt India’s baseline standards for ethical AI governance. The<a href="https://unidir.org/publication/artificial-intelligence-in-the-military-domain-and-its-implications-for-international-peace-and-security-an-evidence-based-road-map-for-future-policy-action/"> UNIDIR report</a> calls for universal bias audits and incident-reporting obligations to prevent unintended escalation. Carnegie scholars propose a tiered certification process under a new protocol for autonomous systems within the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, requiring peer review of algorithms before deployment. Embedding such certification in national export-control regimes would create global incentives for adherence.</p>
<p>The UN General Assembly has established an <a href="https://dig.watch/updates/fourth-revision-of-draft-unga-resolution-for-scientific-panel-on-ai-and-dialogue-on-ai-governance">Independent AI Scientific Panel</a> and a Global Dialogue on AI Governance to issue annual assessments on risks and norms. This mechanism can evaluate military AI applications and recommend confidence-building measures. Procedural transparency would coexist with confidentiality requirements, balancing security with mutual reassurance. Regular joint workshops on risk-assessment methodologies can diffuse best practices and diffuse mistrust among major powers.</p>
<p><strong>Regional Applications and Future Prospects</strong></p>
<p>India’s responsible AI framework must inspire regional adoption and confidence-building measures. Pakistan and China should engage transparency initiatives to prevent dangerous asymmetries in AI capabilities. Proposed measures include <a href="https://www.stimson.org/2024/mapping-the-prospect-of-arms-control-in-south-asia/">joint research on AI safety</a>, shared performance databases, and collaborative development of detection algorithms.</p>
<p>Successful tests of India’s hypersonic ET-LDHCM system, capable of <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5bSpONUdcms">Mach 8</a> and a 1,500-kilometer range, underscore the urgency of governance frameworks before fully autonomous weapons deploy. The Quad’s model of Indo-Pacific cooperation provides a template for multilateral norms on responsible AI in defense. Extending these norms to confidence-building measures such as pre-deployment notifications and automated backchannels can reduce the risk of inadvertent escalation.</p>
<p>Looking ahead to the United Nations General Assembly meeting on AI governance in September 2024, American policymakers can leverage India’s experience. Joint verification exercises and an ethical audit regime will establish global norms for military AI. Integrating lessons from ETAI and iCET into the assembly’s resolutions can produce enforceable standards that bind both democratic and authoritarian states. This approach will reaffirm American extended deterrence and help prevent destabilizing AI-driven arms races worldwide.</p>
<p>By demonstrating that ethical AI development strengthens rather than weakens deterrence credibility, India’s model provides both technical solutions and normative frameworks for managing the military applications of artificial intelligence. Sustained international cooperation on these principles is pivotal for securing strategic stability in a rapidly evolving technological landscape.</p>
<p><em>Vaibhav Chhimpa is a researcher who previously worked with the Department of Science &amp; Technology (DST), India. Views expressed are the Author’s own.</em></p>
<p><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/AI-Arms-Race-South-Asia.pdf"><img decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-29852" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1.png" alt="" width="241" height="67" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1.png 450w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1-300x83.png 300w" sizes="(max-width: 241px) 100vw, 241px" /></a></p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/the-artificial-intelligence-ai-arms-race-in-south-asia/">The Artificial Intelligence (AI) Arms Race in South Asia</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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