The results of the American air strikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities serves as a harsh reminder to those who believe multipolarity is the future of the world order. American military power is still unmatched.

Operation Midnight Hammer demonstrated the remarkable military power of the United States and President Donald Trump’s willingness to use it when an adversary crosses American red lines. The surgical strikes of American stealth aircraft and cruise missiles expertly showcased the awesome power of the American military.

The strikes were more than a display of power. They left no doubt that President Trump is laser focused and committed to protecting American vital interests. The strikes were also a message to allies and foes alike that the United States will stand by its allies when facing an existential threat, especially when that ally demonstrates a willingness to defend itself.

Even though the Trump administration used limited strikes against the nuclear facilities, the underlying message is clear. Red lines, deadlines, and ally support are back. Through the masterful use of deception, stealth, and precision, the American strike was unseen. Tehran’s subsequent retaliatory strikes were nothing more than preplanned and face-saving missile launches to placate domestic audiences.

The follow-on ceasefire agreement stands to put an end to Iran’s regional and nuclear ambitions and forces Iran and Israel to tamp down their hostilities to allow for a negotiated settlement. Interestingly, Iran’s allies effectively abandoned Tehran as the Ayatollah and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) looked feckless and weak compared to the combined strength of Israel and the US.

China, Russia, and Iran’s Middle East proxies were nowhere to be found. The so-called “Axis of Resistance” is in tatters as the result of Israeli and American action. Whether or not Iran takes the opportunity to deescalate and seek a peaceful resolution remains to be seen.  Regardless, Operation Midnight Hammer should be seen as a return to deterrence with Tehran and in the capitals of America’s adversaries worldwide.

Bolstering Alliances

 On the heels of successful air strikes, President Trump received another geostrategic win as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) member states agreed to spend 5 percent of gross domestic product on defense spending. NATO members, with the goading of President Trump, realized that Russian aggression necessitated greater commitment to defense.

Trump’s goal for increased defense spending is not to weaken NATO but to strengthen it. By requiring all members to carry a proportional share of collective defense, American leadership will only strengthen a once great alliance. Russia must reconsider its desire to once again expand its sphere of influence and control by force.

Alliances are based on shared values and commitments. President Trump made it clear that free riding is no longer an option. A strong NATO, with the needed capabilities and political will, can confront aggression and serve as a stabilizing force.

The Dealmaker

 Finally, President Trump made it clear that he desires to be a peacemaker rather than a war maker. Thus, he is seeking to negotiate the end to conflicts around the globe.

First, the administration brokered a peace deal between the Democratic Republic of Congo and Rwanda to end decades of fighting. The administration states that the peace deal will include mechanisms that address the underlying causes of the conflict and pathways for reconciliation.

Second, Trump continues to work toward the resolution of conflict between Ukraine and Russia. While negotiating peace is proving more difficult than expected, the president continues to work toward an acceptable option.

In another significant turn of events, Trump’s dealmakers made overtures to Israel in pursuit of an end to the conflict in Gaza—hoping to end the conflict in the next few weeks. As part of ending the conflict, several Arab neighbors agreed to allow Gazans to immigrate to their countries.

Additionally, the Trump administration also plans to expand the Abraham Accords so that more Arab nations commit to resolving decades of conflict. Trump’s dealmaking goals are aspirational considering that much work remains to fulfill these goals. After decades of animosity, a two-state solution for the Arabs in Israel would be a welcome step toward a lasting peace.

Russia and China failed to provide any resolution to conflict in the Middle East and Africa. Russia has no ability to negotiate a peace deal considering its continued war on Ukraine.  China’s domestic troubles coupled with its questionable usage of the Belt and Road Initiative are backfiring. Russia and China were unwilling to support their friends in need, whereas Washington sought to end conflict. So much for multipolarity.

The past few weeks show a marked contrast to years of wishful thinking and kicking the proverbial can down the road. Peace through strength, President Trump’s foreign policy agenda, seeks to deter adversaries and assure allies while avoiding new conflicts. Ending protracted conflicts through negotiated settlements may also prove a critical element of the Trump Doctrine. The combination of peace and military power may prove a winning combination.

Russia and China cannot achieve these goals. They lack the standing to do so. It should come as no surprise that all eyes are returning to Washington as the world’s leading power broker. Mark Twain once said in response to news stories he was dead, “The rumors of my demise are greatly exaggerated.” Much the same is true of America’s unipolar moment.

Todd Clawson is a retired naval officer with 28 years of service and combat tours in the Middle East, Horn of Africa, and South Asia. He holds a doctorate in defense and strategic studies from Missouri State University. The views expressed are his own.

The Return of the United States Primacy was originally published on Global Security Review.

Yevgeny Prigozhin’s death in August 2023 led to the restructuring of the Wagner Group into several new entities. At least four new groups reorganized thousands of former Wagner fighters, with a significant portion now operating under the Russian Defense Ministry and other intelligence services.

The entity operating as Africa Corps continues Wagner’s operations across Africa, including in the Central African Republic (CAR), Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, and Libya. Estimates suggest that these reconstituted paramilitary groups have around 5,000 members stationed across Africa. These forces are a mix of former Wagner operatives, new recruits, and other mercenaries. They are involved in a variety of roles such as providing security, training, combat operations, support to local regimes, and support to specific factions—like the Rapid Support Forces in Sudan and Haftar forces in Libya. Generally, they have contracts to provide security to unstable regimes in the region.

The presence of Russian troops in certain African nations is a cause for concern. As an illustration, it is worth noting that Russia recently bolstered its military presence in Libya. This includes the deployment of significant military equipment and personnel to provide support for General Khalifa Haftar with towed artillery, armoured personnel carriers, and rocket launchers. Russia is very clearly attempting to bolster its strategic position in the region as it supports aspirations for a naval base in Libya.

This move will amplify Russian influence in North Africa and pose a potential threat to Europe from the southern Mediterranean. In eastern Libya, there are air bases, such as al-Jufra, that serve as refuelling stations for Russian military flights before continuing to other African countries.

There are reports suggesting that Russia is close to setting up a naval base in Sudan, specifically in the vicinity of Port Sudan. In Sahel countries like Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger, Russian forces, including those from the Africa Corps, are helping military juntas. They also participate in operations against insurgencies and safeguard governments. The Russian presence in the Sahel significantly increased after French forces departed from the area. In the CAR, for example, there is a significant paramilitary presence from Russia, and there are plans to establish a formal Russian military base in Berengo. It is anticipated that this base will accommodate a maximum of 10,000 Russian soldiers, bolstering its influence in the region.

The increasing involvement of Russia in Africa has numerous adverse consequences on a global level. In the case of the European Union (EU), the exploitation of migration routes by Russian-backed forces intensifies the issue of irregular migration to Europe, resulting in political and social tensions within EU countries. In addition, the control that Russia can potentially exercise over the oil and gas resources in Libya, for example, gives it the ability to manipulate energy supplies, which undermines the efforts of the EU to reduce its dependence on Russian energy.

For the United States, there are concerns about Russia’s strategic relationship with African regimes, which have the potential to undermine American influence and complicate its counterterrorism and military operations in the region, especially in the Sahel, where extremist groups are growing more active. The US has already taken steps to address security concerns in the Sahel and Maghreb by implementing initiatives like the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP).

These efforts aim to strengthen the ability of countries in the region to combat terrorism and violent extremism. Nevertheless, the current initiatives fall short in addressing the magnitude and intricacy of the violence and governance shortcomings. The involvement of the Russian military in countries like Sudan and Libya has far-reaching consequences for the overall security situation in the Middle East. It has the potential to disrupt neighbouring regions and shape geopolitical decisions. Furthermore, the presence of Russian influence on African resources brings about fresh contenders for control and export of gold, oil, and gas.

To counter the growing presence of Russian forces and influence in Africa, the US and the EU, in coordination with key regional African and Arab partners, must adopt a multi-faceted strategy focusing on military, economic, diplomatic, and soft power measures. Strengthening military cooperation with a selected set of African nations, namely those who share borders with those who experienced a coup over the past three years. Joint exercises, training programs, and the provision of military aid and equipment are crucial, particularly in light of the noticeable decline in Western influence in most Sahel states and the eastern states of Sudan.

In Niger, for example, following the coup against President Mohamed Bazoum, the military junta rejected all US and regional diplomatic initiatives. As a result, we are emphasizing the importance of increasing Western cooperation with countries bordering Niger. Every year, the US conducts Flintlock, the largest annual special operations forces exercise by US Africa Command, with the aim of enhancing combined partner force collaboration in Africa alongside international and NATO special operations forces.

Exercise Africa Lion is also a large-scale US-led annual exercise that involves multiple African and allied nations, focusing on enhancing military readiness and interoperability. However, given the unprecedented level of political instability in Africa over the past few years, as well as the growing influence of Russian groups, it is now a critical time to intensify the West’s security cooperation with regional African partners.

It is essential for the West to strengthen its economic ties with Africa as a means of countering Russian influence in the short term as well as that of the Chinese in the long term. By prioritizing investments in infrastructure, healthcare, education, and other development projects, the West can tackle the underlying issues that contribute to instability. This approach will not only bring tangible benefits to local populations, but also foster domestic goodwill. In doing so, it can diminish the appeal of external support from countries like China and Russia, which have been making significant infrastructure investments in Africa. Providing targeted expertise in mining, agriculture, and energy sectors to strategic African countries will contribute to sustainable development and reduce dependency on foreign entities.

Regardless of its declining effectiveness, diplomatic efforts continue to play a crucial role in countering Russian influence in Africa. Strengthening partnerships with important African nations and regional organizations like the African Union and the Economic Community of West African States, along with specific political groups in unstable African countries, can support the diplomatic efforts of the West and influence the overall narrative. Efforts in the realm of diplomacy should prioritize the promotion of positive governance, human rights, and democratic institutions. This will also enable the implementation of targeted sanctions against entities and individuals engaged in destabilizing activities in Africa with support from Russian groups.

Addressing the challenge of countering Russian influence in Africa requires recognizing the significance of soft power and cultural diplomacy. These aspects play a crucial role in mitigating the impact of disinformation campaigns that aim to manipulate African information systems. It is worth noting that such campaigns have seen a significant rise, nearly quadrupling since 2022.

It is crucial to counter Russian disinformation by supporting independent media and promoting accurate information about the benefits of partnerships with the US and EU. This encompasses a range of initiatives, such as providing financial support for media literacy programs, bolstering the skills of local journalists, and backing civil society organizations and grassroots movements dedicated to promoting democratic reforms in Africa.

It is also crucial to prioritize the expansion of educational and cultural exchange programs. These initiatives aim to foster lasting connections with African youth and future leaders, ultimately contributing to the development of strong relationships. This becomes particularly significant in the context of a changing world, where younger generations are increasingly influenced by Western cultures. Educational scholarships, academic partnerships, and cultural initiatives can contribute to the development of mutual understanding and cooperation.

Engaging in a clear dialogue with African leaders to gain insight into their viewpoints and consistently addressing the geopolitical concerns of African countries will help ensure that their interests are considered in international policies. Thus, this approach should help foster a relationship that aligns more closely with Western values and principles. To address the issue of Russian influence in Africa, it is crucial to establish a collaborative international effort.

This would involve the cooperation of various international partners, including the US and EU, as well as key regional African and Arab nations. Collaborative efforts can greatly enhance the effectiveness and present a united front. Emphasizing regional security initiatives and frameworks that foster stability and cooperation among African countries, including capacity-building programs, will continue to be crucial in addressing the increasing presence and influence of Russian forces on the continent.

Dr. Mohamed ELDoh is a business development and consulting professional in the defense and security sector. Mohamed holds a Doctorate degree from Grenoble École de Management-France, an MBA from the EU Business School-Spain, and an Advanced Certificate in Counterterrorism Studies from the University of St. Andrews, UK. Views expressed are his own. 

Countering Russia’s Influence in Africa: Strategy and Actions was originally published on Global Security Review.

The democratic transition in Sudan was halted in October 2021 when General Abdel Fattah al-Burhane conducted a military coup. Ongoing confrontations between the Rapid Support Forces and the Sudanese Armed Forces keep the country in perpetual instability. They have also drawn civilians into the bloodshed.

Guinean president Alpha Condé was ousted in a September 2021 coup, and his successors pledged to bring in a civilian government by 2024. This has yet to happen.

Two coups occurred in Mali within a short period of time. The first coup occurred in August 2020, and the second one took place in May 2021. The military government promises to restore civilian control. It has not.

Shortly after Gabon’s President, Ali Bongo Ondimba, was re-elected in August 2023, a military coup d’état removed him from power, casting doubt on the legitimacy of the election. Ondimba is but one more example of this trend.

Leaders of these coups frequently use security and governance failures as justification for the actions taken. In reality, they tend to worsen stability and undermine democratic processes. The frequent occurrence of military takeovers in such politically unstable countries adds complexity to diplomatic endeavours and presents substantial obstacles to regional development, stability, and security, including the proliferation of insurgencies and terrorist organizations.

However, a notable trend among these nations in recent years is the steady rise of Russian presence and influence. Over the past few months, there were significant events involving Russian armed groups in Africa, which highlighted Moscow’s growing influence and strategic interests in the region. Russian actions have far-reaching consequences for countering Western influence, especially from the European Union and the United States.

Russia is already strengthening its military ties with several African nations, including those that saw political upheaval in recent years. In May, Russia began implementing a military cooperation agreement with São Tomé and Príncipe, which involves joint exercises, education, training, and logistics.

Guinea-Bissau further strengthened connections with Russia, as President Umaro Sissoco Embalo engaged in discussions with Russian officials regarding diverse areas of collaboration. These include military training and oil exploration.

Russia is also working towards establishing a logistics center on the Red Sea in Sudan. This will strengthen its naval capabilities and strategic presence in the region. Sudan has restated its dedication to Russia in building a naval base on the Red Sea. This development is because of the growing military cooperation between Sudan and Russia, showcasing Moscow’s wider aspirations to enhance its military influence in strategic African nations.

According to experts, there is concern that Russian armed groups are taking advantage of migration routes, specifically those that pass through the Sahara. This exploitation could potentially result in a rise in irregular migration towards Europe. Russia may be seeking to create instability in European nations by intensifying the refugee crises, with the intention of impacting elections and weakening support for Ukraine.

Russia is also actively pursuing economic engagements and resource extraction deals in Africa. Russian officials explored cooperation on infrastructure and natural resource projects, particularly in Chad, Mali, Niger, Sudan, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Russia also sought to dominate the uranium market by acquiring assets in Burkina Faso and Chad. President Vladimir Putin’s strategy to support local regimes, coups, and insurgencies facilitates these economic engagements, as evidenced by recent developments in West Africa.

Furthermore, Russian paramilitary groups, particularly the Wagner Group, or as it is now known, Africa Corps, remained active in supporting local regimes and insurgencies with activities in different African nations, including Sudan, Burkina Faso, the Sahel, the Central African Republic, and Libya. In Libya, for example, Russian forces protect oil and gas interests, which constrains Western access and increases European dependence on Russian energy.

Regardless of the obvious fact that Russia, along with China, has a strategic interest in controlling Africa’s natural resources, Russia has a clear objective of countering the West’s influence in Africa. The impacts manifest on several fronts.

First, when it comes to strategic military positioning, cementing the presence of its paramilitary forces while also establishing military bases and logistical centers in key African locations enhances Russia’s ability to project power and influence regional dynamics—potentially disrupting Western naval operations and trade routes.

Second, by exploiting African migration routes to Europe, Russia can create social and political instability within the EU countries, thus influencing elections and weakening public support for EU policies, including sanctions against Russia and support for Ukraine.

Russia’s investments in African natural resources also provide alternative revenue streams and reduce the impact of Western economic sanctions. Control over critical minerals and energy resources increases Russia’s leverage in global markets, including control of gold mines in Sudan and oil exploration endeavours in various African nations. Russia’s expansion of influence through military cooperation has benefited the latter. Strengthening military cooperation with African nations did indeed help Russia build a network of supportive regimes, limiting Western influence in these countries. Furthermore, by forging closer ties with African countries, Russia is proving successful in undermining Western diplomatic efforts in the region, complicating Western economic strategies, and creating votes and positions in international forums that align with Russian interests.

Russia’s specific involvement in Libya is also important to consider. Controlling significant oil and gas resources is the central focus of Russia’s presence there. By maintaining influence over Libyan oil fields, Russia will constrain Western access to these resources and increase European dependency on Russian energy supplies. The increasing presence of its paramilitary Wagner Group, which is influencing and supporting strongly armed factions within Libya and safeguarding Russian interests, cements this control.

This involvement includes securing key infrastructure and providing military support to local allies. Russian involvement in Libya includes smuggling oil and gas, generating revenue, and undermining EU efforts to cut off Russian energy imports.

Another critical aspect is Libya’s role as a transit point for migrants heading to Europe, which allows Russia to influence migration flows and destabilize European nations—exacerbating the refugee crisis. Overall, Libya’s strategic location on the Mediterranean Sea provides Russia with significant geopolitical leverage, allowing it to project a threat into the Mediterranean and challenge the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s presence.

The actions of Russian paramilitary groups in different African countries, along with their emphasis on safeguarding Russia’s economic interests, are fuelling the rise of terrorism in the region. The growing presence of Russian forces is already exacerbating regional conflicts and heightening local tensions, potentially fuelling the rise of terror groups. This is particularly concerning as organizations with ties to ISIS are gaining momentum in West Africa and the Sahel. The withdrawal of French forces from Mali and Niger, along with the departure of American forces from Niger, resulted in a significant rise in extremist groups in the region. This is having a detrimental impact on the West’s counterterrorism efforts in the region.

Overall, the situation in some African states is proving increasingly worse. The growing influence of Russia comes at the expense of Western powers, resulting in proxy conflicts and potentially destabilizing the continent even more. This can create environments that are conducive to the growth of terror groups. Russia’s manipulation of migration flows can result in worsening the refugee crisis. Terror groups can take advantage of this to bolster influence, bases, and activities in Africa and beyond. The dangers of worsening local conflicts are becoming more pronounced and the escalating violations of human rights in numerous African countries pose a range of intricate consequences that could potentially affect the stability of African.

In short, Russian action in Africa is bad for its inhabitants and bad for the West. At some point the West must counter Russia’s malicious efforts.

Dr. Mohamed ELDoh is a business development and consulting professional in the defense and security sector. Mohamed holds a doctorate degree from Grenoble École de Management-France, an MBA from the EU Business School-Spain, and an Advanced Certificate in Counterterrorism Studies from the University of St. Andrews, UK. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own. 

Russia’s Influence in Africa: Understanding the Big Picture was originally published on Global Security Review.

According to the 2018 Global Slavery Index, an estimated 40.3 million men, women, and children were victims of modern slavery. Women and girls made up 71 percent of victims. Modern slavery is most prevalent in Africa, where 9.2 million live in servitude, followed by Asia and the Pacific region.  State-imposed forced labor and forced marriages constitute the primary culprits of enslavement, which are compounded by recurrent or protracted bouts of armed conflict, especially in fragile and grossly underdeveloped states, such as Burundi, Eritrea, or Mauritania. Slavery or enslavement is a distinct legal concept. It is defined in Article 7(2)(c) of the Rome Statute  as “the exercise of any or all of the powers attaching to the right of ownership over a person and includes the exercise of such power in the course of trafficking in person, in particular women and children.” The 1956 Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery regards slavery as being constituted by four states of servitude, among them debt bondage, servile marriage, exploitation of children, and serfdom. Article 4 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), on the other hand, in Article 8 prohibits the use of forced or compulsory labor and provides for the opportunity to freely choose the means of one’s gainful employment. Forced labor must not entail an element of ownership to constitute slavery but many forms of slavery often involve forced labor which can take many forms, including forced labor exploitation, forced sexual exploitation, and state-imposed slavery, which persists in contravention of Article 4 of the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights. In Mauritania, for instance, individuals become property of their masters, who exercise total ownership over their human ‘property’ and over their descendants. It is not uncommon for slaves, which account for an estimated 155,000 of population, to be inherited by family, to be bought, sold or rented out, and be given away as gifts.

Children are especially prone to various forms of enslavement and become particularly vulnerable to conditions involving forced labor. “Worldwide, 218 million children between ages 4 and 17 are in employment. Among them 152 million are victims of child labor; almost half of them, 73 million, work in hazardous child labor.” One in four victims of modern slavery is a child.

The resurgence of widespread and pervasive forms of modern slavery on the African continent coincides with the reinvigoration of the mining industry, which in turn, benefits from an amalgamation of human vulnerabilities. Poverty and civil conflict, fragile peace, debilitated post-conflict economy, low income, poor health and education of the general population increase opportunities for debt-bondage and resource depletion through unauthorized, poorly monitored and rudimentary illicit digging. Economies of fragile or underdeveloped states remain subservient to governmental fiat whose monopoly on the means of production open prospects for graft and political corruption. Military rule and state ownership of key resource extraction industries on the continent, on the other hand, contributes to the prolongation of civil wars and rebellions, growth of the black market and rise in organized criminal activity. Resource-rich African countries like Angola, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Eritrea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone, to name but a few, have long suffered from the consequences of internal skirmishes, conflicts and outbursts of unstable peace, while also being home to substantial mineral, gem and diamond deposits. This paradox of plenty combined with poor growth and anemic developmental outcomes has been dubbed by scholars as the resource curse, which does not go unnoticed by enterprising Western as well as also increasingly Chinese resource extraction entities.

Africa’s wealth…

Africa “hosts 30% of the earth’s mineral reserves, including 40% of gold, 60% of cobalt, and 70% of platinum deposits, and produces about 30% of the world’s gold, 70% of the world’s platinum, 28% of the world’s palladium, and 16% of the world’s bauxite … and 595,507 kg of gold-bearing ores.” The Democratic Republic of Congo, alone, according to Forbes, is endowed with over $24 trillion worth of untapped mineral deposits, including copper, diamonds, and coltan. The promise of high earnings potential combined with an unquenchable hunger for key mineral resources by China boosts foreign direct investment on the continent, stimulating an export economy, encouraging large-scale labor migration, and feeding irregular smuggling industries. Employment of child labor in mining is not uncommon and the involvement of political classes in resource extraction profiteering – by legal and illegal means – contributes to an exacerbation of already anomalous patterns in income and wealth distribution in fragile, poverty-stricken yet resource-rich African states. Even the established agrarian economies and subsistence farming become prone to major shifts in output as mining relocates workforce, supplants food production, and contributes to noticeable market declines in the agricultural sector of the economy. Poor man’s hopes of sharing in the wealth of gem, diamond and mineral deposits become dashed by revenue capture by large multinational corporations and political and organized criminal enterprises, polluting the local environment and depleting the land, while amplifying opportunities for civil unrest.

… and its inglorious colonial past

Today, the African continent faces its own peculiar set of especially difficult problems, split between a colonial past and a Chinese-dominated future. The cycles of boom and bust in the global supply chains of valuable minerals, coal, copper, uranium, gold, gems and diamonds have played an especially prominent role in Africa’s economic (under)development. Historical exploitation of the continent’s natural resources over the years put a cumulative stress on the traditional agricultural prowess of Central and Southern African states, straining familial and tribal relations and deeply affecting the moral and social fabric of its traditional orders. “Between 1867 and 1935, more than £1,200 million of public and private capital was invested in Africa.” Infusion of capital resulted in high demand for land and labor which caused “a massive decline in rural productivity” and “destroyed the economic, social, and political structures which had held African society together.” Colonial administration of African lands attracted French, German, Belgian, British, and German interests, which invested heavily in the mining industry, “whose dominant units [were] the major international corporations, that cause[d] and reproduce[d] the continent’s underdevelopment.”

The period of decolonization brought with it the globalization of the mining industry, which introduced American and Japanese stakeholders and developed new deposits in Australia and Canada, financed by the profits from Africa. Foreign interests brought capital resources, financial finesse, and technological innovation, yet profits have been one-sided and have disproportionately accrued to Western companies and their financial sponsors – large banking institutions such as Barclays, Deutsche Bank, or First National City Bank of New York – who upon entering into agreements with African governments were guaranteed unobstructed market access and little to none opposition to their projects, while Africa descended into  poverty, civil conflict, and war. Between 1868 and 1928, the South African diamond- and gold-mining industry alone generated “£340 million worth of diamonds, while the total amount of foreign capital invested in the diamond industry was probably no more than £20 million. The dividends of the diamond-producing companies, excluding the profits made by the individual diggers, exceeded £80 million.” Any foreign investments made around the African mineral resource economy were made to ensure the infrastructurally sound and reliable access and export of the mined goods. Investments in transportation links – railways and river barges – had been made to link Africa’s mineral wealth to the main trading routes that fed into the global economy; they had not been made to equip the continent with suitable standards of living and a sure path to development and independence.

The world’s ferocious demand for Africa’s resources, over decades of Western domination and exploitation, only exacerbated the continent’s underdevelopment and increased its dependence. The scramble for Africa’s wealth encompassed material and human goods leaving the continent’s men, women and children at the mercy of the supply and demand chains of the global economy. Mining in Zaire by near-monopolistic power of international capital, for example, “distorted the country’s social structure” through land expropriation leading to the pauperization of the peasantry and blocking the emergence of national bourgeoisie. The need for “cheap black labor” in Southern Rhodesia (present-day Zimbabwe) and the desire to stabilize the supply of labor force resulted in the colonial imposition of a land tax on the African population with an aim of preventing lucrative yields from land cultivation and forcing the local population into industrial mining. Despite Liberia’s position as “a country exceptionally well endowed with natural resources, of iron ore as well as diamonds and other minerals, with good soil, a huge potential in forestry and a booming export trade” the serious budgetary deficits which the country faced in 1968 were largely due to the generous concession agreements, relaxed government supervision of accounting and financial reports, and the inevitable “enormous outflow of resources to the mining companies.” Nearly a third of the country’s GNP of the monetary sector of the economy was consumed by the outflow of cash to foreign interests. Similarly, parasitic practices repeated many times over across the continent – from Zambian copper, South African gold, Namibian and Gabonese uranium, to Togolese phosphates – produced thriving Belgian, British, German, French, and American economies while sentencing Africa to the distressing Third World status. The seizure of land and deliberate suppression of indigenous industries and agricultural development is known to have been replicated by European colonial powers in French North Africa, Anglo-Dutch East and South Africa as well as India. As Shashi Tharoor has shown in Inglorious Empire: What the British Did in India (2017), when the East India Company was established in 1600, Britain accounted for a mere 1.8 percent of global GDP and India for the impressive 23 percent. In 1750, India and China together accounted for three-quarters of the global industrial output. However, by the time of India’s independence in 1947, after decades of systematic plunder and transformation by British imperial rule, India’s contribution to world GDP decreased to 3%, while Britain’s was three times as high, reversing the large imbalances of wealth and political leverage which have lasted well into the 21^st century.

History doesn’t repeat itself, but it rhymes

Today, Africa’s developmental path is heavily influenced by Chinese mining and resource extraction interests, substantial investments in agriculture, infrastructure, peacekeeping, and formal and informal security arrangements, which once again, set the continent firmly on the path of protracted material dependence. According to Brookings, between 2000 and 2017, China provided $143 billion in loans to African governments and their state-owned enterprises in the form of concession loans, credit lines, and development financing and pledged additional $60 billion at the 2018 Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC).¹ The Export-Import Bank of China loan guarantees involve confiscation of resource-rich lands in the event of default. The world’s second largest economy imports $100 billion worth of base metals every year and its interests in Sub-Saharan Africa’s natural wealth in cobalt, chromium, iron ore, copper, gold, manganese, among others, will undoubtedly change the social-economic trajectory of Ghana, Democratic Republic of Congo, Cameroon, Kenya, Sudan, Tanzania, and Zambia. Mining alone, however, implicates cognate conflicts over land ownership, human rights abuses, and environmental degradation on the continent. The impact of mining on the environment has already caused much disaffection and concern. Harmful levels of radioactivity and poor corporate social responsibility paired with inadequate state oversight and corruption of state and local elites threaten to further exaggerate Africa’s vulnerabilities and accelerate social and economic inequalities of already disempowered local populations. In exchange for African countries’ symbolic political support in global institutions and multilateral fora, China – in substantially instrumental yet strategic ways – is gobbling up Africa’s vast natural resource wealth in order to ensure its own global dominance by 2049, the centennial of China’s Communist Revolution.

The many temptations of Chinese direct foreign investment in largely acquiescent Africa are bound to overlook the substantial human cost of forced or state-sanctioned labor, which all-too-frequently assist in the states’ rapid industrialization and upward economic growth.

Despite great legal strides being made in the form of the 1926 Slavery Convention, the 1956 United Nations’ Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, Slave Trade, and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery, the 1976 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the 1957 Convention of the Abolition of Forced Labor, states and corporate entities are often complicit in the crime which maintains and perpetuates a system of political and economic domination and sustains structural inequalities inherent in the global economy. The illicit labor landscape is further complicated by mass population movements resulting from conflicts in North Africa and the Middle East. Vulnerable and at-risk populations turn to organized networks of smugglers and traffickers, who profit from human tragedy. Fresh supply of labor of forced and unforced nature creates opportunities for exploitation which often falls under the definitional category of ‘modern slavery’ or other forms of ‘consensual exploitation’ stemming from economic desperation offered in exchange for inhumane treatment and substandard working conditions. According to the 2005 A Global Alliance Against Forced Labour report “80 percent of forced labor is found in the private economy, mainly in the rural and informal sectors in developing countries, but also penetrating the supply chain of major companies in the developing and industrialized world alike.” Yet, the enforcement and criminalization of such practices remains elusive due in large measure to the architecture of modern demand and supply chains. Scholars even suggest that

“…the majority of victims of forced labour are not slaves of brutal war lords, dictatorial regimes or mafia-type criminal networks. They are subjected to coercion in the informal economy and in mainstream economic sectors, tied to their workplaces by subtle means of coercion and control… their exploitation is part and parcel of labour relations in certain parts of the economy.”²

Can international criminal law be an effective instrument against modern slavery?

The present-day landscape of corporate- and government- level initiatives attempting to address and redress the transnational nature of modern slavery has been gradually populated by a set of guidelines and good practices across industries and continents. Since the enactment of International Labour Organization’s 1977 Tripartite Declaration of Principles concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy, the UN Global Compact, and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises – which call for elimination of forced and child labor – governments and businesses alike have been forced to reckon with human rights abuses within their supply chains. Additionally, the Athens Ethical Principles adopted by business companies in 2006 to combat human trafficking worldwide, have espoused seven main values:

“(1)  Demonstrate the position of zero tolerance towards trafficking in human beings, especially women and children for sexual exploitation (Policy Setting); (2) Contribute to prevention of trafficking in human beings including awareness-raising campaigns and education (Public Awareness-Raising); (3) Develop a corporate strategy for an anti-trafficking policy which will permeate all our activities (Strategic Planning); (4) Ensure that our personnel fully comply with our anti-trafficking policy (Personnel Policy Enforcement); (5)  Encourage business partners, including suppliers, to apply ethical principles against human trafficking (Supply Chain Tracing); (6) In an effort to increase enforcement it is necessary to call on governments to initiate a process of revision of laws and regulations that are directly or indirectly related to enhancing anti-trafficking policies (Government Advocacy); (7) Report and share information on best practices (Transparency).”³

The identification, prevention, and mitigation of human trafficking, forced labor, and human rights abuses propelled by sporadic intensification of stakeholder pressures and generalized public boycotts, could benefit, however, from the assistance of regulators and law enforcement entities. By criminalizing behavior of companies and governments and holding them accountable for falling short on their commitments to the minimization of opportunities for human exploitation are severely overdue steps in the corporate responsibility and state liability discourse and practice. Domestic and international legal and criminal liability might be an effective last resort in incentivizing human rights compliance in both mainstream and informal sectors of the economy and broader state development schemes. The International Criminal Court (ICC) with its comprehensive transnational legal mandate can be a powerful institutional weapon in the fight against modern forms of slavery, which can ensure a modicum of accountability and just satisfaction as it prospectively endeavors to redress the all-too-prevalent abrogation of human, civil, and political rights. Strategic litigation that draws on international criminal law – be it through the ICC or other international judicial mechanisms – can provide a requisite roadmap to future prosecution of offenses of universally objectionable nature and issue an authoritative statement on crimes shocking to the human conscience.

¹ Y. Sun. 2020. “China and Africa’s debt: Yes to relief, no to blanket forgiveness” https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2020/04/20/china-and-africas-debt-yes-to-relief-no-to-blanket-forgiveness/

² B. Andrees, “Defending Rights, Security Justice: The International Labor Organization’s Work on Forced Labor” JICJ. 343-362.

³ Business and Human Rights Resource Centre. “The Athens Ethical Principles” https://www.business-humanrights.org/en/pdf-athens-ethical-principles

Africa’s (Modern) Slavery Problem was originally published on Global Security Review.

In response, the Trump administration’s 2018 “Africa Strategy” specifically targets Russia as a key geopolitical rival, presenting the United States’ potential African partner countries with an apparent choice between Cold War-style enemies. Again in March, the U.S. pointed to Russia as a threat in Africa, when Deputy Secretary of State John J. Sullivan warned Angola of Russia’s interests in Africa. The U.S. media environment has also fostered an ascendant vision of Russia in Africa, quoting “alarmed” U.S. officials who speak of Russia being “highly active” in the region.

This growing narrative pushes an inflated interpretation of Russia’s real capabilities while ignoring or footnoting the broader context. The relative size, scope, and trajectory of Russia’s gradual increasing economic involvement in Africa indicate an approach fitting with the behavior of other similarly sized economies. Russia’s military footprint and economic connections remain comparably marginal in Africa, while the French, Chinese, and U.S. hold entrenched positions. Meanwhile, Russian military adventurism on the scale of with its involvement in the Syrian Civil War is unlikely in Africa, owing to a Russian population increasingly vocal over domestic issues and opposed to foreign entanglements. 

Russian global military posture skips Africa

The Kremlin’s military priorities are planted firmly in Russia’s elongated peripheral regions of Europe, the Middle East, Central Asia, and East Asia. Insofar as Russia leaves these spaces, it is usually to counter the United States and allies (who are actively involved in Russia’s neighborhood themselves) with low-level incursions designed for disruption. 

In terms of intentions, the Russians, unlike the Americans, do not fight a Global War on Terror across the Sahara/Sahel, requiring a lily pad strategy of U.S. drone bases for thousands of miles. There is not an internal security dimension to Russian involvement in Africa, precluding similarly scaled military deployment. 

In terms of capabilities, Russia lacks a significant military or political command in Africa. Many African countries do not have a Russian embassy or even a small diplomatic mission, and Russia’s military footprint—outside of small contingencies of mercenaries—remains marginal, with no bases to bivouac within, and no host governments agreeing to allow them space.  Meanwhile, the United States has 5-6,000 soldiers across Africa and around 34 bases. 

While the United States and ally France fulfill air-land-sea campaigns across multi-country theaters, Russia fills niche support roles with countries the United States does not have significant military relationships with—such as Zimbabwe, Tanzania, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Sudan, and South Sudan. 

It is worth noting that the two most high-profile instances of Russian influence in Africa in recent years were borne out of economic enterprises for Russian businessmen. In 2017, mercenaries—not Russian soldiers—from the Wagner Group outfit began advising Central African Republic (CAR) on how to defend against militias in the country’s seven-year-long civil war.  In 2018, it was reported that Russian individuals arrived as consultants in several African countries to influence their elections, such as South Africa and Madagascar. As with the Wagner Group, it was possibly money that drew in the operatives, rather than clear strategic objectives from Moscow. 

Russo-African Economic Normalization is…Normal

In addition to a smaller military presence, Russia is also a minor economic player in the region. Russia retreated from Africa after the 1991 collapse of the Soviet Union but reinvested in a sharp increase over the past 20 years. The increases are notable not for their scope but rather their steep return from much lower levels. 

Russian trade with Africa makes up less than 1% of global trade with Africa, which is comparable to economies of its own size, though far behind the United States, China, and especially Europe. 

Foreign wars are increasingly unpopular in Russia, reducing the risk of major interventions beyond Russia’s periphery

Russia will continue attempts to drum up economic integration with Africa to bring life to its weak economy, but military interventions involving long-term ground deployments to active conflicts, especially at the levels seen by the United States and France, are unlikely—owing to the growing unpopularity of foreign wars among Russians. Refocusing inward, Russia is less likely to afford attention to far-reaching foreign entanglement in the future, moving Africa further to the bottom of the Kremlin’s limited agenda. 

Moving forward, and with this context in mind, the Cold War-esque U.S. government and media perspective may incur negative policy implications and misconstruing the United States’ geopolitical rivals’ roles risks miscommunication with current or potential African allies. The United States has the benefit of strong favorability in many Africa states. The U.S. should market itself as a productive partner irrespective of other outsiders, and remind African countries of their agency, rather than force a choice between supposed zero-sum competitors.

Don’t Buy the Hype on Russia in Africa was originally published on Global Security Review.

Data breaches seem to be the name of the game in tech this year, and the latest, a software flaw that exposed the private data of hundreds of thousands of Google+ users, has just snagged the spotlight. Despite the fact that data breaches and cybersecurity attacks occur across the globe, their occurrences in major technology markets such as the United States and the European Union (EU) tend to take policy precedence and draw greater media attention.

However, as emerging market nations—such as Indonesia and those in Sub-Saharan Africa—continue to rapidly digitize and foster new technology-based businesses, more attention needs to be paid to the risks these markets and their users face. Failure to do so will significantly hinder economic growth and business development in these regions.

Over 90% of African businesses operate under the cybersecurity poverty line, which means they are unable to adequately protect themselves from vulnerabilities and losses. Although Africa has comparatively limited communications infrastructure, the continent has a high penetration rate of new technologies, and as a result is a prime target for digital attacks. In 2017, cybercrime cost the continent $3.5 billion and yet 96% of online security incidents went unreported. Large and expanding digital hubs such as Nigeria and Kenya particularly suffered, accruing losses of $649 million and $210 million, respectively.

Cybercrime in Africa has targeted startups, corporations, institutions and governments alike. This June, South African insurance company Liberty Holdings Ltd. was held ransom by hackers who were able to access sensitive data including emails. The company is responsible for overseeing 2.5 million life-insurance policies and administering over 10,000 retirement plans and 500,000 individual and institutional investment customers, raising concerns about the consequences of such a hack. Some progress, however, is being made: there was a 73% increase of Information Security Management System certified companies on the continent between 2015 and 2016, the majority of which are based in South Africa, Nigeria and Morocco.

Similarly, in the Asia-Pacific region, cybercrime poses a serious threat to economic success. A study commissioned by Microsoft found that the total potential losses to the region from cyber attacks was $1.745 trillion, or 7% of the region’s current gross domestic product (GDP). These risks are particularly apparent in the ASEAN region, where nations invest an average of 0.07% of their GDP in cybersecurity infrastructure and operations. The consequences of such underfunded and undervalued cybersecurity initiatives can be seen in practice in Indonesia, where the country’s highest valued startup on record, Go-Jek, was found to have significant security vulnerabilities. 

Go-Jek is a ride-sharing and logistics startup that has over 15 million weekly active users and is widely considered a major competitor to global brands such as Uber and Lyft. In March 2017, Fallible, an Indian security firm claimed they were able to extract information such as GPS coordinates of rides and user data such as phone numbers and pick up and drop off points from two problematic APIs on the app. The firm also claimed they were able to exploit a vulnerability which enabled them to manipulate notifications users received. An Indonesian hacker based in Thailand identified similar vulnerabilities in 2016. Go-Jek is Indonesia’s first startup to become a unicorn (meaning it became valued at $1 billion), and over the past year, the company has invested heavily in expanding their services to include mobile payments. 

This expansion into a field that engages with even more sensitive user data underscores the need for a greater cybersecurity focus, as well as a complementary regulatory environment that similarly prioritizes security in tandem with growth. In 2017, the Government of Indonesia took steps in this regard, establishing a National Cyber Agency (NCA) to develop an integrated cyber defense strategy. However, given that in the same year, almost half of Indonesia’s companies were impacted by over 205 million cyber-attacks, costing $34 billion in direct financial losses and long-term reputational damage, there is a great deal of work to be done. 

In larger and more developed technology markets, data security and privacy laws such as the recently passed General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) compel companies to invest more time and resources into developing and maintaining robust security infrastructure. However, in markets, such as in Sub-Saharan Africa and Asia-Pacific, where such regulations and cybersecurity-focused policy environments are weaker or lacking in enforcement, commensurate practices by businesses are less common.

Going forward, emerging market businesses and governments need to recognize that to achieve economic growth and reap the benefits of the ongoing digital boom, cybersecurity needs to be a priority. In practice, this means that there needs to be greater emphasis on operating and maintaining updated and robust security systems; training and expanding cybersecurity workforces; developing long-term cyber resilience strategies that account for all levels of corporate or institutional operations; raising awareness about the importance of such security practices; and generating legislation that adequately offers protections and remediations. 

Greater investment in regionally-specific cybersecurity infrastructure can also open up noteworthy business opportunities. The cybersecurity market is expected to be worth $2 billion by 2020, and thus far the African continent has not released any commercially viable cybersecurity products, while ASEAN nations, although having made some progress, also have room to grow.

The average cost of cybercrime for businesses and governments across the globe is increasing at a rapid rate, and emerging markets are at significant risk. Developing more robust cybersecurity infrastructure, policies, programs and cultures must be prioritized. This is particularly important now as these regions will soon be host to the majority of global internet users, as well as a large share of future digital businesses and services. 

Cyber Insecurity is Harming Emerging Markets was originally published on Global Security Review.

Continuing conflict and lack of political and economic reform threaten poverty reduction, the area’s one last bright spot.  Resource dependence and foreign assistance have propped up elites even as it fostered widespread reliance on the nation by inhibiting markets, employment, and human capital.

MENA: The Middle East and Northern Africa

With oil prices unlikely to recover to levels of the petroleum boom governments may have to limit cash payments and subsidies.  At the meantime, social networks have provided new tools for citizens to vent their political frustrations.  Conservative religious groups—including Brotherhood affiliates and movements—and ethnically-based organizations like those based on Kurdish identity are poised to be superior alternatives to weak governments in the region.

Such groups typically supply social services better than the nation and their politics resonate with publics who’re usually more conservative and religious than the region’s political and economic elites.

If left unchecked, current trends will further fragment the region.  The effect of Islamist groups is very likely to expand, reducing the tolerance for and presence of minorities, setting the stage for additional migration flows.  Hazards of uncertainty in Arab countries like Egypt, and possibly Saudi Arabia, could induce rulers to impose control via force–an impulse at odds with countertrends like the technological empowerment of human data flows, and poverty reduction.

Additionally, a transition to democracy could offer an attractive model, if it delivers better stability and inclusive wealth.  Progress on poverty reduction, education, and girls’ empowerment in individual portions of the region provides momentum for tapping into the growing number of young people which will be coming of working age.

Geopolitically, developing humanitarian crises and regional conflict in the Middle East and North Africa will threaten to further undermine the credibility of international dispute resolution and human rights standards.  Perceptions in the area’s capitals which Washington is undependable have invited competition from Russia, and possibly China, and hedging by nations regarding US obligations.

These perceptions stem from unenforced red lines in Syria, withheld support for Mubarak along with other Arab incumbents in 2011, an alleged tilt toward Iran and away from traditional Sunni allies and Israel, and a sense of neglect due to the US rebalance to Asia.

At the meantime, Iran, Israel, and perhaps Turkey are likely to rise in power and influence relative to other nations in the area but will remain at odds with one another.  Iran’s growing influence, nuclear capabilities, and aggressive behavior will continue to be a concern for Gulf and Israel Arab nations.  The sectarian nature of Iranian and Saudi regional competition, which promotes inflammatory rhetoric and allegations of heresy throughout the region, heightens these concerns.

Sub-Saharan Africa

Practices have changed, civil society groups have proliferated, and citizens across the region demand better and more just governance.  However, many nations continue to struggle with authoritarian rule, patronage politics, and favoritism.  Many leaders remain focused on political survival as opposed to reform–with a few term limitations.

Global economic headwinds also threaten improvement by keeping commodity prices low and investment weak.  Some nations who’ve made progress toward democracy remain fragile and predisposed towards violence corresponding elections.  Tensions between Muslim and Christian groups can escalate into conflict.

Analysis: Demographic, Education, and Development Trends Will Converge

During the next five decades, growing African populations will become more youthful, urban, mobile, and networked, and better educated–and more demanding of a voice.  Rapid urbanization will stress infrastructure and increase the visibility of elite corruption—fueling public frustration with opportunities or services.

Some 75 to 250 million Africans will experience acute water stress, probably leading to mass migration.  Nevertheless, Africa will remain a zone of experimentation from governments, corporations, non-governmental organizations and people seeking to advance development.  The progress of the past two decades–including an expanded middle class, increasingly vibrant civil society, and the spread of democratic institutions–indicates potential.

Africa and the Middle East was originally published on Global Security Review.