The first commercial nuclear power plant in the Arab world is now fully operational, with all four units online and providing roughly a quarter of the country’s electricity. In a region traditionally defined by oil wealth, Barakah represents an intentional shift toward a diversified, low-carbon economy aligned with long-term sustainability goals.

The urgency behind this shift stems from rising domestic energy demand, climate commitments, and the need to hedge against volatility in fossil fuel markets. The UAE’s strategy positions nuclear power not as a replacement for hydrocarbons, but as a stabilising foundation within a broader clean-energy system. With global competition intensifying over clean-technology leadership, the UAE’s nuclear program has become a key pillar of national planning, industrial policy, and diplomatic signalling.

Barakah’s completion is notable in a world where many nuclear projects are delayed or cancelled. Built with South Korea’s KEPCO and operated by Nawah Energy Company, the reactors were brought online between 2021 and 2024 on a timeline that compares favourably with international benchmarks.

The program is overseen by the Federal Authority for Nuclear Regulation (FANR), which maintains a comprehensive regulatory framework and publishes transparent safety and inspection assessments. This regulatory credibility underpins both domestic public confidence and international recognition, distinguishing the UAE’s program from states whose nuclear ambitions raise proliferation concerns.

The impact on decarbonisation is already measurable. According to the Emirates Nuclear Energy Corporation (ENEC), Barakah currently avoids around 22.4 million tons of carbon emissions annually, equivalent to removing nearly 4.8 million cars from the road. This mitigation supports the UAE’s net zero by 2050 Strategic Initiative.

This forms part of wider clean-energy planning that includes hydrogen, expanded solar capacity, and carbon-efficient industrial development. Nuclear power provides stable baseload output that complements intermittent renewables and stabilizes the electricity system as demand grows.

The UAE’s nuclear program is also a catalyst for scientific and industrial capabilities. Prior to Barakah’s commissioning, the UAE invested in human capital through institutions such as Khalifa University, which established the Emirates Nuclear Technology Centre (ENTC) to support reactor safety, radiation science, and advanced materials research. Alongside operator training and regulatory capacity building, these programs expand domestic expertise in high-value sectors that extend beyond power generation. Over time, these skills contribute to cybersecurity, digital instrumentation, robotics for plant inspection, and reactor systems modelling.

This knowledge base has spillover effects in multiple fields. In nuclear medicine, investments in radiopharmaceutical production and imaging facilities have strengthened diagnostic and therapeutic services, enabling the UAE to become a regional hub for advanced cancer treatment. In agriculture, the application of nuclear techniques such as the sterile insect technique (SIT) has supported integrated pest management, reducing chemical pesticide use and improving food security. In industry, nuclear-powered low-carbon aluminium production demonstrates how nuclear energy can decarbonize energy-intensive exports, positioning the UAE competitively as global markets introduce carbon border adjustment mechanisms.

However, several longer-term challenges require sustained policy focus. First, the UAE’s nonproliferation model, which commits to no enrichment and no reprocessing, enhances international trust but requires resilient fuel-cycle logistics. Ensuring diversified fuel suppliers and clearly articulated strategies for spent-fuel management will be essential over the fleet’s 60- to 80-year operational life.

Second, as more renewable energy is integrated into the grid, nuclear power plants will need to operate flexibly to maintain system stability. This will require advanced forecasting, large-scale storage solutions, and coordinated dispatch strategies.

A third challenge is ensuring that the nuclear workforce remains locally grounded and resilient. While Emiratization in the sector has advanced, retaining specialised talent requires clear career progression pathways, applied research opportunities, and continued collaboration with global operators, research laboratories, and regulatory bodies. Sustaining this talent pipeline is vital not only for Barakah’s long-term success but also for future reactor projects or advanced nuclear applications.

These considerations are particularly important as the UAE explores a potential second nuclear plant, which has been signalled in government discussions and energy planning reports. A second site could reinforce fleet-level operations, enhance outage scheduling, expand industrial applications, and deepen domestic supply-chain maturity. If pursued, the contracting and technology-selection process will become a significant geopolitical signal in the Gulf energy landscape, particularly as other states in the region show growing interest in nuclear power.

The UAE is now uniquely positioned to shape the trajectory of civil nuclear development in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). Establishing a GCC Nuclear Regulation and Safety Forum, anchored in FANR’s experience, could enable shared emergency preparedness frameworks, cybersecurity standards, and safety culture norms. Similarly, coordinating research networks in radiopharmaceutical production, nuclear-enabled agriculture, and advanced reactor technologies could support regional industrial integration. These collaborative frameworks would not only enhance security and performance standards but also reduce duplication of effort among neighboring states.

Looking ahead, discussions around small modular reactors (SMR) and microreactors are expanding globally. These technologies offer potential applications for district cooling, desalination, and off-grid industrial clusters. For the UAE, SMRs could complement rather than replace large-scale reactors. Any adoption pathway must be grounded in demonstrated vendor maturity, regulatory readiness, supply-chain localization, and long-term cost predictability. The UAE’s existing regulatory and operational foundation gives it a comparative advantage in evaluating such options pragmatically rather than rhetorically.

The UAE’s experience demonstrates that new nuclear programmes can be delivered on time, integrated into a national climate strategy, and used to catalyse broader scientific and economic development. The challenge now is to advance from successful construction to strategic expansion, ensuring fuel-cycle resilience, embedding research translation, supporting workforce depth, and strengthening regional cooperation mechanisms. If these next steps are taken with the same planning discipline that characterised the first phase, the UAE will not only retain its role as the GCC’s leader in civil nuclear power but also provide a model for how emerging economies can balance energy security with strategic ambition in a decarbonizing world.

Tahir Azad, PhD, is a Research Scholar in the Department of Politics at the University of Reading. Views expressed are the author’s own. 

Energy Security and Strategic Ambition: Evaluating the UAE’s Nuclear Journey was originally published on Global Security Review.

Meanwhile, the US Department of Defense (DoD) appears to be doing the opposite. The Chief Digital and Artificial Intelligence Office (CDAO) recently axed its Chief Technology Officer (CTO) directorate, a move many analysts view as strategic self-sabotage.

This directorate, responsible for overseeing more than $340 million in AI and digital integrations in fiscal year 2024, represented a critical nexus linking battlefield innovations with institutional infrastructure. Its elimination, justified under “efficiency” mandates, alarmed defense observers who fear it fractures continuity, erases institutional memory, and sends a dangerous signal to adversaries willing to exploit perceived American weakness.

The Strategic Misstep

The CDAO was formed in 2022 by fusing key functions from the Joint Artificial Intelligence Center, Defense Digital Service, Chief Data Office, and Advana analytics, aiming to unify policy, technology, and digital services. Embedded within CDAO, the CTO led cross-functional teams in AI, cyber, logistics, and command-and-control systems, ensuring that new technologies remained interoperable and aligned with warfighter requirements.

Abruptly dismantling this directorate not only removes a pivotal vision and coordination role but also creates a void with no clear replacement. The result is fragmented efforts, lost synergy across mission areas, and a battlefield advantage handed to adversaries.

Expertise Lost, Momentum Undermined

Leadership and expertise take years, even decades, to develop. Figures like Bill Streilein, former CTO of CDAO and veteran of MIT Lincoln Laboratory, carried institutional memory and high standards into Pentagon AI programs. But when top-tier professionals are sidelined under the label of “streamlining,” they often leave and seldom return.

This pattern has already occurred. The Defense Digital Service (DDS), once lauded as the Pentagon’s “SWAT team of nerds,” lost almost all of its members by May 2025, prompting its demise. Nearly every DDS member, citing bureaucratic pressure from the Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE), chose to depart rather than conform.

These departures are not benign transfers. They represent the scattering of core innovators and connectors whose insight and trust networks are irreplaceable. Without them, emerging AI systems risk becoming siloed projects rather than battlefield-enabling capabilities.

DOGE: Efficiency or Engineered Evisceration?

DOGE, instituted by a presidential executive order in January 2025, is authorized to slash perceived inefficiencies across federal agencies—often through AI-enhanced, automated assessments. Under the leadership of figures tied to Elon Musk and Vivek Ramaswamy, DOGE has repurposed its mandate to aggressively target leadership and innovation roles across the board—including in national defense.

DOGE has justified cuts using its proprietary AI systems to flag and eliminate “inefficient” programs, often without human oversight or contextual nuance. The CTO’s directorate was among its most high-profile targets, methodically identified and removed, despite its mission-critical nature.

To make matters worse, DOGE is reportedly comfortable with these decisions. One Pentagon official described it as a “theater of dominance,” not just cost-cutting, but deliberate erasure of institutional anchors to obfuscate the depth and breadth of the sacrifice.

The High-Stakes Fallout

Adversaries feast on the narrative that the US champions AI yet purges its own tech leadership overnight. “America cannibalizes its talent while claiming leadership in AI warfare,” such narratives go. These optics weaken American deterrence, erode allied confidence, and provide cover for Moscow, Beijing, and Pyongyang to reframe the battlefield narrative.

Domestic consequences are equally grim. The consistent removal of flagship tech roles projects a clear message to science, technology, engineering, and math (STEM) professionals; serve, and risk being discarded. That weakness is a recruitment boon for adversaries, national lab contractors, and tech-armed autocracies solving tomorrow’s warfare puzzles.

Real efficiencies lie not in gutting leadership but in fortifying it. Per the National Security Commission on AI, prioritizing disciplined recruitment and retention of technical talent, including a Digital Corps and AI fellowships, is key to American competitiveness. Instead, we witness the dismantling of precisely those anchor roles meant to shepherd AI innovation into combat-relevant systems.

The DOGE-Driven Dismantling of Tech Leadership

The concepts herein are alarming and reflect an institutional unraveling that directly undermines America’s global security posture and strategic deterrence in five critical ways. First, the elimination of the Chief Technology Officer (CTO) directorate from the Chief Digital and Artificial Intelligence Office (CDAO) strips away a core pillar of the Pentagon’s ability to adapt emerging technologies for battlefield advantage. This directorate was not redundant bureaucracy; it was the crucible in which ideas from national labs, industry, and warfighters were harmonized into operational capability.

By abruptly dismantling this team, the Department of Defense has extinguished a pipeline of institutional memory and strategic insight at the precise moment when rapid, informed, and integrated decision-making is needed. This brain drain parallels a historical pattern of self-sabotage and leaves adversaries uncontested in the tech talent race.

Second, the removal of high-level AI leadership is a propaganda gift to revisionist powers like China and Russia. These states are watching America voluntarily decapitate its own strategic leadership, an act they can now frame as proof of American decline. This strengthens their strategic messaging in influence campaigns aimed at allies, neutral states, and even American citizens.

“America cannibalizes its talent while claiming leadership in AI warfare” is not just a phrase, it is a weaponized narrative that demoralizes partners and emboldens adversaries to challenge American dominance in contested domains like cyberspace, space, and AI warfare.

Third, strategic deterrence hinges on credible capability and the perception of cohesion. DOGE’s algorithmic-driven targeting of leadership roles without contextual assessment introduces chaos into the acquisition and integration life cycle of military AI systems. Instead of creating synergistic effects across logistics, cyber, and command and control, the US risks building a fractured, siloed ecosystem that fails in joint operations.

By removing the very leaders who prevent stove piping, the US sabotages its ability to develop and field interoperable, scalable, and warfighter-ready AI tools. This systemic breakdown makes deterrence brittle, vulnerable to being cracked in future high-end conflicts.

Fourth, the US has struggled to compete with the private sector for AI and cybersecurity talent. By signaling that even elite government technologists are disposable under the guise of “efficiency,” this policy drives future talent away from public service. Those who might have joined a modern “Digital Corps” will instead seek stability and respect elsewhere, perhaps even abroad.

Strategic deterrence depends not only on weapons but on technologists who know how to deploy them. Gutting these roles ensures that tomorrow’s innovations will not make it past the lab, let alone onto the battlefield.

Fifth, DOGE’s use of automated assessments to eliminate “inefficiencies” without human oversight is a grotesque parody of reform. Its reliance on cold, context-blind algorithms to purge critical roles mimics adversary models of techno-authoritarianism, not democratic accountability. If allowed to continue, this will hollow out innovation across government agencies and military branches.

Efficiency is not the enemy, misapplied efficiency is. Strategic deterrence requires smart investments, not cost-cutting theater that sacrifices our warfighting edge on the altar of political optics.

Strategic Self-Sabotage Must Be Reversed

This is not merely streamlining, it is full-blown surrender. The dismantling of the CDAO’s CTO directorate and the broader DOGE initiative represents an engineered unraveling of the very leadership needed to project U.S. strategic deterrence in the AI era. Leadership is the vector through which technology becomes capability. Remove it, and you hand your adversaries not only the advantage, but the narrative.

Unless reversed, these concepts and actions will echo through wargames, deterrence failures, and battlefield losses. The US must stop cannibalizing its competitive edge and re-center its national security strategy on strengthening, not sidelining, its AI leadership.

Conclusion

Leadership is not just overhead on the funding spreadsheet; these leaders are our ammunition in the fight for global AI dominance. Removing them during a strategic inflection point is not reform, it is a self-made vulnerability, and as the US disables its own leadership of advanced technologies, it is dismantling future readiness.

The nation must insist on accountability. Cost-cutting means nothing if it costs the technological coherence to compete in tomorrow’s battles. In the strategic competition unfolding now, leadership is the weapon, and ceding it is surrender. This page out of the DOGE handbook should be shredded and burned. Remember, Iranian nuclear scientists were not dismantled by their own regime, they were destroyed by US and Israeli bombs.

Greg Sharpe is Marketing Director at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. He is retired from the US Air Force. The views expressed are his own.

The Quiet Dismantling of America’s AI Warfighting Edge was originally published on Global Security Review.

Golden Dome is focused on specific missile threats to the American homeland. AUKUS pillar two is designed to reduce the significant lead China has in dual-use emerging technologies. An “extended” Golden Dome approach that produces strong and resilient allies may provide greater strategic deterrence than an America alone approach.

As stronger allies contribute more to collective defense through burden sharing, this can reduce the financial and military burden on the United States. Capable allies can deter aggression and manage local conflicts, promoting regional stability without constant American intervention.

If allies are seen as weak and easily overrun, it may undermine the credibility of alliances and security guarantees, thereby emboldening adversaries. Strong allies often bring advanced technologies and capabilities that enhance joint operations through interoperability and innovation.

Defeating fractional orbital bombardment system (FOBS), intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM), hypersonic glide weapons, and land-attack cruise missile threats is the focus of Golden Dome, which “proposes a multilayered defense network capable of intercepting threats during the boost, midcourse, and terminal stages of missile flight.” Some analysts argue that it is easiest to target these threats in the boost/ascent phase.

Targeting the boost phase can either occur from allied territory, targeting North Korean missiles from South Korea, or the homeland. The boost phase can also be targeted from space. However, targeting from space is not without its own unique set of challenges. Either way, it will not be solved by America without its allies.

Arguably, five-eyes countries (Australia, Canada, New Zealand, United Kingdom, and United States) are already entangled in American nuclear command, control, and communications (NC3). Furthermore, the US operates in coordination with other military forces as part of broader coalition operations. Hence, extending Golden Dome to allies is not only possible, but can further leverage the AUKUS pillar two effort. Moreover, a missile defense system consists of sensors, interceptors, and command-and-control systems that work together to detect, track, and intercept incoming missiles.

These necessary components exist in AUKUS pillar two working groups like the cyber capabilities, artificial intelligence (AI) and autonomy, quantum technologies, undersea capabilities, hypersonics and counter-hypersonics, electronic warfare capabilities, innovation and information sharing, and the deep-space advanced radar capability program (DARC).

AUKUS pillar two leadership should prioritize the development of technologies and supporting systems for an effective extended Golden Dome architecture. America is unlikely to solve the problem in isolation by building a “tightly integrated system of low Earth orbit (LEO) satellites, terrestrial radar stations, directed-energy platforms, and kinetic interceptors” that senses, decides, and neutralizes incoming missiles. The linkages and opportunities for the prioritization of advanced technology development for missile defense can be found in the following summaries.

Cyber capabilities encompass both offensive and defensive operations for missile defense. Offensive cyber tools are used to deter adversaries and disrupt their operations through tactics such as cyber-reconnaissance, communication isolation, targeted strikes, and network intrusions. Defensively, military forces can prioritize robust network protection, active threat disruption, and seamless coordination across units to safeguard critical systems. Cyber operations can enhance intelligence gathering, command and control, and information warfare to shape public perception and the broader information environment. As conflict evolves, training personnel in cyber tactics and integrating machine learning for threat detection and analysis can maintain strategic advantage.

AI and autonomy can transform missile defense and military operations by enhancing efficiency, precision, and decision-making. Autonomous weapon systems are used for reconnaissance, surveillance, and combat missions. AI-driven wargaming platforms simulate real-world combat scenarios to help strategists test tactics and improve readiness. In command and control, AI supports real-time data processing and analysis. AI optimizes logistics by improving resource allocation, supply-chain management, and transportation.

In intelligence and surveillance, AI analyzes vast datasets to detect patterns and identify threats. Additionally, AI monitors threats and predicts future events. Human-machine teaming allows AI systems to collaborate with human operators, combining strengths and minimizing errors.

Quantum technologies transform missile defenses through enhanced security, operational efficiency, and advanced training. In cybersecurity, quantum-resistant cryptography is being developed to protect against the threat quantum computers pose to traditional encryption. Quantum key distribution offers highly secure communication by transmitting encryption keys through quantum channels, making interception nearly impossible.

In military operations, quantum algorithms can optimize logistics, supply chains, and battlefield strategies by analyzing complex data in real time. Quantum computing could process data in real time, enabling missile defense systems to rapidly analyze incoming threats, allowing for quicker decision-making and more effective interception. Additionally, quantum computing could enable highly accurate simulations of complex systems like nuclear reactions and weapon designs.

Undersea capabilities encompass a wide range of offensive and defensive functions that contribute to missile defense. Offensively, submarines and other undersea platforms can strike surface vessels, submarines, and land-based targets. They are also instrumental in inserting special forces into hostile territory for reconnaissance or sabotage missions. Undersea vehicles play a key role in mine warfare, either by laying mines or clearing minefields. On the defensive side, these platforms are vital for anti-submarine warfare, enabling the detection and neutralization of enemy submarines. They also support surveillance and reconnaissance efforts, gathering intelligence on enemy naval movements. Undersea systems help protect vital infrastructure such as pipelines and communication cables and help ensure safe navigation.

Hypersonic weapons and counter-hypersonic systems are vital to missile defense operations. Hypersonic glide weapons and hypersonic cruise missiles are designed to strike targets with exceptional speed, maneuverability, and precision while evading traditional defenses. Counter-hypersonic capabilities include advanced sensors and tracking systems like radar and satellite imaging to detect and monitor hypersonic weapons. Hypersonic interceptors aim to neutralize threats mid-flight, while high-power lasers and microwave weapons can disrupt their guidance systems. Effective command-and-control systems are essential for coordinating these defenses, and soft-kill measures such as cyberattacks offer additional means to interfere with hypersonic weapons.

Electronic warfare is fundamental for gaining military advantages in cross-domain missile defense. Electronic attack includes jamming enemy communications, radar, and navigation systems. It also includes spoofing—sending false signals to enemy forces. Electromagnetic or directed-energy weapons disable or destroy enemy assets. Electronic protection ensures secure communication through encryption and satellite links and employs electronic countermeasures (ECM) to defend against attack. Electronic counter-countermeasures are used to overcome enemy ECM and maintain operational effectiveness. Electronic support can be focused on gathering intelligence through signals interception, using sensors for surveillance and target acquisition, and detecting threats in the electromagnetic spectrum.

            In short, under the auspices of AUKUS pillar two, Australia and the United Kingdom can contribute to Golden Dome in ways that many may not be thinking about. As longtime allies with a shared culture, history, and values, working together on Golden Dome just makes sense.

Natalie Treloar is a Senior Analyst at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies (NIDS), a Non-Resident Fellow at the Indo-Pacific Studies Center (IPSC), the Australian Company Director of Alpha-India Consultancy, and a cohost of the NIDS Deterrence Down Under Podcast.

Extending the Golden Dome: AUKUS Pillar 2 was originally published on Global Security Review.

Shifting to upgrading existing airframes with advanced technology rather than developing entirely new 6th-generation aircraft could offer significant long-term benefits. This approach results in substantial cost savings by avoiding the massive research and development expenses associated with new platforms while leveraging existing maintenance infrastructure. Additionally, integrating advanced technologies into proven airframes allows for faster deployment, reducing development cycles from decades to just a few years. Reliability would also improve, as these upgraded aircraft are built on battle-tested designs, avoiding the risks of unproven platforms and costly performance shortfalls.

Another key advantage is the ability to adopt modular and open-architecture upgrades, which enable rapid integration of artificial intelligence (AI), sensor fusion, hypersonic weapons, and advanced stealth coatings without requiring entirely new aircraft designs. This incremental innovation approach ensures continuous modernization without the financial and operational burdens of a generational shift. Furthermore, sustaining production of existing airframes stabilizes the industrial base and supply chain, preserving skilled labor and reducing reliance on experimental manufacturing techniques. However, this approach does come with trade-offs.

While upgraded airframes can incorporate many next-generation technologies, they may struggle to compete with emerging peer threats, such as China’s J-20B and a future J-31, which are designed from the ground up with advanced stealth and next-generation propulsion. Despite these limitations, prioritizing enhancements to proven aircraft, while strategically investing in select next-generation platforms, could provide a cost-effective, lower-risk approach to maintaining American air superiority in the evolving global security landscape.

For example, the estimated cost per F-15EX Eagle II is $87.9 million per unit. However, the total procurement cost, including development, support, and spares, can push the price per aircraft to around $117 million. At first glance, this makes the F-15EX slightly more expensive than the F-35A ($82.5 million) but cheaper in terms of long-term sustainment and operational costs, as it leverages existing F-15 infrastructure.

Leveraging emerging technology to enhance existing military capabilities is a cost-effective strategy for extending platform lifecycles, improving combat effectiveness, and increasing survivability. AI and autonomy integration, such as AI copilots for fighter jets and swarm unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV), enhance decision-making and reduce risks for human operators. Upgrading legacy aircraft and naval platforms with hypersonic weapons significantly expands strike ranges and lethality, while applying stealth coatings and advanced electronic warfare systems enhances survivability by reducing detectability and countering modern threats. Cybersecurity and network-centric warfare advancements, including real-time data-sharing and AI-driven analysis, improve battlefield coordination across multiple domains, ensuring more effective mission execution.

Meanwhile, integrating directed-energy weapons, such as high-energy lasers on ships and vehicles, provides cost-effective, high-precision air and missile defense without expending traditional munitions. Ground combat platforms, including M1A2 Abrams tanks and infantry systems, are also benefiting from active protection systems and AI-powered targeting, significantly improving survivability and lethality. In space and intelligence, reconnaissance satellites with AI-driven threat detection and persistent intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) drones ensure superior situational awareness. By applying AI, hypersonics, stealth, electronic warfare, and directed energy to proven platforms, the US can modernize its forces without the extreme costs and risks of developing entirely new systems, ensuring long-term military superiority while maintaining fiscal responsibility.

This strategy allows the United States to maintain its military superiority over China’s rapidly expanding and modernizing forces by prioritizing technological advancements over costly new platform development. By integrating AI, hypersonics, stealth, electronic warfare, and directed energy into existing platforms, the US can rapidly upgrade combat capabilities without the lengthy and expensive process of designing entirely new aircraft, ships, and ground systems. This ensures that American forces remain combat-ready and adaptable while China continues to build up its military infrastructure.

One key advantage is speed and efficiency—modernizing proven platforms allows the US to deploy cutting-edge technologies much faster than China, which is still refining its next-generation aircraft, naval forces, and missile systems. Upgrading legacy airframes like the F-15EX and B-52J with hypersonic weapons, enhancing stealth with radar-absorbent materials, and improving real-time battlefield awareness with AI-driven sensor fusion ensure that American forces can strike faster, detect threats sooner, and operate with superior coordination.

Additionally, network-centric warfare improvements, such as joint all-domain command and control (JADC2) and real-time data-sharing, enhance multi-domain operations, allowing the US to maintain an intelligence and decision-making advantage over China’s military.

Survivability is another critical factor. By integrating active protection systems into tanks, directed-energy weapons into naval ships, and AI-driven electronic warfare suites into aircraft, US forces can better counter China’s advanced missile threats, cyber warfare tactics, and mass drone swarms. Additionally, maintaining a robust industrial base through upgrades to existing platforms ensures that production remains scalable and sustainable, unlike China’s military, which relies heavily on state-controlled production with limited battlefield testing of new systems.

By leveraging emerging technologies in a modular, cost-effective manner, the US can remain ahead of China’s growing military without the financial and operational burdens of continuously developing entirely new systems. This strategy ensures that American forces remain agile, lethal, and technologically superior, capable of deterring war and, if necessary, achieving decisive victories in any operational environment.

Joshua Thibert is a Senior Analyst at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies (NIDS) and doctoral student at Missouri State University. His extensive academic and practitioner experience spans strategic intelligence, multiple domains within defense and strategic studies, and critical infrastructure protection. Joshua currently resides in Columbus, Ohio.

Maintaining American Military Primacy Without Breaking the Bank was originally published on Global Security Review.