Featuring insights from Peter Huessy and Dr. Adam Lowther, the discussion examines the myths perpetuated by Hollywood, the historical context of deterrence policy, and why accurate understanding matters for national security.

Participants gain a deeper appreciation of: * The evolution of U.S. nuclear deterrence strategy since the Cold War * Misconceptions in movies like Oppenheimer and Dynamite * The critical role deterrence plays in preventing large-scale conflict This event is part of NIDS’ ongoing mission to advance peace and stability through education, research, and dialogue on strategic deterrence.

Hollywood vs. Reality: Nuclear Deterrence in the Age of Dynamite and Oppenheimer-Huessy Seminar was originally published on Global Security Review.

Russia, which fields an arsenal of at least 2,000 such nuclear weapons, began modernizing its arsenal of intra-theater nuclear weapons more than a decade ago. These weapons can rapidly strike European NATO member-states—primarily with lower yield warheads.

Russia’s “escalate to deescalate” strategy relies on the use of low-yield battlefield nuclear weapons could either be used to defeat Ukraine and force NATO capitulation in that conflict or win a possible war against a conventional NATO force advancing East. In short, Russia could seek a fait accompli using one or a small number of low-yield nuclear weapons in a limited capacity on the battlefield, for which NATO has no equal response.

What makes such an approach highly attractive to Russia is that NATO is unlikely to respond to a nuclear use in Ukraine or an attack on NATO’s eastern flank with nuclear weapons, because NATO’s dual-cable aircraft—fighter jets armed with B-61 nuclear gravity bombs—are not a combat-ready force that can effectively counter Russian nuclear use on a battlefield. Let me reiterate, Russia likely maintains 3,000–6,000 intra-theater nuclear weapons that vary from low to high yield and short to intermediate range. Low estimates suggest they have 2,000 such weapons.

A 2017 Defense Intelligence Agency report went deeper into Russia’s tactical nuclear warfare commitment revealing delivery systems that include air-to-surface missiles, short-range ballistic missiles, gravity bombs, depth charges for medium-range bombers, tactical bombers, and naval aviation, as well as anti-ship, anti-submarine, and anti-aircraft missiles and torpedoes for surface ships and submarines. While it is only speculation, it is reasonable to suggest that Russian President Vladimir Putin was building a nuclear capability for a circumstance like he finds himself in now.

As two and a half years of war in Ukraine illustrate, Russia does not maintain a conventional force sufficient to defeat an American-led NATO force. This leaves Putin more reliant on his nuclear forces.

Given Russia’s economic and strategic limitations, it should come as no surprise that Russia has pursued low-yield battlefield nuclear weapons as an asymmetric advantage against the United States. In many respects, Russia is pursuing a course of action not dissimilar from the New Look Policy of the Eisenhower administration.

For the Biden administration and, soon, either Kamala Harris or Donald Trump, the real threat of nuclear weapons use in Ukraine or against NATO cannot be ignored. Contrary to the mantra that all nuclear weapons are strategic and there is no such thing as a winnable nuclear war, the Russians and Chinese see things differently.

Low-yield battlefield nuclear weapons do not create a nuclear wasteland. In fact, an air burst at the right height of burst produces no fall-out at all—only heat, a blast wave, and prompt radiation that dissipate in hundreds or a few thousand yards.

With numerous low-yield nuclear options available to Russia, there is a very real need for the United States military to retrain for operating in a post–nuclear detonation environment. In a recent public discussion, the heads of the Central Intelligence Agency and the United Kingdom’s MI6 revealed that Putin came very close to using a nuclear weapon in Ukraine during the fall of 2022. Such a scenario can easily arise again.

American mirror imaging of Russian perspectives on nuclear use, to suggest they think like Americans and would therefore never violate the “nuclear taboo”, is a recipe for getting caught unprepared. While Russians do see nuclear weapons as different than conventional weapons, they do understand weapons effects and are not given to the hyperbole that is widespread in the United States.

The fact that American integrated deterrence was a disastrous failure in its attempt to forestall a Russian invasion of Ukraine and is failing to restore deterrence with Russia vis-à-vis Ukraine means that the Russians now understand that American sanctions and other threats are largely harmless. Since the implementation of sanctions following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Putin found alternative outlets for Russian exports (petroleum) and found alternate sources of imports—including military supplies.

Rather than breaking Russia, American action drove China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia together. This leaves Putin less reluctant to use nuclear weapons in Ukraine than he perhaps was before.

Of course, neither China nor Russia is seeking to start a nuclear conflict that sees the exchange of strategic nuclear weapons. That would be devastating for everyone. But the use of a small number of low-yield battlefield nuclear weapons is a different story.

Even a reluctant Biden administration, now that it is coming to an end, tossed the disarmament community’s ostrich strategy into the dustheap of history. It is now a matter of whether the United States has the will to embark on the expansive modernization effort required to fill the gap in battlefield nuclear weapons.

Adam Lowther, PhD is the Vice President for Research at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. The views expressed are his own.

The Return of Battlefield Nuclear Weapons was originally published on Global Security Review.

In 2024, the world’s population surpassed 8 billion citizens. This is more than a 300 percent increase since 1950, which is an important year for global warming. It was this year when carbon-dioxide (CO₂) emissions began to increase dramatically—driving up the global temperature.

Today, the average American emits about 15 tons of greenhouse gases annually, while the average African emits less than 1 ton per year. The global mean is about 4.3 tons per person per year, a 4.8 percent increase over the previous year.

As the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists points out, the planet is now feeling the devastating effects of the 1.1-degree Fahrenheit increase in global temperature since 1880. According to the Bulletin, recent global warming is responsible for the increased risk of wildfires, the rise of rare diseases, the decline in global crop yields, and may even cause a “mosquito-pocalypse.”

Nuclear weapons deserve a large share of blame for these events. Let me explain.

Nuclear Weapons and Climate Change

As the graph below illustrates, 1–2 percent of the global population, mostly civilians, perished annually because of war between 1600 and 1945. Since 1950, with the development and fielding of great-power nuclear arsenals, that number has declined to less than 0.1 percent.

It is no mere coincidence that the global population has increased 300 percent in only seven decades. The fielding of large nuclear arsenals by the United States and Russia ensured that the great powers and their allies would not engage in World War III, or any other great-power war, that historically ensured the planet did not become overpopulated. Built on a foundation of White privilege, nuclear deterrence created a fear of utter destruction, which completely eliminated great-power war and led to a marked decline in the frequency and severity of all conflict—causing the human population to explode. Thus, the check on population growth was removed.

These weapons not only limit war, but they also decrease defense expenditures and the resources required for reconstruction after war. For example, the United States spent almost half of the nation’s gross domestic product (GDP) waging a world war from 1942–1945. More recently, the United States spent at least $3 trillion fighting limited wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. However, because of the Soviet and American nuclear arsenals, American defense spending, as a percentage of GDP, averaged a mere 5 percent during the Cold War and is now at a low of 3.5 percent.

The consequence of this reallocation of wealth from conventional warfare was unprecedented economic growth, which not only allowed populations to increase but also allowed societies to improve the health, prosperity, and consumption of their citizens—dramatically reducing poverty and increasing the average life expectancy (62 percent). This prosperity also led to the most rapid increase in technological development in human history.

The population growth and human prosperity brought about by seven decades of effective nuclear deterrence may appear to be a net positive, but a closer look reveals that human prosperity comes at the cost of devastating increases in the rate of global warming. There are simply more humans generating more greenhouse gases than ever, and the problem is only getting worse. There is a solution.

Solving the Climate Change Problem

It is time for the United States to take the lead in nuclear disarmament. If the United States, Great Britain, and France disarm, Russia, China, and North Korea will surely follow suit. The global community can then pressure India and Pakistan to disarm as well.

This does not mean we must put an end to war. Nuclear disarmament properly allows the world to return to waging large-scale conventional wars, which regulate population growth and economic prosperity. Such wars will help bring man-made global warming to an end. For example, a war between the United States, Russia, and China—post nuclear disarmament—would optimistically eliminate 80–160 million people. The planet would receive a respite in CO₂ production not enjoyed since the COVID-19 pandemic lockdowns of 2020–2021.

The return to large-scale warfare will also ensure worldwide economic degrowth, which will further reduce overall greenhouse gas emissions. It is only through a less prosperous world that we can ensure global warming ends. Another equitable feature of this strategy is that population will be reduced among the richest, most consumptive nations, possibly leaving room for some modest increases in the developing world.

Some may balk at this solution because they believe a return to great-power wars is not necessary because green energy will solve the problem. Unfortunately,  green energy’s high cost, unreliable energy production, and visible failures in Texas, Germany, and elsewhere are likely to turn people against a degrowth strategy relying on a green energy transition. Despite our best efforts, renewable energy simply cannot meet the insatiable demand of a wealthier and healthier global population. A return to widespread warfare is the only feasible solution.

It is time we follow the advice of Jonathan Swift, who, in his pamphlet, “A Modest Proposal: For preventing the children of poor people in Ireland, from being a burden on their parents or country, and for making them beneficial to the publick,” courageously sought to solve the Irish poverty problem by encouraging the Irish to sell their children as food for the hungry. Making the world safe for war is an equally innovative approach to ending global warming and deserves the same consideration Swift’s proposal received. We must act before it is too late.

Postscript

For those wondering if this is a serious article, the answer should be obvious, no. The article employs a rhetorical technique, reductio ad absurdum or, as Jonathan Swift called it, satire, to make a point. In short, a world without nuclear weapons is prone to frequent great-power wars that create greater human misery. No amount of hope can change what history and human nature have, for at least five thousand years, shown to be true.

Adam Lowther, PhD, is Vice President of the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. The views expressed in this article are the author’s own. 

The Climate Change Consequences of Nuclear Weapons was originally published on Global Security Review.

This infers the US should ignore the plight of Taiwan’s sovereignty as well as accept the seizing of the South China Sea. The People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) willful disruption of global peace and stability to further its imperial expansionism directly violates the sovereignty of its neighbors. Readers should not forget that it was only after the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) was victorious in the Chinese Civil War in 1949 that the communists invaded and occupied Tibet, Inner Mongolia, Manchuria, East Turkistan, and areas in the southeast that were not historically part of China.

Neither is the history of Taiwan a history of control by Imperial China. The simple fact is that China is an expansionist power that is still hungry for more territory. The United States, however, is not attempting to annex land or sea. The simple fact is that China can ensure the first guardrail by ending its imperial expansion.

Second, the article then suggests, “There should be agreement on No First Use (NFU) of nuclear weapons. Some argue that a NFU policy is not credible. But if that is the case, it is hard to explain why both the Obama and Biden administrations tried but failed to adopt a NFU or sole purpose policy. Every person of integrity should acknowledge that NFU is relevant and meaningful.”

This argument is laughable. China’s NFU policy is a ploy to deceive American policymakers and dupe nuclear disarmament advocates. During the Cold War, China’s NFU pledge was judged credible because it had a small and unsophisticated nuclear arsenal incapable of engaging in first use. The recent Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China, 2023 Annual Report to Congress describes an increasingly lethal capability that threatens more and more American cities, contrary to American counterforce targeting strategies.

As noted in a recent analysis of the annual report, the PRC sanctioned a video that threatens to employ nuclear weapons against a non-nuclear Japan. In that video, the narrator states, “We will use nuclear bombs first. We will use nuclear bombs continuously. We will do this until Japan declares unconditional surrender for the second time.” China’s NFU policy is deliberately ambiguous to deter conventional attacks on its nuclear forces. Moreover, the PRC’s four exceptions to its NFU policy are meant to “dissuade the continuation of the strong enemy’s conventional attacks against our major strategic targets.” China has deliberately entangled its nuclear and conventional command and control to intentionally increase the risk of nuclear escalation in the early stages of conflict. Finally, the article proclaims the virtues of no first use because an American NFU policy would leave the United States’ Indo-Pacific allies uncovered from America’s nuclear umbrella and more susceptible to Chinese nuclear coercion. 

Third, the article declares, “There should be no cross-domain deterrence.” The US should manage the interplay between non-nuclear capabilities and nuclear deterrence. The article argues that a deterrence policy “stating that nuclear weapons will not be only used to deter nuclear strikes, but also used to deter non-nuclear strategic strikes…significantly lowers the nuclear threshold and drastically increases the risks of nuclear escalation.” Thus, the article argues that the United States and China should prohibit cross-domain deterrence.

With the article also suggesting the United States should adopt a “sole purpose” nuclear policy, the American arsenal would serve one purpose—deterring nuclear attack. Considering that the article suggests the PRC maintains an advantage in strategic cyberattacks, advocacy for a sole purpose policy is little more than an attempt to encourage self-deterrence on the part of the United States. In reality, cross-domain deterrence is key to American security.

The US cannot threaten an in-kind response to a biological attack any more than it can an in-kind cyberattack. Dr. Strangelove suggested that “deterrence is the art of producing, in the mind of the enemy, the fear to attack.” Asymmetric deterrence ensures the United States can deter any attack with the most destructive weapons available. The article advocates for a PRC advantage by removing that fearful threat and thus increasing PRC freedom of action.

Fourth, the article argues that “[t]here should be no unlimited development of missile defense systems. It is undeniable that missile defense has negative impacts upon strategic stability. The bilateral quarrel over missile defense is one of the root causes of US-Russia tensions in the past two decades. An agreement should be reached to limit the development and deployment of missile defense systems in order to assure other nuclear weapon states that their nuclear retaliation capabilities will not be compromised.”

Designed to defend against North Korean attack, American missile defense systems are part of integrated deterrence and are purposed to limit damage and “expand decision-making space for senior leaders.” With the PRC’s breathtaking growth and modernization of its nuclear forces exhibited in the recent construction of over 300 new intercontinental ballistic missile silos and at least 1,500 nuclear warheads by 2035, China may well be seeking to overwhelm any current or future missile defenses by orders of magnitude.

China is also leading the hypersonic missile arms race, including the coupling of hypersonic weapons with the fractional orbital bombardment system (FOBS) that are potentially nuclear-armed and a destabilizing first-strike capability. Finally, America’s nuclear recapitalization program is already into its second decade and has yet to produce the first new system.

Promulgating PRC propaganda as unbiased perspective may feel good, but it is a red herring. China long ago left the blocks in an arms race that the United States still does not understand it is losing. Not only is China modernizing and expanding its nuclear first-strike capability, but it is also doing so under the guise of deterrence and fear, while the PRC is developing a coercive force meant to ransom American cities in exchange for a Sino-centric Indo-Pacific.

If the United States wants to retain its geopolitical influence and continue to assure regional allies, it must avoid any compromise with the Chinese, like that offered in the article discussed. Instead, it is time for the United States to embark on a comprehensive nuclear arms build-up that accounts for the risks posed by an aggressive and hostile China. To do anything less is a concession to Chinese imperialism and an admission that the United States is no longer a “shining city upon a hill,” the beacon of liberty President Reagan once suggested this country is to the rest of the world.

Col. Curtis McGiffin (US Air Force, Ret.) is Vice President of Education at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies and visiting professor at Missouri State University’s School of Defense and Strategic Studies. Dr. Adam Lowther is Vice President for Research at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies and host of Nuclecast. Together, they have more than five decades of experience in uniform and DoD civil service. Both authors co-host the weekly podcast The Nuclear View. The views expressed in this article are the authors’ own.

Red China’s Concerns About Nuclear Escalation Are a Red Herring was originally published on Global Security Review.