<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><rss version="2.0"
	xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"
	xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"
	xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"
	xmlns:sy="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/syndication/"
	
	>
<channel>
	<title>
	Comments on: SLCM-N, the Virginia-Class Submarine, and AUKUS	</title>
	<atom:link href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/slcm-n-the-virginia-class-submarine-and-aukus/feed/" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml" />
	<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/slcm-n-the-virginia-class-submarine-and-aukus/</link>
	<description>A division of the National Institute for Deterrence Studies (NIDS)</description>
	<lastBuildDate>Wed, 28 May 2025 00:39:43 +0000</lastBuildDate>
	<sy:updatePeriod>
	hourly	</sy:updatePeriod>
	<sy:updateFrequency>
	1	</sy:updateFrequency>
	<generator>https://wordpress.org/?v=6.9.4</generator>
	<item>
		<title>
		By: Natalie		</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/slcm-n-the-virginia-class-submarine-and-aukus/#comment-2110</link>

		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Natalie]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 28 May 2025 00:39:43 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=30767#comment-2110</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[Date for the East Coast SSN Base Ref. https://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/australia-submarine-capabilities/#:~:text=The%20Department%20of%20Defence%20plans,attack%20submarine%20capabilities%20(SSNs). 

I am all for the nuclear armed B-21 bombers, but you aren&#039;t likely to get them before 2034 either. Also, as Dr Christine Leah and I point out in our previous article, we have illuminated the benefits of a limited nuclear option hidden beneath the sea rather than delivered by air.

Ideally, Australia will need a modern nuclear triad (including ICBMs) in the long term to face Chinese and Russian nuclear threats.

It also depends on what missions we want our submarines to do. Are they just going to hunt down and kill other submarines, deliver a limited nuclear option? While the Los Angeles-class focuses on open-ocean anti-submarine warfare and land-based missile strikes, the Virginia-class is designed for a broader range of missions, including littoral operations and special operations support. 

Last time that I checked the map there is a significant archipelagic region to north, north west and east of Australia for littoral operations. 
Not sure how America wants to handle the Chinese militarized islands in the South China Sea though?! 

AI Generated response below (so may be some errors)

Key Differences
Mission Suitability: The Los Angeles-class is primarily focused on open-ocean operations, while the Virginia-class excels in littoral waters and supports special operations due to its &quot;fly-by-wire&quot; control system and features like reconfigurable torpedo rooms. 
Littoral Operations: The Virginia-class is specifically designed for littoral operations, with features like a large lockout trunk for divers and special force support. 
Weapon Systems: Both classes carry Tomahawk cruise missiles and torpedoes, but the Virginia-class has more advanced vertical launch systems and payload capacity, including the Virginia Payload Module (VPM) for future off-board payloads. 
Design: The Virginia-class features a different hull form, photonics masts instead of periscopes, and a relocated control room, which enhances situational awareness for the commanding officer. 
Quietness: The Virginia-class is designed to be quieter than the Los Angeles-class, with a focus on reducing noise and improving its overall acoustic signature. 
Virginia-class Enhancements: Littoral Capabilities: The Virginia-class is designed to operate effectively in shallow waters and coastal areas, including support for special operations forces. 
Advanced Weaponry: The Virginia-class has more advanced vertical launch systems and payload capacity, enabling it to carry and launch a wider variety of weapons and payloads. 
Quiet Operation: The Virginia-class is designed to be quieter than the Los Angeles-class, making it a more stealthy platform. 
Special Operations Support: The Virginia-class has features to support special operations, including a reconfigurable torpedo room, a large lockout trunk, and the ability to carry unmanned undersea vehicles (UUVs) and special force delivery vehicles.]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Date for the East Coast SSN Base Ref. <a href="https://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/australia-submarine-capabilities/#:~:text=The%20Department%20of%20Defence%20plans,attack%20submarine%20capabilities%20(SSNs)" rel="nofollow ugc">https://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/australia-submarine-capabilities/#:~:text=The%20Department%20of%20Defence%20plans,attack%20submarine%20capabilities%20(SSNs)</a>. </p>
<p>I am all for the nuclear armed B-21 bombers, but you aren&#8217;t likely to get them before 2034 either. Also, as Dr Christine Leah and I point out in our previous article, we have illuminated the benefits of a limited nuclear option hidden beneath the sea rather than delivered by air.</p>
<p>Ideally, Australia will need a modern nuclear triad (including ICBMs) in the long term to face Chinese and Russian nuclear threats.</p>
<p>It also depends on what missions we want our submarines to do. Are they just going to hunt down and kill other submarines, deliver a limited nuclear option? While the Los Angeles-class focuses on open-ocean anti-submarine warfare and land-based missile strikes, the Virginia-class is designed for a broader range of missions, including littoral operations and special operations support. </p>
<p>Last time that I checked the map there is a significant archipelagic region to north, north west and east of Australia for littoral operations.<br />
Not sure how America wants to handle the Chinese militarized islands in the South China Sea though?! </p>
<p>AI Generated response below (so may be some errors)</p>
<p>Key Differences<br />
Mission Suitability: The Los Angeles-class is primarily focused on open-ocean operations, while the Virginia-class excels in littoral waters and supports special operations due to its &#8220;fly-by-wire&#8221; control system and features like reconfigurable torpedo rooms.<br />
Littoral Operations: The Virginia-class is specifically designed for littoral operations, with features like a large lockout trunk for divers and special force support.<br />
Weapon Systems: Both classes carry Tomahawk cruise missiles and torpedoes, but the Virginia-class has more advanced vertical launch systems and payload capacity, including the Virginia Payload Module (VPM) for future off-board payloads.<br />
Design: The Virginia-class features a different hull form, photonics masts instead of periscopes, and a relocated control room, which enhances situational awareness for the commanding officer.<br />
Quietness: The Virginia-class is designed to be quieter than the Los Angeles-class, with a focus on reducing noise and improving its overall acoustic signature.<br />
Virginia-class Enhancements: Littoral Capabilities: The Virginia-class is designed to operate effectively in shallow waters and coastal areas, including support for special operations forces.<br />
Advanced Weaponry: The Virginia-class has more advanced vertical launch systems and payload capacity, enabling it to carry and launch a wider variety of weapons and payloads.<br />
Quiet Operation: The Virginia-class is designed to be quieter than the Los Angeles-class, making it a more stealthy platform.<br />
Special Operations Support: The Virginia-class has features to support special operations, including a reconfigurable torpedo room, a large lockout trunk, and the ability to carry unmanned undersea vehicles (UUVs) and special force delivery vehicles.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
		
			</item>
		<item>
		<title>
		By: Jim		</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/slcm-n-the-virginia-class-submarine-and-aukus/#comment-2090</link>

		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Jim]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 23 May 2025 19:04:34 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=30767#comment-2090</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[Natalie - Some points of discussion:

A) There will never be a time when Australia is operating 3 submarine classes at once. By the time AUKUS-SSN is in service the Collins will either have been retired or lie hull-crushed at the bottom of the ocean.

B) Given the UK&#039;s record on building Astute and now Dreadnaught, don&#039;t hold your breathe that the UK will bring AUKUS in on time, budget or even at all. You are much more likely to see Australia continue to add Virginia to it&#039;s fleet and eventually SSN-X which may be rolled into a true SSN-AUKUS  vs current SSN-AUK.

C) Given the UK is having trouble keeping just one of it&#039;s 7 Astute-SSNs at sea, don&#039;t count on one being continually rotated to HMAS Stirling. At best it will do an annual &quot;Fly The Flag&quot; trip.   

D) I am not sure where you are getting the 2043 date for the East Coast SSN Base. That may be a fiction of the labor government, but was not part of the original agreement where it was to be constructed straight away (you may recall then Defense Minister Peter Dutton wanting to announce the location before the election).

There is an Option 4 - Rather than further deplete it&#039;s Virginia Fleet, the US may offer RAN, say 8  of the retiring Los Angeles Class SSN&#039;s with a &quot;Super-LOTE&quot;. This would effectively fit out the Los Angeles hull with Virginia weapons, equipment, Pump Jet Propulsor (vs propellor), Conformal Acoustic Velocity Sonar (along the hull) and a new SG9 reactor from the Virginia (vs the current SG6). The virtually free hull would give faster availability and lower cost., allowing the originally planned 8 - numbers count. If and when AUKUS-SSN arrives, they would be ready to retire.  

There is Option 5 - with a SSN starved USN, America lets has the RAAF take on the long range strike role by selling Australia 16 to 24 x B-21 bombers (at say 2/year). Each of which can deliver 8 long range land-attack, anti-ship and anti-air and anti-missile cruise missiles (vs the Virginia block I to IV&#039;s 12 missiles) not just to the Chinese coast but inland including via Myanmar .... and then come back tomorrow and do it again.]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Natalie &#8211; Some points of discussion:</p>
<p>A) There will never be a time when Australia is operating 3 submarine classes at once. By the time AUKUS-SSN is in service the Collins will either have been retired or lie hull-crushed at the bottom of the ocean.</p>
<p>B) Given the UK&#8217;s record on building Astute and now Dreadnaught, don&#8217;t hold your breathe that the UK will bring AUKUS in on time, budget or even at all. You are much more likely to see Australia continue to add Virginia to it&#8217;s fleet and eventually SSN-X which may be rolled into a true SSN-AUKUS  vs current SSN-AUK.</p>
<p>C) Given the UK is having trouble keeping just one of it&#8217;s 7 Astute-SSNs at sea, don&#8217;t count on one being continually rotated to HMAS Stirling. At best it will do an annual &#8220;Fly The Flag&#8221; trip.   </p>
<p>D) I am not sure where you are getting the 2043 date for the East Coast SSN Base. That may be a fiction of the labor government, but was not part of the original agreement where it was to be constructed straight away (you may recall then Defense Minister Peter Dutton wanting to announce the location before the election).</p>
<p>There is an Option 4 &#8211; Rather than further deplete it&#8217;s Virginia Fleet, the US may offer RAN, say 8  of the retiring Los Angeles Class SSN&#8217;s with a &#8220;Super-LOTE&#8221;. This would effectively fit out the Los Angeles hull with Virginia weapons, equipment, Pump Jet Propulsor (vs propellor), Conformal Acoustic Velocity Sonar (along the hull) and a new SG9 reactor from the Virginia (vs the current SG6). The virtually free hull would give faster availability and lower cost., allowing the originally planned 8 &#8211; numbers count. If and when AUKUS-SSN arrives, they would be ready to retire.  </p>
<p>There is Option 5 &#8211; with a SSN starved USN, America lets has the RAAF take on the long range strike role by selling Australia 16 to 24 x B-21 bombers (at say 2/year). Each of which can deliver 8 long range land-attack, anti-ship and anti-air and anti-missile cruise missiles (vs the Virginia block I to IV&#8217;s 12 missiles) not just to the Chinese coast but inland including via Myanmar &#8230;. and then come back tomorrow and do it again.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
		
			</item>
		<item>
		<title>
		By: Natalie		</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/slcm-n-the-virginia-class-submarine-and-aukus/#comment-2075</link>

		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Natalie]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 21 May 2025 04:28:40 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=30767#comment-2075</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[Either way we need a nuclear option to deal with threats, and as US nuclear forces are spread thinly across combatant commands and being modernised.

In the future, the US will most likely need more nuclear-armed allies. Otherwise, the US will face several nuclear armed adversaries alone, which will be destabilizing. 

In the shortness of time -- Option 3 is the easiest to implement, but could leave Australia with a gap in its ability to conduct sovereign submarine operations. 

Option 2 is a preferred option to trigger the formation of lean Indo-Pacific nuclear alliance. 

Option 1 does degrade US extended nuclear deterrence, especially as US nuclear forces are concurrently undergoing modernisation. A flexible regional response is likely to alleviate some of those gaps.

US END is the status quo for Australia, so to rule out rotational nuclear-armed submarines doesn&#039;t make any sense if we are happy to have nuclear-capable bombers land here. There is even fear here in Australia of nuclear-armed submarines turning up, due to a lack of public and even some government (amongst the public service) understanding of US END and the concept of &quot;don&#039;t ask, don&#039;t tell&quot;. 

There&#039;s also the fact that Australia has a work, health and safety culture now where we would expect to have the appropriate facilities, training and safeguards in place to deal with nuclear assets and or any accidents. From what I have googled, Australia just had some Geiger counters back in the day.]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Either way we need a nuclear option to deal with threats, and as US nuclear forces are spread thinly across combatant commands and being modernised.</p>
<p>In the future, the US will most likely need more nuclear-armed allies. Otherwise, the US will face several nuclear armed adversaries alone, which will be destabilizing. </p>
<p>In the shortness of time &#8212; Option 3 is the easiest to implement, but could leave Australia with a gap in its ability to conduct sovereign submarine operations. </p>
<p>Option 2 is a preferred option to trigger the formation of lean Indo-Pacific nuclear alliance. </p>
<p>Option 1 does degrade US extended nuclear deterrence, especially as US nuclear forces are concurrently undergoing modernisation. A flexible regional response is likely to alleviate some of those gaps.</p>
<p>US END is the status quo for Australia, so to rule out rotational nuclear-armed submarines doesn&#8217;t make any sense if we are happy to have nuclear-capable bombers land here. There is even fear here in Australia of nuclear-armed submarines turning up, due to a lack of public and even some government (amongst the public service) understanding of US END and the concept of &#8220;don&#8217;t ask, don&#8217;t tell&#8221;. </p>
<p>There&#8217;s also the fact that Australia has a work, health and safety culture now where we would expect to have the appropriate facilities, training and safeguards in place to deal with nuclear assets and or any accidents. From what I have googled, Australia just had some Geiger counters back in the day.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
		
			</item>
		<item>
		<title>
		By: Brandon		</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/slcm-n-the-virginia-class-submarine-and-aukus/#comment-2073</link>

		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Brandon]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 20 May 2025 13:05:49 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=30767#comment-2073</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[Wow. This analysis is both comprehensive and accessible, offering a clear exploration of the geopolitical dynamics at play, including the challenges posed by Russian and Chinese rhetoric and the strategic necessity of flexible deterrence options. Discussion of the three potential options for Australia’s submarine acquisition under AUKUS is particularly compelling, providing a balanced perspective on the trade-offs and long-term benefits for US, UK, and Australian undersea capabilities.

I’m curious, which of the 3 does the author anticipate this administration to choose? If you were a senior cabinet member or advisor, what’s your recommendation?

Outstanding article.]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Wow. This analysis is both comprehensive and accessible, offering a clear exploration of the geopolitical dynamics at play, including the challenges posed by Russian and Chinese rhetoric and the strategic necessity of flexible deterrence options. Discussion of the three potential options for Australia’s submarine acquisition under AUKUS is particularly compelling, providing a balanced perspective on the trade-offs and long-term benefits for US, UK, and Australian undersea capabilities.</p>
<p>I’m curious, which of the 3 does the author anticipate this administration to choose? If you were a senior cabinet member or advisor, what’s your recommendation?</p>
<p>Outstanding article.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
		
			</item>
	</channel>
</rss>
