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	<title>
	Comments on: Re-Establishing Non-Strategic Nuclear Capabilities in the United States Navy	</title>
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	<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/re-establishing-non-strategic-nuclear-capabilities-in-the-united-states-navy/</link>
	<description>A division of the National Institute for Deterrence Studies (NIDS)</description>
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		<title>
		By: Joseph Buff		</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/re-establishing-non-strategic-nuclear-capabilities-in-the-united-states-navy/#comment-226</link>

		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Joseph Buff]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 06 May 2024 13:08:19 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=27763#comment-226</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[TSgt Atkins has penned an excellent discussion on the need for SLCM- N or something with very similar tactical nuclear capabilities. Much has been written on the need for SLCM- N elsewhere, all of it compellingly true, yet this new GSR article focuses on something else compelling: To be maximally effective at nuclear deterrence, a system must be evaluated prospectively from the tactical perspective of effective warfighting IF (and ONLY IF) deterrence fails. Any nuclear weapons we own that are &quot;unusable&quot; in the adversaries&#039; minds will NOT give an effective deterrent effect. Nor will weapons that sit in CONUS inventory, obsolescing,  without proper personnel training and comprehensive operational doctrine and infrastructure. The US suffers a serious lack of adequate low-yield nuclear deterrence capacity AND capability. Let us hope and pray that TSgt Atkins&#039;s article will further encourage Congress to instigate redressing this lack, before too late.]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>TSgt Atkins has penned an excellent discussion on the need for SLCM- N or something with very similar tactical nuclear capabilities. Much has been written on the need for SLCM- N elsewhere, all of it compellingly true, yet this new GSR article focuses on something else compelling: To be maximally effective at nuclear deterrence, a system must be evaluated prospectively from the tactical perspective of effective warfighting IF (and ONLY IF) deterrence fails. Any nuclear weapons we own that are &#8220;unusable&#8221; in the adversaries&#8217; minds will NOT give an effective deterrent effect. Nor will weapons that sit in CONUS inventory, obsolescing,  without proper personnel training and comprehensive operational doctrine and infrastructure. The US suffers a serious lack of adequate low-yield nuclear deterrence capacity AND capability. Let us hope and pray that TSgt Atkins&#8217;s article will further encourage Congress to instigate redressing this lack, before too late.</p>
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