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	<title>
	Comments on: Failed Deterrence and Misplaced Compellence in Gaza	</title>
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	<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/failed-deterrence-and-misplaced-compellence-in-gaza/</link>
	<description>A division of the National Institute for Deterrence Studies (NIDS)</description>
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		<title>
		By: Justin		</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/failed-deterrence-and-misplaced-compellence-in-gaza/#comment-2727</link>

		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Justin]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 16 Sep 2025 19:40:09 +0000</pubDate>
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					<description><![CDATA[Hi Ted,
Thanks for reading. I’ve read that analysis as well, and Hamas was planning this attack before the 2014 War. It’s likely that Israel’s offensive then, and the later battle against PIJ delayed their plans. With Hamas’s objective on the ground being to show the death and destruction, you could say they can’t be deterred by the threat of military force. The point I try to make is by going after their wallets and their hosts, that might be enough.]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Hi Ted,<br />
Thanks for reading. I’ve read that analysis as well, and Hamas was planning this attack before the 2014 War. It’s likely that Israel’s offensive then, and the later battle against PIJ delayed their plans. With Hamas’s objective on the ground being to show the death and destruction, you could say they can’t be deterred by the threat of military force. The point I try to make is by going after their wallets and their hosts, that might be enough.</p>
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		<title>
		By: Ted Seay		</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/failed-deterrence-and-misplaced-compellence-in-gaza/#comment-2723</link>

		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Ted Seay]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 16 Sep 2025 06:05:03 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=31470#comment-2723</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[What is deterrence? It’s a state of mind.

When did deterrence fail ahead of the October 7, 2023 atrocities? It appears now that Hamas planning began before the July-August 2014 conflict, and was merely paused during that confrontation. In short, deterrence “failed” in 2014 or earlier for the October 2023 operation.

Or perhaps it is more truthful to say that it never existed.]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>What is deterrence? It’s a state of mind.</p>
<p>When did deterrence fail ahead of the October 7, 2023 atrocities? It appears now that Hamas planning began before the July-August 2014 conflict, and was merely paused during that confrontation. In short, deterrence “failed” in 2014 or earlier for the October 2023 operation.</p>
<p>Or perhaps it is more truthful to say that it never existed.</p>
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