<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><rss version="2.0"
	xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"
	xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"
	xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"
	xmlns:sy="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/syndication/"
	
	>
<channel>
	<title>
	Comments on: Countering the Asymmetry of Nuclear Strategy	</title>
	<atom:link href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/countering-the-asymmetry-of-nuclear-strategy/feed/" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml" />
	<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/countering-the-asymmetry-of-nuclear-strategy/</link>
	<description>A division of the National Institute for Deterrence Studies (NIDS)</description>
	<lastBuildDate>Wed, 28 Feb 2024 20:52:22 +0000</lastBuildDate>
	<sy:updatePeriod>
	hourly	</sy:updatePeriod>
	<sy:updateFrequency>
	1	</sy:updateFrequency>
	<generator>https://wordpress.org/?v=7.0</generator>
	<item>
		<title>
		By: Joe Buff		</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/countering-the-asymmetry-of-nuclear-strategy/#comment-84</link>

		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Joe Buff]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 28 Feb 2024 20:52:22 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=27122#comment-84</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[A must read piece on a critical problem: America&#039;s weakness in in-kind proportionate retaliation against adversary low-yield attacks, compromising our ability to deflect coercion, deter attacks, and credibly assure allies. Short of somehow rapidly building up our in-theater tactical nuclear forces to rough parity with Russia and China -- despite White House antipathy -- exactly as the author strongly (and RIGHTLY) urges, what options would POTUS have IF Putin or Xi suddenly nuked one of our nuclear umbrella allies? Methinks these include: 1) give in to the geopolitical coercion [Unacceptable!] , 2) retaliate with a high-yield weapon [NOT proportionate], 3) retaliate with conventional weapons [might work against a &quot;clean super-low-yield mini-nuke], or 4) retaliate with our own low-yield weapons while the supply lasts, then improvise more by removing the lithium hydride from some stockpiled H-bombs. I vote for Option 4, which calls for planning, training, exercising, and forward deploying NOW.... Trexel also clearly articulates the importance of an effective counterforce triad and reliable, rightsized BMD, to protect the homeland and also put backbone in our extended deterrence assurances.... A solid, thought provoking treatment.]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>A must read piece on a critical problem: America&#8217;s weakness in in-kind proportionate retaliation against adversary low-yield attacks, compromising our ability to deflect coercion, deter attacks, and credibly assure allies. Short of somehow rapidly building up our in-theater tactical nuclear forces to rough parity with Russia and China &#8212; despite White House antipathy &#8212; exactly as the author strongly (and RIGHTLY) urges, what options would POTUS have IF Putin or Xi suddenly nuked one of our nuclear umbrella allies? Methinks these include: 1) give in to the geopolitical coercion [Unacceptable!] , 2) retaliate with a high-yield weapon [NOT proportionate], 3) retaliate with conventional weapons [might work against a &#8220;clean super-low-yield mini-nuke], or 4) retaliate with our own low-yield weapons while the supply lasts, then improvise more by removing the lithium hydride from some stockpiled H-bombs. I vote for Option 4, which calls for planning, training, exercising, and forward deploying NOW&#8230;. Trexel also clearly articulates the importance of an effective counterforce triad and reliable, rightsized BMD, to protect the homeland and also put backbone in our extended deterrence assurances&#8230;. A solid, thought provoking treatment.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
		
			</item>
	</channel>
</rss>
