The most important point is that nuclear deterrence is no longer a one-peer math problem. A posture designed around sequential crises may look sufficient on paper, but it becomes fragile when Russia, China, and North Korea can create overlapping pressure points.

Dynamic Parity is compelling because it does not argue for superiority. It argues for disciplined balance against the combined threat America actually faces. That matters. Deterrence fails when adversaries believe U.S. capacity, political will, or industrial execution cannot keep pace with the strategic environment.

The budget point may be the most overlooked part. Continuing resolutions and shutdown threats are not just fiscal annoyances. They are strategic signals. If modernization depends on annual brinkmanship, then America is telling allies and adversaries that its deterrent is vulnerable to domestic dysfunction.

Execution is credibility. In this era, deterrence cannot rest on assumptions built for a simpler nuclear order.

Additionally USA forces have been particularly bad at Arctic missions. Compared to the Nordics and Greenlanders in particular. USA personal literally saved by Greenlanders and their derided dogsleds in the past.

I have Inuit Family on Greenland. And I will tell you they are an industrious lot. With a labor participation nearly identical to the USA figures. We can work with them. No need for bullying is required.

I can see a USMC NSM detatchment working just fine with NATO NASM units along the East Coast of Greenland. Just ask.

In a multipolar nuclear age with expanding rival arsenals and fading treaties, influenced attacks will aim first at confidence, our thresholds, our second-strike survivability, and especially allied faith in extended deterrence. When allies doubt, proliferation pressure rises and deterrence erodes, and that is exactly the leverage opponents want.

The authors aren’t just offering their view of posture guidance, they are giving America its own playbook for strategic stability. It shows how to keep perception aligned with reality so autocracies can’t manufacture miscalculation at nuclear speed.

Subsequent modelling starting in 2007 using modern computers lowered this threshold dramatically: Rather than the hundreds or thousands of nuclear explosions which TTAPS and other researchers originally believed necessary to trigger the nuclear winter phenomenon, it became clear that 100 Hiroshima-sized explosions (~15 kilotons) over urban areas would be sufficient to trigger the deaths of billions of people (https://www.giss.nasa.gov/pubs/abs/xi08000i.html).

This presents an irreducible problem for advocates of nuclear deterrence: Any nuclear conflict which approaches the aggregate of 1.5 megatons over urban targets is likely to trigger unacceptable GLOBAL casualties — innocent civilians from the other side of the world who have nothing to do with the conflict in question. Strategically, this represents an even greater nightmare than “standard” nuclear attack planning: What to do if the enemy explodes ~1 megaton of nuclear weapons over your cities? Retaliate, and risk laying waste to large swaths of humanity and civilization?

It is clear to those who have eyes to see that the only rational future for nuclear deterrence (that is, the only applicable logic) is, in the short term, self-deterrence, and, on an urgent basis in the longer term, total nuclear disarmament.

Some other thoughts:

>Although there are notable breakthroughs in efforts to reach agreements on arms control and disarmament, the world remains far from achieving disarmament goals and is still on a long quest to eliminate nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons hold a key place in security policy.

See above. Nuclear weapons can have no legitimate place in any rational policy-making.

>The latest report by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) says nearly all nuclear-armed states, including the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Russia, China, India, Pakistan, Israel, and North Korea, are modernizing and upgrading their nuclear capabilities.

The disarmament community, including SIPRI, bears an enormous responsibility here: To bring the basic facts of nuclear winter to the attention, not only to the rulers of the nuclear weapons states, but to all eight billion of Earth’s inhabitants.

>Consequently, a perilous new nuclear arms race is emerging, and reliance on nuclear weapons is increasing. This inevitably raises the question, is nuclear disarmament still logical and relevant?

See above. Total nuclear disarmament is the only logical response to the status quo; nothing else is relevant, including most of the disarmament community’s actions.

>Under the NPT, the division between nuclear weapons states and non–nuclear weapon states is not supposed to be permanent as all NPT parties will move to non–nuclear weapon states.

True, but irrelevant. Proliferation is not the real danger here, as far more nuclear weapons exist than are needed to trigger nuclear winter. What has changed is that India and Pakistan are now capable of killing billions globally with no “assistance” from anyone else: not Beijing, not Moscow, not Washington.

>The current geopolitical landscape regarding nuclear proliferation, nonproliferation, counter-proliferation, and disarmament indicates a deadlock in the pursuit of a global zero (GZ). Two key terms, conceptualized in this article, may help explain the shortcomings in nuclear disarmament efforts under the grand bargain. The first is the security betrayal trap (SBT), which refers to a situation where security guarantees are betrayed, leaving a country exposed and vulnerable. The second is disarmament deception syndrome (DDS), a pattern of negative consequences resulting from false promises made during the disarmament process.

Utterly irrelevant. The cold equations of nuclear winter don’t care about national pride, betrayals or truth-telling.

>Ukraine regrets abandoning its inherited nukes in the wake of its ongoing war with Russia. The withdrawal of North Korea from the NPT and the lesson it learned are that nukes are key to national survival. Similarly, Iran’s pursuit of nuclear capability is considered inevitable for the country’s national security. In this geopolitical context, it is hard to make countries believe in any negative as well as positive security in return for disarmament and de-nuclearization.

Completely, utterly, totally irrelevant. More players in the nuclear winter sweepstakes simply mean more education required on the implications of the cold, dark equations.

>Disarmament is also unlikely in today’s world due to the changing technological landscape.

Irrelevant and ultimately wrong-headed. There is only one choice possible on global nuclear disarmament, and that is to save civilization.

Paul Ingram and I were pleased that our short piece on deterrence and its discontents was accepted for online publication by Global Security Review. We hope to build a dialogue on strategic stability and conflict with GSR readers so that we can thoroughly discuss our doubts about deterrence as currently understood and practiced, and perhaps expand on some of our arguments that were necessarily abridged by the 1,000-word limit.

We were therefore pleased when Captain Severin Pleyer of the Bundeswehr’s Helmut Schmidt University chose to reply with a critique of our piece. We must, however, take issue with several of Captain Pleyer’s comments:

>Thus, in short, the article largely bypasses 70 years of deterrence theory and debate—Schelling, Jervis, Freedman, Waltz, Morgan, Huth, etc.—which have addressed many of the critiques raised. Without engaging this literature, the argument appears underdeveloped and neither disarmament nor a serious debate about deterrence.

Captain Pleyer cites many of the giants of deterrence theory by name but fails to deploy their arguments, much less point out how these pioneers would invalidate our thesis. In fact, two of the giants mentioned, Thomas Schelling and Paul Huth, explicitly mention the importance of reputation – Thucydides’ doxa – to successful deterrence, echoing our own thesis that a total, monomaniacal reliance on fear – phobos – to create deterrence is misguided at best and unlikely to succeed:

“‘Face’ [is] one of the few things worth fighting over…‘Face’ is merely the interdependence of a country’s commitments: it is a country’s reputation for action, the expectation other countries have about its behavior.” (Thomas Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966) p. 124)

Huth, in turn, while raising doubts about the universality of Schelling’s thesis, yet offered his own support for the importance of reputation/doxa to deterrence:

“In a situation of attempted deterrence, the sensitivity of a potential attacker to military threats and challenges to its reputation make it difficult for a defender to undertake actions that demonstrate resolve while avoiding provocation. (Paul Huth, Extended Deterrence and the Prevention of War (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988) p. 9)

Citing names without invoking arguments comes perilously close to committing a fundamental logical fallacy, the appeal to authority. Then there are Captain Pleyer’s comments on nuclear winter:

>The article implies further that nuclear deterrence is invalidated by nuclear winter. This ignores decades of evidence that nuclear deterrence has prevented great-power war. The risks of nuclear use are real, but declaring deterrence “self-deterrence only” underestimates the empirical stability of nuclear dyads since 1945.

There are several problems with this passage. First, the formalization of the nuclear winter thesis properly began with the 1983 publication by Science of “Global Atmospheric Consequences of Nuclear War” by Turco, Toon, Ackerman, Pollack and Sagan (TTAPS). However, the next generation of nuclear winter scholarship began in 2007 with the publication of “Climatic Consequences of Regional Nuclear Conflicts” in Atmospheric Chemistry and Physics by Robock, Oman, Stenchikov, Toon, Bardeen and Turco.

The latter paper pointed out that nuclear winter was no longer the exclusive property of Moscow and Washington, since advanced computer models had revised downward by orders of magnitude the explosive power necessary to trigger a nuclear winter event from thousands of warheads to 100 Hiroshima-sized explosions over urban areas. Now others, e.g., Islamabad and New Delhi, could initiate nuclear conflict and bring about deadly environmental consequences for much of the planet without any involvement by China, Russia or the U.S.

Thus, claiming that “decades of evidence that nuclear deterrence has prevented great-power war” somehow refutes our thesis (that nuclear winter has removed nuclear deterrence from the realm of useful crisis management tools) misses the point that atmospheric scientists have only recently come to grips with the true nature of nuclear winter and the accurate boundaries of its creation.

(Nor, for that matter, do we concede the point that nuclear deterrence is by any means “empirically stable”, since too many close-call and near-miss incidents have come to light in recent years which suggest that the absence of the use-in-anger of nuclear weapons since 1945 can properly be ascribed to sheer, dumb luck.)

>Focusing solely on the attack against Israel has severe problems associated with it; for one, the authors talk about deterrence but do not qualify which aspect they mean. Nobody ever implied that nuclear weapons would prevent an attack by Hamas.

Paul and I made it very clear in our post that our issue was with deterrence as an overarching concept, and most of our piece is explicitly devoted to conventional deterrence. We believe, in fact, that Israel and its history of conflict since 1948 make it the ideal test case for deterrence in all forms, since its opponents have ranged from coalitions of nations all the way down to criminal gangs. It was the spectacular failure of all-forms Israeli deterrence in 1973 and 2023, in fact, which led us to posit fundamental, even existential issues with deterrence as currently understood.

>Lastly, an alternative to deterrence is nowhere to be found.

As we stated in our post, our goal was to emphasize the importance of matching incentives to desired behaviors, in deterrence as in all aspects of political economy. A broader understanding of Thucydides’ three main conflict triggers will lead, we hope, to a better matching of incentives offered to potential opponents and the outcomes we seek from them. The dire position Israel finds itself in currently is for us the most eloquent warning possible of the dangers inherent in sole reliance on fear-inducing deterrence to prevent conflict.

We hope, in any event, to continue this discussion with other GSR readers and contributors. Please – tell us where you think our argument falls down, so that our mutual understanding can continue to grow!

Thus, in short, the article largely bypasses 70 years of deterrence theory and debate—Schelling, Jervis, Freedman, Waltz, Morgan, Huth, etc.—which have addressed many of the critiques raised. Without engaging this literature, the argument appears underdeveloped and neither disarmament nor a serious debate about deterrence.

The article implies further that nuclear deterrence is invalidated by nuclear winter. This ignores decades of evidence that nuclear deterrence has prevented great-power war. The risks of nuclear use are real, but declaring deterrence “self-deterrence only” underestimates the empirical stability of nuclear dyads since 1945.

Focusing solely on the attack against Israel has severe problems associated with it; for one, the authors talk about deterrence but do not qualify which aspect they mean. Nobody ever implied that nuclear weapons would prevent an attack by Hamas.

Lastly, an alternative to deterrence is nowhere to be found.

When did deterrence fail ahead of the October 7, 2023 atrocities? It appears now that Hamas planning began before the July-August 2014 conflict, and was merely paused during that confrontation. In short, deterrence “failed” in 2014 or earlier for the October 2023 operation.

Or perhaps it is more truthful to say that it never existed.

Agree. Shared values and interests, room for much collaboration. Bravo to the author. There is an ongoing need to take the lead, defend and preempt those who have small minded revisionist ambitions and show a better way.

Thank you. This piece is one of many here on the site. Stay tuned and I’m sure you’ll find another one 🔥🗝️!

Joelvis, yes. In almost everything you’ve got to have backup. You can’t finance a car without proof of income and positive history of paying your bills on time. Our nations strength is our W-2 and credit score when it comes to effective deterrence.

Jaedyn, yes! Chefs Kiss. Thanks for the read. We’ve got to get back to legit conversations and points, instead of trying to find a way to switch the narrative. Let’s narrate truth and reality. Stay Tuned. NIDS & Global Security Review are constantly going to give you another one 🔥🗝️

I can tell you read the piece, Thanks for the read. Negotiation goes a lot smoother when you’re in the “drivers seat”. Stay Tuned. NIDS & Global Security Review are constantly going to give you another one 🔥🗝️

Thanks for the read. You grasped the exact point of both pieces. Stay Tuned. NIDS & Global Security Review are constantly going to give you another one 🔥🗝️

Hi JD,

Thanks for reading and for your comment. I do believe there exists the capacity for bioterrorism to happen. However from my review of the data there does not seem to be any indicator of terrorist groups resorting to that type of attack, instead favoring cheaper more effective weapons.

Hi Andrew,

Thank you for your comment. I agree it would take a qualified scientist or foreign government to perpetrate a successful bioterror attack, such as the 2001 American Anthrax attacks. However the point I try to make is that would-be attackers are more likely to resort to cheaper and more effective measures. Even with the 2001 anthrax attack orchestrated by trained scientists only managed to kill five people, and injured less than 20. While absolutely tragic, it does not compare to the 2016 Nice Truck attack that killed 86 people and injured several hundred. The skills to drive a truck are significantly easier to obtain.

I certainly agree Dr. Brandon. From Local to International political sphere, it has loaded of spillovers. Thank you so much for your kind words to my think piece. Looking forward to read yours in the future, Sir. Cheers!

Thanks, Brandon!

The piece is effective as a policy advocacy article: it clearly articulates the rationale for Golden Dome, rebuts common criticisms, and leverages historical context to strengthen its case.

Well done!

I especially appreciate the article’s focus on Iran’s measured and pragmatic follow-up actions. While many analyses overlook this aspect, this one correctly identifies that Iran’s limited missile strike—delivered with advance warning—was likely its only realistic option in the face of overwhelming U.S. air superiority. The piece acknowledges that, given current power dynamics, Iran’s choices are constrained to asymmetric tactics and indirect retaliation, rather than direct military confrontation. This was an insight is crucial for understanding the broader strategic picture and is often missing from other coverage.

I appreciate your perspective, especially given the regional context. The credibility of the U.S. nuclear umbrella really does have ripple effects far beyond its traditional focus areas. Thanks for reading and for sharing your insights from South Asia.

Thank you, Dr. Meera. The Indo-Pacific is where a lot of these questions are playing out in real time, and U.S. commitment is under the microscope. I’m glad the article helped frame the debate, and I hope to keep the conversation going with more region-specific analysis.

Thanks, Siddharth. The multipolar world really does demand a fresh look at extended deterrence, and India’s evolving role is central to that. I agree that U.S. frameworks need to better account for India’s growing influence—something I hope to explore further.

Ravi, you’re absolutely right—hypersonics and other new tech are changing the deterrence equation. Trust can’t just rest on legacy systems anymore. Layered, modern capabilities are key to keeping the umbrella credible, especially with China’s rapid advances. Thanks for highlighting this.

Thank you, Ananya. The intersection of U.S. reassurance and India’s strategic autonomy is a fascinating topic—one that deserves its own deep dive. I’ll keep this in mind for a future piece and would love to hear what specific angles you think are most important to cover.

Jonathan, I appreciate your thoughtful read. Sustainability is the big question, isn’t it? The nuclear umbrella has delivered stability for decades, but maintaining credibility as circumstances change is a real challenge. I think the triggers for doubt often come down to shifting U.S. priorities or mixed signals. Exploring what keeps allies confident (or not) is something I’d like to tackle in more depth soon.

Thanks, Emily. You’re right—the threat landscape is changing fast, and cyber and hybrid tactics are challenging the old playbook. The “rain will come” metaphor was meant to capture that uncertainty, but you’re spot on that we need to think harder about how to deter sub-nuclear aggression. I’ll definitely explore this more in future articles—appreciate the push for a deeper dive.

Great point, Michael. Extended deterrence really does work best when it’s a partnership, not a one-way street. I agree that “stepping up” could mean a mix of increased defense spending, more burden-sharing, and stronger conventional capabilities. I’m actually considering a follow-up piece that digs into what meaningful allied contributions look like in practice—thanks for the nudge!

You’ve hit on a real dilemma—how do we keep the NPT strong while making sure extended deterrence remains credible, especially as some umbrella states double down on nuclear roles? It’s definitely a balancing act. I think reinforcing transparency, investing in arms control dialogue, and encouraging responsible nuclear policies among allies are all part of the answer. Would love to hear your thoughts on what practical steps could help bridge that gap.

Thank you for raising this important point, Priya. The risk of escalation is real, and any shift in posture must be managed with careful signaling and robust diplomatic engagement. The goal isn’t to trigger an arms race, but to adapt to evolving realities while maintaining stability. In the future I’ll explore strategies for balancing assertiveness with restraint to avoid unintended consequences. Would love to hear your perspective on those ideas when they’re published.

Appreciate it James. The concept of ‘minimum credible deterrence’ has served its purpose, but as you point out, the ambiguity it creates can be risky in today’s environment. Dominance, as I see it, is about clarity and resilience—not provocation. It’s about ensuring our posture and messaging leave no room for miscalculation. Thanks for highlighting this nuance.

Thank you, Helena. You’re absolutely right—today’s threat landscape is more complex than ever, and effective deterrence has to extend beyond the traditional nuclear triad. Integrating cyber and space considerations is essential for a credible posture. That’s a great idea to dive deeper into these multi-domain challenges, so I appreciate your interest and hope you’ll share your thoughts on the next installment as well.

How could Saudi Arabia’s assertive Syria strategy affect its relations with global players like the U.S. and Russia, given their deep interests in the conflict?

I am all for the nuclear armed B-21 bombers, but you aren’t likely to get them before 2034 either. Also, as Dr Christine Leah and I point out in our previous article, we have illuminated the benefits of a limited nuclear option hidden beneath the sea rather than delivered by air.

Ideally, Australia will need a modern nuclear triad (including ICBMs) in the long term to face Chinese and Russian nuclear threats.

It also depends on what missions we want our submarines to do. Are they just going to hunt down and kill other submarines, deliver a limited nuclear option? While the Los Angeles-class focuses on open-ocean anti-submarine warfare and land-based missile strikes, the Virginia-class is designed for a broader range of missions, including littoral operations and special operations support.

Last time that I checked the map there is a significant archipelagic region to north, north west and east of Australia for littoral operations.
Not sure how America wants to handle the Chinese militarized islands in the South China Sea though?!

AI Generated response below (so may be some errors)

Key Differences
Mission Suitability: The Los Angeles-class is primarily focused on open-ocean operations, while the Virginia-class excels in littoral waters and supports special operations due to its “fly-by-wire” control system and features like reconfigurable torpedo rooms.
Littoral Operations: The Virginia-class is specifically designed for littoral operations, with features like a large lockout trunk for divers and special force support.
Weapon Systems: Both classes carry Tomahawk cruise missiles and torpedoes, but the Virginia-class has more advanced vertical launch systems and payload capacity, including the Virginia Payload Module (VPM) for future off-board payloads.
Design: The Virginia-class features a different hull form, photonics masts instead of periscopes, and a relocated control room, which enhances situational awareness for the commanding officer.
Quietness: The Virginia-class is designed to be quieter than the Los Angeles-class, with a focus on reducing noise and improving its overall acoustic signature.
Virginia-class Enhancements: Littoral Capabilities: The Virginia-class is designed to operate effectively in shallow waters and coastal areas, including support for special operations forces.
Advanced Weaponry: The Virginia-class has more advanced vertical launch systems and payload capacity, enabling it to carry and launch a wider variety of weapons and payloads.
Quiet Operation: The Virginia-class is designed to be quieter than the Los Angeles-class, making it a more stealthy platform.
Special Operations Support: The Virginia-class has features to support special operations, including a reconfigurable torpedo room, a large lockout trunk, and the ability to carry unmanned undersea vehicles (UUVs) and special force delivery vehicles.

A) There will never be a time when Australia is operating 3 submarine classes at once. By the time AUKUS-SSN is in service the Collins will either have been retired or lie hull-crushed at the bottom of the ocean.

B) Given the UK’s record on building Astute and now Dreadnaught, don’t hold your breathe that the UK will bring AUKUS in on time, budget or even at all. You are much more likely to see Australia continue to add Virginia to it’s fleet and eventually SSN-X which may be rolled into a true SSN-AUKUS vs current SSN-AUK.

C) Given the UK is having trouble keeping just one of it’s 7 Astute-SSNs at sea, don’t count on one being continually rotated to HMAS Stirling. At best it will do an annual “Fly The Flag” trip.

D) I am not sure where you are getting the 2043 date for the East Coast SSN Base. That may be a fiction of the labor government, but was not part of the original agreement where it was to be constructed straight away (you may recall then Defense Minister Peter Dutton wanting to announce the location before the election).

There is an Option 4 – Rather than further deplete it’s Virginia Fleet, the US may offer RAN, say 8 of the retiring Los Angeles Class SSN’s with a “Super-LOTE”. This would effectively fit out the Los Angeles hull with Virginia weapons, equipment, Pump Jet Propulsor (vs propellor), Conformal Acoustic Velocity Sonar (along the hull) and a new SG9 reactor from the Virginia (vs the current SG6). The virtually free hull would give faster availability and lower cost., allowing the originally planned 8 – numbers count. If and when AUKUS-SSN arrives, they would be ready to retire.

There is Option 5 – with a SSN starved USN, America lets has the RAAF take on the long range strike role by selling Australia 16 to 24 x B-21 bombers (at say 2/year). Each of which can deliver 8 long range land-attack, anti-ship and anti-air and anti-missile cruise missiles (vs the Virginia block I to IV’s 12 missiles) not just to the Chinese coast but inland including via Myanmar …. and then come back tomorrow and do it again.

In the future, the US will most likely need more nuclear-armed allies. Otherwise, the US will face several nuclear armed adversaries alone, which will be destabilizing.

In the shortness of time — Option 3 is the easiest to implement, but could leave Australia with a gap in its ability to conduct sovereign submarine operations.

Option 2 is a preferred option to trigger the formation of lean Indo-Pacific nuclear alliance.

Option 1 does degrade US extended nuclear deterrence, especially as US nuclear forces are concurrently undergoing modernisation. A flexible regional response is likely to alleviate some of those gaps.

US END is the status quo for Australia, so to rule out rotational nuclear-armed submarines doesn’t make any sense if we are happy to have nuclear-capable bombers land here. There is even fear here in Australia of nuclear-armed submarines turning up, due to a lack of public and even some government (amongst the public service) understanding of US END and the concept of “don’t ask, don’t tell”.

There’s also the fact that Australia has a work, health and safety culture now where we would expect to have the appropriate facilities, training and safeguards in place to deal with nuclear assets and or any accidents. From what I have googled, Australia just had some Geiger counters back in the day.

I’m curious, which of the 3 does the author anticipate this administration to choose? If you were a senior cabinet member or advisor, what’s your recommendation?

Outstanding article.

Our enemies spread usury and inflation. They corrupt culture through porn, prostitution, liberty without true freedom…. They poison us with gene therapy, so-called vaccines, and food additives. They lock in high energy costs through the green grift that leads to more pollution, less reliability, and increased monthly bills. They use fractional reserve banking and communistic capitalism for the monopolies and destroy small business. They use money printing to bail out their failures and take advantage of the inflation to control more assets, bring misery to families, and steal wages from laborers. They engineered and executed an invasion by our adversaries who wish us dead. All of the errors of those that reject Christ are choking Europe and America. Let’s get our own house in order and most likely the Arabian peninsula will let the traffic flow.

So why should we care about the Houthis, again?

Let’s have a truly America First strategy.

I share your frustration with the current reactive responses and fully back your call for a coalition-led, multi-dimensional strategy. This military strategy should also leverage strategic isolation and regional cooperation. The argument for a unified Arab front that disrupts Iranian support is particularly powerful given the Houthis’ increasing regional influence.

That said, a few questions arise: How do you respond to skeptics who doubt the feasibility of synchronizing such a diverse coalition amidst entrenched geopolitical rivalries? What concrete measures can be implemented to ensure that a military response doesn’t inadvertently further destabilize Yemen? And in your view, how can Arab states overcome longstanding internal divisions to engage effectively against the Houthi threat?

Great piece. even better conversation starter. I’m curious to hear your thoughts on these points.

You’ve got it.

Thank you for your engagement. FOBS is a critical aspect of this evolving security landscape that fundamentally reshapes defensive strategy. It forces a re-evaluation of traditional deterrence models. The shift to a 360° posture underscores the urgency of developing both offensive capabilities and robust countermeasures. I appreciate your recognition of the strategic implications and the need for proactive investment in these technologies.

Great question. In my opinion, Deterrence must evolve to address hypersonics’ speed, unpredictability, and payload ambiguity. This means investing in advanced detection, rapid response, and clear communication to reduce the risk of misinterpretation and accidental conflict.

Thank you for catching that Speed Racer reference! In my opinion, and there are much more qualified individuals to answer your question, the ambiguity between conventional and nuclear payloads is a core challenge-because hypersonic weapons can carry either, adversaries may assume the worst in a crisis, dramatically raising the risk of miscalculation and unintended escalation.

Appreciate your feedback. Hypersonics truly do turn “minutes into seconds,” shrinking reaction windows and challenging even the most advanced defenses.

Thank you! Using a familiar reference was intentional-to show how something once fun now signals a serious, urgent threat in modern warfare.

You’re right-the Mach 5 is a warning, not just nostalgia. Hypersonic weapons can be either conventional or nuclear, which creates dangerous uncertainty in crisis situations

Thank you! Relatable analogies help bridge the gap between technical complexity and public understanding, especially with threats as serious as hypersonic weapons.

Glad the Mach 5 metaphor resonated. Hypersonics are no longer science fiction-they expose real gaps in global defense and crisis management.

Thank you for your thoughtful response. It’s sobering how much innovation is now focused on countering new threats. Readiness in this era means staying ahead of rapidly evolving technologies.

I appreciate your comment! Making national security issues accessible is vital. The Mach 5 metaphor captures how hypersonics compress decision time, making the threat both real and urgent.

Great question. In my opinion, Deterrence must evolve to address hypersonics’ speed, unpredictability, and payload ambiguity. This means investing in advanced detection, rapid response, and clear communication to reduce the risk of misinterpretation and accidental conflict.

analysis is a sobering wake-up call, weaving technical detail with geopolitical stakes to highlight the erosion of strategic stability. What specific arms control measures could realistically curb the hypersonic arms race?

This is more than a history lesson—it’s a wake-up call. The timeline of NATO support—from Korea to Kosovo, Afghanistan to the Red Sea—makes one thing indisputable: NATO has shown up for America time and again, especially after 9/11.

Article 5 wasn’t just words on paper. It was Canadian pilots patrolling U.S. skies. British and German troops fighting and dying alongside ours in Afghanistan. Allies deploying when we called.

Now, with Europe rearming and confronting 21st-century threats, the question isn’t “Are they doing enough?” It’s “Are we honoring their sacrifices and trust?”

America’s leadership in NATO should reflect gratitude, strength, and strategic foresight—not threats, withdrawal talk, or transactional ultimatums.

Reagan got it right: “An attack on you is an attack on us.”
Let’s not forget who echoed that back to us when we needed it most.

#NATO #NationalSecurity #Article5 #TransatlanticAlliance #AlliesMatter #StrategicLeadership

They both feel that the Shia clerical leadership can stay without control of the Government, much like the Pope or others as an example.

If the leadership from both countries look to businesses being allowed to operate in Iran and Iranian business can flourish domestically and internationally relations should improve dramatically.

The Iranians should stop third countries attacking others in the Middle East and visa versa. Look at the UAE and others where they can do business and are not extreme religious wise.

I watched a YouTube recently where an Aussie guy went around Tehran trying food out. Most women were not wearing any head covering and said hello. Two other guys in separate places where wearing jumpers with California logos and US logos.

Lukas, I truly appreciate your comment and your characterization of the analysis as insightful. You’ve captured the core message about the importance of reaffirming NATO commitments during this period of heightened European security threats. Your emphasis on strengthening extended deterrence and ensuring a credible nuclear posture as key elements for alliance stability and unity is precisely on point. Thank you for recognizing these crucial factors. If our leaders could have fruitful dialogue like this we’d be better off!

Isabelle, thank you for taking the time to comment and for your kind words about the American perspective presented. It’s reassuring to hear your agreement on NATO’s indispensable role in collective defense and the importance of renewed emphasis on deterrence and readiness. You’ve articulated the dynamic between strategic ambiguity and clear, resolute action very well. It’s a delicate but crucial balance in effective deterrence.

I’m pleased the article provided a helpful breakdown. The vital link between steadfast US commitment and NATO cohesion, the necessity of modernizing capabilities against emerging threats, and the fundamental truth that a strong NATO is indeed foundational to a safer Europe are well taken points.

I’m grateful for your thoughtful analysis of the broader implications of Hegseth’s Doctrine. You’ve captured the essence of what I hope to convey—a paradigm shift in strategic philosophy that combines mindset, technological dominance, and decisive deterrence. It’s a significant moment, and I agree that the world should pay close attention to how these ideas unfold.

Your comment highlights an essential truth about deterrence—it’s not static but dynamic, requiring constant adaptation. Hegseth’s Doctrine challenges us to embrace a leadership model that evolves with the times, redefining our strategies to address both threats and opportunities. Thank you for resonating with this perspective.

I appreciate your reflection on the necessity of forward-looking strategies. Our reliance on past successes can sometimes hinder progress, and you’re absolutely right that anticipation and preparation are key. Incorporating emerging technologies into our strategic framework is a core tenet of the proactive approach I advocate for in my piece.

Spot on. I need you to be my hypeman! Thanks for the feedback.

Thank you for pointing out the importance of addressing emerging challenges in cyber and space. Indeed, China’s advancements in these realms demand renewed focus on our resolve and readiness. Hegseth’s Doctrine aims to spark this essential debate, emphasizing that credible deterrence in the 21st century must evolve to meet unconventional threats head-on.

Absolutely. That unwavering resolve is the cornerstone of deterrence. It’s a message that leaves no room for doubt—clear, strong, and essential.

You’ve captured the essence of the doctrine perfectly. A strong defense has always been a proven deterrent, and Hegseth’s approach reinforces that timeless principle while adapting to modern challenges.

From your lips to God’s ears! The balance between decisive action and strategic prudence is critical, and Hegseth’s focus on reaffirming alliances is a vital component of extended deterrence. Trust and resolve go hand in hand. Do me a favor. Browse the site to engage in the broader discussion, share your perspective, and discover more topics that encourage reflective and dynamic discourse.

You’re right—urgency is key. The prospect of nuclear parity demands a proactive and strategic response, and Hegseth’s doctrine reflects the seriousness of this challenge. I hope you continue actively participating in the discussion on the site, share your insights, and stay connected for upcoming topics designed to inspire meaningful dialogue.

That ‘warfighting mentality’ is indeed a powerful reminder of the vigilance required to maintain deterrence. Constant readiness has always been a cornerstone of effective defense. Dive into the full discussion on the site, add your voice to the conversation, and keep an eye out for more thought-provoking topics coming your way!

Thank you for the kind words. I’ve worked in some capacity for the nation most of my adult life, and yes I wore the uniform in the Navy. Hooyah. The balance between dominance and stability is indeed delicate, and Hegseth’s approach aims to navigate that tension thoughtfully while addressing evolving global security challenge. We need folks like you to be part of the ongoing dialogue on the site, express your views, and stay tuned for more subjects that foster engaging and impactful conversations.

Great observation brother! Hegseth’s COIN background does offer a unique lens for understanding deterrence in today’s complex battlespace. It’s fascinating to see how those experiences influence his strategic thinking. There are some great writers and wise strategic sages on this platform. Browse the site to engage in the broader discussion, share your perspective, and discover more topics that encourage reflective and dynamic discourse.

Thank you for sharing your perspective. Modernizing the nuclear triad is indeed a critical priority, and staying ahead technologically is essential for maintaining effective deterrence. Explore the conversation in full across the website, contribute your thoughts, and look forward to future discussions that aim to challenge perspectives and spark ideas.

Absolutely. Clear communication of intent is a powerful tool for preventing escalation, and Hegseth’s doctrine reflects the importance of transparency in maintaining stability. Join the discussion on the site, share your insights, and stay connected for upcoming topics designed to inspire meaningful dialogue

You’ve captured the duality perfectly. The ‘warrior ethos’ is vital, but diplomacy remains an equally important pillar in navigating the complexities of deterrence and global security. Dive into the full discussion on the site, add your voice to the conversation, and keep an eye out for more thought-provoking topics coming your way!

Mic drop!

Spot on. African states have both the moral authority and the lived experience to challenge the status quo and redefine what equitable security looks like. By championing diplomacy, leading on arms control dialogue, and pushing for reforms in global governance, Africa can shape a more balanced and just international order—not just react to it.

Absolutely agree—“Global Security Isn’t Optional” is a powerful framing. You nailed it: instability anywhere has ripple effects everywhere. It’s time we move the multilateralism conversation from lofty ideals to practical necessity. And you’re right—regardless of political tone, the burden imbalance is real and long overdue for recalibration.

Well said. Africa may not be a major arms producer, but it often bears the brunt of global arms flows and policy gaps. Elevating African voices in arms control is essential—not just for equity, but for crafting solutions that reflect the realities on the ground.

Absolutely agree. African states are not spectators in global affairs—they are key stakeholders whose voices and values matter in shaping the future of international security.

I can try! Traditional arms control treaties often struggle to keep pace with rapidly evolving technologies and the rise of non-state actors. Innovative mechanisms could include dynamic, modular agreements that update more frequently, AI-assisted verification systems for real-time monitoring, and multistakeholder frameworks that engage tech companies and civil society alongside states.

Thank you—I completely agree that trust is foundational and increasingly fragile. Rebuilding it requires sustained commitment to transparency and dialogue. Specific steps could include expanding confidence-building measures, establishing verifiable arms control or cyber agreements, increasing data sharing through multilateral forums, and reviving diplomatic channels even amid tensions.

That’s a complex one. Cybersecurity norms play a critical role in preventing escalation. In theory they establish shared expectations for responsible state behavior in cyberspace. Clear norms—such as refraining from targeting critical infrastructure during peacetime—create a baseline for accountability, reduce ambiguity, and help prevent misattribution from spiraling into broader conflict. A major issue is that without widespread enforcement mechanisms or mutual trust, norms alone aren’t enough.

Strengthen regional alliances, diversify strategic partnerships, and invest in resilience—diplomatic, economic, and technological—to reduce dependence and increase leverage. That would be my primary advice.

Thank you. Adam Lowther was a big help in the finished product. You got the main point. All these things are interconnected and we should all be paying attention!

That is the million dollar question. The U.S. has business to address on the home front.

Thank you for the kind words. I have to acknowledge Dr. Adam Lowther as a major part of the finished product you read. Stay tuned. We have more coming!

2. **Name:** Daniel Kim
**Email:** daniel.kim@example.com
**Comment:** “The erosion of key treaties and the rise of nationalist policies present a worrying trend for global security. This piece captures the urgency of addressing these challenges through transparency and collective effort.”

3. **Name:** Sophia Martinez
**Email:** sophia.martinez@example.com
**Comment:** “The themes of distrust and strategic ambiguity discussed here resonate deeply with the current geopolitical climate. Strengthening arms control frameworks and fostering trust among nations is essential for preventing a return to unchecked proliferation.”

Let me know if you’d like further tweaks or different names again!

Thanks so much! Glad you found the analysis valuable. You’re right, sustainment is truly where strategy hits the ground running. And I agree, there’s a ton of insightful content here on the Global Security Review.

Totally agree! Infrastructure is absolutely a strategic imperative, not just a support function. You can’t run a modern military on outdated facilities. It’s time we treated infrastructure modernization with the urgency it deserves – it’s as vital as the latest tech.

Chefs kiss….measuring readiness by trust! You’re spot on that proving we’re ready starts with the basics: logistics, maintenance, the stuff that often goes unseen. It makes total sense that a strong warrior ethos needs that solid support – can’t fight effectively without the right tools being ready. It definitely makes you think about how all those pieces build confidence, both within our military and with our allies. Thanks for such pinpoint examples.

Anthony,
Thanks so much for the encouraging feedback! Glad the analysis on sustainment, deterrence, and readiness resonated with you. Appreciate your support and the acknowledgment of the importance of this topic.

Gen. Miller’s research from five years ago was pivotal in shedding light on the fragility of our industrial base, and his observations remain just as relevant today. Investing in technicians and the infrastructure they work within is as critical as advancing technology itself. A compelling point to ponder—where is the disconnect when a well-crafted plan on paper fails to materialize in execution? Are the issues rooted in resource allocation, organizational inertia, or perhaps communication gaps between strategists and implementers? It’s worth exploring how we can better bridge this divide to ensure plans translate into tangible outcomes. I’d love to hear your thoughts!

The relationship between high-level strategy and on-the-ground operational realities is something that initially didn’t resonate with me, but your comment made it crystalize for me. I appreciate a reader who can highlight an aspect that even the author doesn’t recognize. Bridging these elements is essential for meaningful defense planning, and your comment highlights the importance of ensuring strategy translates into actionable results.

Thank you for engaging so thoughtfully with the article! I deeply appreciate how different aspects resonate uniquely with readers, as you’ve highlighted a crucial point about readiness that sometimes gets overshadowed by tangible metrics. Morale, leadership, and infrastructure are, indeed, mission-critical and reflect the human and environmental elements that shape success. Your observations enrich the conversation, and I’m grateful for your perspective. Let’s continue exploring these vital investments together! Welcome to the Global Security Review movement.

Thank you for engaging so thoughtfully with the article! I deeply appreciate how different aspects resonate uniquely with readers, as you’ve highlighted a crucial point about readiness that sometimes gets overshadowed by tangible metrics. Morale, leadership, and infrastructure are, indeed, mission-critical and reflect the human and environmental elements that shape success. Your observations enrich the conversation, and I’m grateful for your perspective. Let’s continue exploring these vital investments together! Welcome the Global Security Review movement.

Thank you feedback! I’m grateful you found the article impactful, and I deeply appreciate your perspective on the critical need for prioritizing defense in the face of global threats. These are conversations we must continue to have, and I encourage you to keep engaging with the discussion—your voice and observations add immense value. Let’s work toward driving the necessary changes together!

Esprit de corps, quality of facilities, and strong leadership aren’t just “nice to haves”—they are mission-critical.

A unit with high morale, modern infrastructure, and trusted leadership can outpace a better-equipped counterpart that lacks cohesion or suffers from neglect.

Readiness isn’t just about what we have—it’s about who we are, how we lead, and where we operate.

Are we investing enough in the people and places that make our missions possible?

Absolutely—what a wake-up call these past two months have been! I’m thrilled that Secretary Hegseth’s vision resonates with you. It truly underscores the need for proactive measures in defense strategy. Raising Espirit de Corps is essential to addressing the personnel shortfall, and the new SecDef is certainly energizing the conversation. Not only is he captivating to watch, but he also seems to have a clear vision and a roadmap to get us there.
Your engagement with these critical reforms is invaluable, and I hope you’ll continue to share your thoughts and contribute to these vital discussions!

“You had me at ‘juxtaposition’—it’s one of my favorite words too! But seriously, you’re absolutely right. The contrast between the demands of GPC and the limitations of outdated infrastructure is a pressing issue. These changes are crucial to maintaining a strategic edge. I’m very hopeful that one the results of the pivot in approach is the catalyst for some amazing innnovation.

Thank you for engaging with this topic. Check out some of the other articles and Livecasts on the site and share the links. Let’s build our own community that allows everyone to share ideas. Reader’s insights help drive these important conversations forward—I encourage you to continue exploring and sharing your thoughts on these issues.

All critical points. Alignment is the cornerstone for ensuring readiness and effectiveness. What do you think is the best approach to garner the necessary bipartisan support? That’s a tough one… That may be worth clicking the submission link and penning your thoughts. That’s what the platform is all about.

I also encourage you to explore more articles and actively engage with them—these discussions often lead to unexpected insights and discoveries that enrich our collective understanding. Your contributions truly elevate the conversation, and I hope you’ll continue to share your thoughts!

Spot on! The drop in USAF fighter fleet readiness rates underscores the need to prioritize sustainment efforts. This seems like a sound approach to counter threats from adversaries such as China and Russia. Strategic collaboration and innovation will be essential to bolstering readiness and ensuring security in this challenging environment. Thank you for your engagement and continue to plug in to Global Security Review. Consider sharing your thoughts!

Thank you! I’m glad you found the article both accessible and practical. Most of the credit goes to the Global Security Review and the National Institute of Deterrence Studies. They have established a unique platform that fosters an open environment where ideas are freely shared. I encourage you to explore their other articles, visit the website, and connect on all social media platforms for more insightful content.

Regard Informatika

With respect to Mr. Loverro and his point of view I did not forget any of these talking points he brings up; word limits prevented addressing the narrative promulgated by the Biden Administration and NGOs, and I opted to use the opportunity to elucidate on my perspective. That said, I will briefly rebut Mr. Loverro’s points: First, the point is not whether the U.S. needs to destructively test ASAT capabilities. The reality is we made a unilateral arms control concession without extracting similar concessions from peer and near-pear geopolitical actors. Moreover, as noted in the article, the need for destructive testing is gone. The technology and techniques for doing so have been available to any state that possesses anti-ballistic technology, and thus as noted in the article an incident involving destructive actions are demonstrations of a capability not a test. Second, while the West dismisses the role of lawfare and hybrid warfare, the Russians, the PRC and certain NGOs are aware of its use. This means despite Mr. Loverro’s assurance testing of ballistic missile defense is protected, the role of lawfare and its use by the entities mentioned cannot be dismissed, especially since destructive testing involves technology ancillary to missile defense. Further, Mr. Loverro’s assertion the PRC, the Russian Federation and India implicitly agree with the ban is nonsensical for two reasons. 1) There is no evidence standing down further “testing” by these actors means they agree with the moratorium and 2) there is no reason for these actors to “test” a capability that they have demonstrated. Finally, the argument this unilateral concession puts the U.S. in a position of leadership is inaccurate. Indeed, the U.S. efforts at the Conference of Disarmament in 2018 calling out the Russian Federation and the PRC for their counterspace activities effectively burned down the soft-power efforts of those two actors in regard to outer space security and put the U.S. in a position of prestige. The unilateral concession made by the U.S. and its support of the Open-Ended Working Group, which was a diplomatic catastrophe, were a phoenix from the ashes moment for the PRC and the Russian Federation and their soft-power agenda. All-in-all, the ban is a political win and positive optics for those who support the ban but is also a soft-power win for the Russian Federation and the PRC.

The moratorium has now put the US back in the leadership position in space diplomacy, a position we had ceded for the last 40 years. It cost us nothing, further ostracized Russia, gained explicit or implicit agreement from almost every nation of the world, and made it that much harder for anyone else to engage in a debris-causing test. Pretty nice payoff for the price of a signature.

While, per Clausewitz, “all wars are fundamentally about politics” (or rather, geopolitics), they are usually won or lost based on depth of manpower and nimbleness of macroeconomic output. It is somewhere between ironic and terrifying that numerous “progressives” keep claiming loudly that America should spend even more on social handouts while we abolish our nuclear deterrence triad altogether in the name of “world peace.” And this at a time when the CRINKs are expanding their conventional and nuclear coercion and warfighting power to record high levels, while flexing their militaristic muscles in Eastern Europe, the Middle East, Asia, the Arctic, and outer space!

What good is turning the U.S. of A. into the world’s ocercrowded soup kitchen & HQ of delusional pacifism, if our need for effective deterrence (of attack, invasion, & even enslavement) is left in the lurch, and our precious, God-given Freedoms go down for the count? What happened to the USSR in Cold War I could easily happen instead to the U.S. in Cold War II — but without any Putin-style resurgence — if we do not rationalize our National Balance Sheet’s spending amounts and allocations, and our debt. Otherwise, what’s happening now to Ukraine could happen to us to, sooner or later. Aaron’s message needs to be heard loud and clear in the next White House and Congress!

The threats have come so often that they have been normalized. In war, there is nothing so dangerous as complacency.

Is Putin willing to use nuclear weapons? That depends on how one interprets his psychological profile. Putin grew up in Leningrad in poverty. He developed a “hobby” of playing with and observing rats’ reactions in certain situations. Putin served as a KGB agent in East Berlin. He was shocked by what he saw as the fall of the Soviet Empire.
Further, Putin is a paranoid personality. He sees rivals and dangers everywhere, even in his inner circle. He is becoming further isolated. He only receives optimistic intelligence briefings. Putin is so afraid that he recently destroyed his Sochi villa. These are traits commonly found in autocrats.

Regarding his intent, would the collapse of the Russian Army in Ukraine trigger an irrational response regarding the use of nuclear or other WMD? Given the probability that Putin would be deposed and, presuming he survived that, he would be turned over as a war criminal. My perspective is that, given his personality, he would turn to the use of WMD.

There are several caveats. To achieve room for maneuver, it would be necessary to detonate two tactical nuclear weapons. The first problem for Russia is that the West has identified the storage sites for both low-yield weapons as strategic nuclear weapons. The movement of low-yield armaments would be detected by satellite. Satellites would also detect preparations for the use of strategic weapons. The next Russian problem is exploiting a breach in a nuclear environment, which requires special combat vehicles and trained troops. Given battlefield losses in workforce and equipment, the Russians cannot engage in maneuver operations in an irradiated operational zone.

The next consideration is, would the military actually obey such an order? The rank and file suffer from very low morale. Junior and field grade officers also have similar issues. Are the general and flag officers willing to become casualties, or will a mutiny exist?

Last caveat: Are Putin and the Kremlin willing to suffer the geopolitical fallout? Some intelligence sources have analyzed that the General Secretary of the CCP, Xi, has told the Kremlin not to go nuclear.

William Downey, USAF, retired.

Amy, I am certainly not surprised that you find my arguments difficult to support your pro-arms control and disarmament views are well known. Perhaps you did not see the public statements of the CIA Director and MI6 Head, who stated very clearly that Russia was very close to using a nuclear weapon in November 2022. Russia has capabilities that range from sub-one kiloton to over a megaton. They also have the same ability to calculate weapons effects as we do. I can’t agree with your mirror imaging of American values on the Russians. I certainly have followed the debate. To suggest nuclear weapons have no military purpose to fail to understand actual warfighting, which is understandable after a life spent in Washington. I wrote a longer piece in Aether a year or so ago called Nuclear Apples and Conventional Oranges, or something like that, where we go into the specific details of nuclear utility on the battlefield. It clearly shows how and when you would use nuclear rather than conventional weapons. Since you are ignoring the near use in 2022, I’m pretty sure I can’t bring you up to speed in a reply to a comment.

As for why I used an in-text link to your paper, it was simply to show how one author, and you are one of many who write on the topic, defines terms. There was nothing particularly special about your writing. It was just an example.

You mischaracterize what I said, as per usual. I said the Russians see nuclear weapons as warfighting weapons, but they do not see them as interchangeable with conventional weapons. Reread the piece…. the 800-word piece. That is absolutely correct.

Again, your piece offers one definition of these weapons. Thats all it was used for, to show what one person thinks.

Finally, I’m not sure you really understand how blast, thermal, and ionizing radiation propagate, and more importantly dissipate. I’d recommend reading Glasstone and Dolan. Over 80% of casualties in Hiroshima were caused by the fire that started after the detonation. The direct effects were quite limited, which is why the concrete structure directly below the fireball (which never got close to the ground) was left standing. Please don’t propagate inaccurate information about weapons effects. It does not help people understand what these weapons actually do.

Second point: why would the United States need a parallel nuclear capability to respond to Russia’s nuclear use? What military mission/target set would require the use of nuclear weapons? Or is it just tit-for-tat punishment that you seek?

Finally, my real complaint with this piece appears in the first paragraph, where you state that “There is ample evidence to suggest a growing relevance of what are interchangeably called non-strategic, tactical, or low-yield battlefield nuclear weapons.” Th link in that sentence takes you to a paper I wrote. And I can assure you, beyond a doubt, there is nothing in that paper, or in my thinking that indicates that those three phrases are interchangeable. I offer several definitions for the term “non-strategic,” and I firmly agree with General Mattis, who, when testified before Congress, stated that any use of nuclear weapons would be strategic. This is true even if there were a battlefield military mission. Treating nuclear weapons a just a “bigger boom” is dangerous and ridiculous. Even if there were little or no fall-out, the blast, fire, and radiation would exceed any military requirements. And, even though the radiation would dissipate from the atmosphere, it’s effects would not dissipate from the bodies of those who, whether military or civilian, were exposed in the initial blast.

In today’s parlance, the bomb dropped on Hiroshima was “low yield.” I’d suggest a review of the results of that attack before you claim that the use of a few of these weapons would be no big deal.

Unfortunately, world leaders in the last few decades have almost uniformly been idiots…in particular, the USA, with a POTUS who is suffering from dementia, yet remains in office. Look at our current choices for his replacement; Trump or Harris. Harris is a congenital idiot, incapable of speaking a coherent sentence, and Trump is supremely self destructive. Relying upon eithers rationality or “clear eyed awareness” is whistling past the graveyard.

the tactical nukes, on both sides, have already been used, as you’re well aware. tver. kiev. rostov. beruit. …
nice frameworking you got going on here tho. hope it works out for your career.

Jeff, we stated comments. You are absolutely correct. Most of the reasons that senior (Federal side) ANG leaders have not had good answers is because tehy have been restrained by policy from commenting. Only when they retire do they (sometimes) have the freedom to state their real “best military advice.”

The other watercooler talk is that if Air National Guard space operators transfer to the Space Force, they would play second fiddle to the active-duty Space Force. In essence the Air National Guard members would no longer be the primary operators, trainer’s, instructors, and weapon system SME’s that they are today. Why would the National Guard units want to be anything less than the tip of the spear in the EW fight. More importantly is that with tensions continuing to evolve and mount with our adversaries, Space Force does not have the manning or experience capabilities to counter an offensive let alone defensive EW posture in future conflicts without the Guard.

Josh – great article and it certainly opens the door for a broader discussion of reconstitution of our global power projection infrastructure and our ability to deter and defeat adversaries. In 1997 the Air Force think tank did a year long analysis of this question as it pertained to the “anti-access threat in the Southeast Pacific/China.

Bottomline – there are opportunities in the region to reconstitute and build the infrastructure required to operate in the area. In general there is a shortage of airfields that can support shorter range jets and logistics. The Chinese have spent 30 years making those that do exist more vulnerable or taken them off the board politically.

The Pentagon knew the problem existed, studied it, quantified it, identified required corrective actions, strategies and costs. Then we gutted the long range bomber force, ignored the inability of Carrier groups to generate volume or get close enough to the fight and stuck our collective head in the sand for 25 years.

Even with the Stockpile Stewardship Program testing and certifying the US must continue to maintain a nuclear infra structure capable of new production (weapon platforms and warheads). Unfortunitely the nation has allowed its nuclear deterrent to atrophy and age out. Methink people forgot how the US won the Cold War and the country might pay a high price (literally and figuratively) for it.

Hi James and thanks for the great question. In my opinion, I think Japan is making it clear that they are changing their strategy military posture in response to the growing threats from China and North Korea (https://apnews.com/article/japan-us-military-command-missile-china-4e97f4cb01cfef7b6db8fb1a5df771e4). Currently, I haven’t obtained information that suggest Japan will lead efforts to recommission older airfields in the Asia-Pacific region and it seems more likely that Japan will encourage the US to expand military presence and capabilities at active airbases hosted by Japan. The US has made some early strides towards this overall objective by recently announcing the conversion of US Forces – Japan into a war fighting command which will report directly to the US Indo-Pacific Command (https://www.defenseone.com/policy/2024/07/us-forces-japan-be-upgraded-warfighting-command/398386/). Additionally, the US is increasing available air power and advanced aviation capabilities based throughout Japan (https://breakingdefense.com/2024/07/f-15ex-f-35-headed-to-japan-under-new-dod-tactical-aircraft-laydown/), and Japan recently achieved some critical military manufacturing milestones when it was recently announced that Japan had completed its first local produced F-35 (https://www.dcma.mil/News/Article-View/Article/1209525/first-japan-built-f-35-prepares-for-take-off/), and the start-up of AMRAMM and PAC-3 production (https://www.airandspaceforces.com/japan-steps-up-missile-production-in-deal-with-u-s/). Thanks again for the question and please ask more if I missed the mark in this response.

Mr. T

The idea of what used to be called “soft power” is sound and wise and necessary. Properly applied as a concept and as a strategic influencer, integrated deterrence is simply the modern use of soft power to deter via the usual threat/promise of retaliation if friendlies are attacked. No?

I wanted to bring some perspective on your section about nuclear weapons facilities. While I am in agreement the defense sector needs more competition, the nuclear security enterprise does not function in a similar capitalistic/competitive manner that DOD procurement does. All DOE/NNSA sites are government owned/contractor operated. This would mean that even the addition of another assembly/disassembly plant would not be capable of reducing overall costs for building nuclear weapons. The two sites would never be competing with each other to see which can assemble/dissemble warheads the ‘cheapest.’ Further, the cost to build another nuclear site is astronomical. Take a look at pit production in Savannah River, turning the old MOX facility into a pit production site is going to cost at least $6.9 – $11.1 billion and many years to do so. There is limited political capital to even support our current modernization plans.