Todays Top GSR Headlines

• BBC — Trump’s nuclear arms control push with Russia hinges on China (Feb. 5, 2026). U.S. efforts to replace New START face a major obstacle: Beijing resists trilateral limits, making any successor agreement slower, harder, and strategically more complex.
• Newsweek — War Won’t Solve Iran’s Nuclear Threat. This Could | Opinion (Apr. 25, 2026). The article argues the Non-Proliferation Treaty should be strengthened through stricter inspections and verification rather than military action against Iran’s contested nuclear program.
• AP News — Iran’s nuclear program takes focus as atomic treaty review starts (Apr. 27, 2026). A new NPT review session opened with Iran’s program at center stage, highlighting renewed friction over safeguards, disarmament commitments, and peaceful nuclear rights.
• GB News — New Start treaty: World enters grim new nuclear era after historic US-Russia pact expires (Feb. 4, 2026). With New START expired, the U.S. and Russia now operate without treaty limits, feeding concern over transparency losses, strategic instability, and renewed arms competition.
• USNI News — “STRATCOM CO: Chinese, Russian Build Up of Nuclear Weapons Will ‘Test’ U.S. Strategic Deterrence” (date not exposed in surfaced result). USNI’s archive highlights warnings that parallel Chinese and Russian nuclear expansion could strain U.S. deterrence credibility, modernization plans, and force-posture assumptions.
• War on the Rocks — Eurodeterrent: A Vision for an Anglo-French Nuclear Force (Mar. 30, 2025). The essay explores whether an Anglo-French nuclear framework could strengthen European deterrence as allies reconsider burden-sharing, sovereignty, and the future of transatlantic defense.
• Global Times — Chinese FM releases national report of China’s implementation of NPT (Apr. 19, 2026). China publicized its national NPT implementation report ahead of review diplomacy, presenting Beijing as supportive of non-proliferation and multilateral nuclear governance.
• Substack — Messages from Moscow (Apr. 8, 2026). This Substack post examines Russian strategic signaling and its implications for deterrence, escalation management, and Western interpretation of nuclear and geopolitical messaging.
• BBC — Fears of new arms race as US-Russia nuclear weapons treaty expires (Feb. 4, 2026). BBC frames New START’s expiration as a watershed moment ending decades of bilateral nuclear restraint, transparency, and inspections, while raising fears of a destabilizing arms race.
• AP News — The last US-Russian nuclear pact is about to expire, ending a half-century of arms control (Feb. 4, 2026). AP describes New START’s lapse as the end of the final U.S.-Russian nuclear constraint, removing caps on deployed warheads, missiles, bombers, and verification mechanisms.

Todays Top Stories was originally published on Global Security Review.

200 New B-21 Raider Bombers Could All Fail Thanks to a 1957 Tanker the U.S. Air Force Is Still Using was originally published on Global Security Review.

Iranian ship seized by US Marines has China links was originally published on Global Security Review.

Iranian official says US ‘maximalist’ demands stall face-to-face talks

 SUZAN FRASER|AP News

ANTALYA, Turkey (AP) — Iran is not yet ready to hold a new round of face-to-face talks with U.S. officials, a senior Iranian official said Saturday, citing Washington’s refusal to abandon “maximalist” demands on key issues.

In an interview with The Associated Press on the margins of a diplomacy forum in Turkey, Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Saeed Khatibzadeh also said his country will not hand over its enriched uranium to the United States, rejecting claims made by U.S. President Donald Trump.

“I can tell you that no enriched material is going to be shipped to United States,” Khatibzadeh said. “This is non-starter and I can assure you that while we are ready to address any concerns that we do have, we’re not going to accept things that are nonstarters.”

Iranian official says US ‘maximalist’ demands stall face-to-face talks was originally published on Global Security Review.

With no end in sight to their deployment, National Guard troops roam Washington

Gary Fields – Associated Press – 

The cherry blossoms draw more than a million visitors to Washington’s Tidal Basin annually. This year was no different, except some strolling the area between the Lincoln Memorial and the Thomas Jefferson Memorial were dressed in camouflage and armed.

Eight months after President Trump declared a crime emergency in the nation’s capital and called up the National Guard, more than 2,500 troops remain, in a deployment that has grown increasingly routine, with no clear end in sight.

Deployments to other cities have ended or been paused by courts in California and Illinois, while more limited operations are ongoing in cities including New Orleans. But in Washington, guard members still walk city streets and patrol metro stations, tourist attractions, neighborhoods and parks.

Even with pivotal elections looming this year, that lingering presence is barely mentioned in city council meetings or by candidates running for mayor and Congress – perhaps reflecting both competing priorities and a sense that local officials have little power to stop it. Unless the courts step in, the guard will remain at least through the end of the year, if not longer.

“Taxpayers are paying more than a million dollars a day to have them walk around,” said Phil Mendelson, chairman of the District of Columbia Council, in an emailed response to questions.

And, he said, “the presence of armed soldiers on American streets is not a good look.”

With no end in sight to their deployment, National Guard troops roam Washington was originally published on Global Security Review.

Bottom line: The center of gravity in deterrence is shifting to space-enabled, long-range, rapidly replaceable kill webs, and our adversaries are acting as if they know it. NATO voices now openly frame space as a war-fighting domain, while Europe moves from point defense to deep strike, Washington debates force-design trades (B-52J vs. more B-21s), and Iran/Russia press for coercive advantage amid sanctions friction. The strategic task is to turn language and spending into tested, resilient, allied operational architectures, and fast.

Unifying Trends

1. Space goes operational, not “supporting.”
   NATO leaders’ tone shift (Germany, France, Spain, Canada) treats space as a domain for defense and offense (“shield and sword”), demanding common doctrine, delegated authorities, and tactically responsive launch (<96 hours) to restore/augment constellations under attack.
2. From point defense to deep strike.
   Denmark’s decision to field long-range precision fires (Tomahawk/JASSM-ER class and European options) reflects a continental realization: you can’t intercept your way out of massed salvos—you must hold launchers, C2, and magazines at risk.
3. U.S. force-design inflection.
   Cost/schedule breaches on B-52J upgrades collide with contested-airspace realities, strengthening arguments to expand and accelerate B-21. This is a survivability vs. standoff trade with industrial-base and budget consequences.
4. Great-Power coercion is coordinated.
   ISW’s readout on Moscow’s aims, Iran’s missile signaling and suspected tests, and Beijing’s pressure campaigns (incl. Taiwan wargaming counters) form a convergent pressure track seeking to outlast Western cohesion and exploit cost-asymmetry (cheap counter-space/EW vs. exquisite satellites).
5. Homeland defense as a system-of-systems problem.
   “Golden Dome” can work only if rigorous end-to-end (E2E) testing—across space sensors, comms, C2, effectors, cyber—starts now and leverages commercial testbeds/digital twins. Otherwise, the architecture risks beautiful fragility.
6. Forward posture debates return.
   Talk of re-entering Bagram underscores a broader theme: geography for deterrence matters again, but must be weighed against access, legitimacy, and escalation dynamics with the Taliban and China.

What This Means Operationally

• Speed is deterrence. Time to detect-decide-deliver (and to replace space capacity) is now a primary measure of merit.
• Proliferation beats pedigree. Multi-orbit, proliferated constellations with rapid reconstitution are more survivable than few exquisite assets.
• Kill webs over platforms. Advantage will come from tested integration of sensors, AI-enabled C2, and multi-domain effectors, not any single “silver bullet.”
• Allies are moving—synchronize them. Europe’s deep-strike pivot and NATO’s space posture create a window to standardize doctrine, data, and munitions.

Risks to Watch

• Doctrine lag in space. Without common allied space ROE/authorities, response times will miss the fight.
• Testing shortfalls. If E2E campaigns are under-funded or staged too late, integration debt will surface in crisis.
• Budget whiplash. Raiding legacy accounts for survivable capacity is necessary—but undisciplined shifts can hollow critical standoff magazines and training.
• Cost asymmetry. Adversaries’ cheap EW/dazzling/cyber vs. our pricey satellites remains a structural vulnerability.

Priority Actions (next 6–12 months)

1. Adopt an Allied Space Operations Doctrine 1.0
   Codify protect/defend, attribution thresholds, delegated authorities, and tactically responsive launch across NATO.
2. Stand up a Joint Tactically Responsive Space (TacRS) pipeline
   Contract now for rideshare, hot-spare payloads, and 96-hour launch/checkout drills; exercise quarterly.
3. Golden Dome: lock an Integrated Master Test Plan
   Fund E2E test events that include on-orbit sensing + ground C2 + live/interoperable interceptors + cyber red-teaming. Mandate industry-in-the-loop from day one.
4. Rebalance the bomber portfolio toward survivability
   Protect B-21 ramp; scrutinize B-52J scope/schedule to preserve standoff munitions buys and mission-planning AI.
5. European deep-strike integration
   Fast-track common mission planning, targeting data standards, and logistics for JASSM-ER/Tomahawk/European LR strike across F-35 and surface fleets.
6. Harden the space kill web
   Deploy optical crosslinks, jam-resilient waveforms, PNT alternatives, and autonomous battle management aids to ride through EW/cyber.
7. Tighten economic levers against Russia/Iran
   Enforce oil price caps/leakage, expand sanctions on dual-use microelectronics, and close maritime re-flag loopholes that fund attritional strategies.
8. Wargame access/logistics for any Afghanistan posture
   If Bagram re-entry is pursued, pre-plan overflight, basing, sustainment, and escalation controls; build non-permissive extraction branches.

Concrete Measures of Effectiveness

• Time-to-Replace-On-Orbit (TTRO): target ≤ 96 hours from loss to restored coverage.
• Find-Fix-Finish latency: median time from first detection to effect in minutes, not hours.
• E2E test cadence: quarterly cross-domain integrated events; zero critical interoperability defects carried forward.
• Allied deep-strike coverage: % of NATO targets held at risk at >500 km with validated comms/targeting.
• Resilience index: % of space services with disaggregated backups (multi-orbit/multi-vendor).

Longer Perspective

Deterrence now hinges on resilient connections more than singular platforms: space that can fight and recover, kill webs that integrate fast, and alliances that can reach deep. If we test as we will fight, standardize with allies, and bias for speed and survivability, we deny adversaries the slow-motion coercion they seek—and keep escalation ladders short, clear, and in our control.

This Week in Deterrence (September 15-19, 2025) was originally published on Global Security Review.

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Why Support The Global Security Review? was originally published on Global Security Review.

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Deterrence Down Under Podcast: Wargaming-A Strategic Tool for Defence with Darren Huxley and John McGarry was originally published on Global Security Review.

In this episode, Christine and Natalie engage with Dr. Mariana Budjeryn, a nuclear historian, to discuss her book ‘Inheriting the Bomb’ and the complexities surrounding Ukraine’s nuclear disarmament. They explore the historical context of Ukraine’s nuclear arsenal, the narratives surrounding its disarmament, and the implications of security assurances from major powers. Mariana shares her personal reflections on the ongoing war in Ukraine, the challenges faced by nuclear facilities under occupation, and the lessons learned for international security and cooperation.

Podcast: The Complexities of Ukraine’s Nuclear Legacy was originally published on Global Security Review.

Reports

The Only Nuclear Deterrence Strategy America Needs.
Dynamic Parity by Curtis McGiffin and Adam Lowther
https://thinkdeterrence.com/dynamic-parity/

The latest ICBM EAR Report by Peter Huessy
https://globalsecurityreview.com/icbm-ear-report-october-28th-2024/

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Nuclear Devices in Space by Joe Buff
https://globalsecurityreview.com/nuclear-devices-in-space/

Hypersonic Horizons: The Next Generation of Air Superiority by Joshua Thibert
https://globalsecurityreview.com/hypersonic-horizons-the-next-generation-of-air-superiority/

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Real Space Strategy: Starlink, Key Tool in the Battle for Freedom?
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Podcast Episode: Keeping AI Honest in Nuclear Command and Control
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For more compelling reports and analysis visit us at https://thinketerrence.com and https://globalsecurityreview.com

Weekend Gouge – November 8, 2024 was originally published on Global Security Review.

This means the cost is going to be exorbitant over using the cloud’s “in-place” structure of GPUs, distributed power etc.  The DOD procured and set up their own system, but where is the data coming from?

Air Force Launches Its Own Generative AI Chatbot. Experts See Promise and Challenges

The Air Force has entered into the ChatGPT game.  was originally published on Global Security Review.

Against a backdrop of conflict and global security concerns, 2023 may prove to have also been a pivotal year for automated nuclear weapons systems.

A year that began with chatbots and Artificial Intelligence (AI) as the subjects of major news stories – some with particularly concerning headlines – ended with members of the United States Congress introducing legislation to ban AI systems from nuclear weapons and US President Biden signing an Executive Order on the subject. The issue was even raised in discussions between the United States and China at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum, which met in San Francisco in November.

One can imagine a hypothetical scenario in which a nuclear weapon targets a naval base, but an approach pattern recognition determines that the target submarines have already put to sea, and so the missile opts for a redirected underwater strike instead of an atmospheric detonation. This is but one of many possible scenarios to consider involving AI.

AI systems offer an opportunity to strengthen nuclear deterrence by providing a more accurate and capable defensive nuclear response. The purpose of making nuclear weapons more accurate and capable is not to promote their usage. Such capabilities, instead, provide a more credible deterrence to nuclear war and are consistent with classic nuclear doctrine. AI is simply a strategic tool, like nuclear weapons themselves.

Read More

Should artificial intelligence be banned from nuclear weapons systems? was originally published on Global Security Review.

Senior Director, Defense, Special Competitive Studies Project

Emma Morrison

MSFS Candidate, Georgetown University

Published July 2023

Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies/Henry A. Kissinger Center for Global Affairs

The Challenge to Deterrence Strategy

Deterrence strategy, and a state’s ability to effectively employ it, is dependent on the state’s ability to demonstrate capability and credibility and to clearly communicate those signals to a potential adversary. Credibility cannot be achieved without effective detection and attribution. Without detection, would-be deterrers are unable to mount an effective strategy of denial or threaten retaliation as part of a strategy of punishment. Without attribution, defense is possible, though punishment cannot be targeted at a specific actor. While detection and attribution are not the only components of credibility, they are essential.

Russia has come to depend on information operations as its “most effective gray zone tactic”—a tactic that continues “to be well-funded, relentless, and prolific,”^[18] as expressed by Moscow’s military doctrine, which scholars have found “frequently equates the strategic impact of information weapons with that of weapons of mass destruction.”

When an adversary manages to ensure that its operations and preparations for those operations avoid detection and attribution, that reduces the probability that targeted countries will adequately prepare to respond. This increases the probability of the aggressor accomplishing its goals and decreases its likely cost of victory, undermining the credibility of deterrence strategies.

As with any strategy, the odds of deterrence achieving its desired effects are dependent on a clear understanding of the world at a given moment.

Read More

Deterrence Through AI-Enabled Detection and Attribution was originally published on Global Security Review.

AI and the Future of Deterrence: Promises and Pitfalls was originally published on Global Security Review.

1. Foreword and Executive Summary:
   • The ASC program has utilized high-performance computing for nearly three decades to support U.S. nuclear deterrence following the 1992 ban on underground nuclear testing.
   • The integration of AI technologies aims to accelerate problem-solving for national security challenges.
   • The strategy emphasizes combining AI with existing modeling and simulation capabilities to enhance the U.S. Stockpile Stewardship Program.
2. AI4ND Strategy Objectives:
   • Apply AI methods to nuclear security missions, focusing on design, production, and analysis.
   • Develop ML tools to function with limited data and stringent accuracy requirements.
   • Create scalable and secure data infrastructures to support ML applications.
   • Foster a data-driven workforce by investing in training and developing expertise in AI and ML.
3. Motivations for AI in Nuclear Deterrence:
   • AI can reduce time for material discovery, model development, manufacturing, and maintenance.
   • AI/ML technologies promise to enhance the efficiency and responsiveness of the nuclear weapons lifecycle, including discovery, design optimization, manufacturing, certification, and maintenance.
4. Enabling Capabilities and Investment Areas:
   • Physics-Informed Machine Learning (PIML): Embedding physical constraints in ML models to ensure accuracy and speed in simulations.
   • Limited and Sparse Data Sets: Developing methods to work with limited experimental data and augmenting it with simulations.
   • Verification, Validation, Uncertainty Qualification, and AI Trustworthiness: Ensuring AI models are reliable and explainable, integrating existing verification practices.
   • Data Infrastructure: Investing in performant data storage, federated data environments, and flexible data access interfaces.
   • Machine Learning Architectures and Systems: Developing high-performance ML systems integrated with existing HPC platforms.
5. Workforce, Collaborations, and Partnerships:
   • Establishing partnerships with industry, academia, and other U.S. government agencies to leverage external advancements in AI/ML.
   • Developing international collaborations with similar programs in France, the UK, and Japan.
   • Building a capable workforce through training programs and collaboration with universities.
6. Conclusion:
   • The successful execution of this AI4ND strategy will enhance the ASC program’s ability to meet national security needs, increase efficiency, and attract specialized talent.
   • Collaboration with academia, industry, and other government agencies is crucial to achieving these goals.

The document emphasizes the transformative potential of AI in ensuring a secure and reliable nuclear deterrent through strategic investments in technology, data infrastructure, and workforce development. Get the report.

Artificial Intelligence for Nuclear Deterrence Strategy was originally published on Global Security Review.

Why it matters: The hacking campaign laid out in the report marks a sharp escalation in China’s willingness to seize U.S. infrastructure — going beyond the typical effort to steal state secrets.

• The advisory provides the fullest picture to-date of how a key China hacking group has gained and maintained access to some U.S. critical infrastructure.

Details: The U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, the National Security Agency and the Federal Bureau of Investigation released an advisory Wednesday to warn critical infrastructure operators about China’s ongoing hacking interests.

• According to the advisory, China-backed hacking group Volt Typhoon has been exploiting vulnerabilities in routers, firewalls and VPNs to target water, transportation, energy and communications systems across the country.
• The group has relied heavily on stolen administrator credentials to maintain access to the systems — and in some cases it has maintained access for “at least five years,” per the advisory.
• Volt Typhoon has been seen controlling some victims’ surveillance camera systems, and its access could have allowed the group to disrupt critical energy and water controls.

Of note: Volt Typhoon uses so-called “living off the land” techniques that limit any trace of their activities on a network — making the actors more difficult to detect.

READ MORE

China had “persistent” access to U.S. critical infrastructure was originally published on Global Security Review.

The newspaper cited U.S. officials, who described the incidents as potential forms of espionage.

Last year, the U.S. Department of Defense, FBI, and other agencies held a review to try to curb the frequency of these breaches, which involved unauthorized entries into US military bases and other federal sites, the newspaper reported.

READ MORE

Chinese Nationals Posing as Tourists Have Accessed US Military Bases and Other Sensitive Sites: Report was originally published on Global Security Review.

Read More

Chinese ‘Police Station Spy Network in the U.S. was originally published on Global Security Review.

Read More

The Cubans are more disciplined and more effective pound-for-pound than the KGB ever was was originally published on Global Security Review.

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Ties to Russian Military and Russian Intelligence Agencies was originally published on Global Security Review.

By Lt Col Shawn Littleton

Wild Blue Yonder, By Lt Col Shawn Littleton

With the movie Oppenheimer bringing the Bomb back into our casual conversations, it is a good time to rethink how you feel about the Bomb. Its abstract but existential implications are especially present today as a driver of both conversation and human behavior in an unprecedented way. Will the unleashing of nuclear weapons be the sadly predictable end of mankind that our worst nightmares portend, or will the Bomb fulfill our greatest hopes and be a deterrent backstop that prevents a third World War and enables a global reconciliation that leads to total disarmament? Should we hate or love the Bomb, or somewhere in between?

Read more about the paradoxes, the hatelove of the bomb, and some unsolicited advice from a cat in the article on Wild Blue Yonder.

We Are the Cat: How Schrödinger Can Teach Us to Hatelove the Bomb was originally published on Global Security Review.

Subscribe to GSR was originally published on Global Security Review.

NIDS Knowledge Podcast was originally published on Global Security Review.

NIDS View Podcast was originally published on Global Security Review.

“America’s Strategic Posture Report: Get Behind It” by Jonathan Trexel highlights the urgent need for the US to revise its strategic posture in response to escalating global threats. It emphasizes the changing international security environment, underscoring the necessity for the US to adapt its defense planning. The report suggests enhancing conventional, nuclear, and strategic defense forces to address these threats, including those from Russia, China, North Korea, and Iran. The recommendations also cover aspects like modernizing nuclear weapons, missile defense systems, and developing offensive and defensive space assets. The author argues for the urgent adoption of these measures to maintain national and global security.

“Congressional Dysfunction Impacts American Defense in the Pacific” by Christophe Bosquillon highlights concerns about American defense strategy in the Pacific, specifically due to congressional delays in funding the Compacts of Free Association (COFA) with Pacific island-states. The article underscores the strategic importance of these island-states, such as Palau, for American defense, particularly against China. Bosquillon argues that congressional inaction undermines American commitments in the region, potentially inviting Chinese influence and jeopardizing American security interests in the Pacific.

“Deterrence in Space: It’s Not Complicated” by Michael J. Listner examines the concept of space deterrence, arguing it’s a simple yet often over-complicated idea. He discusses the importance of understanding different perspectives on deterrence, especially from adversaries like Russia and China. Listner emphasizes the need for the US to have the capability and will to apply force in space. He critiques the reliance on resilience as a method of deterrence, stating it’s not a substitute for actual defensive and offensive capabilities in space. The article advocates for a straightforward approach to deterrence in space, stressing the importance of capability, will, and communication.

“Japanese Space Strategy: Deploying a Credible Deterrent” by Christophe Bosquillon analyzes Japan’s evolving space strategy in the context of regional security challenges, particularly threats from North Korea and China. The article discusses Japan’s shift from pacifist policies to developing credible deterrence in space, including the use of anti-satellite capabilities and enhancing space situational awareness. It underscores the importance of Japan’s cooperation with the US for security in the Indo-Pacific region and highlights the challenges Japan faces in establishing a credible deterrent in space.

“Nano Aquabots and the US-China Science and Technology Cooperation Agreement” by Alexis Littlefield explores the dual-use nature of nano aquabots and other advanced technologies, emphasizing the risks and benefits of the US-China Science and Technology Cooperation Agreement. Littlefield discusses how these technologies, while beneficial for society, can also be weaponized. The article critically examines the implications of US government-funded research in collaboration with China, highlighting concerns about intellectual property transfer and national security. The author’s perspective sheds light on the complexities of international science and technology agreements and their impact on strategic interests.

“Russia and the Growing Danger of Satellite Cyber-Attacks” by Alexis Schlotterback highlights the increasing threat of Russian cyber operations targeting satellites. The article explores various satellite cyberattack methods such as data interception, data corruption, and seizure of control. It emphasizes Russia’s advanced capabilities in cyber warfare, including the use of GPS jammers and potential hacking of American satellite control systems. The discussion includes the need for enhanced security measures in satellite infrastructure to protect against these threats.

“The Comprehensive Strategy for the Space Force: The Good and Bad” by Christopher Stone critically evaluates the US Space Force’s strategy as outlined in a congressional report. Stone highlights the positives, such as acknowledging the Space Force’s role in supporting terrestrial forces. However, he points out significant gaps, arguing that the Space Force should focus more on warfighting capabilities to counter growing space threats from China and Russia, rather than merely supporting other forces. He emphasizes the need for combat-credible space forces capable of offensive and defensive operations, asserting that this should be the primary mission of the Space Force.

“The Danger of Minimum Deterrence” by Peter Huessy critiques the concept of minimal deterrence in nuclear strategy. Huessy argues that reducing the US nuclear arsenal to a minimal level undermines the credibility of the U.S. nuclear umbrella, impacts the deterrence of conventional conflict, and ignores the need for strategic stability. He emphasizes that a robust nuclear arsenal is crucial for credible deterrence and argues against the reduction of nuclear forces as part of a path to disarmament.

“The Faux Nuclear Arms Race that Isn’t” by Adam Lowther and Col (Ret) Curtis McGiffin challenges the notion of a new nuclear arms race, arguing that the current situation is not comparable to the Cold War era. They critique the assertion of an arms race, highlighting the significant reduction in nuclear weapons since the Cold War and the lack of expansion in US nuclear capabilities. The authors emphasize the importance of arms control agreements that align with US interests, and they critique the viewpoint that more nuclear weapons are inherently destabilizing, suggesting that strength, not weakness, deters conflict.

“The Pentagon’s China Military Report: Why Americans Should Be Alarmed” by Curtis McGiffin and Adam Lowther is a critical analysis of the Department of Defense’s 2023 report on China’s military developments. The authors highlight the significant increase in China’s nuclear capabilities and potential first-strike aspirations, which contradict its “No First Use” policy. They argue that the US needs a coherent strategy to counter this threat, emphasizing the urgency for more robust American deterrence measures in response to China’s rapid military expansion.

“The Strategic Posture Commission and the China Breakout” by Peter Huessy discusses the rapid expansion of China’s nuclear capabilities and its implications for US strategic posture. Huessy highlights the significant growth of China’s nuclear arsenal and the development of advanced delivery systems. He emphasizes the need for the US to enhance its nuclear deterrence and missile defense capabilities in response to China’s expanding nuclear force. The article urges the US to consider strategic adjustments to maintain a credible deterrent against the evolving threat posed by China.

“The Value of Panda Diplomacy” by Alexis Littlefield explores the geopolitical symbolism of pandas in Sino-American relations. The article discusses how pandas leased to zoos, such as Tian Tian and Mei Xiang in Washington DC, represent diplomatic ties between China and the US. The return of these pandas to China signifies a shift in relations, especially in the context of China’s global influence and the Belt and Road Initiative. Littlefield examines the broader implications of these changes, suggesting pandas as indicators of China’s international relationships.

“Understanding the Strategic Posture Commission Report” by Peter Huessy addresses the Congressional Commission’s findings on the strategic challenges posed by China and Russia. It highlights the United States’ unpreparedness in nuclear deterrence against these peer adversaries. The report recommends strengthening the nuclear triad, deploying air and missile defense systems, and increasing cooperation with allies. It emphasizes the urgency of these recommendations and the need for phased modernization of US nuclear capabilities, considering the evolving strategic environment and the growing threats from China and Russia.

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Knowledge Alert: 2023 Global Security Review Compendium of Articles was originally published on Global Security Review.

A federal grand jury investigating Russian meddling in the 2016 election on Friday indicted 13 Russian nationals including 12 employees of a St. Petersburg, Russia-based organization that carries out online influence operations on behalf of the Russian government.

The indictment alleges that the Internet Research Agency, a propaganda outlet tied to the Kremlin, engaged “in operations to interfere with elections and political processes” during the 2016 U.S. presidential elections.

The indictment accuses the organization’s employees of carrying out “interference operations targeting the United States” from 2014 to the present, according to the indictment.

The goal of these information operations was to “promote discord in the United States to undermine public confidence in democracy,” said Deputy Attorney General Rod Rosenstein on Friday. “We must not allow them to succeed.”

The indictment alleges that the defendants and their co-conspirators began to study and track groups of U.S. citizens on social media sites dedicated to discussion of U.S. politics and other social issues as early as 2014.

To measure the performance of these various social media groups, operatives of the Internet Research Agency tracked certain statistics like the size of a given group, the frequency of content published, and the level of audience engagement with a given piece of content, such as the number of comments, shares, or likes a social media post received.

What does the special counsel’s indictment reveal?

In 2016, the accused allegedly posed as U.S. individuals and made contact with several U.S. political and social activists. The indictement gives an example of how the defendants, in June 2016, communicated with a U.S. citizen affiliated with a grassroots political organization based in Texas. It was in this interchange that the Internet Research Agency operatives learned that they should concentrate their information operations on “purple states,” like Florida, Colorado, and Virginia.

The indictment states that it was after this exchange that “defendants and their co-conspirators commonly referred to targeting ‘purple states’ in directing their efforts.

The indictments were announced by the office of Special Counsel Robert Mueller’s.

Mueller’s expansive investigation into Russian election interference has led to the indictments of former Trump campaign chairman Paul Manafort and his associate Rick Gates III.

Former Trump national security adviser Michael Flynn and former campaign foreign policy adviser George Papadopoulos have pleaded guilty to lying to the FBI about their contacts with Russian officials during the campaign and the transition. Both are now acting as cooperating witnesses in the special counsel’s investigation.

Special Counsel Charges Russian Nationals Involved in U.S. Elections Interference was originally published on Global Security Review.

• Wikileaks is considered to be a non-state intelligence agency with hostile intentions to the United States and ties to Russian military and foreign intelligence agencies.
• Wikileaks asked Donald Trump Jr. for his cooperation in coordinating the distribution of political messages, in contesting the results of the election, and in sending “the right signals” to U.S. allies like Australia and the U.K.
• These revelations indicate some form of coordination between a Kremlin actor and the Trump campaign.
• At the strategic level, these communications centered on building a sustainable narrative that would be mutually beneficial for the Trump Campaign, Wikileaks, and their respective backers.
• Steve Bannon, Kellyanne Conway, Brad Parscale, Hope Hicks, and Jared Kushner were informed of these communications during the campaign.
• Wikileak’s suspected involvement with Russian military and security intelligence services was public knowledge at the time.

The Atlantic Magazine published a set of private communications between Donald Trump Jr. and Wikileaks. These messages were sent prior the election and discussed how best to disseminate the trove of DNC emails obtained by Wikileaks through a Russian Intelligence hacking operation.

[bs-quote quote=”Wikileaks asked Donald Trump Jr. for his cooperation in coordinating the distribution of political messages, in contesting the results of the election, and in sending “the right signals” to U.S. allies like Australia and the U.K., “to start following the law and stop bending it to ingratiate themselves with the Clinton’s.”” style=”style-16″ align=”left”][/bs-quote]

The messages reveal a lengthy and often one-sided correspondence between Wikileaks and Donald Trump Jr. that continued until sometime July 2017, at least. The U.S. intelligence community believes that Wikileaks was either playing a complicit or ignorant role in disseminating information obtained by Russian intelligence services. The CIA Director, Mike Pompeo, labeled Wikileaks as a “hostile non-state intelligence agency” at his first public remarks as CIA Director at the Center for International and Strategic Studies.

In the messages, Wikileaks asked Donald Trump Jr. for his cooperation in coordinating the distribution of political messages, in contesting the results of the election, and in sending “the right signals” to U.S. allies like Australia and the U.K., “to start following the law and stop bending it to ingratiate themselves with the Clinton’s.”

These revelations indicate some form of coordination between a Kremlin-linked actor and the Trump campaign, mainly as the email conversations between Trump Jr. and Wikileaks were taking place during campaign events and refer to references to Wikileaks. Furthermore, it seems as if the Wikileaks team perceived themselves as working in the capacity a  partner of—or even a department within—the Trump Campaign. The view within Wikileaks mostly seemed to be that the two organizations were working in tandem.

The messages allege media strategy coordination by Trump Jr. and Wikileaks.

Julia Ioffe, the author of the Atlantic’s piece centers on a specific exchange between Trump Jr. and Wikileaks. On October 3, 2016, WikiLeaks wrote: “Hiya, it’d be great if you guys could comment on/push this story,” WikiLeaks suggested, attaching a quote from then-Democratic nominee Hillary Clinton about wanting to “just drone” WikiLeaks founder, Julian Assange.

“Already did that earlier today,” Trump Jr. responded an hour-and-a-half later. “It’s amazing what she can get away with.” Trump Jr. wrote again two minutes later, asking, “What’s behind this Wednesday leak I keep reading about?”

[bs-quote quote=”Hiya, it’d be great if you guys could comment on/push this story.” style=”style-8″ align=”center” author_name=”Wikileaks” author_job=”to Donald Trump Jr. on October 3, 2016″ author_avatar=”http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/WL_Helping_Hand.jpg”][/bs-quote]

[bs-quote quote=”Already did that earlier today, what’s behind this Wednesday leak I keep reading about?” style=”style-8″ align=”center” author_name=”Donald Trump Jr.” author_job=”to Wikileaks on October 3, 2016″ author_avatar=”http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/30309613870_787846f5fc_b.jpg”][/bs-quote]

The day before, Roger Stone, an informal advisor to Donald Trump during the campaign, tweeted: “Wednesday @HillaryClinton is done. #WikiLeaks.” WikiLeaks didn’t respond to Trump Jr.’s question, but on October 12, 2016, the account again messaged Trump Jr: “Hey Donald, great to see you and your dad talking about our publications,” WikiLeaks wrote.

“Strongly suggest your dad tweets this link if he mentions us,” WikiLeaks went on, pointing Trump Jr. to the link wlsearch.tk, which it said would help Trump’s followers dig through the trove of stolen documents and find relevant stories.

[bs-quote quote=”Hey Donald, great to see you and your dad talking about our publications. Strongly suggest your dad tweets this link if he mentions us. There’s many great stories the press are missing and we’re sure some of your follows will find it. ” style=”style-8″ align=”center” author_name=”Wikileaks” author_job=”to Donald Trump Jr. on October 12, 2016″ author_avatar=”http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/WL_Helping_Hand.jpg”][/bs-quote]

“There’s many great stories the press are missing and we’re sure some of your follows [sic] will find it,” WikiLeaks went on. “Btw we just released Podesta Emails Part 4.”

[bs-quote quote=”Btw we just released Podesta Emails Part 4.” style=”style-8″ align=”center” author_name=”Wikileaks” author_job=”to Donald Trump Jr. on October 12, 2016″ author_avatar=”http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/WL_Helping_Hand.jpg”][/bs-quote]

Wikileaks Attempted to Communicate with Trump Jr. As Recently as July 2017

The communications didn’t end with the election. In July 2017, in the wake of Donald Trump Jr.’s congressional testimony, Wikileaks reached out to Trump Jr. again.  “Hi Don. Sorry to hear about your problems, We have an idea that may help a little. We are VERY interested in confidentially obtaining and publishing a copy of the email(s) cited in the New York Times today.” The message was referencing a Times’ report on emails Trump Jr had exchanged with Rob Goldstone, a publicist who had helped set up the now-infamous June 2016 Trump Tower meeting with Russian lawyer Natalia Veselnitskaya.

“We think this is strongly in your interest,” WikiLeaks went on. It then reprised many of the same arguments it made in trying to convince Trump Jr. to turn over his father’s tax returns, including the argument that Trump’s enemies in the press were using the emails to spin an unfavorable narrative of the meeting. ‘Us publishing not only deprives them of this ability but is beautifully confounding.'”

[bs-quote quote=”Hi Don. Sorry to hear about your problems, We have an idea that may help a little. We are VERY interested in confidentially obtaining and publishing a copy of the email(s) cited in the New York Times today. We think this is strongly in your interest…Us publishing not only deprives them of this ability but is beautifully confounding.” style=”style-8″ align=”center” author_name=”Wikileaks” author_job=”to Donald Trump Jr. in July, 2017″ author_avatar=”http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/WL_Helping_Hand.jpg”][/bs-quote]

In short, Wikileaks offered to publish Donald Trump Jr’s (already released) emails to WikiLeaks in an attempt to show that Wikileaks is objective concerning the targets of their “leaks.” Secondly, this would benefit Trump Jr. as he could use Wikileak’s reputation as a hostile non-state intelligence service to his advantage, by claiming that the emails were doctored or otherwise misrepresented. Unfortunately for Wikileaks, Trump Jr. proceeded by posting the emails to his own twitter account.

Analysis: while mostly one-sided, the communications imply coordination between the Trump Campaign and Wikileaks

The conversations centered on how surrogates or the candidate was referring to specific keywords or hashtags in social media postings. At a technical level, this would indicate coordinated action by the trump campaign with Wikileaks. Beyond these emails, the extent of coordination that has taken place is unclear at this point. At the strategic level, these communications centered on building a sustainable narrative that would be mutually beneficial for the Trump Campaign, Wikileaks, and their respective backers.

While the communications between Trump Jr. and Wikileaks are not necessarily a legal offense (Trump Jr. was a private citizen at the time), if he failed to provide information or documents to the special counsel or congressional investigators, he may be liable for obstruction of justice.

Who Knew What, and When?

What’s important to draw from these exchanges is that while Donald Trump Jr. in large part ignored emails from Wikileaks,  he did act on some of their requests. According to Ioffe, the same day that Donald Trump Jr. received the first email that was sent by Wikileaks, he informed senior Trump Campaign officials.  Specifically, Steve Bannon, Kellyanne Conway, Brad Parscale, Hope Hicks, and Jared Kushner all became aware of Trump Jr.’s contacts with Wikileaks.

Donald Trump Jr. did not rebuff Wikileaks at any time during his correspondence with the organization. Wikileak’s suspected involvement with Russian military and security intelligence services was public knowledge at the time.

Donald Trump Jr’s Secret Communications with Wikileaks was originally published on Global Security Review.

• At-sea deployments of nuclear weapons by India, Pakistan, and perhaps China, would increasingly nuclearize the Indian Ocean throughout the next two decades.
• The presence of multiple nuclear powers in the Indian ocean operating nuclear-armed vessels increases the potential risk of miscalculation and inadvertent escalation.

Nuclear deployment requirements for naval-based delivery vehicles remove a safety valve that, until now, has kept atomic weapons stored separately from missiles in South Asia.

Pakistan will feel compelled to address India’s economic and conventional military capabilities through asymmetric means. Pakistan will seek to enhance its nuclear deterrent against India by expanding its nuclear arsenal and delivery means, including pursuing battlefield nuclear weapons and sea-based options.

India will focus its attention on both Islamabad and Beijing—seeking military partnerships with Europe, Japan, the US, and others—to boost its conventional capabilities while striving for escalation dominance vis-a-vis Pakistan.

India will continue to offer smaller South Asian nations a stake in India’s financial growth through development assistance and increased connectivity to India’s economy. This strategy will contribute to India’s broader effort to assert its role as the predominant regional power. At the same time, violent extremism and extreme ideology-based terrorism continue to spread throughout South Asia.

Violent extremism, terrorism, and instability will continue to hang over nuclear-armed Pakistan.

The threat of terrorism, from Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LET), Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), and al-Qaeda and its affiliates as well as ISIL’s expansion and sympathy for associated ideology—will remain prominent in the area.

Competition for jobs, coupled with discrimination against minorities, might contribute to the radicalization of the region’s youth, especially given abnormal sex ratios favoring males in several nations.

In increasingly volatile Pakistan, which neighbors India, there is a significant concern at the regional and global levels that a non-state actor could obtain a nuclear weapon in Pakistan. This scenario would be particularly challenging to manage, as conventional deterrence practices don’t deter a non-state actor like a trans-national terrorist group, creating a significant threat for neighboring India.

Disaster in South Asia: Nuclear Deployments & Violent Extremism was originally published on Global Security Review.

Continuing conflict and lack of political and economic reform threaten poverty reduction, the area’s one last bright spot.  Resource dependence and foreign assistance have propped up elites even as it fostered widespread reliance on the nation by inhibiting markets, employment, and human capital.

MENA: The Middle East and Northern Africa

With oil prices unlikely to recover to levels of the petroleum boom governments may have to limit cash payments and subsidies.  At the meantime, social networks have provided new tools for citizens to vent their political frustrations.  Conservative religious groups—including Brotherhood affiliates and movements—and ethnically-based organizations like those based on Kurdish identity are poised to be superior alternatives to weak governments in the region.

Such groups typically supply social services better than the nation and their politics resonate with publics who’re usually more conservative and religious than the region’s political and economic elites.

If left unchecked, current trends will further fragment the region.  The effect of Islamist groups is very likely to expand, reducing the tolerance for and presence of minorities, setting the stage for additional migration flows.  Hazards of uncertainty in Arab countries like Egypt, and possibly Saudi Arabia, could induce rulers to impose control via force–an impulse at odds with countertrends like the technological empowerment of human data flows, and poverty reduction.

Additionally, a transition to democracy could offer an attractive model, if it delivers better stability and inclusive wealth.  Progress on poverty reduction, education, and girls’ empowerment in individual portions of the region provides momentum for tapping into the growing number of young people which will be coming of working age.

Geopolitically, developing humanitarian crises and regional conflict in the Middle East and North Africa will threaten to further undermine the credibility of international dispute resolution and human rights standards.  Perceptions in the area’s capitals which Washington is undependable have invited competition from Russia, and possibly China, and hedging by nations regarding US obligations.

These perceptions stem from unenforced red lines in Syria, withheld support for Mubarak along with other Arab incumbents in 2011, an alleged tilt toward Iran and away from traditional Sunni allies and Israel, and a sense of neglect due to the US rebalance to Asia.

At the meantime, Iran, Israel, and perhaps Turkey are likely to rise in power and influence relative to other nations in the area but will remain at odds with one another.  Iran’s growing influence, nuclear capabilities, and aggressive behavior will continue to be a concern for Gulf and Israel Arab nations.  The sectarian nature of Iranian and Saudi regional competition, which promotes inflammatory rhetoric and allegations of heresy throughout the region, heightens these concerns.

Sub-Saharan Africa

Practices have changed, civil society groups have proliferated, and citizens across the region demand better and more just governance.  However, many nations continue to struggle with authoritarian rule, patronage politics, and favoritism.  Many leaders remain focused on political survival as opposed to reform–with a few term limitations.

Global economic headwinds also threaten improvement by keeping commodity prices low and investment weak.  Some nations who’ve made progress toward democracy remain fragile and predisposed towards violence corresponding elections.  Tensions between Muslim and Christian groups can escalate into conflict.

Analysis: Demographic, Education, and Development Trends Will Converge

During the next five decades, growing African populations will become more youthful, urban, mobile, and networked, and better educated–and more demanding of a voice.  Rapid urbanization will stress infrastructure and increase the visibility of elite corruption—fueling public frustration with opportunities or services.

Some 75 to 250 million Africans will experience acute water stress, probably leading to mass migration.  Nevertheless, Africa will remain a zone of experimentation from governments, corporations, non-governmental organizations and people seeking to advance development.  The progress of the past two decades–including an expanded middle class, increasingly vibrant civil society, and the spread of democratic institutions–indicates potential.

Africa and the Middle East was originally published on Global Security Review.