I. Introduction

The concept of warfare has evolved significantly over the years, with the traditional notion of state-on-state conflict increasingly giving way to more complex forms of engagement. This essay explores the concept of hybrid and non-linear warfare, a strategy that systematically blurs the lines between war and peace, and its implications for international security. The Russo-Ukrainian War (2014-2023) and the Chinese approach to hybrid warfare, particularly regarding Taiwan and the South China Sea, serve as case studies to illustrate the practical application of these concepts.

Hybrid warfare combines conventional and unconventional methods, including military operations, cyber warfare, disinformation campaigns, and economic pressure. Non-linear warfare, on the other hand, refers to a strategy that disrupts the traditional battlefield, making it difficult to distinguish between combatants and civilians or between times of war and peace. These strategies have become increasingly prevalent in the 21st century as state and non-state actors seek to gain strategic advantages without resorting to full-scale conventional warfare¹.

The Russo-Ukrainian War provides a clear example of these tactics in action. The conflict, which began with Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, has been marked by a mix of traditional military operations, cyber attacks, and information warfare.² The war has also been characterized by its non-linear nature, with the front lines and the state of war and peace often blurred.

Meanwhile, China’s approach to hybrid warfare, particularly about Taiwan and the South China Sea, offers another perspective on these strategies. Chinese military theorists Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, in their work “Unrestricted Warfare,” have outlined a broad approach to conflict that includes not only military actions but also economic, informational, and other non-military means.³ This approach, evident in China’s actions in the South China Sea and towards Taiwan, reflects a strategic shift towards hybrid and non-linear warfare.

This essay aims to explore these issues in depth, examining the nature of hybrid and non-linear warfare, its implications for international security, and how it has been employed in the Russo-Ukrainian War and by China. In doing so, it seeks to provide a comprehensive understanding of these complex and evolving forms of warfare.

II. Hybrid and Non-Linear Warfare: An Overview

Hybrid and non-linear warfare represent two of the most significant developments in conflict and warfare in the 21st century. Their complexity and fluidity characterize these forms of warfare and the blurring of traditional lines between combatants and civilians and between war and peace.⁴

Hybrid warfare is a type of conflict that blends conventional and unconventional methods, including military operations, cyber warfare, disinformation campaigns, and economic pressure. This form of warfare is not limited to a single shape or dimension and can involve a mix of regular and irregular tactics across all dimensions of war.⁵ The term ‘hybrid warfare’ has been in use since at least 2005 when it was employed to describe the strategy used by Hezbollah in the 2006 Lebanon War.⁶

Non-linear warfare, on the other hand, disrupts the traditional battlefield, making it difficult to distinguish between combatants and civilians or between times of war and peace. This form of warfare utilizes a grand strategy approach, where force-on-force conflict is not the primary objective. Instead, the goal is to create a complex and fluid situation that exploits an opponent’s weaknesses.⁷

Several factors, including advances in technology, the increasing interconnectedness of the world, and the evolving nature of threats, have driven the rise of hybrid and non-linear warfare. These forms of action allow state and non-state actors to gain strategic advantages without resorting to full-scale conventional war. However, they also pose significant challenges to international security, as they can be difficult to detect and counter and have far-reaching impacts on societies’ political, economic, and social fabric.⁸

In the following sections, we will delve deeper into these concepts and explore their implications through the lens of the Russo-Ukrainian War and China’s approach to hybrid warfare about Taiwan and the South China Sea.

III. Case Study: The Russo-Ukrainian War

The Russo-Ukrainian War began in 2014 and is a prime example of hybrid warfare. The conflict started with disguised Russian troops’ covert invasion of the Ukrainian autonomous republic of Crimea. This was followed by the seizure of territory in Ukraine’s Donbas region by Russians and local proxy forces, marking the expansion of the conflict.⁹

In the early stages of the war, Russia employed a blend of conventional and unconventional tactics to destabilize Ukraine. This included cyber warfare, propaganda, economic pressure, and the deployment of “little green men” – soldiers without insignia who were later confirmed to be Russian personnel.¹⁰

However, the war took a significant turn on February 24, 2022, when Russia launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine.¹¹ This marked a shift from the hybrid warfare tactics used in annexing Crimea to a more traditional form of warfare. Despite initial gains by Russian forces, Ukrainian defenders repelled attempts to seize Kyiv and other major cities and soon launched counterattacks at Russian positions.¹²

The full-scale invasion was not executed in the same manner as the 2014 annexation of Crimea. The gradual escalation of tensions and the failure of Russia at a strategic level to achieve its objectives became evident. The invasion resulted in a significant loss of life and displacement of people, with millions fleeing Ukraine.¹³

The Russo-Ukrainian War demonstrates the complexities and challenges of hybrid warfare. While Russia initially succeeded in destabilizing Ukraine through a blend of conventional and unconventional tactics, the shift to a full-scale invasion marked a significant escalation of the conflict. The failure of Russia to achieve its strategic objectives despite this escalation highlights the limitations of hybrid warfare when confronted with a determined and resilient defense.

The Russo-Ukrainian War also underscores the international implications of hybrid warfare. The conflict drew widespread international condemnation and led to significant sanctions against Russia. It also highlighted the role of global alliances and partnerships in countering hybrid warfare tactics.¹⁴

IV. Case Study: China’s Approach to Hybrid Warfare

China’s approach to hybrid warfare, particularly in the context of Taiwan and the South China Sea, offers a unique perspective on applying non-linear warfare strategies. This section will analyze China’s hybrid warfare tactics, focusing on its maritime gray zone operations, cyber warfare capabilities, and information warfare strategies.

China’s hybrid warfare strategy combines military, economic, diplomatic, and informational means to achieve strategic objectives without resorting to open warfare.¹⁵ This approach is particularly evident in China’s maritime gray zone operations in the South China Sea. China has been using a combination of naval, coast guard, and militia forces to assert its territorial claims in the region.¹⁶ These operations are designed to incrementally alter the status quo in China’s favor without provoking a military response from other regional actors or the United States.¹⁷

China has developed significant capabilities in the cyber domain and has been accused of conducting cyber espionage and cyberattacks against foreign governments and corporations.¹⁸ China’s cyber warfare strategy is driven by its perception of other countries’ changing cyber warfare approaches and practices, especially those of the U.S. and Russia.¹⁹ The Chinese government views cyber warfare as consistent with its military strategy, which is modified according to the national security environment, domestic situation, and activities of foreign militaries.²⁰

China’s information warfare strategies also play a crucial role in its hybrid warfare approach. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has been using information warfare to control the narrative within its borders and influence perceptions abroad.²¹ The CCP employs various tactics, including censorship, propaganda, and disinformation campaigns, to shape public opinion and advance its strategic objectives.²²

In the context of Taiwan, China’s hybrid warfare approach is designed to isolate Taiwan internationally, undermine its political system, and gradually erode its will to resist unification with the mainland.²³ This strategy includes diplomatic pressure to reduce the number of countries recognizing Taiwan, economic coercion to make Taiwan more dependent on the continent, and military intimidation to demonstrate China’s resolve to achieve unification.²⁴

China’s approach is multifaceted and adaptive, reflecting its strategic objectives and the evolving security environment. This approach allows China to pursue its interests and assert its influence without resorting to open warfare, thereby minimizing the risk of escalation and international backlash.

V: Causes and Consequences of Hybrid Warfare

Hybrid warfare, as a complex and multifaceted form of conflict, is driven by various causes and has significant national and international security consequences. This section will explore these causes and effects, drawing on various academic sources to provide a comprehensive analysis.

V.1 Causes of Hybrid Warfare

The causes of hybrid warfare are multifaceted and complex, reflecting the diverse nature of this form of conflict. One key driver is the changing nature of power in the international system. Monaghan notes that the diffusion of power away from states and toward non-state actors has created an environment where hybrid threats can thrive.²⁵ This is particularly true in the digital domain, where non-state actors can wield significant influence.

Another cause of hybrid warfare is the desire of states to achieve their objectives without resorting to conventional action, which is often costly and risky. Hybrid warfare allows states to exploit the “gray zone” between peace and war, using military and non-military means to achieve their objectives.²⁶ This is evident in the case studies of Russia and China discussed in the previous sections.

V.2 Consequences of Hybrid Warfare

The consequences of hybrid warfare are significant and wide-ranging. At the national level, hybrid warfare can undermine state sovereignty, security, and the rule of law. This is evident in the case of Ukraine, where Russia’s use of hybrid warfare tactics has resulted in a protracted conflict that has undermined Ukraine’s sovereignty and security.²⁷

At the international level, hybrid warfare can destabilize the global system and challenge the norms and principles that underpin it. This is particularly the case in the South China Sea, where China’s use of hybrid warfare tactics has challenged the principle of freedom of navigation.²⁸

Hybrid warfare also has significant implications for the conduct of warfare. As Baines and Edwards note, hybrid warfare blurs the lines between combatants and civilians and between war and peace.²⁹ This complicates the conduct of action and poses significant ethical and legal challenges.

VI: Rethinking Warfare: A New Framework

The evolution of warfare, particularly the rise of hybrid and non-linear warfare, necessitates a new framework for understanding and responding to these threats. This section will explore the need for a new framework, the critical elements of this framework, and how it can be applied to the case studies of Russia and China.

1. The Need for a New Framework
   The traditional understanding of warfare, which primarily focuses on conventional military conflict, is no longer sufficient to address the complexities of the contemporary security environment³⁰. Hybrid warfare, characterized by blending conventional, irregular, and cyber warfare, along with other non-military tools, has become a prevalent strategy for state actors.³¹ This necessitates a new framework that can effectively address the multi-dimensional nature of hybrid warfare.
2. Key Elements of the New Framework: The new framework should incorporate the following key elements:
   1. Comprehensive Understanding of Hybrid Warfare: The framework should provide a comprehensive understanding of hybrid warfare, including its various dimensions, such as conventional, irregular, cyber, and information warfare.³² It should also consider using non-military economic, diplomatic, and political tools.
   2. Recognition of the Role of Non-State Actors: The framework should recognize the role of non-state actors in hybrid warfare. This includes not only insurgent groups and terrorists but also cybercriminals, hackers, and other actors who state actors can co-opt to achieve their objectives.³³
   3. Incorporation of Technological Developments: The framework should incorporate the impact of technological developments on warfare. This includes using cyber capabilities, artificial intelligence, and other emerging technologies.³⁴
   4. Focus on Resilience and Defense: The framework should emphasize the importance of resilience and defense in responding to hybrid threats. This includes not only military security but also strengthening societal resilience, cyber protection, and other non-military reasons. ³⁵
3. Application to the Case Studies of Russia and China: The new framework can be applied to the case studies of Russia and China to provide a more comprehensive understanding of their hybrid warfare strategies.
   1. Russia: The new framework can help to understand Russia’s use of hybrid warfare in Ukraine. It can shed light on Russia’s use of conventional and irregular warfare, cyber and information war, and non-military tools such as economic and political measures³⁶.
   2. China: The new framework can help to understand China’s use of hybrid warfare in its approach towards Taiwan and the South China Sea. It can shed light on China’s use of conventional and irregular warfare, cyber and information war, and non-military tools such as economic and political measures.³⁷

The continuous evolution of warfare necessitates a new framework for understanding and responding to hybrid threats. This framework should provide a comprehensive experience of hybrid warfare, recognize the role of non-state actors, incorporate technological developments, and focus on resilience and defense. It can be applied to the case studies of Russia and China to provide a more comprehensive understanding of their hybrid warfare strategies.

VII. The Agile Approach to Hybrid Warfare

The agile approach to hybrid warfare is a strategic response that emphasizes flexibility, adaptability, and rapid decision-making in the face of complex and evolving threats. This approach is particularly relevant in hybrid warfare, where the lines between conventional and unconventional warfare are blurred, and the adversary’s tactics constantly evolve.

The agile approach is not a new concept in military strategy. It is rooted in maneuver warfare principles, which emphasize speed, surprise, and initiative to disrupt the enemy’s decision-making process.³⁸ However, applying these principles to hybrid warfare is a relatively recent development.

The NATO Alliance has recognized the need for an agile approach to hybrid threats. In its 2016 Warsaw Summit, NATO leaders agreed on a strategy to enhance the Alliance’s resilience against hybrid threats, emphasizing the need for rapid decision-making, enhanced situational awareness, and improved strategic communications.³⁹

The U.S. Department of Defense has adopted an agile approach to hybrid threats. The 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review highlighted the need for a more agile force that can quickly adapt to new threats and challenges.⁴⁰ This approach has been further developed in the concept of Multi-Domain Operations, which seeks to integrate capabilities across all domains (land, sea, air, space, and cyberspace) to create multiple dilemmas for the adversary.⁴¹

The agile approach to hybrid warfare also has implications for defense acquisition and technology development. Rapid technological change and the proliferation of advanced technologies to non-state actors and near-peer competitors have increased the complexity of the threat environment. Defense organizations must rapidly adopt more agile and flexible acquisition processes to field new capabilities.⁴²

However, the agile approach is not without its challenges. It requires high coordination and integration across different domains and agencies, which can be challenging to achieve in large and complex organizations. It also requires a cultural shift towards greater risk tolerance and a willingness to experiment and learn from failure.⁴³

An agile approach to hybrid warfare offers an intriguing framework for responding to the complex and evolving threats posed by hybrid warfare. However, its successful implementation requires significant organizational and cultural changes.

VIII. Policy Recommendations

The complexity and evolving nature of hybrid warfare necessitates a comprehensive and adaptive approach to policy-making. The following recommendations are proposed to counter hybrid threats effectively:

1. Strengthening International Cooperation: The international community must work together to counter hybrid threats. This includes sharing intelligence, coordinating responses, and developing joint strategies. In this direction, NATO has already taken steps, establishing the Hybrid Analysis Branch and the Hybrid Warfare Fusion Cell to enhance understanding and response to hybrid threats.⁴⁴ However, more can be done to strengthen these efforts, including expanding these initiatives to include non-NATO members and fostering closer cooperation with the private sector and civil society.
2. Building Resilience: Resilience is critical to countering hybrid warfare. This includes societal resilience, such as public awareness and media literacy to counter disinformation campaigns, and institutional resilience, such as robust cyber defenses and crisis management capabilities.⁴⁵
3. Investing in Research and Development: Technological advancements play a significant role in hybrid warfare. Therefore, investing in research and development in artificial intelligence, cyber security, and advanced weaponry can provide a competitive edge.⁴⁶
4. Enhancing Legal and Normative Frameworks: Hybrid warfare often exploits legal and normative gray zones. Therefore, enhancing international legal and normative frameworks to address these challenges is crucial. This includes clarifying the application of international law in the cyber domain and developing norms against the use of disinformation and other hybrid tactics.⁴⁷
5. Adopting a Whole-of-Government Approach: Countering hybrid threats requires a coordinated approach involving all government sectors. This includes the military and intelligence agencies and departments dealing with foreign affairs, domestic security, finance, and infrastructure.⁴⁸
6. Promoting Strategic Communication: Effective communication is crucial in countering hybrid warfare. This includes both internal and external communication within the government with the public and international partners. Strategic communication can help to counter disinformation, build public trust, and promote a unified response to hybrid threats.⁴⁹

Countering hybrid warfare requires a comprehensive and adaptive approach involving all societal sectors. By strengthening international cooperation, building resilience, investing in research and development, enhancing legal and normative frameworks, adopting a whole-of-government approach, and promoting strategic communication, we can effectively counter the complex and evolving threats posed by hybrid warfare.

IX. Conclusion

Hybrid warfare, characterized by blending conventional, irregular, and cyber action with other non-military tools, has emerged as a significant challenge in the contemporary security environment. This essay has comprehensively analyzed hybrid war, its causes and consequences, and the need for a new framework to understand and respond to these threats.

The case studies of Russia and China illustrate hybrid warfare’s diverse and complex nature. Russia’s actions in Ukraine and China’s approach towards Taiwan and the South China Sea demonstrate how state actors can exploit the “gray zone” between peace and war to achieve their objectives.^{50 51} These case studies underscore the need for a comprehensive understanding of hybrid warfare that includes both military aspects and non-military dimensions, such as economic, diplomatic, and political measures.

The causes of hybrid warfare are multifaceted and complex, reflecting the changing nature of power in the international system and the desire of states to achieve their objectives without resorting to conventional action.⁵² The consequences of hybrid action are significant and wide-ranging, undermining state sovereignty and security, destabilizing the international system, and complicating the conduct of warfare.⁵³

The agile approach to hybrid warfare offers a promising framework for responding to these complex and evolving threats. This approach emphasizes flexibility, adaptability, and rapid decision-making and incorporates the impact of technological developments on warfare.⁵⁴ However, its successful implementation requires significant organizational and cultural changes.

The policy recommendations proposed in This essay provide a roadmap for countering hybrid threats. These include strengthening international cooperation, building resilience, investing in research and development, enhancing legal and normative frameworks, adopting a whole-of-government approach, and promoting strategic communication.⁵⁵ However, the effectiveness of these measures will depend on the specific circumstances of each country and the nature of the threats they face.

Endnotes

¹ Smith, M. E. (2016). Hybrid warfare and its implications for defense and security policies. European View, 15(2), 223-234.
² Galeotti, M. (2019). The Russo-Ukrainian War: A Case Study in Non-Linear Warfare. In Non-Linear Warfare (pp. 45-64). Palgrave Macmillan, Cham.
³ Liang, Q., & Xiangsui, W. (1999). Unrestricted Warfare. PLA Literature and Arts Publishing House.
⁴ Hoffman, F. G. (2007). Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars. Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, 1-72.
⁵ Kaldor, M. (2012). New and old wars: Organised violence in a global era. Stanford University Press.
⁶ Van Puyvelde, D. (2015). Hybrid war – does it even exist? NATO Review. Retrieved from https://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/2015/05/07/hybrid-war-does-it-even-exist/index.html
⁷ Hoffman, F. G. (2009). Hybrid warfare and challenges. JFQ: Joint Force Quarterly, (52), 34-39.
⁸ Kofman, M., & Rojansky, M. (2015). A Closer Look at Russia’s “Hybrid War.” Kennan Cable No. 7. Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars.
⁹ Galeotti, Mark. “Russia’s ‘New’ Tools for Confronting the West: Continuity and Innovation in Moscow’s Exercise of Power.” Chatham House, The Royal Institute of International Affairs, March 2016.
¹⁰ “Documents on Democracy: Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine.” Journal of Democracy, 2023.
¹⁵ Fravel, M. Taylor. “China’s Strategy in the South China Sea.” Contemporary Southeast Asia: A Journal of International and Strategic Affairs 33, no. 3 (2011): 292-319.
¹⁶ Erickson, Andrew S., and Ryan D. Martinson. “China’s Maritime Gray Zone Operations.” Studies in Chinese Military Science (2019).
¹⁷ Yoshihara, Toshi, and James R. Holmes. “China’s Vision of Victory.” The Diplomat, June 6, 2019.
¹⁸ Segal, Adam. “What Are China’s Cyber Capabilities and Intentions?” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, April 1, 2019.
²¹ Brady, Anne-Marie. “Magic Weapons: China’s Political Influence Activities Under Xi Jinping.” Wilson Center, September 18, 2017.
²³ Chase, Michael S., and Benjamin S. Purser III. “China’s Long-Range Bomber Flights: Drivers and Implications.” RAND Corporation, 2015.
²⁴ Tsang, Steve. “Taiwan’s Impact on China: Why Soft Power Matters More than Economic or Political Inputs.” The China Quarterly 177 (2004): 25-44.
²⁵ Monaghan, Andrew. “The ‘War’ in Russia’s ‘Hybrid Warfare.'” Parameters 45, no. 4 (2015): 65-80.
²⁶ Hoffman, Frank G. “Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars.” Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, 2007.
²⁷ Galeotti, Mark. “I’m Sorry for Creating the ‘Gerasimov Doctrine.'” Foreign Policy, 2018.
²⁸ Yoshihara, Toshi and Holmes, James R. “Red Star over the Pacific: China’s Rise and the Challenge to U.S. Maritime Strategy.” Naval Institute Press, 2018.
²⁹ Baines, Paul, and Edwards, Nicholas. “The Art of Hybrid War: China’s Maritime Gray Zone Operations.” Naval War College Review 73, no. 2 (2020): 1-37.
³⁰ Hoffman, F. G. (2007). Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars. Potomac Institute for Policy Studies.
³¹ Johnson, R. (2018). Hybrid warfare and its countermeasures: A critique of the literature. Small Wars & Insurgencies, 29(1), 141-163.
³² Thiele, R. D. (2017). Hybrid warfare and the changing character of conflict. Connections, 16(2), 65-72.
³³ Popescu, N. (2015). Hybrid tactics: neither new nor only Russian. EUISS Issue Alert, 4.
³⁴ Kostyuk, N., & Zhukov, Y. M. (2019). Invisible digital front: Can cyber attacks shape battlefield events? Journal of Conflict Resolution, 63(2), 317-347.
³⁵ Baines, P. R., & Jones, K. (2019). Influence and interference in foreign elections: the real threat to the ‘free and fair’ election process? Intelligence and National Security, 34(5), 685-703.
³⁶ Galeotti, M. (2016). Hybrid, ambiguous, and non-linear? How new is Russia’s ‘new way of war’? Small Wars & Insurgencies, 27(2), 282-301.
³⁷ Cheung, T. M., & Thomas, J. (2018). The impact of China’s military modernization on regional stability. In China’s Evolving Military Strategy (pp. 1-30). Brookings Institution Press.
³⁸ Lind, William S. “Maneuver Warfare: Can We Make It Work?” Defense & Security Analysis 5, no. 2 (1989): 153-161.
³⁹ “Warsaw Summit Communiqué.” NATO. July 9, 2016. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/officialtexts133169.htm.
⁴⁰ “Quadrennial Defense Review 2014.” U.S. Department of Defense. March 4, 2014. https://archive.defense.gov/pubs/2014QuadrennialDefenseReview.pdf.
⁴¹ “Multi-Domain Operations.” U.S. Army. https://www.army.mil/standto/archive/2018/12/06/.
⁴² Gansler, Jacques S., and William Lucyshyn. “Defense Acquisition Reform: Where Do We Go from Here?” University of Maryland School of Public Policy, Center for Public Policy and Private Enterprise. October 2014. https://www.csis.org/analysis/defense-acquisition-reform-where-do-we-go-here.
⁴³ Blanken, Leo J., and Jason Lepore. “Is the U.S. Military Ready for Agile Acquisition?” War on the Rocks. August 14, 2019. https://warontherocks.com/2019/08/is-the-u-s-military-ready-for-agile-acquisition/.
⁴⁴ “Hybrid Warfare,” NATO, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics156338.htm.
⁴⁵ “Hybrid Warfare: New Threats, Complexity, and Trust as the Antidote,” NATO Review, 2023, https://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/2021/11/30/hybrid-warfare-new-threats-complexity-and-trust-as-the-antidote/index.html.
⁴⁶ Andrew Monaghan, “The ‘War’ in Russia’s ‘Hybrid Warfare,'” Prism 8, no. 2 (2019): 104-120, https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/prism/prism8-2/PRISM8-2Monaghan.pdf.
⁵⁰ Monaghan, Andrew. “The ‘War’ in Russia’s ‘Hybrid Warfare.'” Parameters 45, no. 4 (2015): 65-80.
⁵¹ Yoshihara, Toshi and Holmes, James R. “Red Star over the Pacific: China’s Rise and the Challenge to U.S. Maritime Strategy.” Naval Institute Press, 2018.
⁵² Hoffman, Frank G. “Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars.” Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, 2007.
⁵³ Baines, Paul, and Edwards, Nicholas. “The Art of Hybrid War: China’s Maritime Gray Zone Operations.” Naval War College Review 73, no. 2 (2020): 1-37.
⁵⁴ Lind, William S. “Maneuver Warfare: Can We Make It Work?” Defense & Security Analysis 5, no. 2 (1989): 153-161.
⁵⁵ “Hybrid Warfare,” NATO, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics156338.htm.

The Changing Face of Conflict: What is Hybrid Warfare? was originally published on Global Security Review.

Russia’s military doctrine dictates the use of nuclear weapons in response to any non-nuclear assault on Russian territory.

Russia’s military doctrine encompasses a broad range of potential national security threats, including local, or small-scale wars, regional, or large-scale wars, internal and foreign military threats, the Russian military’s budget, and a host of military-related technical, political, social, and economic issues. Additionally, the doctrine defines the circumstances under which nuclear weapons are to be used by the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation in response to a threat to Russia’s national security.

The current edition of the Russian military doctrine—when compared to the national security strategy and military doctrine published in 1993—significantly lowers the threshold under which the use of nuclear weapons is permitted. While the 1993 doctrine allowed the first use of nuclear weapons only when the “existence of the Russian Federation” is threatened, the versions published since 2000 explicitly state that Russia “reserves the right to use nuclear weapons to respond to all weapons of mass destruction attacks” on Russia and its allies.

Furthermore, the doctrine released in 2000—and all subsequent versions—allows for nuclear weapons use “in response to large-scale aggression utilizing conventional weapons in situations critical to the national security of the Russian Federation.” Succinctly put, Russia’s entire national security strategy is predicated on the concept of nuclear de-escalation.

Historical Context: NATO Intervention in the Balkans

In the year before the release of Russia’s 2000 military doctrine, Russia’s military and political leaders warily observed as NATO executed an efficient and precise conventional military operation in the former Republic of Yugoslavia. In 1999, Russia was facing renewed tensions in Chechnya in the aftermath of the disastrous war that broke out following the Soviet Union’s collapse.

It was clear that the United States (and its allies) possessed far greater conventional military capabilities than Russia. Plus, the underlying ethnic and religious issues in Kosovo which led to NATO taking action were seen by Russia as almost identical to those underlying the first Chechen war. These similarities, combined with Russia’s historical view of Serbia—the successor state to the Republic of Yugoslavia—as its “little brother,” led to Moscow developing deep anxiety that the United States would involve itself in another within Russian borders.

In 2000, Russia released an updated military doctrine in which it outlined the concept of de-escalation through a limited nuclear strike. This idea put forth the notion that if Russia were subjected to a major non-nuclear assault that exceeded its capacity for conventional defense, it would “de-escalate” the conflict by launching a limited—or tactical—nuclear strike. While this policy has never been publicly discussed with relation to any particular conflict, the concept of nuclear de-escalation undoubtedly was on the minds of Western leaders during Russia’s invasion of Georgia in 2008, and in the ongoing conflict in eastern Ukraine.

Conventional and Nuclear Deterrence During the Cold War

The Soviet Union’s collapse and the effective end of the Cold War in the 1990s left Russia and the United States with significantly less reason to fear that one would launch a massive, surprise strategic nuclear attack on the other. The role nuclear weapons played in the international geopolitical framework was fundamentally altered. Nuclear weapons no longer were the centerpiece of security relationship based on the concept of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD).

Instead, they became status symbols; at the very most, they were considered the ultimate insurance policy against unforeseen aggression. Nuclear weapons maintained their role as the penultimate security guarantee; however, they had very much moved to the background of the international security stage. Many, particularly in the West, believed that global nuclear disarmament was an attainable goal.

During the Cold War, deterrence was effective in maintaining peace between the two superpowers because both states ensured that the other would be deterred on all levels in the event of escalating tensions. At the time, the security relationship between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. was heavily dependent on the concept of parity.  Conventional forces were deterred with conventional forces of equal strength, while nuclear arsenals were positioned in support of mutually assured destruction.

As the Soviet Union broke apart, following years of economic stagnation, the United States and its allies were demonstrating their significant conventional military capabilities in their 1990-1991 campaign to expel Iraqi occupying forces from the oil-rich state of Kuwait.  Russia’s military and political leaders grew increasingly wary about the imbalance—to Russia’s disadvantage—in conventional power projection and efficacy.

Shifting Security Perspectives in the Post-Cold War Era: Russia’s Asymmetric Deterrence Strategy

This anxiety amongst the Russian military’s top brass further developed during the U.S.-led NATO 1999 intervention in Kosovo. The United States’ conventional military power became a clear and distinct threat to Russia. There were many similarities between the origins of the Kosovo conflict and Russia’s own internal war with Chechen separatists during the first Chechen War. What Russia feared most was that the U.S. would intervene in what Russia considered its’ internal affairs. If the U.S. were to launch a non-nuclear (i.e. conventional) assault against the newly formed Russian Federation, Russia’s conventional forces would be of little benefit.

As nuclear deterrence theory during the Cold War was predicated on the concept of “mutually assured destruction” (MAD), deterrence strategy required that effective and credible forces were maintained at every level—conventional and nuclear to be effective. The Soviet Union’s collapse decimated that military’s conventional force projection capabilities. The subsequent Russian military’s ability to deter any conventional U.S. or NATO military action against Russia was rendered ineffective.

The efficacy of the United States’ high-precision conventional weapons was demonstrated in both the Balkan and Iraqi campaigns of the 1990s. Unlike nuclear weapons, these precision-guided “smart bombs” were highly usable and effective—in stark contrast to nuclear weapons. Framed in this context, Russia’s military planners became painfully aware of their strategic disadvantage. Thus, the concept of nuclear de-escalation was born.

Before the conclusion of NATO’s Kosovo operation, Russia initiated the development of a new military doctrine that would deter any conventional or nuclear strike against Russia.  Responsible for the supervision of this effort was then-secretary of Russia’s Security Council, Vladimir Putin. Coincidentally, it was Putin who would sign this doctrine upon its release in 2000, having just become president.

De-escalation revises the scale of a possible nuclear strike. While Cold War deterrence was predicated on the threat of inflicting an overwhelming degree of damage on enemy military and civilian targets, de-escalation rests on the concept of “tailored damage.” The doctrine defines “tailored damage” as inflicting “damage subjectively unacceptable to the opponent [and] exceeds the benefits the [opponent] expects to gain as a result of the use of [conventional] military force.” In other words, Russia’s military planners believed that the threat of a limited or tactical nuclear strike against enemy targets would be an effective deterrence against a conventional attack by the United States or NATO.

Today, the concept of “nuclear de-escalation” continues to be in play, presenting a significant challenge to western military strategists. If Russia were to mount a successful invasion of the Baltic states, it is likely that Russia would consider these countries to be sovereign Russian territory, meaning that any conventional NATO military operation designed to restore the independence of the NATO members would likely be met with a limited nuclear strike. That is, of course, unless U.S. or NATO cyber or other non-kinetic capabilities can disrupt Russia’s nuclear command-and-control apparatus.

Escalate to De-Escalate: Russia’s Nuclear Deterrence Strategy was originally published on Global Security Review.

Security is an inherently contested concept, encompassing a wide variety of scenarios, and is commonly used in reference to a range of personal and societal activities and situations.

Security can be distinguished between day-to-day security at the individual level (nutritional, economic, safety), security for favorable conditions (the rule of law and due process, societal development, political freedom), and security against adverse conditions or threats (war and violence, crime, climate change).

The term security is used in three broad segments. The first is the general, everyday use of the term. In this instance, security refers to the desire for safety or protection. Second is the usage of the word for political purposes; relating to political processes, structures, and actions utilized to ensure a given political unit or entity is secure.  The term “security” is frequently used as a political tool to assign priority to a given issue or perceived threat within the broader political realm.

Third, and finally, “security” can be employed as an analytical concept to identify, define, conceptualize, explain, or forecast societal developments such as security policy, institutions, and governance structures.

Politically speaking, the usage of the term “security” increased drastically in the second half of the twentieth century. Following the allied victory that ended World War II, the United States government’s military and intelligence institutions underwent a major restructuring.

The Advent of National Security

The National Security Act of 1947 not only created a “National Military Establishment,” which would later become the Department of Defense, and the Central Intelligence Agency; the Act established the National Security Council (NSC) to serve as the primary vehicle for coordinating national security and defense policy across multiple government agencies.

The National Security Advisor oversees the U.S. National Security Council. This structure would become a model for other countries; the governments of Australia, Brazil, France, Germany, India, Japan, South Korea, Russia, Turkey, the Republic of China (Taiwan), and the United Kingdom, to name a few, all maintain NSCs responsible for coordinating policy and advising heads of government or state on national security issues.

The advent of national security as a concept enabled states, and their political leaders, to rhetorically pursue a particular security policy. National security policy is broader than defense policy or military policy, and it is more than merely preparing for armed conflict or responding to security threats.  National security policy encompasses all of the above while also aiming to avoid war.

National security includes both internal and external security, foreign policy, economic development, and education. As former U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara put it, “security is development.”

National security policy became a critical tool for states to protect and further their interests within the broader international system. International security policy, which the United Nations was responsible for promoting, was often at odds with the national security interests of individual member states. Thus, the UN lost much of its influence as the world become increasingly divided between the U.S.-led West and the Soviet Union-led East.

It was in this context that the understanding of national security as a concept expanded from being based mainly on defense and military issues to focusing on those matters in conjunction with diplomatic, economic, and political issues, both domestically and internationally. Two major geopolitical blocs competed for global influence, but differently than great powers of the past. The UN provided a forum for the two superpowers to engage with one another to avoid another, likely far more destructive, global conflict.

A Shifting International Security Landscape

After the Soviet Union collapsed, the international landscape changed fundamentally. The previously bipolar world order was restructured under as a unipolar order. The United States, being the sole remaining superpower, was ideally positioned as the global hegemon.

A new international security framework was required when the Cold War ended. The previously bipolar international system became replaced by a unipolar global order dominated by the United States. Globally, the odds of a major war between two great powers were increasingly low. From the 1990s through the first decade of the twenty-first century, major conflicts were asymmetrical. The United States and its allies, with or without a mandate from the UN Security Council, employed the use of force multiple times arguing that they were doing so on behalf of the international community.

Some actions, such as the first Gulf War and the U.S.-led invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, enjoyed broad support from the international community. The only time (to date) that Article 5 of the NATO charter has been enacted was following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. These operations were authorized by the United Nations Security Council, which has the responsibility of acting on behalf of all UN member states in matters of global security. The threat of significant conflict between two sovereign states substantially dissipated, for a time.

Security is Everything

With a return to great power competition, national security priorities are shifting. States, rather than non-state actors like terrorist groups or insurgencies, are the primary security threat. The idea that security encompasses more than military and defense issues alone has returned, particularly in light of threats posed by rising nationalism and hostile foreign information operations. The security paradigm of the twenty-first century has expanded to nearly every facet of human life.

Rising nationalism is driving ontological and societal insecurity. This trend is fueled, in part, by economic inequality and stagnation, coupled with an influx of migrants and refugees fleeing violent conflicts, humanitarian disasters, and economic hardship. Unless Western societies implement substantial reforms for integrating immigrants and refugees, existing social divisions will widen, damaging the legitimacy of democratic institutions and polluting national identities with xenophobic sentiments.

There is also growing concern over gang violence, radicalization, transnational crime, privacy threats, and human rights violations worldwide. These issues all impact individual or personal security, and the widespread use of social media and other mass-communications technologies only serve to heighten the emphasis individuals and societies place on individual security.

Issues like climate change and pollution are also increasingly regarded through a security lens. These issues jeopardize human security, meaning they pose a threat to both individuals and humanity as a species.

Finally, cyberspace presents a whole host of new security threats. Cyber attacks not only compromise personal data and steal information, they can cause physical destruction, as well. Critical infrastructure like communications, power plants, water treatment centers, and oil refineries are all vulnerable to a debilitating cyber attack. Such an attack could disrupt operations, inflict sabotage, and even destroy the target facility. Cyber operations can be used by state and non-state actors to complement or augment kinetic operations to achieve a political goal. This is exemplified by Russia’s invasion of Eastern Ukraine.

In the twenty-first century, the concept of security is all-encompassing. The geopolitical element of great-power competition is further exacerbated by a transnational cyberspace, rapidly developing and increasingly accessible technologies, alongside a global economic system which has created complex inter-dependencies between states. In this new order, the traditional security debate between those who see it as a military and defense matter, and those who subscribe to the broader perspective that everything is security.

In this context, national security objectives can be only be achieved when hard power is seen as a compliment to soft power initiatives such as reducing societal and economic inequities, providing access to education and healthcare, and promoting intellectual and technological innovation.

What is Security? Everything. was originally published on Global Security Review.

China’s vast amounts of territory are inhabited by diverse groups of people—each with distinct cultural, political, economic, and religious traditions. Today, the Chinese Communist Party aims to forge a single, homogeneous “Chinese” national identity. Beijing is implementing policies designed to effectuate the forced ethnic and cultural assimilation of minorities like the Tibetans and the Uyghurs of Xinjiang.

This lack of a singular national identity was further compounded by a geographical landscape that impeded the establishment of a multipolar regional order like that of Europe. Europe’s plains and uplands are divided by rivers and mountain ranges—a vast swath of territory that enabled the rise of multiple, sovereign nation-states.

Eventually, European imperialist ambitions would extend this competition to the Americas, Africa, and Asia. As competing sovereign entities, European nation-states were actors an evolving political system that would eventually become known as the balance of power. This system upended the universalist status quo following the Peace of Westphalia in 1648. The term balance of power gained significance in the aftermath of the Treaty of Utrecht in 1713.

China’s topography isn’t conducive to balance of power politics. Where the Europeans had space to expand and develop distinct national identities, China’s various competing groups had competed with one another for supremacy in the absence of a strong central authority. Each ruling dynasty followed a similar path to power, with minor exceptions.

Controlling the Chinese heartland allows for the control over all of China.

Until the tenth century, the Guanzhong Plain was the primary center of political power. Eventually, this concentration of wealth and power shifted to the North China Plain, which took on increased economic and cultural significance. The North China Plain then connected to the fertile Yangtze Plain. The importance of the North China Plain only increased as the Chinese empire expanded further to the north and the east.

The Yangtze Plain, by contrast, generated dynasties that instantly succumbed either to their weaknesses, like the Southern Song in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries or to their northerly competitors like the short-lived nationalist government did in the twentieth century.

The North China Plain’s political importance is primarily due to its geography. Unlike areas to the south, the North China Plain expands mostly uninterrupted by mountains and has fewer rivers. This facilitated rapid communication by horseback. This resulted in a mostly homogeneous linguistic makeup, relative to the many different languages and dialects that are found throughout southern China. The ability to communicate rapidly across a significant distance allowed political and economic power to be concentrated along the North China Plain.

While the North China Plain was primarily the political center of China after the tenth century, it was control over Zhongyuan (中原)—the Central Plains—that was central to the survival of any ruling dynasty. Each understood that control over the Central Plains—the Chinese heartland—would enable for the control over all of China. This principle, the “Heartland Theory” was laid out by British economic theorist Halford Mackinder in The Geographical Pivot of History.

Historically, China’s international relations were based on suzerainty rather than sovereignty.

The area that comprises the Chinese heartland is less than one-third the size of the European plains, albeit with a substantially higher population. These demographic and geographic variables inhibit the development of a system of competing sovereign states. As such, the concept of sovereignty was nonexistent in imperial China.

Whereas the great powers of Europe looked upon rival powers as peers and understood the concept of sovereignty, China held no such outlook. Up until the nineteenth century, China’s international relations were based on the idea of suzerainty. China considered itself to be without equal, seeing itself as the world’s cultural and political center. It managed its international relations through a tributary system.

The Mandarin word for China is Zhongguo (中国), which translates literally as the “Middle Kingdom.” This Sinocentric perception can be primarily be attributed to China’s geographical reality and the fact that it possessed no notion of national sovereignty. Political scientist Suzanne Ogden has discussed Chinese international relations as being fundamentally based on the concept of universal morality, one that is developed, implemented, and imposed on others by a single entity. This belief of “moral persuasion and cultural superiority” as Ogden puts it, is a significant driver of the narrative of Chinese exceptionalism.

The Chinese emperor was identified as the single “supreme authority under heaven.” The area “under heaven” was, therefore, subject to the emperor’s authority. The sole “supreme authority” was the emperor of the Middle Kingdom. During China’s imperial period, no word akin to “Chinese emperor” existed. In relations with other rulers, even those of European states, the Chinese viewed the emperor as a patriarchal figure to which there was no equal.

East Asia expert Alan M. Wachman explains that the Chinese emperor’s sovereignty or rule over the imperial Chinese state was “potential, not actual, control.” As such, the degree to which the emperor’s authority was accepted depended on the period and location in question. This belief guided the nation through generations of unification, expansion, fragmentation, and decline, prescribing an approach for handling each phase in the cycle.

At times of dynastic corrosion and rebellion, for example, defense and military strategy had been the answer for aspiring leaders. Furthermore, major infrastructure development projects like the Grand Canal and military incursions in the broader region helped a dynasty secure the “mandate of heaven”—thereby legitimizing its hold on power.

The bureaucracy was and is essential to central government’s exercise of political power. Auxiliary tiers of bureaucratic authorities within the central government’s control extended from the heartland to the rest of China, and beyond. Utilizing a tributary system of appointed officials and in rare circumstances, military forces, China’s leaders were able to diffuse their power within Central Asia, into the Korean Peninsula, and throughout Southeast Asia, consolidating their control over the heartland, China, and the world as they saw it.

Chinese notions of geopolitics failed to account for the importance of maritime power.

During the seventeenth century, however, the onset of the maritime era would interrupt China’s illusions of being a separate realm. Naval invaders began arriving on the nation’s shore, where the Manchu rulers of the Qing dynasty, China’s last imperial dynasty, would eventually meet them.

Although the Manchu Qing possessed what Mackinder called the “superior mobility of horsemen and camelmen,” their approach to repelling invasions was no different from that of the previous ethnically Han Ming dynasty. Where the Han Ming dynasty constructed the Great Wall to protect against the Manchu, the Qing erected fortifications along the shoreline to keep foreign invaders at bay.

At that point, China hadn’t developed significant naval assets of its own, and its conceptualization of geopolitics wouldn’t include maritime power for three centuries. Even then, the geostrategic implications of robust naval power would garner little notice within China before Japan used its superior naval power to achieve victory over China in the first Sino-Japanese War of 1894 and 1895.

China’s defeat marked the beginning of another era of decline and the demise of the Sinocentric view of international relations. It took the so-called “century of humiliation” for China to comprehend that this worldview was no longer compatible with the rest of the world.

The broader geopolitical strategy which prevailed in the West did not serve the European powers far better. After fighting for control of the Eurasian landmass, what Mackinder dubbed the World Island, they emerged from two world wars and innumerable smaller conflicts only to see that the center of international power had moved across the Atlantic Ocean to the United States.

Contemporary Chinese foreign policy is rooted in the successes and failures of the past.

As maritime and land-based powers (the United States and the Soviet Union, respectively) expanded their spheres of influence across the globe, the combination of territory on the border of the Eurasian landmass and a shoreline seemed to sentence China to be on the margins of the international system.

Nevertheless, under the rule of the Chinese Communist Party, China overcame its geographical circumstances, and in the process, its reasoning has evolved. The trials and tribulations it suffered through in the second half of the twentieth century, including the wars on the Korean Peninsula and in Vietnam, a U.S. naval quarantine, and concurrent pressure from the Soviet Union, encouraged China to realize its capabilities. The geography that once seemed a curse to Chinese theorists now brimmed with possibility.

The country’s location, in the end, provides it access to developed economies overseas and overland access to precious energy assets in Central Asia and the Middle East, an edge that economic theorist Nicholas Spykman identified in the early 1940s. China’s geopolitical goal was now to tap into wealth in the east, and technological advancement in the west, as stated by Chinese scholar Zhang Wenmu.

China’s ascendancy to great power status in the twenty-first century was primarily enabled by a combination of geographic, political, and economic factors. It’s economic growth allowed in this century an unprecedented concentration on naval development. The People’s Liberation Army Navy has grown substantially over the previous two decades, enabling the overseas projection of Chinese military power.

As it has done throughout history, China is embarking on an expansionary course more out of necessity than out of ambition. The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), for instance, aims to ease the country’s economic and logistical dependence on its eastern coast while developing its less-developed interior regions.

Similarly, Beijing’s increasingly assertive maritime policy is another attempt to secure its access to overseas markets and preclude a challenger from presenting a threat to its multiplying global interests. There are consequences, however, for China’s increasingly aggressive expansionism.

China will attempt to outmaneuver these consequences wherever possible, as it strives to revise the terms of the international order. Chinese expansionism is a policy that will yield unpredictable results after centuries of a Sinocentrist approach to international relations. However, if the U.S. and its allies fail to provide and sustain a viable alternative to counter China’s hegemonic ambitions, Beijing will find it increasingly easier to rewrite the rules of global trade and security.

How Chinese Exceptionalism Fuels an Expansionist Foreign Policy was originally published on Global Security Review.

The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has a firm grip on power in the People’s Republic of China (PRC), there are a number of ethnic, religious, and economically-motivated groups which pose a number of threats to the control that the CCP holds over the politics, people, and territory of the PRC.

The local populations in the western regions of Tibet and Xinjiang have historically sought greater autonomy from Beijing. Many in both regions desire complete independence from China. The Communist Party leadership perceives any separatist sentiments as a threat to internal order and, ultimately, party control over the country.

To combat separatism, the central government has implemented programs designed to assimilate local populations into a dominant “Chinese” national narrative. In Xinjiang, up to a million Muslim Uyghurs (a Turkic-ethnic group largely concentrated in the restive western region) have been reportedly interned in “reeducation” labor camps. Those who have managed to avoid the internment camps are subjected to near-totalitarian levels of surveillance and security measures.

On the economic front, a multitude of issues could pose major threats to the Communist Party’s power monopoly. Any significant economic disruption or slowdown could reduce public confidence in the party and potentially lead to political destabilization.

Ensuring sustainable economic growth is key to the Communist Party’s hold on power. Now that CCP Chairman Xi Jinping has consolidated power and begun his second term, China’s debt-laden economy will continue to undergo substantial reform in order to ensure the state’s control over economic activities.

The Communist Party is taking steps to mitigate the risk of social unrest in the event of an economic downturn.

When it comes to economic threats to the Communist Party, the next several years—or even decades—will be critical in sustaining party control and legitimacy. The government has elevated the status of Xi Jinping, in both the party and the state, to a level not seen since the days of Mao Zedong.

Xi’s purported anti-corruption drive will persist, if not escalate, and Xi’s economic policies, which have resulted in millions losing their jobs, will proceed as well. The anti-corruption drive has been a vehicle to rid the party’s upper-echelons of any challengers to Xi’s authority. Xi’s economic reforms stand in contrast to the policies pursued by his more market-oriented predecessors, as Xi strives to ensure state-dominance over China’s economic affairs.

Both Chinese state-owned and private companies are laden with increasing levels of debt, and a number of firms are failing as a result. If discontent were to persist, the growing number of unemployed could present a threat to the party. However, the government has offered urban unemployed job opportunities in rural infrastructure development, tourism, and education in China’s eastern provinces.

Programs such as these offer urban-dwelling unemployed wages they would otherwise be unable to earn. They also serve the dual-purpose of dispersing highly-concentrated urban populations to rural provinces, reducing the likelihood of large-scale societal unrest in the event of a sharp economic downturn.

In a similar vein, the central government has offered economic incentives to members of the majority Han ethnic group to establish themselves in both Tibet and Xinjiang. Ostensibly, Beijing argues that it is merely providing opportunities for unemployed or underemployed citizens along China’s densely populated eastern coast.

What’s more likely, however, is that Beijing is counting on significant numbers of Han Chinese relocating to China’s western regions incrementally suppress Tibetan or Uyghur identities. This would effectively reduce the threat of Uyghur or Tibetan separatism as both groups are forcibly assimilated into a national “Chinese” identity.

Beijing is Increasingly Wary of Separatism

Tibet has historically sought complete independence, rather than autonomy from the People’s Republic of China. Having achieved total independence from China after the demise of the Qing dynasty’s rule in Tibet in 1912, the Tibetan people enjoyed sovereignty for approximately 36 years. After the Chinese Civil War, the CCP emerged as the dominant power in Mainland China and subsequently incorporated the region of Tibet into their territorial holdings.

The CCP granted a significant amount of autonomy to Tibet, which was renounced during the failed Tibetan Rebellion of 1959, during which the Tibetan government, including the Dalai Lama, the head of the Tibetan faith, fled to India. It is important to note that the Tibetans did not perceive the Chinese invasion as a threat to the territorial integrity of Tibet, although Tibet had assumed a distinct geographical entity as a nation beginning in the seventh century. The assault was seen more as a threat to their faith. Since this so-called offensive against the Tibetan faith occurred, the CCP has treated the citizens of the Tibetan region much differently than citizens of the rest of the country.

In 2008, violent protests and riots, caused by resentment towards the inequalities that Tibetans experience relative to other parts of China, erupted throughout Tibet. Tibetans were angered by inflation, inadequate education and low access to employment. The riots were mainly ethnically driven, as rioters attacked business owners and pedestrians of the Han and Hui ethnic groups. These actions by the people of Tibet are indicative of a desire for greater independence from the government of the PRC, reveal the fact that Tibet is a significant threat to the CCP’s authority.

This is because it is an issue of ethnicity and religion, rather than being an issue of government reform or democratization. The desire for equality and with that, independence is something that the CCP cannot reform without weakening itself by sacrificing territory. This issue will continue to plague the Party until Tibet wins full autonomy or is obliterated by the CCP.

There are a significant number of Tibetan exiles living outside the reach and influence of the central government, who can both influence foreign governments to take action against Beijing and provide valuable information and assistance to activists within Tibet. The fact that there are elements outside of the party’s control concerning the issue of Tibet—variables that it cannot predict or control—makes this an even more substantial threat from Beijing’s perspective.

Preventive Oppression and Cultural Cleansing of Muslim Uyghurs in Xinjiang

Beginning in the 1990s, the CCP started to tightening restrictions on religious practices as part of a crackdown on Xinjiang’s Muslims in response to public demonstrations in the 1980s and a violent mass uprising in 1990. Today, Xinjiang has effectively become a totalitarian police state. Residents are subjected to regular security checks, mandatory spyware, and there are reportedly anywhere from several hundred thousand to over a million Uyghurs in “reeducation” or internment camps.

The repression of Islam in Xinjiang has gone so far that the government has mandated that mosques be closed and that clerics submit to supervision by party officials. As Islam is no doubt a large part of the Uyghur population, as part of their spiritual and cultural expression, this is viewed as a highly oppressive act by the central government.

This oppression exists because China’s leadership perceives the practice of religion as a potential threat to the integrity of the atheist state and CCP authority. Likewise, they fear that the free practice of Islam encourages radicalism and separatism among Uyghurs and other Muslims in China.

This fear of radicalism has encouraged both the Party and government to go so far as charging individuals who try to practice Islam peacefully of ‘separatism,’ and it persecutes religious leaders and Muslim opposition figures linking them to terrorism.

Beijing has implemented a number of programs designed to systematically assimilate members of non-Han ethnic groups such as Uyghurs. Education policies in the region are designed around integrating youths of Uyghur and non-Han ethnicities into Chinese society through means such as Mandarin language instruction, while discouraging or prohibiting the use of the native languages of these ethnic groups.

While it can be said that the central government’s fear of dissent by the population of Xinjiang has motivated their policies of religious intolerance and discouragement of native languages, these policies are most likely encourage anti-social activities on the part of the Uyghur populace. The statement that the ruling party enacts more oppressive policies when it feels threatened reigns very true in this instance.

As the elite of the CCP reacts to its fears of separatists in Xinjiang, it only encourages more resentment from the people it fears. In 2009, a small percentage of the Uyghur population of Xinjiang reacted to the oppressive policies of the CCP, attacking members of the Han ethnic group in Xinjiang, and encouraging protests in cities as far away as Beijing.

While the CCP realizes the legitimacy of this threat, CCP policymakers will likely find it difficult to address the long-term separatist risks as long as Uyghurs and other minorities in Xinjiang perceive the PRC policy in Xinjiang as unjust and oppressive.

China perceives its actions in Xinjiang as both a means of population management and as a national security strategy.

The same goes for the population of Tibet. Oppressive policies and omnipresent surveillance creates a sense of inequality for residents. The separatist sentiments that exists in both Xinjiang and Tibet will only grow larger as Beijing attempts to oppress the population through harsher means.

Affirmative Action With Chinese Characteristics?

While the government’s repressive tactics are well-documented in both Tibet and Xinjiang, Beijing has stepped up its use of “soft-power” in both regions. Alongside the discouragement of the use of local languages in favor of Mandarin in schools, Beijing has encouraged Tibetans and Uyghur students and young people with education opportunities, offering them disproportionate acceptance rates to state universities, similar to Affirmative Action programs in the United States.

Dissimilar to the programs in the United States, China’s were conceived to assimilate a potentially separatist population into a constructed national culture, rather than to correct a historical discrimination and injustice. In short, China perceives its version of “affirmative action” as both a means of population management and as a national security strategy.

The Chinese Communist Party’s Biggest Fears are Separatism and an Economic Crisis was originally published on Global Security Review.

The E.U. first decided to impose sanctions in the wake of the March 2014 annexation of Crimea, which were expanded a few months later after Russia began a destabilizing hybrid war in eastern Ukraine, and after a Russian-made missile destroyed Malaysia Airlines Flight MH17 over eastern Ukrainian territory controlled by separatist forces backed by the Kremlin.

In 2018, E.U. members states joined the United Kingdom and the United States in expelling a record number of Russian diplomatic and intelligence personnel in response to the reportedly Kremlin-ordered attempted assassination of former Russian military intelligence officer Sergei Skripal, in which the nerve agent Novichuk was used on U.K. soil.

At the turn of the century, Russia saw itself as European. However, as E.U.-Russia relations have steadily deteriorated over the past decade, Russia has turned away from Europe, identifying instead as a Eurasian power. In the aftermath of the Soviet Union's collapse, Russian President Boris Yeltsin promoted the idea of E.U. integration for Russia, and upon becoming president in 2000, Vladimir Putin pursued a similar path.

Russian-European Integration

The 2000 Russian Foreign Policy Concept, a whitepaper produced by the Kremlin that defines Russia's foreign policy, identified the E.U. as being critically important for Russia as one of Moscow's primary "political and economic partners." While the Kremlin still perceived NATO and the U.S. as Russia's foremost national security threats, in addition to impeding Russia's long-term goal of restoring its status as a "great power," the European Union was viewed favorably.

However, this perception did not last. Following the 2003 invasion of Iraq, led by the U.S., Putin became increasingly vocal about the necessity for Russia to reestablish itself as a "great power" to adequately defend its interests in the post-Cold War era. Concurrently, the Kremlin, in both rhetoric and action, became increasingly assertive about what it considered its right to dictate the foreign policy of neighboring states, located in what Russia historically regards as its sphere of influence.

In 2004, the Baltic republics of Estonia, Lithuania, and Latvia (former Soviet republics) joined the E.U. along with multiple former members of the Warsaw Pact, such as Poland. In response, the Kremlin denounced the E.U.'s expansion, accusing the bloc of creating divisions across the European continent.

The expansion of the E.U. into what Russia viewed as its sphere of influence, combined with the wave of "color revolutions" in several former Soviet republics between 2003 and 2005, led the Kremlin to begin regarding the E.U. as a power with expansionist ambitions that threatened Russian sovereignty and strategic foreign policy aims.

European Expansionism

Under Putin, Russia grew convinced that both the E.U. and the U.S. played a part in the "color revolutions" in Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan, which either could have—or did—shift the alignment of those states towards Europe, at Russia's expense.

The perception in Moscow of the E.U. as a distinct and separate entity from NATO and the U.S. faded between 2004 and 2008. From Russia's point of view, all three actors were working to impede Russia's foreign policy, and undermine its sovereignty by imposing on Russia an international order that was at odds with Russia's interests.

Less than eight years after desiring greater integration with Europe, Putin regularly accused the U.S. of unipolar hegemony and argued that the post-Cold War order was unfair. In a speech delivered at the 2007 Munich Security Conference, Putin asserted that the U.S. "overstepped its boundaries in all spheres—economic, political, and humanitarian." As a consequence, he stated that Russia would follow an "independent foreign policy."

The Russian Foreign Policy Concept released in 2008 subsequently downgraded the E.U. from a "main political and economic partner" to "one of the main trade-economic and foreign policy partners." In the same year, Russia invaded Georgia and occupied the regions of Abhkazia and South Ossetia, situated along Georgia's border with Russia.

In response, the E.U. halted negotiations on what would be a new Partnership and Cooperation Agreement that would define Moscow-Brussels relations. In 2009 the E.U. launched its Eastern Partnership initiative with six former republics of the Soviet Union.

The following year, the Eurasian Customs Union (ECU) was formed by Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan. The ECU was intended as a counterweight to the E.U. and was designed to consolidate Russia's influence in the post-Soviet space to guarantee its national interests better and increase its global standing.

Russia Turns Away from Europe—to Eurasia

In 2012, Moscow was overwhelmed by large-scale protests over the reported rigging of the 2011 parliamentary elections. The Kremlin, again, saw the protests as being part of a Western plot to destabilize Russia's political system and foment regime change. Putin, having returned to the presidency that year, began instituting structural reforms that would impede Western influence within Russia, while simultaneously promoting Russia as the conservative defender of traditional values.

The 2014 Maidan Revolution in Ukraine that toppled the pro-Russian government of President Viktor Yanukovych was seen by Putin as yet another example of Western interference in Russia's historical sphere of influence. Just months after Yanukovych fled Ukraine, Russia annexed the territory of Crimea from Ukraine and stoked a devastating civil war in eastern Ukraine.

In recent years, Russia has gone on the offensive against the West, interfering in multiple elections and exploiting political divisions in Europe and the United States. From the Russian perspective, this is only logical. The Kremlin maintains that the E.U and the U.S. were engaged in a plot designed to destabilize and weaken Russia, so it attempts to do the same.

Relations between the E.U. and Russia largely reflect the broader relationship between Russia and the West. Russia's 2016 Foreign Policy Concept eliminates any reference to the European Union, instead emphasizing "Eurasian integration," a reference to the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), the successor to the ECU. Currently, Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Armenia, and Kyrgyzstan are members.

The EAEU is intended to facilitate the economic integration of former Soviet republics into a single economic entity. Russia's reorientation towards Eurasia through the EAEU is a signal that it now sees the E.U. as something that, instead of cooperating with, must be confronted.

As Russia Identifies as a Eurasian Power, It Turns Away from Europe was originally published on Global Security Review.

The status of U.S.-Russia relations is often explained by commentators as a “second Cold War.” This, however, is a misstatement. The Soviet Union and the United States were nowhere near as interconnected as Russia and the U.S. today. Even despite Western sanctions, Russia remains deeply integrated into the global trading, financial, and political systems—and it has exploited them.

American (and European) institutions, civil society, and social discourse—at all levels—have been caught almost entirely off-guard by the Kremlin’s strategic exploitation of a rigid military taxonomy.

Failure to accurately conceptualize war threatens national security and risks destabilizing the rules-based global order. Changing the perception that cyber and traditional warfare are distinct—or even mutually exclusive—entities is a prime example of a necessary step forward.

21st Century Wars Are Fought in all Domains

U.S. leaders have struggled to conceptualize asymmetric measures of influence-projection,  like the Russian concept of nonlinear warfare. In the aftermath of the U.S.-led NATO intervention in Yugoslavia, Russian military planners recognized that—a considerable nuclear arsenal notwithstanding—Russia’s conventional forces would have no means of matching NATO in terms of conventional force parity.

In the first decade of the twenty-first century, the U.S. military underwent a restructuring based on its experience fighting mostly insurgents and other non-state actors in the Middle East. Meanwhile, an increasingly emboldened Russia embarked an multi-domain campaign to counter what it perceives as the threat of NATO encirclement.

First and foremost, the U.S. must restructure the civilian and military components of its national security apparatus. Accordingly, the core notions of national security and warfare as legal, practical, and existential concepts that have been maintained for over seven decades are no longer applicable. Policymakers and strategists must regard warfare in an entirely new light.

Western military strategists over-rely on a rigid structure of categories or taxonomies in their effort to build a useful model for various types of conflict. Cyber operations have been treated as a distinct domain—a domain of lower strategic importance than warfare in the traditional sense.

Changing the perception that cyber and traditional warfare are distinct entities is a prime example of a necessary step forward.

In contrast—to the detriment of U.S. strategic interests—adversarial powers have learned to rely on a nuanced mixture of conventional forces, cyber warfare, and the dissemination of strategic communications (propaganda) through traditional, digital, and social media outlets to deliberately sow confusion and dissent within a target territory or state.

Agile Warfare

With a perpetual “innovation-cycle,” Russian nonlinear tactics are strikingly similar to the Agile development methodology used by engineering teams in the technology sector.

The iterative cycle of establishing a hypothesis, experimentation (also known as a/b testing), analysis, and iterative review, repeated endlessly, has been a remarkably efficient way of creating disorder.

Such chaos makes it difficult for dissenters both outside and inside the country to effectively mobilize their compatriots, overloading social media and data streams with information and traffic from botnets and trolls.

The Age of Nonlinear Combat

Nonlinear warfare has been described by some “the Gerasimov doctrine”—following the publication of an essay by General Valeriy Gerasimov, Chief of the Russian General Staff —this is a misnomer. In contemporary parlance, nonlinear warfare is synonymous with hybrid warfare. The U.S. Department of Defense uses the term “hybrid threat.”

The notion of hybrid or nonlinear warfare is also incorrectly associated with the concept of asymmetric warfare, which originated following the U.S.-led invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, and the insurgencies that arose in the aftermath.

The U.S. had limited experience with long-term combat against non-state actors and lengthy counter-insurgency campaigns prior to the 2001 and 2003 invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, respectively. The term asymmetric warfare was used to define this new paradigm.

However, the system of classification has, yet again, proved to be the United States’ achilles heel. Without a doubt, the United States possesses insurmountable conventional military strength and continues to pose an undoubtedly credible threat of mutually assured destruction through its strategic nuclear arsenal.

Both Russia and China realized early that technological advancements in the fields of information technology and population or market research and analysis could be effectively weaponized and integrated into a multichannel offensive military strategy that would have far-reaching advantages when it came to confrontations with the less-agile policies pursued by U.S. military planners.

Moscow’s success stems from its total or “all-in” conception of war. The Kremlin has been heavily investing in modernizing its outdated soviet-equipped military. This model depends on the blurring of lines between state and non-state actors, alliances and adversaries; even war and peace.

Starting in 2008, Russian special and conventional forces were assisted by political subversion, information warfare, and other active measures in simultaneous and complementary assault on Georgian infrastructure and territory. As a result, the Georgian state was paralyzed and unable to act to prevent the de-facto secession of the territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

A similar scenario occurred in Moscow’s annexation of Crimea from Ukraine in 2014, with an executed apparatus of plausible deniability using information warfare, insurgent funding, and economic warfare to utilize proxy “local actors” to achieve individual goals. In the Crimean campaign, Russia’s non-kinetic operations—information, economic, and cyber attacks—laid the groundwork for a complementary military operation.

Nonlinear Thought and Military Planning

Linear thinking has long-dominated military planning and has dominated Western military strategy until the end of the twentieth century. In a linear thought model, a strategy is laid out through detailed planning, established processes, step by step detail management tips, and stakeholder expectations.

To combat foreign influence operations, all levels of the private and public sectors must develop and implement strategic plans to protect intellectual property, secure sensitive information, and deter acts of aggression. This requires a substantial degree of nonlinear thought. Nonlinear thought is less constrictive than linear thinking. A nonlinear combatant employs a range of tactics and measures across domains to gauge what is effective and what isn’t.

The ability to project force through a multitude of mediums is tantamount to U.S. national security interests—particularly if those means are utilized by a foreign adversary to subvert or threaten the interests of the United States.

To Counter Hybrid Threats, U.S. Must Redefine Conception of Warfare was originally published on Global Security Review.

Governments and institutions will be tested by considerable challenges over the next decade as the international order is restructured and global trends converge.

All forms of government in every region will face increasing tensions both domestic and foreign. In the short-term, these global trends will increase the threat posed by all types of terrorism, and the ability for asymmetrically-powerful state and non-state actors to adversely affect the International order and the global balance of power.

Tensions are rising because citizens around the world are raising questions about the relationship that exists between governments and themselves. The social contract that exists between society and their governments is unraveling as people demand increasing levels of security and prosperity. Globalization means that domestic conditions are shaped, to an ever-greater degree, by occurrences overseas.

Growing populism in the West threatens an international order governed by rule-of-law. Tensions between governing elites and their citizens are reshaping global geopolitics. A weakened United States would mean less of an emphasis on human rights and maintenance of global order.

Less of a U.S. presence on the global stage creates gaps for authoritarian powers like China and Russia. It also means a heightened risk of conflict arising between competing for regional powers like India and Pakistan or Iran and Saudi Arabia, and an international order comprised of competing “spheres of influence.”

1. Sharpening tensions and heightened doubts concerning the U.S. role in the world will continue for several years.

In the short term, the U.S. will have a diminished presence abroad due to domestic political divisions. These political divisions compounded by with the Trump administration’s preference for unilateral action, which threaten to isolate the U.S. diplomatically.

Economic crises and inequality have contributed to widening societal and class divisions. The number of men who are not working and not seeking work is at its highest since the Great Depression. However, incomes have risen slowly, and investors see high rates of return on both domestic and foreign investments.

Politically, the country is still profoundly divided. However, growing solidarity and activism around critical issues such as healthcare have been useful in checking executive and congressional power.

2. The European Union will need to implement badly needed reforms to maintain its legitimacy.

The Brexit vote of 2016 and rising popularity of far-right nationalist political parties in Western Europe has led many observers to question the long-term viability of a united Europe. In the aftermath of the 2016 U.S. presidential election, many were concerned that European far-right politicians like Marine Le Pen would gain traction in their electoral contests.

However, despite considerable attempts by Le Pen’s campaign—and the Kremlin—Emmanuel Macron led a stunning rebuke of the populist trend circumventing the globe. Europe initially seemed to be trending away from the right as the United States Government continued to be paralyzed by the competing factions of the governing Republican Party. In light of a slew of populist and right-wing victories across E.U. member state, however, it’s clear that politics on both sides of the Atlantic are increasingly polarized.

Rising ethnic, demographic, and economic tensions will make European integration more difficult. Furthermore, Europeans must repair the structural problems in E.U. institutions.

For example, E.U. agencies set monetary policy for members of the Eurozone; however, member states retain control over their financial and security obligations. This leaves poorer E.U. states like Greece with vast amounts of debt and decreasing growth prospects. There is no unified E.U. security policy; each member state determines its national security strategy.

3. Ongoing uncertainty surrounding the future North Korea’s nuclear program threaten East Asian security.

In North Korea, Kim Jong Un has consolidated his grip on power through patronage and fear and has doubled down on his nuclear and missile programs, developing long-range missiles that may soon endanger the continental USA.

Beijing, Seoul, Tokyo, and Washington have a shared incentive to handle security risks in Northeast Asia, but a history mutual distrust, warfare, and occupation makes cooperation between the different parties difficult.

A resumption of North Korean provocations, such as nuclear and missile tests, may destabilize the balance of power in the region and result in the North’s immediate neighbors potential taking unilateral action to defend their security interests.  Kim is determined to secure international recognition of the North as a nuclear power, for security, prestige, and political legitimacy.

Contrary to his father and grandfather, he’s had substantial success in terms of achieving those goals.  He codified the North’s nuclear status in the party constitution in 2012 and reaffirmed it during the Party Congress in 2016.

Beijing faces a continuing strategic conundrum about the North.  Pyongyang’s behavior both undermines China’s argument that the US army presence in the region is anachronistic and demonstrates Beijing’s lack of influence–or perhaps lack of political will to exert influence—within its neighbor and customer.

North Korean behavior leads to tightening U.S. alliances, more assertive action by US allies, and, on occasion, greater cooperation between these partners themselves—and might lead to a change in Beijing’s approach to North Korea with time. However, long-simmering tensions between South Korea and Japan fueled by the South’s historical grievances may hinder Washington’s efforts to present a united front against North Korea.

4. Populism and dissent will spread across Latin America.

Leftist governments have been kicked out in Argentina, Peru, and Guatemala. Venezuela’s left-wing populist government is stripping the country of its democratic institutions in a sharp slide towards authoritarianism, leading to a sharp increase in lawlessness across the country.

Furthermore, while Venezuela doesn’t produce drugs, it’s become a major transport hub for drugs going to Europe or  Africa before being routed to Europe. Drug trafficking increases under as the rule of law decreases. After a 2009 coup in Honduras, the country was run by a fragile government—lawlessness increased dramatically.

Honduras now has one of the highest homicide rates in the world. Countries like the United States are seeing a significant increase in the number of people arriving from countries like Honduras that are plagued with violence.

5. Expect increasing assertiveness from Beijing and Moscow as both governments seek to lock in competitive advantages.

Beijing and Moscow will seek to lock in competitive advantages and also to right what they perceive as historical wrongs before economic and demographic trends can present impediments and the West regains its foundation.

Both China and Russia maintain worldviews where they’re rightfully dominant in their regions and able to form regional politics and economics to match their security and material interests.

Both have moved aggressively in latest years to exert more considerable influence in their regions, to contest the U.S., and also to force Washington to accept exclusionary regional spheres of influence—a situation that the US has historically opposed.

6. The standoff between Russia and the West will continue throughout 2019.

Diplomatic spats, strategic political and political tensions will last between Russia and the U.S. In Washington, U.S. President Donald Trump’s administration may have few choices for relieving the strain because of increased checks on the president’s power and enlarged sanctions from the U.S. Congress.

In Moscow, meanwhile, forthcoming local and national elections will prevent the Kremlin from creating significant concessions. Consequently, sanctions enacted on Russia from the US along with the European Union probably will stay through the end of the year. Depending upon how investigations into Russia’s role at the 2016 U.S. Presidential election shape upward, Washington might even ramp up the political and financial pressure on Russia.

Similarly, North Korea will remain a factor in determining the direction of U.S.-Russian relations over the next several months. Russia will keep going along with the overtures that Washington has made to Pyongyang, but will skirt sanctions requirements and continue provide economic aid to North Korea as it sees fit.

7. China, for its part, may have domestic concerns to grapple with this year.

The Chinese Communist Party’s careful preparation for a change of direction was realized in the October 2017 party congress. The event reshuffled the highest ranks of the party and was a proof of President Xi Jinping’s near-absolute consolidation of power.

To date, all indications point to the Xi’s success in strengthening his grip over top decision-making bodies of both the Party and the state. Xi has already achieved the status of core leader of the Communist Party, the Chinese state and People’s Liberation Army (PLA).

Xi has also managed to quickly promote a lot of his partners to prestigious positions in 2017 and 2018. Even more significant, party members nearly unanimously endorsed the addition of Xi’s philosophy of the Communist Party Constitution at the Party Congress, positioning him alongside the venerated figures of Deng Xiaoping and Mao Zedong.

8. Expect Persisting Volatility in Southeast Asia

Nuclear deployment requirements for naval-based delivery vehicles remove a safety valve that, until now, has kept atomic weapons stored separately from missiles in South Asia.

At-sea deployments of atomic weapons by India, Pakistan, and perhaps China, would increasingly militarize the Indian Ocean throughout the next two decades.

The presence of multiple nuclear powers with uncertain doctrine for controlling your stresses at sea incidents between nuclear-armed vessels increases the potential risk of miscalculation and inadvertent escalation.

New Delhi, however, will continue to offer smaller South Asian nations a stake in India’s financial growth through development assistance and increased connectivity to India’s economy, contributing to India’s broader effort to assert its role as the predominant regional power.

India will be the world’s fastest-growing economies throughout the next five years as China’s economy cools and growth elsewhere sputters, but internal tensions over inequality and religion will complicate its expansion.

9. Violent extremism, terrorism, and instability will continue to hang over Afghanistan, Pakistan, and the region’s fragile communal relations.

The threat of terrorism, from Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LET), Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), and al-Qaeda and its affiliates as well as the Islamic State’s expansion and sympathy for associated ideologies—will remain prominent in the area.

Competition for jobs, coupled with discrimination against minorities, might contribute to the radicalization of the region’s youth, especially given unbalanced gender ratios favoring males in several nations.

Populism and sectarianism will intensify if Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan fail to provide employment and education for growing urban populations and officials continue to govern principally through identity politics.

10. The Middle East and North Africa will see continued, if not escalating instability.

Continuing conflict and lack of political and economic reform threaten poverty reduction, the area’s one last bright spot.  Resource dependence and foreign assistance have propped up elites even as it fostered widespread reliance on the nation by inhibiting markets, employment, and human capital.

With oil prices unlikely to recover to levels of the petroleum boom governments may have to limit cash payments and subsidies.  In the meantime, social networks have provided new tools for citizens to vent their political frustrations.  Conservative religious groups—including Brotherhood affiliates and movements—and ethnically-based organizations like those based on Kurdish identity are poised to be superior alternatives to weak governments in the region.

Such groups typically supply social services better than the nation and their politics resonate with a general public that is more conservative and religious than the region’s political and economic elites.

11. Sub-Saharan Africa will struggle with authoritarian regimes

Practices have changed, civil society groups have proliferated, and citizens across the region demand better and more just governance.  However, many nations continue to struggle with authoritarian rule, patronage politics, and favoritism.  Many leaders remain focused on political survival as opposed to reform–with a few term limitations.

Global economic headwinds also threaten improvement by keeping commodity prices low and investment weak.  Some nations who’ve made progress toward democracy remain fragile and predisposed towards violence corresponding elections.  Tensions between Muslim and Christian groups can escalate into conflict.

12. Threats from terrorist and insurgent groups will persist and are likely to become more decentralized.

The threat of terrorism is likely to increase as the means and the motivations of states, groups, and people to impose harm diversify. Prolonged conflicts and the info age allow terrorists to recruit and operate on a large scale, demonstrating the evolving nature of the threat.

Terrorism kills fewer people globally than crime or disease, but the potential for new capabilities reaching the hands of people bent on apocalyptic destruction is all too real. This ultimate low-probability, high-impact event underscores the imperative of international cooperation and state attention to the issue.

Terrorists will continue to justify their violence by their very own interpretations of religion, but several underlying drivers are also in play. Within nations, the breakdown of state structures in much of the Middle East carries on to create space for extremists.

The world order is changing. The question is, how?

The post-World War II international order that enabled today’s political, economic, and security arrangements and institutions is in question. As power diffuses worldwide, seats at the table of global decision making are reshuffled.  Today, aspiring powers seek to adjust the rules of the game and international context in a way beneficial to their interests.

This complicates reform of international institutions such as the UN Security Council or the Bretton-Woods institutions, also brings into question whether political, civil and human rights—hallmarks of liberal values and US leadership since 1945—will continue to be so.

Norms that were believed to be settled will be increasingly threatened if present trends hold, and consensus to build standards can be elusive as Russia, China, along with other actors such as the Islamic State seek to shape regions and international norms in their favor.

12 Predictions for Global Geopolitics for 2019 through 2025—and Beyond was originally published on Global Security Review.

Russia has been threatened by invasions for centuries. The country’s western borders have always been distinctly vulnerable, with no mountain ranges, bodies of water, or other geographical features to serve as natural defenses.

The European landmass that borders western Russia is a large peninsula that lies between the Baltic and North Seas in the north, the Atlantic Ocean in the west, and the Black and Mediterranean Seas in the south.

In contrast to its European neighbors, Russia has few maritime access points. Its few ports are mostly unusable during the winter, and even during warmer months, the Arctic Ocean is far from Russia’s major population centers. Turkish waters to the south, much like Nordic waters to the north, can be easily blocked.

During the Cold War, airbases in the United Kingdom, Norway, Iceland, and Greenland gave NATO air superiority which would, in the event of a conflict, enable the alliance to block Russian access to the Atlantic ocean through the strategic GIUK Gap.

The concept of containing Russian expansion wasn’t limited to the Cold War. During the latter part of the nineteenth century, both France and Britain made concerted efforts to contain Russian activities in the Balkans, the Middle East, and Asia. With limited defensive options available, Russia’s military doctrine has historically been offensive, with the aim of dominating its neighbors to prevent borderlands from being used against it.

Whereas the West views Russia’s fear of invasion as baseless, history has shown otherwise. The view in the Kremlin is that each era brings a fresh existential threat, be it overt or covert, conventional or asymmetric.

Russia’s history and geography have fostered the existence of a highly centralized and autocratic political system, with leaders obsessed with both internal and external security.

After World War II, Moscow saw the encirclement of the Soviet Union by the U.S. and its western allies as a strategic threat. The incorporation of Ukraine, Belarus, and the Baltic states into the Soviet Union, along with the creation of buffer states in Eastern Europe like Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia, bolstered Russia’s feelings of security at the expense of the West’s.

NATO expands as the Soviet Union disintegrates.

As the Kremlin lost control over territory across Eastern Europe and Central Asia, its sense of security was eliminated entirely. At the end of the twentieth century, Russia’s security buffer had ceased to exist, and its western border was the farthest east it had been since the eighteenth century.

Following the Soviet Union’s collapse, Russian objections left few options when it came to NATO expansion in Eastern Europe. One option was for a robust expansion of NATO, under the logic that Russia would always attempt to dominate its neighbors if not deterred by the threat of military force.

Alternatively, the NATO expansion could be delayed until Russia reneged on its pledges to respect the sovereignty of its neighbors. However, NATO proceeded with its eastward expansion, arguing that it had done so on the premise of avoiding a confrontation with Russia, rather than preparing for a new or expected Russian threat.

After the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland joined NATO in March 1999, the alliance commenced a three-month bombing campaign against Serbia, a state with deep historical and cultural ties to Russia.

The campaign demonstrated the efficacy of NATO’s advanced conventional weaponry at a time when Russia was struggling to rebuild itself. Additionally, the concurrent NATO expansion into former Warsaw Pact countries all but ensured that Russian leaders would once again be able to seize upon the tried-and-true narrative that NATO, led by the United States, was an existential threat to Russia.

Russia’s perpetual fear of invasion has always been a significant driver of its foreign policy.

While military conflicts in Moldova, Georgia, and Ukraine have been attributed to aggressive Kremlin efforts to reestablish elements of the Soviet empire, it should be noted that, with the exception of Crimea (which houses the Russian Black Sea Fleet), Russia has not officially annexed any territory belonging to the states in which it has engaged in hybrid conflicts.

The Kremlin’s motives in Ukraine aren’t merely plausible deniability, the annexation of pro-Russian territories would only have the counter-productive effect of encouraging pro-Western forces to escalate their efforts.

Annexation would undermine Russia’s primary goal, which is to prevent countries in what the Kremlin considers to be its sphere of influence from joining NATO, essentially a strategy of reverse-containment.

The alliance typically rejects aspirants with unresolved border disputes, internal territorial conflicts, and insufficient military capabilities to provide for credible national defense. The presence of frozen conflicts in the Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine effectively blocks them from joining NATO.

Recommendations for Policymakers: Contain and Modernize

During the Cold War, the NATO alliance worked because the United States understand the reality of a Russian sphere of influence with which it had to balance to maintain global stability and security.

In the cases of Georgia and Ukraine, the timing of the Russian interventions coincided with those states’ respective overtures to both NATO and the European Union, entities viewed as inherently hostile to Russia’s interests.

The combined separatist territories, under de-facto Russian control, now form a protective barrier along Russia’s southwestern border. Just as Stalin used the countries of Eastern and Central Europe as a security buffer against the perceived threat of western encirclement, Putin has done the same.

NATO members and partner states can better inform their view of Russian strategy by analyzing the conflicts in Georgia and Ukraine. Russia has employed hybrid warfare in both conflicts to great effect, in the form of conventional cross-border assaults accompanied by a combination of unconventional operations, information operations, cyber tactics, economic coercion, and political influence.

NATO requires a multi-faceted modernization strategy that goes beyond merely padding the frontlines with additional troops and assets. To effectively contain Russia in the twenty-first century, the transatlantic alliance urgently needs looking to modernize its maritime forces, as well as improve non-frontline capabilities such as cyber, information warfare, and missile defense.

Russian Expansionism is a Consequence of Geography was originally published on Global Security Review.

The issue of reunification between mainland China and the island of Taiwan is one of the most significant obstacles to Chinese President Xi Jinping’s drive for “national rejuvenation,” a campaign to restore China’s position as a global power by 2049.

Since the end of the Chinese Civil War, Taiwan has been de facto independent, and Beijing has not made forcible attempts to recapture what the Chinese Communist Party considers a wayward province. However, China has made attempts to lure Taiwan closer while preventing it from formally declaring independence.

The Taiwanese independence movement has steadily grown in influence over the past few decades, while the United States has signaled its willingness to provide a greater degree of support for the democratically-ruled island, factors which have contributed to the highest cross-straight tensions in over ten years. The Trump Administration will likely lay the groundwork for a closer relationship with Taiwan as it ratchets up pressure on China.

The Chinese government has shifted between threatening of military force to economic incentives in its campaign to draw Taiwan into Beijing’s sphere of influence. Throughout 2017 and 2018, the growing military strength of mainland China alongside its aggressive reunification rhetoric and coercive diplomacy has led the U.S. to increase arms sales to Taiwan, increase official-level communications between Taipei and Washington, and improve U.S.-Taiwan defense cooperation.

Strengthened Taiwan-U.S. Ties

The growing cooperation between the U.S. and Taiwan has, in turn, aggravated tensions between the U.S. and China, as the latter regards the former as challenging the “One China” principle that states that mainland China holds sovereignty over the island of Taiwan. While the Trump Administration is by no means the first to draw China’s ire in this arena, strengthened ties between the U.S. and Taiwan are accompanied by a shifting geopolitical landscape in the Indo-Pacific.

China’s rising economic, political, and military power has greatly changed the Indo-Pacific balance of power. China is more willing to use force to achieve its aims—one of which is reuniting Taiwan with the mainland. Reunification would be of both symbolic and strategic significance—Xi Jinping has declared reunification a key facet of his “national rejuvenation” by 2049 initiative, and establishing control over Taiwan would allow China to project power unimpeded into the Pacific.

Taiwan’s location, and de facto independence, currently present an impediment to Beijing’s global ambitions. Furthermore, China sees the island as a potential national security threat, as an independent Taiwan could be utilized by the U.S. as a jumping-off point for sorties against mainland China in any U.S.-China conflict.

Growing Urgency in China

Reunification is an increasingly urgent issue for Beijing—which has historically employed patience—due to Xi Jinping’s self-imposed deadline for reunification by 2049. Simultaneously, perceived growing U.S. support for an independent Taiwan, and the failure of the mainland’s previous efforts at reunification through economic incentives is raising the pressure on China.

Increased U.S.-Taiwan defense cooperation would likely be met with condemnation by Beijing, however, it may be the most effective means of deterring a mainland invasion of the island. Increased cooperation between the U.S. and Taiwan could take the form of the U.S. taking a visible and active presence on the island. This would ensure that China would find itself at war with the U.S. in the event of any attempt at reunification by force.

Regardless, it’s unlikely that China will attempt to reunify the mainland with Taiwan within the next decade. Taiwan maintains a strong conventional military, and the risk of a U.S. intervention remains high. However, China is steadily increasing its hard power capabilities and is projected to have a military capable of true power projection on a global scale by 2030. For the foreseeable future, reunifying China will remain a key strategic objective of Beijing.

Expect Rising Tensions Between China and Taiwan for the Foreseeable Future was originally published on Global Security Review.

The legitimacy and authority of governments and institutions across the globe will the called into question. All forms of government in every region will face increasing tensions both domestic and foreign.

In the short-term, these global trends will increase the threat posed by all types of terrorism, and improve the ability for asymmetrically-powerful state and non-state actors to adversely affect the international order and the global balance of power.

Why are global tensions rising?

Tensions are rising because citizens around the world are raising questions about the relationship that exists between governments and themselves. The social contract that exists between society and their governments is unraveling as people demand increasing levels of security and prosperity. Globalization means that domestic conditions are being shaped, to an ever-greater degree, by events overseas.

Growing populism in the West threatens a rules-based international order. A weakened United States would mean less of an emphasis on human rights and maintenance of global order. Less of a U.S. presence on the world stage creates gaps that can be exploited by authoritarian, revisionist powers like China and Russia.

Multipolarity may also heighten the risk of conflict arising between competing for regional powers like India and Pakistan or Iran and Israel, and an international order comprised of competing “spheres of influence.”

The world order is increasingly multipolar.

Questions were raised about the long-term viability of a rules-based international order in the wake of the 2016 Brexit vote and election of Donald Trump. The era of U.S.-led globalization seemed to be at an end.

While globalization has dramatically increased the degree of economic interdependence among the world’s major powers, it is not, in-and-of-itself, a guarantor of stability. Countries like Russia and Iran are perpetually searching for ways to decrease their dependence on adversarial powers, reducing their vulnerability to economic pressures like sanctions while allowing them to pursue their national interests more aggressively.

As international relations trend from a unipolar to a multipolar order, the threat of terrorism remains ever-present but will be eclipsed by increased competition between adversarial great powers.  This trend, combined with rapidly developing technologies, disinformation (“fake news” propaganda), employment shortages, and demographic trends mean greater disorder on a global scale. Thus, fundamental questions will need to be resolved regarding laws, institutions, and the balance of power in the international order.

Tensions between governing elites and their citizens are reshaping global geopolitics.

Liberal democracies—like Canada, the United States, Western Europe, Japan, Australia, and South Korea—will face considerable challenges throughout the next several years. Growing populism and nativist nationalism will need to be tempered by governments, as stagnant living standards, rising wealth inequality, and demographic problems persist. This concentration on domestic issues could mean less bandwidth for engagement overseas.

Overseas events increasingly determine domestic realities. However, rising populist and nationalist sentiments are leading citizens to demand national solutions to global problems. Western governments will need to educate their voters on the importance of foreign policy effectively, and the role it plays in supporting domestic tranquility, rather than giving into xenophobic rhetoric and nativist policies to appease voters.

Liberal democracy is under threat.

Liberal Western powers like Germany and France lack the resources—and in the former’s case, political unity—to fill the void created by the isolationist and unilateral rhetoric and behavior emanating from the United States. In Europe, infighting between E.U. member states is obstructing badly-needed reform.

Newton’s third law—“for every action, there is an equal and opposite reaction”—applies to international relations just as much as it pertains to physics. Abrupt and sudden departure from the established policy by one actor will result in numerous responses by that actor’s allies, rivals, dependents, and institutions that will impede or exacerbate the impact of that action.

The Early Stages of a Multipolar World Order was originally published on Global Security Review.

According to reports in the French newspaper Le Monde, Saudi Arabia has asked the government of France to assist it in preventing Qatar from buying the S-400 system from Russia.

The S-400 is Russia’s most advanced air defense missile system, and both Turkey and Saudi Arabia have signed agreements to purchase the S-400 system.

The report states that King Salman of Saudi Arabia expressed his “deep concerns” concerning Qatar’s intentions to purchase the air defense system.

Furthermore, the King specifically threated to take military action against Qatar if the S-400 sale goes forward and the missile system is deployed.

King Salman reportedly stated in the letter that “the kingdom [Saudi Arabia] would be ready to take all necessary measures to eliminate this defense system, including military action.

Qatar and Russia signed a military and technical cooperation agreement on military in 2017.

In January of 2018, the Qatari ambassador to Russia was quoted saying that Qatar’s government was in talks at the “advanced stage” to acquire the Russian S-400 missile air defense system.

Despite Saudi Threats, Russia Indicates S-400 Deal Will Go Forward

A senior Russian politician has said that Russia will supply Qatar with an anti-aircraft missile system despite Saudi Arabia’s reported threats.

Russian Lawmaker Aleksei Kondratyev, a member of the Russian upper house and the deputy chairman of the committee on Defence and Security, said Russia would pursue its own objectives in determining the countries that it allows to purchase its S-400 surface-to-air missile system.

“Russia seeks its own interest, supplying S-400 to Qatar and earning money for the state budget. Saudi Arabia’s position has nothing to do with it, Russia’s plans will not change,” Kondratyev said in remarks to Russian state media, adding that “it is clear that Riyadh plays a dominant role in the region, but Qatar gets an advantage by enhancing its armed forces due to the acquisition of Russian S-400 systems.”

No End in Sight

Saudi Arabia, backed by other regional powers including Bahrain, Egypt, and the United Arab Emirates, broke off relations with Qatar in June last year, after harshly criticizing Qatar’s deepening ties with Iran, Saudi Arabia’s strategic rival in the region, and accusing the Gulf state of funding terrorism throughout the region.

In April of 2018, Saudi Foreign Minister Adel al-Jubeir warned Qatar that it faced “imminent demise” unless it provided funding and support for a U.S.-led military presence in Syria.

Foreign Minister of Bahrain Sheikh Khalid bin Ahmed al-Khalifa said in a May interview with a Saudi-owned newspaper that there was no “glimmer of hope” for an end to the crisis.

Saudi Arabia Threatens Military Action if Qatar Purchases Russian S-400 Air Defense System was originally published on Global Security Review.

As the conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East, and the threat of escalations on the Korean Peninsula continue to draw the majority of international media attention, Venezuela’s deepening political and economic crisis rapidly grows regarding significance for security in the Americas.

To understand the complexities the perfect storm of food and economic insecurity, political repression, and violence stemming from the absence of any form of law and order, we spoke to Jennifer McCoy, Ph.D., distinguished University Professor of Political Science at Georgia State University. Dr. McCoy served as Founding Director of the Global Studies Institute at GSU (2015-16), and Director of the Carter Center’s Americas program (1998-2015) where she led projects strengthening democratic institutions, provided mediation and encouraged dialogue and hemispheric cooperation. Her latest book is International Mediation in Venezuela (co-authored with Francisco Diez, 2011).

Dr. McCoy directed the Carter Center’s projects on Mediation and Monitoring in Venezuela (2002-2004), the Ecuador-Colombia Dialogue Group (2008-2010), and the U.S.-Andean Dialogue Group (2010-2011), and led over a dozen election monitoring and observation missions.

According to Dr. McCoy, three main scenarios could potentially play out. One of these is the current situation; people willing to publicly protest led by a unified opposition with specific demands are being met by the government with repression. If no concessions are made by the government, the unrest could potentially peter out if no change occurs.

The Maduro government has been hanging on… waiting for oil prices to rise… trying desperately to make its bond payments…

This has happened twice before in the past three years. Venezuelan’s went out into the streets, drawing international attention, and resulting in dialogues that were sponsored by the international community. Each time, an exchange was sponsored and then protests died down, but nothing was changed as a consequence of the inter-party dialogues. The government and its economic policies continued, the social situation deteriorated, setting the stage for another crisis like the one we see now.

But what makes this round of protests different and more sustained is the lack of elections as an alternative means to resolve differences. The cancellation of all election options, as well as the Supreme Court’s undermining the authority of the legislature (the only institution controlled by the opposition), means the people are losing hope of peaceful means of changing the situation.

Russia and China have provided the Venezuelan government with financial support as it tries to hang on. The government is counting on the situation to improve—i.e., for oil prices to rise—before the presidential elections scheduled for late-2018. They’ve already delayed or all-out suspended local, regional, and governor elections and successfully halted an effort by the opposition to have a recall referendum that would cut short the president’s term.

The worst-case scenario for Venezuela

A prolonged economic crisis and food shortages, coupled with rapidly escalating violence and unchecked arms proliferation could lead to a civil war.

If there isn’t any meaningful resolution of the crisis or a decrease in public anger, Dr. McCoy says a significant escalation in tensions and armed conflict is possible, from what is currently mainly peaceful protests with low levels of violence.

Harsh repression has been widely propagated by the government or by government-armed militias and gangs. However, the risk of escalation increases due to the large number of young Venezuelans that are coming out and setting up barricades in the streets, mainly in the evenings after protests have ended, and engage in fights with police, the National Guard, and the government-armed gangs.

Dr. McCoy notes that the youths coming out in opposition aren’t using firearms. Instead, they’re using Molotov cocktails, sticks, and are setting fires in the streets. The danger here is if this low-level of violence escalates and spirals out of control with increasing levels of chaos and violence between civilian protesters, the political opposition, government-armed militias and street gangs, and government police and military forces.

Is Venezuela the Next Syria?

In some ways, it is possible Venezuela’s situation could escalate to the level currently observed in the Syrian civil war. That would be the absolute worst-case scenario, according to Dr. McCoy, with some fundamental differences. Both crises arose from food and resource shortages, but ethnic and religious factions—like those engaged in the Syrian civil war—don’t exist in Venezuela.

In Syria, the military has supported Assad partly because of the ethnic and religious alignments in the region and—to some degree—the belief that the armed forces best chances of survival lay with Assad. In Venezuela, the socialist Chavez movement arose from the military. It was when it incorporated some civilian leftist intellectuals that it became a hybrid civic-military coalition movement.

The Venezuelan military, however, has a long professional history, and members of the armed forces have been very reluctant to fire on their citizens, and have been pushing for the military to maintain the legitimacy and professionalism of the institution of the armed forces. Still unclear, however, is the degree to which the military has been politicized in Venezuela.

Since Chavez and his supporters came to power 15 years ago, they’ve made political promotions within the military, but it is unclear how far lower-ranking troops, who are also suffering from low salaries and food and medicine shortages, will support their superiors if they are called on to repress their fellow citizens.

How will the events in Venezuela affect the region geopolitically?

Geopolitically speaking, the situation in Venezuela is much different than the conflict in Syria. Venezuela’s neighbors are democratic. The Maduro government is also very conscious of legitimacy; it doesn’t want to be seen as an authoritarian regime—and a military takeover would carry the stigma associated with an authoritarian ruler. In this day and age, military coups aren’t as accepted in the Western hemisphere.

While the worst case scenario is Venezuela devolving into civil war, Dr. McCoy believes that point is still some ways off. Venezuela’s democratic neighbors—Columbia, or Brazil, for instance—would likely exert tremendous pressure on the government and security services in Venezuela to negotiate an end to hostilities before it escalates into a full-blown civil war.

If the worst is to occur, with continued failures of the state to govern effectively, if the country enters a state of general lawlessness, then there will be repercussions for the entire hemisphere, as well as Europe, Dr. McCoy says. While Venezuela doesn’t produce drugs, it’s a major transport hub for drugs going to Europe and even to Africa before making their way to Europe.

Drug trafficking increases under lawlessness, as we saw in Honduras after 2009. There was a coup, and for a while, the country was run by a fragile government, and lawlessness increased dramatically. Now, Honduras has one of the highest homicide rates in the world. Countries like the United States are seeing a significant increase in the number of people arriving from countries like Honduras that are plagued with violence.

An actual collapse of the state in Venezuela would likely mean large numbers of economic migrants and refugees fleeing the violence. Notably, the Venezuelan border with Colombia would be most fragile. For a while, Venezuela closed the border with Colombia as thousands of people would try to cross the Amazon into Colombia just to try and get food or medicine.

If the security situation in Venezuela worsens, the Colombian border would be the main point where people would cross. Internally, Colombia is just starting to get its peace agreement in place, so further destabilization in Venezuela could have significant ramifications for Colombia.

A negotiated political settlement is the best-case scenario for ending Venezuelan political and economic upheaval

Dr. McCoy discussed a third potential outcome for the situation in Venezuela: a negotiated solution. A negotiated settlement means addressing the food and medical shortage and ensuring people’s basic survival needs are met while providing international economic support on the condition that specific political and institutional reforms are implemented.

Years ago, Venezuela cut itself off from the Inter-American Development Bank, the IMF, and the World Bank. Since then, it has been relying on loans from Russia and China in exchange for oil as collateral, but that’s increasingly becoming an unsustainable source of funding for the Venezuelan government.

China and Russia are becoming more leery about continuing to loan new money because of depressed oil prices, instability, and their internal problems. As a result, Venezuela’s financial options are thinning out. However, Dr. McCoy notes that negotiations could resolve this issue in this third scenario, which is the most optimal.

In exchange for international aid, the Venezuelan government would have to agree to implement changes in monetary and fiscal policy and to reinvest revenues, particularly in the nationalized oil sector. The national oil company has lost its capacity to produce efficiently and in the required volume. Venezuela’s commodity-based economy needs an efficient oil industry to generate sufficient revenue to reinvest in other sectors to promote a more diversified economy.

Additionally, the government needs to agree to political negotiations, as well. The independence of Venezuela’s democratic institutions has been critically undermined, so there needs to be a significant effort to restore the independence of the judiciary, the legislative branch, the security forces, and the media, in addition to setting in place a timetable for elections.

The problem, Dr. McCoy says, is that the government is reluctant to hold elections because if they perceive it as an all-or-nothing situation if they (the Maduro government) falls out of power. If the Chavez movement loses control of the Venezuelan government, they fear recrimination and are afraid of losing all the gains they’ve made—in their eyes—for the Venezuelan people through what Chavez called his “Bolivarian revolution.”

There is significant corruption that permeates the government and armed forces, and reported criminal activity, as well. Therefore, many officials will be reluctant to risk giving up power if they think they will be tried and punished, or if they expect a witch-hunt without due process.

Also looming over members of government is the possibility of extradition to the United States. This threat is particularly worrisome for those who’ve already been indicted in the U.S., or who have had sanctions imposed upon them by the U.S. in response to corruption, drug trafficking, or human rights abuses.

Applying transitional justice in Venezuela

Transitional justice is usually implemented after countries have emerged from a civil war with a peace agreement, or after a transition from a military dictatorship or authoritarian regime to a democratic system. In the past, it has granted pure amnesty to everybody.

Now, Dr. McCoy says, transitional justice typically provides reduced sentences for abusers of human rights, and potentially for corrupt officials, conditioned on their agreeing to provide compensation to the victims or the country, acknowledge responsibility and tell the truth, and guarantees not to repeat the criminal activity.

Some form of negotiation must include elements transitional justice to ensure a peaceful transition of power, and more importantly, to even have the ability to hold elections where it’s possible that the government could be ousted.

What’s at stake for American interests?

A failure to reach a solution in Venezuela would have considerable implications for American interests, both economic and national security. A failure would result in a marked increase in the number of Venezuelan’s fleeing the country, either seeking better economic opportunity or fleeing political violence and oppression.

This risk involves the point that if there is a state collapse, oil production will likely cease in Venezuela and worldwide prices escalate. An interruption in oil exports to the U.S. from Venezuela has never before occurred, despite political tensions and lack of ambassadors in each country.

The criminal and extremist activity would increase in the absence of order. There have been allegations that Venezuela has sold visas to Hezbollah in Iran, Dr. McCoy says, noting that these haven’t necessarily been concretely proven, but provide a window into the range of threats that could emerge from Venezuela if it became a failed state.

Venezuela’s Economic Collapse & the Rise of Authoritarianism was originally published on Global Security Review.

For decades, Western academics, policymakers, and analysts assumed that China’s embrace of capitalist economic policies would set the stage for democratic reform. Almost three decades later, however, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) remains firmly in power under the increasingly autocratic leadership of General Secretary Xi Jinping.

While the CCP-controlled government faces a range of threats from groups within its borders, the idea of a downturn in the Chinese economy remains a very legitimate threat.

The Chinese government has radically modernized its economic policies over the past three decades, completely reversing their initial Marxist or Maoist aversion to providing monetary compensation for labor.

These reforms are responsible for the significant growth of the Chinese middle class, which has the potential to be the most influential group in China when looked at in regards to socio-economic status.

As a result, the considerably large middle class has come to perceive the CCP as being responsible for their rising levels of prosperity.

China has undoubtedly experienced the effects of the 2008-2009 global economic crisis; it indeed fared much better than the majority of the world. However, China still faces many hurdles to overcome.

Rising Debt and Escalating Unemployment for Chinese College Graduates

It is becoming increasingly difficult in China for college graduates to find jobs, the volume of China’s exports is dropping, and tens of millions of workers are out of work. The possibility of a financial crisis in China could challenge Beijing’s ability to hold up its side of the deal with the population.

Since the inception of Jiang Zemin’s ‘Three Represents,’ meant to attract private entrepreneurs to party membership, the middle and upper classes have seen the party as being responsible for their economic well-being.

The government provides an environment for a healthy, regulated economy, to encourage the creation of private wealth and property, and in return has its rule legitimized by its people.

Arguably, while it is individuals are responsible for the creation of personal wealth, the party made it possible. If the government or party cannot guarantee jobs to the people, there remains the little reason for the people to tolerate the strict control that the party maintains over the state.

If the CCP-controlled government cannot sustain economic growth, it could be perceived by members of the growing middle class as violating the social contract that has existed between China’s citizens and the country’s ruling party elite.

The CCP could face a challenge to its legitimacy if and when the time comes that it is unable to guarantee a healthy economy, prompting potential discontent from the middle class.

Beijing has a track record of effectively suppressing unrest

The Chinese government has become particularly adept at maintaining or regaining control over its people via means of physical repression, censorship, and through the creation of an environment where fear of speaking out is a legitimate means of control. Indeed, the likelihood of an economic downturn eliminating the CCP’s influence is minimal.

Rising social discontent isn’t likely to be enough to force the party itself from power, but it might be sufficient to tempt some members of the elite to take advantage of the situation to their political benefit, thus leading to internal instability within the party and damaging its credibility.

While the CCP has an extraordinary ability to suppress dissent, many argue that it can only contain such dissent for so long.

However, due to the rapid proliferation of advanced technologies including surveillance, censorship, and controlled access to information, the Chinese authorities are empowered as never before, to monitor, identify, and censor those whose activities are a perceived threat to the party.

Nevertheless, a sustained economic downturn poses a threat to the CCP’s legitimacy.

Continued civil unrest on the part of groups desiring independence from CCP rule as a result of religious suppression and ethnic inequality illustrate not-insignificant threats to the party’s ability to maintain total control over the Chinese state.

Regardless, the most significant threat to the power monopoly held by the CCP is a pronounced economic downturn.

While the party may not be overthrown if segments of the Chinese populace make their economic grievances known, the likelihood that the CCP would emerge unscathed is slim.

The party is increasingly structured around a rigid hierarchy and personality cult that is centered around Xi, a drastic shift from the somewhat meritocratic structure of the CCP that existed under the tenures of Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, and Hu Jintao.

In China, Change Trickles Down from the Top

There has recently been an increased desire for greater citizen participation in local politics, along with calls for an end to the one-party policy from Chinese intellectuals. However, the latter are fewer and far between, as the message doesn’t resonate with many in China.

However, that doesn’t mean the party would disintegrate. More likely, it would reorganize itself. Change in China is significantly more apt to come from the top rather than the bottom.

Not only would it create very a substantial amount of public dissent, but it could encourage a power struggle within the ranks of the party elite.

Party officials seeking to take advantage of such a situation might break away from the party to seek public approval to gain more authority, power, and perceived legitimacy for themselves.

The likelihood of an individual taking advantage of a situation like this is higher than the removal of the party itself from power. Furthermore, the mobilization of a large segment of the Chinese population, organized around a common goal, remains unlikely.

Removal Two-Term Limits Signals Potentially Significant Reforms

The party has argued that abolishing term limits for the party leader puts the chairmanship in line with the unlimited tenures for the party and military heads — and that strengthening this “trinity” of leadership is good for long-term political stability.

Xi Jinping holds both the top leadership positions within the Chinese Communist Party and the military (the People’s Liberation Army).

Xi’s consolidation of power serves several purposes—both in the domestic and international arenas.

Domestically, the removal of the term-limits gives Xi the bandwidth necessary to initiate major, strategic structural reforms to the Chinese economy, society, and the party bureaucracy.

Xi would be hard-pressed to deliver on his pledges to make China a truly global power in three stages: 2020, 2035 and 2050. Militarily, for example, Xi proposed that China’s military would complete mechanization efforts by 2020, modernization by 2035, eventually evolving into what he termed “a world-class army by 2050,” complete with a blue water navy capable of hemispheric, if not global force projection.

Economically-speaking, the seeming indefinite nature of Xi’s rule allows a degree of leeway in pursuing domestic economic policies that could be painful to many Chinese in the short-term. Xi can pursue policies he believes will be beneficial in the long-term, without having to concern himself with the short-term implications as they relate to his political position.

Internationally, the removal term limits could signify stability and continuity, at a time when many governments and world leaders are questioning the reliability of the United States as the traditional guarantor of international security and order.

In light of the U.S. withdrawal from the Iran deal (signed and negotiated during the previous Obama administration), the reforms in China could be a signal to China’s partners and potential partners that they can rely on stability and continuity, as opposed to the unpredictability emanating from the White House.

An Economic Downturn in China is the Greatest Threat to Chinese Domestic Security was originally published on Global Security Review.

In the early hours of May 10, 2018, Iranian forces in Syria reportedly launched 20 rockets against Israeli targets in the Golan Heights, territory occupied and administered by Israel.

The move was likely made in retaliation against repeated Israeli air strikes against Iranian military targets in Syria. The Israeli military had mobilized beforehand in preparation for such an attack.

According to the Israeli army, none of the rockets hit their targets, with some being destroyed by Israel’s Iron Dome missile defense system and the rest falling short of their targets in Syrian territory.

In response, Israel launched air strikes against seventy Iranian targets in Syria. The Israeli Air Force struck weapons depots, logistics sites, military compounds, and intelligence facilities used by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps and its elite Quds Force. Many of the targets were located near Damascus or in southern Syria.

Israeli fighter jets fired missiles at and subsequently destroyed several Syrian air defense systems after coming under heavy fire. No Israeli planes were hit by Syrian air defenses.

Israeli Jets Target Iranian Infrastructure in Syria

The Israeli military said that Israeli jets struck “dozens of military targets” that belong to Iran in Syria. Specific targets include intelligence sites used by Iran, Syria, Hezbollah, and Hamas, a Quds Force logistics compound, a military logistics compound south of Damascus, and Iranian military compound in Damascus, Quds Force munitions depots, intelligence systems, and posts, and the Iranian launching platform from which the missiles were fired at Israeli positions.

Israeli Defense Minister Avigdor Lieberman stated that Israel has a “very clear policy,” regarding Iran’s activity in Syria and that Israel would not permit Iran to establish a permanent presence in the country, which sits along Israel’s northern border. Lieberman said that Israel struck nearly all of Iran’s infrastructure within Syria.

“If we get rain, then they will get a flood,” Lieberman said, adding that he hoped this round of violence is over.

The Israeli military stated that it would “not allow the Iranian threat to establish itself in Syria,” adding that the Syrian government will be held accountable for “everything happening in its territory.”

Will Iran decide to escalate tensions further?

Israeli government officials say that while Israel does not want a significant escalation, the ball is in Iran’s court. Iran can either choose to increase tensions and further escalate what has been (until now) a shadow conflict between the two regional powers, or it can decide to stand down and tamper its activity within Syria.

The latter is unlikely, as it would amount to de-facto victory by Israel in the eyes of the international community. However, it remains to be seen how the situation will develop.

Russia, an ally of both Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and Iran, did not engage itself in defending Syrian positions from Israeli air strikes, and Russian air defense systems were not activated during the Israeli assault.

Unprecedented actions by both sides

The actions undertaken by Iran and Israel posit a significant escalation in what was previously a low-level conflict being waged within the chaos and shadows of the Syrian civil war.

The May 10th air strikes were one of the most extensive military operations carried out by Israel in Syria in decades.

Iran itself had acted without precedent in launching an estimated 20 rockets at Israeli forces positioned in the Golan Heights, according to the Israeli military.

However, now that the Assad government in Damascus, backed by Russia and Iran, is seizing control over crucial territories from rebel forces, and with the threat posed by the Islamic State dying down, the Syrian civil war may turn into a broader, high-stakes, and more conventional conflict between regional powers.

Escalation in Syria After Israel Strikes 70 Iranian Targets was originally published on Global Security Review.

In Washington and in Israel, there is a growing concern that Iran may soon initiate a military assault against Israel, according to United States military officials who spoke with CNN on May 8, 2018.

The report notes that “intelligence is not clear on when an attack could come and what form it would take…with one official noting that ‘if there is an attack it might not be immediately clear it’s Iran.”

The U.S. State Department has issued an alert for U.S. citizens in the Golan Heights region citing security concerns.

The State Department’s security warning states that travel to the Golan Heights should be carefully considered “until the situation stabilizes.”

U.S. intelligence and military officials haven’t found a direct connection between the announcement that the U.S. would withdraw from the Iran nuclear agreement (known as the JCPOA or Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.”

Rapidly Rising Tensions Between Iran and Israel

However, tensions are rapidly escalating in the region following multiple Israeli airstrikes against Iranian targets in Syria.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said he “fully supports” the United States’ withdrawal, initiated by President Trump, blaming the JCPOA for “increased Iranian aggression.”

Netanyahu stated that “for months now, Iran has been transferring lethal weaponry to its forces in Syria, with the purpose of striking at Israel.”

The Prime Minister continued by saying that “we will respond mightily to any attack on our territory.”

If Iran were to launch an assault against Israeli targets, it would likely be done in retaliation for Israel’s airstrikes. On Tuesday, Syria accused Israel of targeting an area south of Damascus with air strikes.

Israeli Troops Mobilized

Citing “irregular Iranian activity” in Syria, the Israeli military has directed authorities to open and prepare bomb shelters in the occupied Golan Heights region.

Israeli troops are on “high alert for an attack” in the area, according to the military.

According to Israeli media, this is the first time there has been an order to open bomb shelters in the region since the beginning of the Syrian civil war.

According to statements from the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF), reserve forces have been mobilized in limited numbers, which one IDF spokesperson said was a “specific call-up based on need.”

Furthermore, non-combat reserves—which include those acting in medical or intelligence capacities—were also being mobilized, according to a separate IDF statement.

Could Israel Launch a Preemptive—or Preventive—Strike?

If Iran were to launch an attack against Israeli targets, either directly or with the involvement of a proxy such as Hezbollah, Israel could—and is likely to—respond by significantly escalating the situation.

Israel would likely launch a large-scale aerial—or ground—assault against Iranian or Hezbollah positions in Syria or even within Lebanon if Hezbollah is involved.

Alternatively, Israel could initiate a preemptive—or even preventive—assault against Iranian targets. In a preemptive strike, Israel would be launching an attack in anticipation of immediate aggression by Iran or Iranian proxy groups.

By contrast, a preventive attack would be launched to eliminate (i.e. destroy) the potential threat posed by Iranian or proxy groups, without there being an imminent attack or planned attack on Israel.

Israeli Military on ‘High Alert’ in Anticipation of Iranian Attack was originally published on Global Security Review.

The attempt to influence the 2016 U.S. election through social media is but one example of how traditional espionage, foreign government propaganda, and information warfare tactics have evolved to make use of social media and other technologies to pose a more significant national security threat than ever before.

Researchers from the Digital Forensic Research Lab at the Atlantic Council reviewed and analyzed hundreds of thousands of social media messages, botnets, and bot accounts that were allegedly under the control or influence of the Kremlin.

The team presented their findings at the February 2018 Munich Security Conference, where they demonstrated how the Kremlin tightly coordinates different branches of its multi-faceted and far-reaching disinformation system.

The announcement follows the indictments filed in February by the U.S. Department of Justice and Special Counsel Robert Mueller against 13 Russian nationals and three entities associated with certain social media accounts and botnets, which were allegedly employed as part of the Kremlin’s campaign to interfere in the U.S. political system.

The accounts and botnets were reportedly used to amplify messaging designed to influence the 2016 election, according to an indictment filed by the office of Special Counsel Robert Mueller.

A tightly-coordinated system for disseminating Kremlin disinformation

The bots were just one component of a multi-faceted strategy employed by the Russians. Overt propaganda outlets masquerading as genuine news sources, such as RT and Sputnik, will publish fake news stories designed to influence a particular population (fake news), and post likes to those stories on social media.

Alongside these outlets, diplomatic social media accounts such as that of the Russian embassy in London will push messaging that aligns with the narrative being driven by the media outlets.

At the same time, websites, which claim to be independent, but have been proven by whistle-blowers or forensic researchers to have been funded by the Russian government, publish content that supports the narrative being pushed by outlets like RT and official Russian government social media accounts.

To amplify this content, troll accounts (which are fake accounts that are operated by a human being) and automated ‘bots,’ comment, repost or employ other methods to increase the reach of a particular message.

Russian hackers obtained emails from the Democratic National Committee in mid-2016. Subsequently, Wikileaks published the stolen emails.  The timeline of the hacking and publications of the hacked documents reveals the different elements of the Russian’s propaganda machine and illustrates the disinformation distribution system employed by Russian government operatives.

For example, one Twitter account that was known to be run by the St. Petersburg  Troll Factory, Tennessee GOP, rapidly gained several thousand retweets for a tweet linking to the hacked DNC content published by Wikileaks.  At the same time, RT and Sputnik were reporting on the contents of the DNC leaks.

Russia is engaged in a sustained information warfare campaign

The Russian government has repeatedly denied any involvement in the 2016 or any U.S. election. Nevertheless, it’s increasingly clear that the Russian’s interference in the 2016 U.S. election is just the beginning of a more sustained campaign designed to divide society and breed institutional distrust.

This effort to discredit the global standing of the United States and its allies is one that requires an improved defense, which includes a deterrent component.

Private sector companies like Facebook and Twitter—whether they like it or not—are where this “information war” is being waged. Rather than protesting regulations and subsequently reacting to them, private sector firms should proactively engage in collaboration with the intelligence and national security communities.

Proactive public-private engagement and collaboration between the national security community and companies like Google, Facebook and Twitter is in the best interest of all parties and should be regarded as critical to U.S. national security.

Russian Election Interference Campaign Was a Well-Oiled Information Warfare Machine was originally published on Global Security Review.

Saudi Arabian Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman reportedly informed Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas that he must support the Israeli-Palestinian peace deal put forth by the Trump administration or resign.

According to Israeli media broadcasts, Abbas was given the ultimatum after he was summoned to Riyadh in October 2017 for a meeting with Bin Salman days after Senior U.S. Presidential Advisor Jared Kushner made an unannounced visit to the Saudi capital to meet the young crown prince.

Riyadh had offered to normalize relations with Israel in 2002 on the condition that it agreed to the two-state formula, which more and more Israeli’s, including Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, have rejected.

While the details of any peace deal remain unclear, there is growing concern among Palestinians about Bin Salman’s readiness to support a U.S. president described as the most overtly pro-Israel president in years.

The Trump administration, at the time, was reportedly drafting a deal allegedly arranged by Jared Kushner, himself a staunch advocate of Israel. Kushner has given money to Israeli settlement charities, and his family is reportedly friendly with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.

Israeli media reports also stated that Abbas was directed to prevent increased rapprochement with Hamas—an ultimatum that could jeopardize the reconciliation process between the two rival Palestinian factions.

On the surface, the warning given by Bin Salman seems to be identical to the one made by Netanyahu who is strongly opposed to the Palestinian unity government.

While Abbas has disputed the claims made on Israeli news Channel 10, details of the meeting seem to be in line with the Saudi, UAE, Israeli and U.S. vision for the region agreed before Trump’s inauguration.

Since the Trump administration has taken power, the U.S. has backed the unpredictable Crown Prince and seems to be endorsing a regional plan that will see full U.S. support for the Gulf monarchies, revisions to the Iran nuclear deal, and a new Israel-Palestine peace plan.

The Saudis appear to be entirely behind this agreement whose blueprint is being drawn up by senior members of the Trump administration.

Since his election, Trump has gone on to describe Saudi Arabia as a “magnificent country” while taking the unprecedented step of visiting the Gulf state in his first official visit, having condemned the rulers during his election campaign. Trump also struck a multibillion-dollar deal with the Saudi royals in May.

Trump’s fondness for the Saudi’s saw him backing the anti-Qatar media campaign directed by the Saudi and Emirati governments and the November announcement that he was decertifying the Iran nuclear accord.

When Saudi Arabia arrested scores of princes and businessmen in an “anti-corruption” purge, Trump tweeted his support for the move.

Saudi Arabia Pressured Palestinian Authority to Accept Saudi-backed Israel-Palestine Peace Deal was originally published on Global Security Review.

Editor’s note: This video was produced by the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy at the University of Singapore. Global Security Review content was used to source some of the information provided.

Geopolitics in 2018: Non-state actors, economic growth, climate change, cyber attacks, and North Korea

1. The Islamic State threat moves to Southeast Asia, where over 1,000 fighters have joined their ranks. The Islamic State is active in the Mindanao region of the Philippines, and it is responsible for at least one attack carried out in Indonesia in 2017.
2. The global economy is projected to grow by almost 4% in 2018. Oil prices are expected to remain stable through the year, and the Federal Reserve of the United States is widely expected to continue raising interest rates.
3. Tensions on the Korean Peninsula continue to persist.  The chance of a war with North Korea could be close to 70% if there is no cessation of nuclear threats from the North Koreans, says Senator Lindsay Graham. China is preparing for a flood of refugees across its border.
4. Climate change will accelerate in 2018.  Scientists are observing an acceleration in rising sea levels.
5. The fallout from the massive cyber attacks in 2017 will begin to emerge. Data breaches affected governments, corporations, and private citizens across the world.

5 Predictions of Major Global Security Threats in 2018 was originally published on Global Security Review.

• The seven largest emerging market countries could grow, on average, around two times as fast as advanced G7 economies.
• Six of the seven largest economies in the world are projected to be emerging economies. In 2050, the global economy will be led by China, with India in second place, followed by Indonesia in fourth place.
• The United States is projected to be the world’s third-largest economy in 2050, based on gross domestic product (GDP).
• The European Union’s share of world GDP could fall below 10% by 2050.
• The U.K. could drop to tenth place, with France potentially cut from the top 10, and Italy falling from the top 20. They are projected to be overtaken by countries with faster-growing economies like Mexico, Turkey, and Vietnam (respectively).

The global economy could more than double in size by 2050, far outstripping population growth, thanks to continued technology-driven productivity improvements. Emerging markets will drive global financial growth, and will progressively increase their share of world gross domestic product, based on an analysis of World Bank economic projection data. The global economy is projected to approximately double in size by 2042, growing at an annual average rate of around 2.6% between 2016 and 2050.

This growth is expected to be primarily driven by emerging market and developing nations, with the Emerging-Seven (E7) economies of Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Russia, and Turkey growing at an annual average rate of almost 3.5% during the next 34 years, compared with an annual average growth rate of 1.6% for the G7 countries of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the U.S.

 Half of the seven largest economies in the world are still considered emerging markets.

A continued shift will be observed in international economic power away from high-income advanced economies towards emerging economies in Asia and elsewhere. The E7 could account for nearly 50% of the globe’s gross domestic product by 2050, while the G7’s share of global GDP declines to just over 20%.

China has already overtaken the U.S. to become the world’s largest economy in purchasing power parity (PPP) terms, while India currently stands in third place and is projected to overtake the U.S. by 2050. In terms of PPP, the United Kingdom is projected to. fall to tenth place, France is forecasted to fall out of the top ten, and Indonesia could climb to fourth place by 2050

While looking at Gross domestic product measured at market exchange rates (MERs), one doesn’t see quite such a radical shift in international economic power, representing the lower average price levels in emerging economies.

However, China is projected to be the world’s largest economy by 2030, and India the third largest in the world by 2050. This reveals a considerable and gradual shift in economic power towards Asia and the Indo-Pacific region.

Emerging economies will take center stage by 2050.

By 2050 economies like Indonesia, Brazil, and Mexico are likely to be bigger than those of the United Kingdom and France, while Egypt and Pakistan could overtake Italy and Canada. With regards to growth, Vietnam, India, and Bangladesh may be the most rapidly growing economies from 2015-2050, averaging an increase of around 5% annually.

Nigeria has the potential to be the fastest growing major African economy, and could potentially increase its national gross domestic product ranking from place to fourteenth by 2050. However, Nigeria will only realize this possibility if it can diversify its economy away from oil and strengthen its democratic institutions and national infrastructure.

Poland and Colombia exhibit great potential and are projected to be the quickest growing large economies in their respective regions; Latin America and the E.U. Many emerging economies will be supported by a relatively rapidly growing populations, boosting domestic demand and the size of the workforce.

Investments in education and improved economic freedoms are necessary to ensure there are enough jobs for the growing number of young individuals in these countries, providing a path of sustainable growth for countries with emerging markets and developing economies. 

Today’s advanced economies will continue to have higher average incomes, but developing countries will likely make progress towards eliminating that gap. With the possible exception of Italy, each of the G7 will rank above the E7 states in 2050, based on rankings of projected gross domestic product per capita.

Emerging Economies Will Hold Increasing Amounts of Global Economic Power by 2050 was originally published on Global Security Review.

• Moscow will attempt to develop stronger economic connections with Tokyo and Seoul
• The Ukrainian government could likely escalate the conflict within the next year.
• Transdniestria and Nagorno-Karabakh: Potential Conflict Hotspots
• Russian foreign policy has fed domestic nationalism and pride has become a source of power for the Kremlin.

Russia attempts to make inroads to the east as tensions persist with the West.

As relations with the West remain tense for the foreseeable future, Moscow will attempt to develop stronger economic connections with Tokyo and Seoul, playing them off each other, and off Beijing, to its benefit.

Despite talks between Russia and Japan in November 2017, the two countries are still at odds over a contested set of islands, and China remains Moscow’s most important partner in the region.

Russia’s proposal to send U.N. Peacekeeping forces to Donbas will gain traction, despite discussions between Russia and Ukraine, together with its Western supporters, over the installation’s parameters.

Expect Continued Hostilities in Eastern Ukraine

The plan likely will not come to fruition by the end of the year. However, there is a small chance it may reduce the violence in eastern Ukraine in the short-term.

In the medium- to long-term,  recent developments in Ukraine may mean an escalation of hostilities in the country’s east, as the Ukrainian military takes command over operations in the region.

A recently passed bill by the Ukrainian parliament outright labels Russia as a foreign aggressor. The law gives the President increased over Ukraine’s armed forces and eliminated the requirement for parliamentary support before ordering military action. Lastly, it calls for banning trade and all forms of transport to the regions in question.

President Poroshenko faces domestic opposition against any diplomatic move giving Russian a foothold in their territory. Despite this and other measures taken by both sides, fighting continues in the conflict zones.

As the conflict nears its fourth year, the conflict in eastern Ukraine joins the ranks of other frozen conflicts in the former Soviet sphere of influence, like the Georgian breakaway regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia.

Ukraine’s new parliamentary bill suggests that the government will attempt to escalate the conflict within the next year.

Transdniestria and Nagorno-Karabakh: Potential Conflict Hotspots

Two other post-Soviet regions, Nagorno-Karabakh (disputed by both Armenia and Azerbaijan), and the Moldovan breakaway territory of Transdniestria, will remain prone to internal instability and vulnerable to political, cyber, military, or other hybrid interference from Russia.

The long-term standoff between Armenia and Azerbaijan could potentially flare up again. The joint border shared by Moldova and Ukraine will potentially result in an increased Russian security presence in the region, either by conduction more frequent military exercises or shipping more weapons to separatist groups.

While it is unlikely that either of these territories will result in a regional conflict, it remains to be seen whether Russia will seek to exploit ongoing political and social divisions in the West to advance its interests in either region.

Both lie within what the Kremlin considers its traditional “sphere of influence,” and maintaining this sphere is an essential component of its national security strategy

Russia: the aspiring—but declining–great power?

Russia aspires to restore its great power status through nationalism, military modernization, nuclear saber-rattling, and foreign engagements overseas. Russian foreign policy is centered on regaining and retaining the former Soviet sphere of influence.

However, at home, it faces increasing constraints from a poorly-diversified economy and crippling U.S. and E.U. sanctions, levied in the aftermath of Moscow’s seizure of Crimea in 2014. The Kremlin (and above all, Putin) prizes internal stability and order, offering Russians security at the expense of personal freedoms and political expression.

Moscow’s ability, through its foreign policy, to regain what it views as its traditional role on the world stage—even through aggressive expansionism and disruption abroad—has fed domestic nationalism and pride which has further legitimized the Kremlin and has become a source of regime power.

Russian nationalism features strongly in the Kremlin’s national narrative, with President Putin praising Russian culture as the last bulwark of conservative Christian values against the decadence of Europe and the tide of multiculturalism.

Putin is personally popular, but recent protests driven by economic and administrative mismanagement reflect public impatience with deteriorating quality of life conditions and abuse of power by government officials and those close to them.

However, Putin’s recent re-election has been used by the Kremlin as a referendum to buttress his continued rule. Domestically, authoritarianism and decreased rule-of-law are likely to be expected.

Foreign policy will be dictated by heightening tensions with the west due to the Kremlin’s aggressive expansionist ambitions and foreign interference operations will dictate Russian foreign policy for the foreseeable future.

Russian Foreign Policy: Expansionism Feeds Domestic Nationalism was originally published on Global Security Review.

The Chinese Communist Party’s careful preparation for a change of direction was realized in mid-October during its national congress. The event has reshuffled the highest ranks of the party and proved a significant test of General Secretary Xi Jinping’s efforts to consolidate power.

To date, all signs indicate towards success in Xi’s efforts to strengthen his grip over the nation’s top decision making bodies. Xi has already achieved the status of core leader, not merely of the Communist Party, but of the Chinese state and military, as well.

He’s also managed to quickly promote a lot of his allies to prestigious positions in recent months. Looking ahead, as many Politburo and Politburo Standing Committee members have retired,  Xi has had the chance to fill nearly all seats in the bodies with political allies.

Even more significant, party members have endorsed the addition of Xi’s philosophy of the Communist Party Constitution in the approaching Congress, allowing him to rise to the revered ranks of Deng Xiaoping and Mao Zedong.

Xi emerged from the party’s congress with the political capital required to see a lot of his ambitious visions through. However, in the aftermath of a widespread exodus of the Communist Party’s top ranks, Xi will largely focus his attention on stabilizing the country.

The recent abolishment of the two-term requirement that previously applied to the paramount leader of the Chinese Communist Party is another sign of Xi’s near-total consolidation of power. This could be a sign that the central leadership, or even Xi himself, forecasts economic instability in the short- to medium-term, and decreased dissent within the upper ranks of the Chinese Communist Party would allow for Xi to respond to unrest or internal challenges without dissidence.

Xi will seem to contain any economic issues in the home or disputes overseas that may damage the image of the Chinese state, the Communist Party, or Xi’s status within both entities. This will likely consist of attempts by the central government to stabilize the Chinese financial system with its hugely leveraged companies while mitigating the possibility of domestic social and economic volatility.

The government’s efforts to resettle urban unemployed in the country could be a preemptive attempt to disperse concentrations of disaffected workers to more rural environs.

To that end, China has tried to blunt the impact of U.S. trade measures, engaged in high-level discussions with North Korea, while discouraging U.S. military actions, and implementing a temporary deal with India to end their tense border standoff.

China faces a daunting test—with its political stability in the balance.

China’s sensitive environment won’t lead its leadership to ignore economic reform entirely. The party’s newly instated officials, after all, will have to boost the public’s confidence in the authorities as the economy stays stable but weak.

Within the last several months, Beijing has combined broad-based structural reforms like the consolidation of businesses, production cuts, and the enforcement of environmental regulations, with renewed attempts to chip away at the mountain of debt crippling state-owned enterprises, public and private financial sectors, and local governments. These reforms will only accelerate in the short- to medium-term.

After three decades of record financial growth and social change, Beijing, amid slower growth and the aftermath of a debt binge, is transitioning from an investment-driven, export-based economy to one fueled by domestic consumption of goods and services.

Meeting demands for clean air, affordable houses, improved services, and continued opportunities are going to be essential for the government to maintain legitimacy and political order.

Xi’s consolidation of power could threaten an established system of steady succession, while Chinese nationalism—a force Beijing occasionally encourages support for when facing heightened foreign tensions—might prove difficult to control.

China’s economy appears to be on shaky ground, as layoffs increase and consumer debt levels and capital flight skyrocket.

Xi Jinping has suggested sending China’s increasingly debt-prone youth to work in the country, in a “Second Cultural Revolution.” Few have taken the offer, despite an abundance of promised employment opportunities in farming, food processing, and rural tourism.

Industrial manufacturing—comprising approximately 45 percent of China’s GDP—is suffering from debt–laden overproduction. Chinese corporations owe an aggregate amount equivalent to 170% of China’s GDP.

The state-supported National Institute for Finance and Development (NIFD) stated in 2017 that local and provincial governments, small businesses, and households owe an amount totaling 154 trillion yuan (almost $23 trillion)—228 percent of China’s GDP. The NFID estimates that household debt alone is projected to reach 66 trillion yuan ($8.45 trillion) within the next three years.

The government’s efforts to resettle urban unemployed in the country could be a preemptive attempt to disperse concentrations of disaffected workers to more rural environs.

Corruption, Speculation, and Money Laundering

Economists and media pundits within China have recently escalated rhetoric critical of financiers and industrial elites. Wang Xiangwei, a Beijing-based media pundit, harshly criticized speculators and financial tycoons for their prolific exploitation of regulatory loopholes and government connections.

In the South China Morning Post, Wang wrote that these speculators secured cheap loans for themselves while issuing high-risk financial products to finance projects and investments both within and outside of China.

Furthermore, China’s wealthy have begun moving massive amounts of capital abroad, under the guise of the government’s call for investing overseas—termed “going out.”

A particular tactic being used is inflating the value of one’s domestic assets and guaranteeing these funds to overseas branches of Chinese banks, which in turn provide them with overvalued loans which finance asset acquisitions abroad.

Lay-Offs and Labor Disputes

China’s massive labor force has enabled it to become the globe’s manufacturing hub, creating massive domestic economic growth. Unemployment insurance covers only about 10% of China’s 270 million migrant workers according to the Chinese Government’s statistics agency.

Lin Yanling, of the Beijing-based China Institute of Industrial Relations, says that “the size of China’s labor force has peaked, but it’s wrong to think that there will be no employment problems.” Lin said 80% of China’s workers are “in a weak position” regarding their job and wage security, adding “if the economic situation is not good, their position will become even weaker.”

Any mass-disruption for manufacturing workers, migrant workers, or other low-wage worker is bound to have consequences for internal stability that could prompt a forceful intervention by the government. This and ongoing wage stagnation are the two issues of most significant concern.

Thus, the government’s efforts to resettle urban unemployed in the country through offers of paying jobs could be a preemptive attempt to avoid internal disruption by dispersing concentrations of disaffected workers to more rural environs.

Beijing’s Balancing Act of Long-Term Stability over Short-Term Growth

According to the South China Morning Post, the root-cause of the impending economic crisis is expansive fiscal policy, increased government spending, rising property values, extremely lax monetary policies, record-high bank lending, and exploitation of regulatory loopholes.

In 2009, during the last economic crisis in China, then-Premier Wen Jiabao oversaw the disbursement of over $500 billion to stimulate the stagnating economy. This provided severely needed relief to the economy, but ongoing corruption and crony capitalism, combined with rising competition from lower-wage countries like Vietnam, have ensured that growth continued to stagnate.

Between 2010 and 2015, Chinese economic growth steadily declined from 10.5% (annual GDP growth) to 6.9%, respectively. The current GDP growth target is 6.5%. Louis-Vincent Gave, co-founder of Gavekal Research, said that “the 6.5% growth target, you can still achieve it, but at a higher and higher cost. So why would they [the Chinese Government] want to keep doing that?” Gave added that the practice of dropping growth targets could serve to decrease short-term growth, but promote long-term sustainable growth.

Beijing probably has ample resources to prop up growth while efforts to spur private consumption to take hold. Nevertheless, the more the government cracks down on state-owned enterprises (SOEs), allowing them to fail, the higher the risk of financial shocks that could cast doubt on the fiscal management capabilities of the central government.

Automation and competition from low-cost producers elsewhere in Asia, Eastern Europe, Africa, and Latin America will put pressure to raise wages for unskilled workers. Furthermore, China’s long-term economic growth will be challenged demographically by the country’s rapidly shrinking working-age population.

Xi’s Power Consolidation a Signal of an Impending Economic Crisis? was originally published on Global Security Review.

North Korea’s nuclear program began in the early 1990s, and in its first decade or so was often thought to be a means of extorting financial and material support. The Agreed Framework, established in 1994 to manage the crisis, looks in hindsight like a reward for stopping the country from misbehaving.

North Korea got the world’s attention – and Donald Trump’s – when it said on July 4 that it had successfully launched an intercontinental ballistic missile for the first time. The weapon, potentially equipped with a nuclear warhead, could reach Alaska.

On November 28, 2017, North Korea conducted a test launch of a long-range intercontinental ballistic missile capable of carrying a nuclear warhead to almost any target located within the United States—continental or otherwise. This test was conducted after a hiatus of more than 70 days and has served to escalate tensions.

There are few options for dealing with North Korea—and none are good.

Leaders around the world agree that North Korea should be a top priority, but given the reclusive nation’s belligerence, options are scarce. Furthermore, ties between North Korea and its traditional ally China are growing increasingly fraught, as China reduces coal exports to the “hermit kingdom.” As China withdraws, Russia steps in to exploit the crisis by propping up the North Korean regime with energy and technology.

The U.S. has three options for managing the North Korea crisis. The U.S. could agree with the North Korean regime over accepting some degree of the North’s nuclear capabilities, it could use military force to decapitate the government of North Korea and secure its nuclear weapons, or the U.S. could steadfastly continue on its current (somewhat provocatory) strategy of containment. Through diplomatic efforts, economic sanctions, force posturing, and investment in ballistic missile defense systems innovation, the U.S. would seek to contain the North Korean regime to contain any future escalation.

Explore the Series: Geopolitics & North Korea’s Nuclear Ambitions

Recently Published in this Series

Sleepwalking Into War: The North Korean Quagmire

The escalating war of words between U.S. President Donald Trump and North Korean Leader Kim Jung-Un has effectively created a situation in which the U.S. Government has three strategic options for dealing with a crisis that continues to escalate further as each day passes.

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Don’t Rely On China: North Korea Won’t Kowtow To Beijing

Those who want to end North Korea’s nuclear threats often point to China as the sole actor who could save the day by making Kim Jong-Un and his regime stand down. Beijing provides about 90 percent of imports that North Koreans rely on, mainly food and oil. Many academics and policy analysts in the United States, South Korea, and Japan agree that China holds the magic key to making North Korea cease its nuclear activities. It is a view based on the assumption of a “patron-client” relationship between China and North Korea. I have studied such lopsided alliances and I’ve learned that no matter how in sync the national security goals of the two countries may be or how much the stronger power may have helped the weaker, the weaker never merely rolls over and obeys.

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What Are North Korea’s Military Capabilities?

North Korea has embarked on an accelerated buildup of weapons of mass destruction and modernization of its already large conventional force. The U.S. and its Asian allies regard North Korea as a grave security threat. It has one of the world’s most substantial conventional military forces, which, combined with its escalating missile and nuclear tests and aggressive rhetoric, has aroused concern worldwide. But world powers have been ineffective in slowing its path to acquire nuclear weapons.

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North Korea Launches ICMB Capable of Hitting Targets in the Continental States

On November 28, 2017, North Korea conducted a test launch of a nuclear-capable intercontinental ballistic missile after over 70 days without any such activity. This is the third ICBM test launch of 2017.  U.S. Secretary of Defense James Mattis stated that this missile “went higher, frankly, than any previous shot they’ve taken.”

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Explore the analysis, assessments, forecasts, and commentary in our series: “Geopolitics and North Korea’s Nuclear Ambitions.“

Explore the Series: Geopolitics & North Korea’s Nuclear Ambitions

Series: Geopolitics & North Korea’s Nuclear Ambitions was originally published on Global Security Review.

Authoritarianism is a form of government characterized by strong central power and limited political freedoms. Individual freedoms are secondary to the interests of the state, and there is an absence of constitutional authority or supremacy over the government in an authoritarian regime.

Authoritarianism has been the norm in countries like Russia and China. However, there is a growing trend towards authoritarianism among democratically-elected governments in countries like Turkey, Hungary, and Poland.  Here are recently published stories that relate to this trend.

Explore all Stories Relating to Authoritarianism

China’s Role in Ousting Mugabe During the Zimbabwe “Coup”

The ouster of Robert Mugabe dominated global coverage of Africa at the end of 2017.

In Western coverage of the first week after the coup in Zimbabwe, there was speculation about what China knew beforehand and whether Beijing played an active role in pushing for it.

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10 Elections to Watch in 2018 

Millions of people around the world voted in elections this year. The French elected Emmanuel Macron president, while South Koreans elected Moon Jae-in president. Iran’s President Hassan Rouhani won reelection with a much wider margin of support than his first time around. Turkey voted to expand President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s constitutional authority. Britain’s Theresa May gambled and lost her parliamentary majority, whereas Japan’s Shinzo Abe gambled and came away with a big victory. German Chancellor Angela Merkel led her party to a first-place finish but is struggling to form a coalition government. A disputed independence referendum in Catalonia triggered a constitutional crisis in Spain, and a similarly controversial independence referendum in Iraqi Kurdistan raised political tensions in Iraq. Next year will see equally important and consequential elections. Here are ten to watch.

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Geopolitical Shifts in the Middle East

The impact of the Arab Spring, the retraction of the U.S. military, and diminishing economic influence on the Arab world—as displayed during the Obama Administration—are facts. The first visit of a Saudi king to Russia shows the growing power of Russia in the Middle East. It also shows that not only Arab countries such as Saudi Arabia and the UAE, but also Egypt and Libya, are more likely to consider Moscow as a strategic ally.

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Explore all Stories Relating to Authoritarianism

Geopolitical Trend: Authoritarianism Spreads Around the Globe was originally published on Global Security Review.

The real question is, how? The post-World War II international order that enabled today’s political, economic, and security arrangements and institutions is in question as power diffuses worldwide, shuffling seats at the table of global decision making.

Today, aspiring powers seek to adjust the rules of the international order and alter the global context in a way beneficial to their interests.

This complicates any reform of international institutions such as the UN Security Council or the Bretton-Woods institutions, also brings into question whether political, civil and human rights—hallmarks of liberal values and US leadership since 1945—will continue to be so.

Norms that were believed to be settled are increasingly threatened if present trends hold, and consensus to implement and follow standards can be difficult to build as Russia, China, and Iran seek to shape regions and international norms in their favor. Some features of the evolving global order are apparent:

Rising and Declining Powers Exert Their Influence

Competition is on the increase as China and Russia seek to exert more considerable influence over their neighboring regions and encourage an order wherein US influence doesn’t dominate.

Although nations and organizations will continue to shape citizen anticipation about the future order, citizen and sub-national concerns will increasingly push states to the stage that international and domestic politics won’t be separable.

This may result in the near term in waning responsibilities to security concepts and human rights among several nations, even as many individuals and smaller groups advocate for ideas through platforms, venues, and institutions.

Authoritarian regimes are likely to reinterpret and manipulate human rights norms increasingly.  This may probably lead to decreasing consensus in the international arena on the extraterritorial obligations of nations, which might have implications for domestic societies and the resolution of humanitarian conflicts.

International Norms are Changing

The norms and practices emerging around climate change—and their influence on global and state development policies—are the more than likely candidates for fostering a twenty-first-century set of universal principles.  Majorities in 40 nations, according to a poll by Pew, say that climate change is a significant issue, with a median of 54 percent saying it’s an issue.

The near-term likelihood of international competition leading to doubt and global disorder will stay raised as long as ad-hoc internationalism persists.

As dominant nations limit cooperation to a subset of issues while asserting their interests in regional matters, international norms and institutions are likely to hamper and the global system to fragment in favor of contested regional spheres of influence.

A Multipolar Global Order Doesn’t Mean the West is “in Retreat” was originally published on Global Security Review.

The post-World War II international order that enabled today’s political, economic, and security arrangements and institutions is in question as power diffuses worldwide, shuffling seats at the table of global decision making.  Today, aspiring powers seek to adjust the rules of the game and international context in a way beneficial to their interests.

This complicates reform of international institutions such as the UN Security Council or the Bretton-Woods institutions, also brings into question whether political, civil and human rights—hallmarks of liberal values and US leadership since 1945—will continue to be so.

Norms that were believed to be settled will be increasingly threatened if present trends hold, and consensus to build standards can be elusive as Russia, China, along with other actors such as ISIL seek to shape regions and international norms in their favor.  Some features of the evolving global order are apparent:

Rising and Declining Powers Exert Their Influence

Competition is on the increase as China and Russia seek to exert more considerable influence over their neighboring regions and encourage an order wherein US influence doesn’t dominate. Although nations and organizations will continue to shape citizen anticipation about the future order, citizen and sub-national concerns will increasingly push states to the stage that international and domestic politics won’t be separable.

This may result in the near term in waning responsibilities to security concepts and human rights among several nations, even as many individuals and smaller groups advocate for ideas through platforms, venues, and institutions.

Authoritarian regimes are likely to reinterpret and manipulate human rights norms increasingly.  This may probably lead to decreasing consensus in the international arena on the extraterritorial obligations of nations, such as when to apply concepts like the Responsibility to Protect—that might have implications for domestic societies and the resolution of humanitarian conflicts.

International Norms are Changing

The norms and practices emerging around climate change—and their influence on global and state development policies—are the more than likely candidates for fostering a twenty-first-century set of universal principles.  Majorities in 40 nations polled by Pew state climate change is a significant issue, with a median of 54 percent saying it’s an issue.

The near-term likelihood of international competition leading to doubt and global disorder will stay raised as long as a la carte internationalism persists.  As dominant nations limit cooperation to a subset of issues while asserting their interests in regional matters, international norms and institutions are likely to hamper and the global system to fragment in favor of contested regional spheres of influence.

Global Shifts in Geopolitical Trends was originally published on Global Security Review.

Kim Jong Un is consolidating his grip on power through a combination of patronage and dread and is doubling down on his nuclear and missile programs, developing long-range missiles that may soon endanger the continental USA.

Beijing, Seoul, Tokyo, and Washington have a shared incentive to handle security risks in Northeast Asia, but a history of warfare and occupation along with current distrust makes cooperation difficult.

Continued North Korean provocations, such as additional nuclear and missile tests, may worsen equilibrium in the region and immediate nations to take actions, sometimes unilaterally, to defend their security interests.

Kim is determined to secure international recognition of the North as a nuclear-nation, for safety, prestige, and political legitimacy. With the news from U.S. President Donald Trump that he would be willing to engage in a meeting with the North Korean dictator, it now seems that Kim is on track to securing that status which he so deeply craves.

Contrary to his father and grandfather, he has previously signaled little interest in participating in talks on denuclearization.  He codified the North’s nuclear status in the party constitution in 2012 and reaffirmed it during the Party Congress in 2016.

Now, that seems to have changed, as well. North Korea is reportedly willing to discuss the possibility of their relinquishing their nuclear weapons in exchange for a security guarantee, according to statements made by South Korean officials.

Beijing faces a continuing strategic conundrum about the North.  Pyongyang’s behavior both undermines China’s argument that the US army presence in the region is anachronistic and demonstrates Beijing’s lack of influence—or perhaps lack of political will to exert influence—within its neighbor and customer. Now, with North Korea seeming to be on track to engage in direct talks with the U.S., China has been summarily cut out of the process.

North Korean behavior leads to tightening US alliances, more assertive action by US allies, and, on occasion, greater cooperation between these partners themselves—and might lead to a change in Beijing’s approach to North Korea with time.

Japan Will Enhance Its Military and Security Capabilities

Having come out of a particularly disruptive year in terms of domestic politics and subsequently securing another term as Prime Minister,  Shinzo Abe, has the political mandate to pursue his agenda of reforming the Japanese constitution.

The snap election in October 2017 was seen as a referendum on Abe’s ambitious proposal to revise the Japanese Constitution to pave the way for the normalization of the country’s military and to pass an enormous economic reform package.

North Korea’s persistent weapons tests, particularly the ones which involve launching missiles on Japanese territory, undoubtedly helped to drum up support for the Prime Minister and his party.

Japan will likely pursue increased spending on its military and become a more significant presence in the region, particularly as China has begun flexing its maritime muscles in the East China Sea and the heavily contested South China Sea.

If China continues to escalate its island-building and militarization programs in the South China Sea, Japan will likely join the U.S. in performing “freedom of navigation” exercises in an attempt to de-normalize Chinese encroachment in the region.

Japan Will Enhance Its Military Posture to Counter China was originally published on Global Security Review.

• In the short term, the U.S. will have a diminished presence abroad due to its domestic political divisions.
• Economic crises and inequality have contributed to widening societal and class divisions. The number of men not working and not seeking work is at its highest since the Great Depression. However, incomes have risen slowly, and investors see high rates of return on both domestic and foreign investments.
• In the long term, there is a reason to believe that the U.S. will maintain its position as a world leader and that the current state-of-affairs may even act as a catalyst for the U.S. to come to terms with its’ responsibilities as a 21st-century superpower.  

Politically speaking, the United States remains profoundly divided in the run-up to the 2018 midterm elections. However, growing solidarity and activism around critical issues such as gun control, healthcare, and tax reform have been useful in checking executive and congressional power. The U.S. court system has also proven to be a valid check on executive power, intervening on issues like immigration reform and the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program.

The Double-Edged Sword of U.S. Credibility

Contradictory statements from within the executive branch with regards to defense and national security policy will test U.S. government credibility. As evidenced by the recently-fired Secretary of State Rex Tillerson’s many public statements that were in direct contrast to rhetoric from the White House, such activity is a diplomatic double-edged sword: it causes concern for allies, but it creates uncertainty for adversaries.

The deeply entrenched military and national security bureaucracies mean that the U.S. is potentially more prone to force, as military leadership undoubtedly knows that a credible force capability must support any stated threat. This is in stark contrast to the center of U.S. diplomatic credibility, the State Department. Scores of U.S. senior diplomats and foreign service officers have left the State Department, leaving it bereft of regional or issue-specific expertise and institutional memory.

This will harm the U.S. in the short term. Any negotiations held with North Korea will be done with a shortage of expertise, potentially putting the U.S. in a disadvantaged situation, depending on the nature of the talks. Another area of U.S. policy that will suffer in the short term is the Iran Nuclear Deal or Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).

The two issues could become intertwined if the Trump administration withdraws from the Iran deal, which would signal to the North Koreans that any agreement signed with the United States isn’t a credible one, particularly when one examines the history of similar agreements that were entered into with Muammar Gaddafi and Saddam Hussein.

In the long term, there is a reason to believe that the U.S. will maintain its position as a world leader and that the current state-of-affairs may even act as a catalyst for the U.S. to come to terms with its’ responsibilities as a 21st-century superpower.  

However, this is contingent upon effective execution of the National Defense Strategy, and the National Security Strategy, both of which identify China and Russia as the most significant strategic national security threats to American interests. This return to “Great Power” geopolitics will be defined by the U.S. and its allies acting to preserve the international status quo, while states like Russia and China seek to uphend it to impose an alternative order for their own benefit.

Is the U.S. in decline? Probably not, but rocky times could be ahead.

Despite an overall economic recovery from the 2008 financial crisis, the United States faces considerable challenges. Domestically, these problems include decreased public trust in institutions, “fake news” proliferating on social media, a growing wealth gap, and technological disruption to financial and labor markets.  On the global stage, there is considerable anxiety about the role the U.S. will play in what seems to be an increasingly multi-polar world order.

The international community will scrutinize the United States’ every move over the next decade. They will be watching for signs of internal dissent, cooperation, contradiction, and isolationism. Economic policy, ethnic tensions and identity politics, tax policy, and workplace regulations will be areas of focus. Lack of progress in these areas could signal a broader decline for the United States. This would mean a growing gap between the wealthy and the poor, decreased federal authority, and diminished U.S. influence in global affairs.

Nevertheless, the United States’ possesses undeniably massive levels of human and security capital. It is deeply entrenched in international political and economic systems, while a clear separation of powers within U.S. government institutions ensures that abrupt withdrawal from foreign engagements remains unlikely.

U.S. influence is likely to remain stagnant or constrained in the short term.

Contradictory rhetoric from the executive branch will impede U.S. credibility abroad and harm American interests. Persistent contradictions from within the administration heighten the risk of U.S. engagement in significant conflict. While the short-term outlook for the United States’ role as the global leader remains uncertain, in the long-term, the U.S. will continue uniquely positioned to stay at the forefront of the worldwide order. The United States has weathered hard times before.

The 1970s were a period of high national anxiety but were followed by a robust economic recovery and a greater sense of global leadership. Ingenuity and strong institutional foundations at the state and municipal levels, innovation in the private sector, and financial and human capital projections more balanced than other developed countries will be a critical advantage in overcoming internal divisions.

Ingenuity and strong institutional foundations at the state and municipal levels, innovation in the private sector, and financial and human capital projections more balanced than other developed countries will be a critical advantage in overcoming internal divisions.

U.S. Foreign Policy Could Become Increasingly Aggressive in 2018 was originally published on Global Security Review.

The Russian flag was raised by residents of Crimea, not Russian soldiers. Russian forces were stripped of any identifying markers or insignia. Cyber attacks launched at Ukrainian infrastructure and internet domains were structured in a manner that obfuscated Russia’s involvement.

It’s widely understood that Russia was responsible for the violation of Ukraine’s sovereignty. However, the confusion spawned by the disinformation campaigns, cyber attacks, and unmarked special forces, and the later actions in eastern Ukraine, would see the west committing further inaction allowing the Kremlin to consolidate, and then normalize the acquisition of Crimea by the Russian Federation.

After the conspicuous invasion of Georgia in 2008, the 2014 Crimea operation employed subtle paramilitary and special forces to seize critical points of interest while securing internal order. Russia applied a  broad swath of non-military, hybrid or “non-linear” warfare tactics designed to foster the rapid integration of the Crimean political, security, media, and financial sectors with those in Russia.

The period between the initial “invasion” of information and cyber attacks and the eventual referendum deciding Russian sovereignty over the peninsula was little more than a month.

The military involvement served as a deterrent to Ukrainian troops, while the lack of insignia or identifying features on Russian special forces provided a degree of plausible deniability. Accordingly, the NATO powers in Europe and North America would not have apparent cause to intervene.

Simultaneously, the political, economic, and information warfare campaigns that had been set in motion were masked by the threat of a full-scale Russian invasion in other parts of Ukraine.  Russian troop mobilizations and activity near the Ukrainian border diverted international attention from Crimea while pro-Russian non-military measures were implemented to politically, socially, and economically integrate the Crimean peninsula with Russia.

Having learned the mistakes of overt military action, and the risks that such action has for becoming embroiled in a heated civil war, Russian military strategists employed a mixture of both state-sponsored actors, state actors, and pro-Russian Crimean civilian protestors and militia groups.

All state-actors in Crimea were bereft of identifying marks that would associate Russia with the incursion.

All that was required for the Kremlin to deny any responsibility was for their special forces to show up wearing un-flagged uniforms. Regarding ensuring the viability and legitimacy of their actions in Ukraine, Russia proceeded to launch an aggressive campaign in the United Nations. As they had done before their 2008 invasion of Georgia, their disinformation campaign extended to Russian delegates at the United Nations.

Russia’s ambassador repeatedly—and forcefully—asserted that Ukrainian authorities were threatening and committing acts of violence against ethnic Russians in Ukraine. Superficially, the carefully crafted (artificial) legal context for this argument was structured similarly to the 1999 NATO bombing of Yugoslavia.

It must be noted that the latter was to ensure the security and existence of critically vulnerable civilians. This is a stark contrast to the underlying reason for Russian aggression, which is to provide the continued hegemony of Russia in the post-Soviet space.

The efficacy of the Crimean campaign (and Russian non-linear warfare as a strategy) is evidenced by two factors.

One is the degree to which Russia was able to normalize the annexation. The other is the masterful execution of diplomatic and legal rhetoric which rendered the West inability of Western military intervention, to realize a controlled process of de-escalation and normalization.

The ongoing exploitation—and arguably weaponization—of International law and legal framework by State actors posits a critical urgency to reform theoretical conceptualizations of international law governing conflict, especially since purely conventional battles will be the exception in the 21st century. The blending of non-linear tactics with plausibly deniable conventional forces actively threatens the rule of law in the international order.

“Plausible Deniability” in Russia’s Hybrid War in Ukraine was originally published on Global Security Review.

In the early autumn of 2016, a Ukrainian hacker collective calling itself CyberJunta obtained and subsequently published emails reportedly belonging to Vladislav Surkov, a senior advisor and personal aide to Russian President Vladimir Putin.

CyberJunta stated that its efforts were undertaken in conjunction with other hacker collectives; specifically, groups referred to as “FalconsFlame,” “RUH8,” and “Trinity.” This grouping refers to itself the Cyber Alliance. Oft-referred to as the” Gray Cardinal of the Kremlin,” Surkov is considered the be the architect of Russia’s contemporary political system.

Who is Vladislav Surkov?

From 1999 to 2011, while serving as the First Deputy Chief of the Russian Presidential Administration, Surkov acted as the Kremlin’s main ideologist; proposing and subsequently implementing the concept of “sovereign democracy” in Russia. Surkov is perceived by many—both in Russia and in the West—as a key figure with considerable influence in the Kremlin. According to The Moscow Times, this power is independent of any official title Surkov has held within the Putin administration or in the Russian government.

Observers have credited Surkov’s keen ability to manipulate public perception through an intricate blend of theater and managed politics with keeping Putin in power since 2000. As First Deputy Head of the Presidential Administration, Surkov sat a desk laden with phones labeled with the names of nearly all of Russia’s “independent” or “opposition” political party leaders, “calling them and directing them at any moment, day or night.”

The Puppet Master of Moscow

Rather than directly oppressing opposition as traditional authoritarian governments had done, Surkov’s strategy was more complex. Under Surkov’s direction, dominant ideologies and movements were infiltrated with propaganda and misinformation, sewing chaos by exploiting their internal disagreements, rendering them ineffective.

This strategy is exemplified by Surkov funding civic forums and foreign non-governmental organizations while simultaneously providing support and encouragement to Russian nationalists who would accuse NGOs of being “tools of the west.” By placing itself at the center of all forms of political and ideological discourse, the Kremlin effectively owns any narrative an independent movement might try to seize.

In December of 2011, Surkov was appointed Deputy Prime Minister. In May of 2013, Surkov forced to resign his position within the government, returned to the Presidential Administration to serve as a personal adviser to Vladimir Putin on Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Crimea, and Ukraine. Surkov has since been placed on U.S. and E.U. sanctions lists for his role in orchestrating the Crimean annexation.

The Kremlin Plot to Normalize Ukraine

The hacked emails detailed a Kremlin plan to further destabilize Ukraine in an effort favor Russia’s interests, by pushing for early Parliamentary elections through the extensive use of cyber and information warfare tactics, and through increased financial support to separatist or “pro-Russia” politicians.  Also published by hackers were copies of passports that are alleged to belong to Surkov and members of his family, which have been verified as authentic.

The plan detailed in Surkov’s purported emails states that de-escalating the conflict in eastern Ukraine on Russian terms is possible—if the Kremlin can fundamentally shift the Ukrainian political landscape in its favor. De-escalation and normalization would then create favorable circumstances for the integration of the Donbass with Russia—Russian-armed separatist militias, and “little green men”—widely known to be Russian troops in unmarked uniforms continue to wage war against the Ukrainian armed forces in the Donbass and Donetsk regions of eastern Ukraine.

The campaign detailed in the alleged Surkov emails would increase non-kinetic tactics—i.e. active measures (subversion, kompromat, propaganda, economic influence)—that would bolster support for Russian interests in Kiev. If more pro-Russia or “separatist” politicians were elected to the Ukrainian parliament,  Russia’s influence would undoubtedly increase exponentially, allowing it to “de-escalate” the conflict on its terms.

Oleksandr Tkachuk, the chief of staff to the Head of the Security Service of Ukraine (the SBU), said on Television Tuesday that after a thorough examination by experts, Ukraine’s intelligence services believe the emails to be authentic.  At the time, Tkachuk reiterated that the SBU only has access to documents that were released to the public and does not have any connections with CyberJunta or related hacker groups.

The Ukrainian presidential administration and the SBU declined requests for comment from domestic and international media regarding the alleged hack. Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov denied Surkov’s participation in any Russian plot to further destabilize in Ukraine and insisted that the documents released by the hacking group were forgeries.

Analysis: Kremlin Timeline Coincides with Political Disorder and Confusion in Post-Election U.S.

The leaked documents allege that the optimum time to proceed with the initiative was from November of 2016 through to March of 2017. Just as the United States’ presidential election was ending. In hindsight, one can note that this timetable perfectly coincided with increased dysfunction and divisions within the United States government.

This may indicate that senior Kremlin officials were anticipating a U.S. government in chaos, distracted by domestic issues and by the well-documented Russian-directed disinformation campaigns and cyber operations designed to damage the integrity of the United States’ democratic process and institutions. Surkov was—at the time—confident in the detrimental effect Russia’s interference would have on the U.S. political system, and in the U.S.’s ability to deter normalization in Ukraine that would favor Russia’s interests.

Top Putin Aide’s Hacked Emails Reveal Secret Plan to Invade Ukraine was originally published on Global Security Review.

On March 6, The U.S. Director of National Intelligence told a Senate Armed Services Committee hearing on worldwide threats that the U.S. government is lacking in any “coherent strategy” to defend the against Russian interference in the 2018 midterm elections.

The U.S. intelligence chief added that it is “highly likely” that Russia will engage in a efforts to interfere in the upcoming elections just as it did in the 2016 presidential election.

Coats told the Senate Armed Services Committee hearing on worldwide threats that several U.S. agencies are “well aware” of the need for the government to guard against Russian election interference in the United States.

When asked why the U.S. was lacking in a strategy to combat interference from Russia, he answered that he didn’t have an answer to the question. “We understand it has to be addressed,” Coats said. “I don’t have a specific answer to your question.”

Coats stated that, as of March 2018, the U.S. has “not seen evidence of a robust effort yet on the part of Russia, but we know their malign activities continue to exist. It’s highly likely that they will be doing something. We just don’t know how much and when and where.”

Russia has repeatedly denied engaging in any interference in the U.S. election. However, the U.S. intelligence community has assessed with high confidence that the interference campaign was personally ordered by Russian President Vladimir Putin.

The Director of National Intelligence told Senate Armed Services Committee members that intelligence agencies “assess that Russia is likely to continue to pursue even more aggressive cyber attacks with the intent of degrading our democratic values and weakening our alliances. Persistent and disruptive cyber and influence operations will continue against the United States and European countries and other allies.” He added that Russia will be “using elections as opportunities to undermine democracy, sow discord and undermine our values.”

“Russia perceives its past efforts as successful and views the 2018 U.S. midterm elections as a potential target. We continue to see Russian activities designed to exacerbate social and political figures in the United States,” Coats said. “In the next year, we assess Russia will continue to use propaganda, social media, false flag personas, sympathetic spokesmen and other means of influence to try to build on its wide range of disruptive operations.”

China is Increasing Its Foreign Influence Spending

In the same Senate Armed Services Committee hearing, Coats revealed that China is spending “an extraordinary amount of money” to increase its international standing, heightening tensions with its neighbors and threatening U.S. influence around the world.

“A report was recently released, an unclassified version, that China will spend about $8 billion in 68 different nations establishing its geostrategic positioning, not only for economic purposes and trade purposes, but also for use of military facilities,” Coats told the committee.

Earlier this month, China unveiled the largest defense spending increase in three years, targeting growth of 8.1 percent this year, in order to fuel an ambitious program to modernize its military.

The Trump administration has put forth the largest proposed military budget since 2011, centered on improving U.S. nuclear defenses and countering the growing influence and ambitions of China and Russia.

U.S. Lacks Strategy to Combat Foreign Interference in 2018 was originally published on Global Security Review.

The visit is seen as a sign of both countries’ efforts to contest Chinese expansionism in the South China Sea. The USS Carl Vinson, a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier with a crew of around 5,500 anchored off the central Vietnamese port city of Danang Monday for a five-day visit from March 5-9.

This is the first time a U.S. aircraft carrier has made a port call to Vietnam after the end of the Vietnamese War. Previously, however, smaller U.S. warships like the USS Frank Cable, a submarine tender, and the USS John S. McCain, visited Vietnam as ties between the former enemies have improved.

The visit sends a message to China.

The USS Carl Vinson’s visit comes as Vietnam’s northern neighbor China is embarking on a significant military buildup in the Parcel islands, which are claimed by Vietnam.

Furthermore, China has constructed seven artificial islands in the Spratlys territory, a region of the South China Sea that is also claimed by Vietnam.

Vietnamese envoys have reportedly been working to ameliorate Chinese concerns over the carrier visit alongside the prospect of broader military cooperation between Vietnam and the U.S.

The USS Carl Vinson is accompanied by a carrier battle group which includes the guided-missile destroyer, USS Michael Murphy. The group of ships is planning to sail through areas of the South China Sea that are claimed by China later in the month.

How will China respond?

In a statement, the U.S. Navy said that the carrier battle group is “promoting freedom of the seas and enhancing regional security.” China is likely to heighten its militarization efforts as a response, by accelerating island development or deploying fighter planes to the region.

China claims approximately 90 percent of the 2.17 million-square-mile (3.5 million square kilometers) South China Sea. These claims are contested by Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan, and Vietnam.

While the U.S. doesn’t claim territory in the South China Sea, it conducts regular “freedom of navigation” exercises in the region to ensure shipping lanes remain open and free for commercial use. Under the Trump administration, the U.S. has conducted “freedom of navigation” exercises approximately once every two months.

U.S. Aircraft Carrier Visits Vietnamese Port for First Time Since Vietnam War was originally published on Global Security Review.

On February 19, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov told reporters that allegations of Russian interference in the U.S. presidential elections were baseless and denied any Russian government involvement in interfering with the U.S. political system.

Peskov’s remarks were the first comment from the Kremlin concerning the charges announced by the office of U.S. Special Counsel Robert Mueller three days earlier.

“There are no indications that the Russian state could have been involved in this. There are none and there cannot be any,” Peskov said.

“Russia did not meddle, is not in the habit of meddling in the internal affairs of other countries, and is not doing it now.”

Peskov’s comments come mere days after the United States’ special counse, indicted 13 Russian nationals and three Russian entities with conducting an illegal “information warfare” campaign to disrupt the election to the benefit of President Donald Trump at the expense of former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton.

Special Counsel Robert Mueller’s indictment of the Russian interests concluded that the Internet Research Agency, a St. Petersburg, Russia-based social media firm with Kremlin ties, along with 12 of its employees, and its financial backer orchestrated the effort.

The 37-page indictment alleges that the Russian conspirators sought to coordinate their effort with Trump campaign associates, but it does not accuse any employees, volunteers, or surrogates of the Trump campaign of colluding with the Russians.

The U.S. indictment, which was issued by a grand jury and released by Mueller’s office, said that the Russian entities in question began interfering in U.S. political processes as early as 2014.

The indictment stated that some of those charged posed as Americans and communicated with people associated with Trump’s campaign, adding that those people were “unwitting” in their communications with the Russians.

Trump has repeatedly insisted that neither he nor his campaign colluded with Russia, even as the U.S. intelligence community and now Mueller have concluded that Russia conducted a wide-ranging influence operation during the election that was intended to help Trump win.

The indictment is the first time the special counsel’s office has brought charges against Russians and Russian entities for unlawfully interfering in the 2016 election.

The Response from the White House

On Twitter, Trump broadly criticized the various investigations underway in the Justice Department and in various congressional committees.

“If it was the GOAL of Russia to create discord, disruption and chaos within the U.S. then, with all of the Committee Hearings, Investigations and (Republican) Party hatred, they have succeeded beyond their wildest dreams,” Trump said. “They are laughing their asses off in Moscow. Get smart America!”

Trump was also critical of H.R. McMaster, his national security adviser, who, on February 17, stated at the Munich Security Conference that there was “incontrovertible” evidence of Russian interference in the election.

“I never said Russia did not meddle in the election, I said ‘it may be Russia, or China or another country or group, or it may be a 400 pound genius sitting in bed and playing with his computer,’ Trump tweeted. “The Russian ‘hoax’ was that the Trump campaign colluded with Russia – it never did!”

Trump proceeded to tweet that McMaster “forgot to say that the results of the 2016 election were not impacted or changed by the Russians and that the only Collusion was between Russia” and former U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton alongside other Democrats. He left out any criticism of Russia.

Thus far, Mueller’s investigation has led to the indictments of Paul Manafort, the former Trump campaign chairman, and his associate Richard Gates III on money laundering charges in connection with their lobbying efforts in Ukraine that predates Trump’s 2016 campaign.

Former Trump National Security Adviser Michael Flynn and former campaign foreign policy adviser George Papadopoulos have pleaded guilty to lying to the FBI about conversations with Russian officials and are both cooperating with Mueller’s investigation.

Russia Denies Interfering in U.S. Elections After Special Counsel Indictments was originally published on Global Security Review.

International orders have a tendency be based on two pillars: the equilibrium power and prestige among the main members and some level of shared values. Both of those pillars look shaky today.

For several years, U.S. Grand Strategy was based on the concept that a unitary, U.S.-led order revealed universal values, was simple to join and exercised a gravitational force on others nations.

Those assumptions don’t keep as strongly as they formerly did. If Washington expects to maintain an international system which might help avoid conflict, increase wealth, and promote liberal values, it’s going to have to adopt a more diverse order, one that operates in various ways for various states and regions and on various issues.

Connected Forecasts:

• The Assertions of Rising and Declining World Powers
• Russia: Ongoing Tensions with the West Throughout 2018
• Non-State Actors: Terrorist Groups and Insurgencies
• A Changing Role for the United States
• The European Union: A Chance to Lead?

The U.S. will be lured to withstand such a change and also to double down on the present liberal order following the book of the Cold War: rallying democracies and penalizing norm-breakers.

But, such an order will create more embittered outcasts and imperil the most basic objective of a global order: to maintain peace between the great powers. Dividing the world into defenders and opponents of a shared sequence is also very likely to be less feasible than in the past. China’s role in the worldwide economics and its standing as a regional power mean that it can’t be isolated in the manner the Soviet Union was.

A Multi-Lateral Order

A lot of today’s rising powers, furthermore, have personal preferences which are too diverse to collect into a U.S.-led system or a bloc opposed to it. If China or even Russia adopt a considerably more aggressive stance, the U.S. might find it necessary to focus mostly on containing it and hunker down into a narrow, U.S.-led liberal purchase.

However, doing so should be the last resort. Throughout the Cold War, the central challenge of world politics was to contain, and finally transform, just one power opposed to the most important world order. Today the aim is extremely different: to prevent war and promote collaboration among a group of nations.

Building a more inclusive order

An order that’s inclusive and shared will face this challenge better than one that’s narrow, competitive, and dominated by Washington. The US would, therefore, be better off attempting to develop many distinct yet overlapping forms of sequence: universal and significant power global-centric and regional, political and economic, liberal and realist. To an extent, Washington already does this.

However, the trend in U.S. strategy, particularly since the conclusion of the Cold War, was to pursue a more homogeneous liberal order that all states must join in about the same manner and which pushes its liberal values on each front. The United States would have greater grip if it knowingly embraced a sequence and accepted a few of the hard compromises that came with it.

Connected Forecasts:

• The Assertions of Rising and Declining World Powers
• Russia: Ongoing Tensions with the West Throughout 2018
• Non-State Actors: Terrorist Groups and Insurgencies
• A Changing Role for the United States
• The European Union: A Chance to Lead?

U.S. Grand Strategy & the Future of the International Order was originally published on Global Security Review.

Turkey’s military offensive into the northwestern enclave of Afrin launched Saturday, amid anger at a U.S. decision to form a 30,000-strong border security force for Syria.

Russia relocated military personnel and military police officers from the Syrian region Afrin where Turkish military operations have initiated against Kurdish forces, according to the Russian Ministry of Defense.

A report published by Reuters stated that the Chief of the General Staff of the Russian military, Valery Gerasimov, and his counterpart in the U.S., Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Joseph Dunford, discussed the situation in Syria via telephone.

The report cited Russia’s Defense Ministry and disclosed no details of the call. The alleged conversation took place after Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan announced on that the Turkish military had begun an offensive ground operation in Syria’s Kurdish-controlled Afrin region.

Turkey’s actions in Syria come at a low point in the U.S.-Turkey relationship.

The United States backs the Kurdish forces in Syria, which were instrumental in the U.S. campaign against ISIS. Turkey initiated the in the aftermath of a cross-border shelling by artillery units of the Turkish army.

The Turkish air force has conducted air raids in support of ground forces in Afrin, while the Free Syrian Army (FSA) has also engaged Kurdish fighters in the region. U.S. support of  Kurdish militia groups in Syria—groups Turkey considers to be terrorists—has contributed to a widening division between the two NATO allies.

Turkey, for its part, has accused the U.S. of supporting an attempted military coup against the Turkish government in 2015 and, despite being a NATO member, has moved to align itself closer to Russia by signing defense agreements with the country.

Turkey’s President Erdogan has used the coup in justification of his rapid consolidation of power which has decreased the influence of Turkey’s democratic and secular institutions. The U.S. uses the Incirlik Air Base in Turkey as a central hub for regional operations, and also stations several adjustable-yield B-61 nuclear bombs there.

Russian officials issued Kurdish authorities in Afrin with an ultimatum on behalf of Syrian government

Russian military officials proposed handing over the Kurdish-controlled region in Syria’s northwest to the Syrian government to avert a Turkish military offensive, according to Kurdish officials cited in a report published by the Associated Press.

Russian officials reportedly suggested to Kurdish leaders that they cede administration and control of Afrin to the Syrian government. The Russians said that in doing so, the Kurds would avoid a military offensive from Turkey.

Ilham Ahmed, a senior Kurdish official who was named in the report, stated that Russia gave Kurdish authorities in Afrin a choice: hand control over to the Syrian government or face a Turkish military offensive.

All Kurdish officials cited in the AP’s report refused the Russian-initiated proposal, vowing to resist an attack from Turkey. Geographically, Afrin is surrounded by territory controlled by Syrian government forces and militia groups backed by Turkey.

Russia Presented an Ultimatum to Kurdish Authorities in Syria Before Turkish Assault was originally published on Global Security Review.

The Israeli military says its air force destroyed 12 Iranian and Syrian positions in Syria, including command centers and missile defense installations.

Israeli jets carried out air strikes against Iranian targets in Syria after an Iranian drone was shot down near the Israel-Syria border.

Israeli army officials said that the Iranian drone did not cross into Israel by accident, but have not provided more details on the drone’s mission or whether it drone was armed.  Iran has denied that it was operating any such drone.

An Israeli F-16 fighter jet was shot down by Syria air defenses during the offensive. The jet crashed in northern Israel after its pilots ejected from the plane. It is believed to be the first time Israel has lost a jet in combat since 2006.

“Our preliminary understanding is that the plane crashed due to a ground-to-air missile,” Israeli military spokesperson Lieutenant-Colonel Jonathan Cornicus said on Sunday.

Israel then launched a second wave of airstrikes on both Syrian and Iranian military targets in Syria.

The Israeli military said it had inflicted critical damage on targets in Syria in the “most significant attack” of its kind against the country since the 1982 Lebanon war.

Syria’s state media reported that Syrian air defense opened fire in response to an Israeli attack on a military base, hitting more than one plane.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu warned that Israel’s policy to defend itself against “any attempt to harm our sovereignty” was “absolutely clear”.

The International Response

The U.S. Defense Department issued a statement saying that Israel maintains the right to protect itself against acts of aggression.

“Israel is our closest security partner in the region, and we fully support Israel’s inherent right to defend itself against threats to its territory and its people,” said Pentagon spokesman Adrian Rankine-Galloway.

The U.S. State Department later released a statement saying, “The United States is deeply concerned about today’s escalation of violence over Israel’s border and strongly supports Israel’s sovereign right to defend itself.”

Mr. Netanyahu stated that Israel would continue its policy of harsh retaliation for any violation of its sovereignty and security.

“We have made it unequivocally clear,” he said, Israel “will strike back at every attempt to strike at us,” he said.

The air strikes are Israel’s most significant air assault within Syria since the beginning of the Syrian civil war, hitting eight Syrian military sites and four targets the Israeli military said were Iranian installations.

Israel’s actions have raised concerns in Russia, which is supporting the Syrian government along with Iran.

“The creation of any threat to the lives and safety of Russian military servicemen currently in Syria on the invitation of its lawful government to help fight terrorists is absolutely unacceptable,” a statement issued by the Russian Foreign Ministry read.

Prime Minister Netanyahu said that he spoke with Russian President Vladimir Putin and reiterated Israel’s “right and obligation to defend [itself].” Netanyahu and Putin have reportedly agreed that military cooperation between Israel and Russia would continue.

Major Israeli Air Strikes Target Iranian and Syrian Military Installations was originally published on Global Security Review.

U.S. Secretary of Defense James Mattis praised the expanding partnership between the United States and Vietnam, and lauded the upcoming visit of a U.S. aircraft carrier to Vietnam, during a visit to Hanoi on January 25, 2018.

“We thank you for the increasing partnership, with our carrier coming into Danang here in March,” Mattis told Nguyen Phu Trong, the General-Secretary of the Vietnamese Communist Party.

The visit of a U.S. aircraft carrier will be the first of its kind to a Vietnamese port and signals a growing defense partnership between the two countries. “It’s not final, but it all looked very encouraging,” Mattis told reporters. Pentagon officials have repeatedly stated that Vietnam’s prime minister—the official head of state—has the final sign-off on any visit to Vietnam by a U.S. aircraft carrier.

Secretary Mattis met with Vietnamese Defense Minister Ngo Xuan Lich during his visit to Hanoi.  The two leaders discussed plans to increase the degree military cooperation between their respective countries and agreed to expand defense cooperation between the U.S. and Vietnam over a three-year period. Areas of cooperation include maritime security, humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, and peacekeeping operations.

The U.S. has been increasingly committed to improving relations with Vietnam, notably as Hanoi has emerged as willing to resist China’s expansionist policies in the disputed regions of the South China Sea. Mattis said he believes “it’s in America’s best interest to see a strong and prosperous and independent Vietnam, and we intend to be a partner as we go forward.”

Mattis repeatedly emphasized areas of agreement and cooperation. “We are like-minded partners,” Mattis told Communist Party General-Secretary Nguyen. “So we do not have to search hard for areas of common agreement.”

Rising Tensions in the South China Sea

Vietnam maintains a policy of not engaging in formal military alliances. Therefore, U.S. officials are cautious about the pace of improving relations. However, Mattis stated that ties between the U.S. and Vietnam are “close now, and getting closer.”

President Barack Obama lifted a decades-old embargo on U.S. weapons sales to Vietnam in 2016. The U.S. currently has 24 active foreign military sales with Vietnam, valued around $70 million, according to U.S. officials. The U.S. recently transferred a Hamilton-class cutter to Vietnam’s Coast Guard—the largest ship in the country’s coast guard or navy. This was the first U.S. transfer of lethal military equipment to Vietnam.

An expanded relationship with Southeast Asian allies seems to play a significant role in the Pentagon’s new defense strategy, which is attempting to pivot U.S. attention from counterterrorism to managing a geopolitical rivalry with China and Russia.

Support for freedom of navigation and the rule of law in the South China Sea are essential components of U.S. values and foreign policy, according to Mattis. Beijing claims nearly the entirety of the South China Sea, ignoring the territorial claims of Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, and many of its other, smaller neighbors.

Vietnam’s increasing capability to stand up to China, supported by the U.S., could potentially serve as an effective deterrence to China’s increasingly aggressive expansionist activity in the South China Sea.

The U.S. and Vietnam Are Expanding Areas of Military Cooperation was originally published on Global Security Review.

The Dutch General Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD)—the domestic security and counterintelligence agency in the Netherlands—successfully hacked into computers that were being used by the members of the Russian government-linked hacking group known as Cozy Bear.

Through this, intelligence services in the Netherlands were able to collect evidence of Russia’s hacking of the U.S. Democratic National Committee (DNC) in 2016, which was promptly provided to American officials. The news was initially reported in Volkskrant, a daily morning newspaper published in the Netherlands, and on the Dutch television news program Nieuwsuur.

According to the reports, hackers working for the Dutch General Intelligence and Security Service initially gained access to computers used by Cozy Bear in mid-2014. Dutch intelligence agents were then able to monitor the activities of Cozy Bear hackers for at least a year, even managing to watch them from security cameras they had gained access to.

In late-2014, AIVD agents were able to use the information gleaned from their surveillance activities to assist the FBI and NSA in ridding U.S. State Department computer networks of Russian Hackers who were attempting to gain access.

The 2016 Presidential Election: Russian Hackers Gain Access to DNC Networks and Email Accounts

AIVD agents watched, in real-time, as Cozy Bear hackers infiltrated the DNC’s computer networks in 2016. Unbeknownst to the Russians, AIVD hackers observed the Russians gained access to the email accounts of DNC officials and Democratic Party leaders and collected thousands of documents and emails.

Russian operatives would later release many of documents obtained by hackers through Wikileaks, D.C. Leaks, or Guccifer 2.0. Dutch officials provided this critical evidence of Russia’s involvement in the 2016 U.S. presidential elections to counterintelligence officials in the U.S. The evidence was, reportedly, a catalyst for the FBI initiating a counterintelligence investigation into the Russian government’s interference in the 2016 presidential election.

Cozy Bear is one of two hacking groups affiliated with the Russian government that infiltrated DNC networks in the run-up to the 2016 presidential election; the other is referred to as Fancy Bear. Cozy Bear has been linked to Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) by AIVD officials. Fancy Bear is widely understood to be connected to Russian military intelligence, GRU. Government officials and private sector cybersecurity experts believe the two groups conducted their activities independently of one another.

The report published by Volkskrant is based on the accounts of six American and Dutch sources familiar with the matter.  Security and intelligence officials in the Netherlands declined to comment on the subject when asked by reporters.

In the Hague, Dutch Interior Minister Kajsa Ollongren stated to reporters that she was “very happy that we have good security services in the Netherlands that do their work well. I can’t say anything about this case that has been published.”

Russian Hacker Group Cozy Bear Was Hacked By Dutch Intelligence Service was originally published on Global Security Review.

In June 2017, President Donald Trump ordered that special counsel Robert Mueller be fired, but backed off when the White House counsel threatened to resign in protest, according to reports published by The New York Times and The Washington Post. Trump described the reports as “Fake news, folks Fake news. Typical New York Times fake news” to reporters at the World Economic Summit in Davos, Switzerland.

Trump reportedly ordered the White House Counsel Don McGahn to direct the Justice Department to fire Mueller because Trump felt three separate conflicts of interest disqualified Mueller from leading the investigation.

The first reason he gave was an alleged dispute over membership fees at a Trump-owned golf course that caused Mueller to end his membership at the course. The second reason given was that Mueller had previously worked for a law firm that had represented Jared Kushner, Trump’s son-in-law and advisor. The final reason given by the president was that Mueller was interviewed to return to his old job as FBI director the day before he was appointed as the special counsel.

According to the reports, McGahn refused to deliver Trump’s order to fire Mueller to the Justice Department. McGahn reportedly believed firing Mueller would have a catastrophic effect on the Trump presidency and cast a more significant cloud of alleged obstruction of justice, according to the news reports. Trump’s attorney Ty Cobb declined to comment “out of respect for the Office of the Special Counsel and its process.”

More Evidence of Obstruction of Justice?

Mueller is investigating allegations the Trump campaign colluded with Russia in interfering in the 2016 presidential election. He is also looking into possible obstruction of justice by the Trump and other members of his administration.

Mueller was appointed special counsel in May after Trump fired FBI Director James Comey, who was then heading up the Russia probe. Comey’s firing has raised questions of whether the president tried to obstruct justice in the investigation.

Trump’s legal team has stated that, as of January 2018, more than 20 White House employees have voluntarily talked to investigators working on the special counsel’s investigation. Additionally, Trump’s lawyers have reported that the White House has given more than 20,000 pages of documents to the special counsel’s office.

Trump reiterated that there was no collusion with Russia to help him win the election and suggested he is being investigated for obstruction of justice because he was “fighting back” against the investigation. Trump’s interview with investigators from the Office of the Special Counsel has not been scheduled.

Mueller’s investigation into the Russian election interference has extended into Trump’s Cabinet, with Attorney General Jeff Sessions having been interviewed. Sessions met with Russian Ambassador Sergey Kislyak while a U.S. senator and a surrogate for the Trump campaign.

Trump Unsuccessfully Ordered Firing of Robert Mueller in June 2017 was originally published on Global Security Review.

Under the administration of Donald Trump, the United States has been attempting to rebalance its priorities, giving the appearance that it is stepping back from its traditional role as guarantor of international security, trade, and diplomacy. However, the rhetoric from the executive branch is hardly news.

Prior U.S. presidential administrations—recently the Obama and Bush administrations—repeatedly stressed the need for NATO allies in Europe to increase defense spending. U.S. Presidents and politicians from both political parties have long made the argument that, for decades, American taxpayers have underwritten European security and defense.

U.S. Allies in Europe

The European Union—and its two largest economies, France and Germany are facing growing uncertainty in their electorates regarding the role of the Union. The bloc remains comprised of vastly contrarian points-of-view, and it remains to be seen how the E.U. will handle Brexit negotiations with the United Kingdom. At present, it is possible the U.K. and E.U. will agree to some degree of security and defense cooperation.

French President Emmanuel Macron and German Chancellor Angela Merkel, as leaders of the two most influential European Union member states, will need to alleviate the concerns of their respective electorates, which are increasingly concerned with issues such as terrorism and mass immigration—both of which pose severe challenges to European security and social cohesion. Additionally, they will need to effectively communicate the purpose and value of the bloc, in economic, security, and social terms.

On the surface, the European Union would seem to be in a better position than China (oft-touted as the successor to U.S. global hegemony) to serve as a guarantor of global security.

However, the capability of any future E.U. military would pale in comparison to those of the United States. While they compare regarding the number of citizens under arms, American military spending and technological capability far outweigh those of the EU, meaning that the United States remains the only country capable of projecting force on a truly global scale.

Germany became acutely aware of the strategic consequences the European Union would face should Marine Le Pen ascend to the French presidency and follow through with her promises to withdraw France from the both European Union and the NATO Joint Military Command Structure. After the U.S. and Russia, France possesses the third largest nuclear arsenal in the world.

German Defense Minister Ursula von der Leyen was notably concerned about the prospect of France withdrawing from the European Union, as such an act would leave the E.U. without a nuclear deterrent. In this scenario, Germany would likely become the bloc’s de-facto military and economic leader and would have to consider leading the development of a European Union nuclear weapons program to deter an increasingly aggressive and opportunistic Russia.

U.S. Allies in the Middle East

Iran’s continued military and political involvement in Syria is viewed as a strategic national security threat to Israel, and continued encroachment towards Israeli territory heightens the risk of a large-scale conflict between Iran and Israel, with a remote possibility of Sunni Gulf Monarchies like Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates supporting Israel in an effort to check Iran’s hegemonic ambitions.

The U.S. seems to have, at the least, tacitly approved of heightened Israeli aggression against Iranian targets in Syria, although it remains to be seen the level of involvement the U.S. will take on following the appointment of noted hawk John Bolton as U.S. National Security Advisor, and the pending Secretary of State nomination of the similarly hawkish Mike Pompeo, both of whom have long argued for preemptive U.S. action against Iran.

U.S. Allies in Asia

Key American allies in East Asia, notably Japan, are also reacting to the “America First” Japan’s military capabilities are restricted by its post-World War II constitution. Japan is limited in its ability to deploy troops overseas and is forbidden from developing or possessing aircraft carriers. Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has advocated for constitutional reforms that would allow for expanded military and defense capabilities.

Japan’s push to increase its military capabilities isn’t a reaction to the rhetoric currently emanating from the White House. Instead, Japan’s decades-long reluctance to demonstrate its “hard power” capabilities is increasingly outweighed by China’s increasing expansionism and North Korea’s nuclear program.

2018 will likely reveal the limits of China’s influence over the “hermit kingdom.” While China recognizes the security threat posed by a nuclear-armed North Korea with increased intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) capability, Beijing is more concerned with the prospect of a U.S.-aligned, unified Korea. As such, it likely intends to maintain the status quo on the Korean Peninsula.

U.S. Allies More Likely to Take Unilateral Action in 2018 was originally published on Global Security Review.

According to a report published by the Wall Street Journal, U.S. counterintelligence officials warned Jared Kushner that Chinese-American businesswoman Wendi Deng Murdoch could be utilizing her relationship with Kushner and Ivanka Trump, his wife, to further the Chinese government’s interests. The Journal cited multiple individuals familiar with the matter.

Wendi Deng Murdoch is the former wife of Rupert Murdoch, the executive chairman of News Corp, who filed for divorce from Ms. Murdoch in 2013. According to the report, U.S. counterintelligence officials have been concerned about an assessment which found that Ms. Murdoch was lobbying on behalf of a Chines government-funded construction project in Washington, D.C. that was deemed a national security risk.

The project was projected to be a $100 million Chinese garden located at the National Arboretum. It was deemed a national security threat due to the inclusion of a 70-foot-tall structure which intelligence community officials believed could be used for surveillance and signals intelligence (SIGINT) collection.

Ms. Murdoch initially appeared on the radar of counterintelligence officials after reports surfaced that she had been romantically involved with former British Prime Minister Tony Blair while she was still married to Mr. Murdoch.  British security officials reportedly spoke with their counterparts in the U.S. about whether the alleged relationship might be cause for concern. According to the Journal’s sources, the FBI decided that there was cause for increased concern about Ms. Murdoch. However, she was not the subject of any formal investigation at the time.

The Chinese government responded to the Journal’s report, saying that it was “groundless speculation.” U.S. counterintelligence officials are increasingly concerned about the Chinese government’s attempts to utilize individuals with ties to the Trump Administration or with business interests or family in China to influence official policy.

The Chinese garden project at the Arboretum in Northeast Washington was proposed for at least a decade as a sign of goodwill between the two nations, similar to Beijing’s gift of pandas to the National Zoo in 1972. The 12-acre project was to incorporate a lake along with multiple buildings and gardens which could be employed to host cultural programs. The project was initiated in January 2011, when then-President Hu Jintao traveled to the U.S. A version of the project was presented to him by Vice President Joe Biden and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton.

Jared Kushner Warned by U.S. Officials About Wendi Deng Murdoch was originally published on Global Security Review.

Netanyahu delivered the announcement to reporters accompanying him on an official visit to India, saying that his statement was based on a “solid assessment.” Netanyahu’s statement follows U.S. President Donald Trump’s recognition of Jerusalem as the Israeli capital in December 2017.

“There are three things happening in the U.S. that never happened before; one is moving the U.S. embassy. My solid assessment is that it will go much faster than you think: within a year from now,” the Prime Minister said before praising the United States’ increasingly aggressive position on Iran along with the Trump Administration’s announcement that the U.S. would be withholding approximately $65 million in aid funding to the United Nations Palestinian Refugee Agency (UNRWA).

The UN discouraged the Trump Administration from cutting to aid to UNRWA. Before the official announcement that the U.S. would withhold aid, UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres announced his concern, due to the agency being “an important factor of stability.”

Israel has been quietly lobbying the Trump Administration to maintain aid funding to the Palestinian Authority and agencies like UNRWA, as Israel would be left to fill the financial gaps created by a cut in U.S. aid funding.

U.S. Embassy move to Jerusalem: An accelerated timeline?

Initially, the U.S. stated that the embassy would not relocate during President Trump’s first term in office, as it would take time to construct a physical embassy in Jerusalem. However, Netanyahu’s announcement is in direct contradiction to statements by U.S. officials, indicating that the relocation may be expedited.

Much of the international community has condemned the recognition of Jerusalem as counter-productive to the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, with some states in the Middle East accusing the U.S. of having an inherent bias towards Israel.

The UN General Assembly passed a non-binding resolution condemning the move while reaffirming a commitment to a two-state solution. In such an outcome, East Jerusalem would be the State of Palestine’s capital.

U.S. Embassy in Israel will move to Jerusalem in 2018, says Netanyahu was originally published on Global Security Review.

Venezuela’s problems will only get worse as President Nicolas Maduro strips Venezuela’s democratic institutions of their authority while consolidating his power. While government and business elites who have access to petrodollars enjoy overwhelmingly favorable exchange rates, the majority of Venezuelans are going hungry.

Further economic mismanagement will increase already-widespread starvation, illness, and insecurity. The result will be a massive overland exodus of refugees from Venezuela to Colombia, Brazil, and Guyana. The Dutch island territories of Aruba, Bonaire, and Curaçao—just 40-80 km off the northern coast of Venezuela—would face a significant number of refugees.

Summary

• Government mismanagement of the oil industry is at the root of Venezuela’s humanitarian crisis, as productivity has rapidly collapsed. 
• Hyperinflation has made Venezuelan currency nearly worthless as the prices of essential goods have skyrocketed.
• If the already-dire situation worsens considerably, there will be a massive overland exodus of refugees from Venezuela to Colombia, Brazil, Guyana, and the United States. 
• The number of Venezuelans seeking political asylum in the United States has increased by over 160% from 2016.

A massive refugee crisis in the Americas wouldn’t just affect Venezuela’s neighbors.

Already, thousands have fled, and the number of Venezuelans seeking political asylum in the United States has increased by over 160% from 2016. As food insecurity worsens for the public and the government steps ups its repression of dissent, there will be a spillover effect regarding migration to the United States from South and Central America.

If the United States is unprepared for such a crisis, the results could have catastrophic implications for American national security. The Venezuelan Vice President, Tareck El Aissami, has been accused of having ties with Iranian and Hezbollah connected individuals and entities. El Aissami has been linked to 173 Venezuelan passports and identity cards that were issued to individuals from the Middle East and Central Asia, including alleged members of Hezbollah.

Holders of Venezuelan passports are afforded visa-free entry to over 130 countries, including 26 European Union member states. While a visa is required to enter the United States, there are likely more lenient standards for accepting applications from holders of Venezuelan passports than for holders of Iranian, Syrian, or Lebanese passports.

The situation in Venezuela is terrible for everyone

For Venezuela, the worst case scenario is a complete breakdown of the central government’s control over the state. If the Venezuelan government is unable to contain the flow of refugees and an overwhelming number cross into neighboring Brazil and Colombia, those governments may be forced to act in the interest of their national security interests.

Given the geographic proximity of the United States to Venezuela, democratic governance there along with adherence to the rule-of-law is paramount for American security in the long-term. Otherwise, the U.S. will undoubtedly face a massive influx of immigrants. Such a flow would not be stopped by a wall, like the one proposed by President Trump along the U.S.-Mexico border. Venezuelans seeking refuge from the humanitarian crisis will utilize air or maritime transport routes to reach the U.S.

Already, over 250,000 Venezuelans have migrated into Colombia in search of greater security and access to food and medical care. Colombia is in the process of finalizing a significant peace agreement with the FARC Rebel group, and a continued mass-migration of Venezuelan refugees could threaten Colombia’s internal stability. Absent a political settlement, which seems increasingly impossible due to the criminal nature of the Venezuelan regime, military intervention may be the only solution.

The Colombian government—possibly in cooperation with Brazil and other regional partners—may decide to pre-empt a mass-exodus of Venezuelans into Colombia by launching a military operation with the intent of deposing the government of Nicolas Maduro.

This would be no easy task. Venezuela, in addition to its military resources, has close security ties with Cuba. An attempt at intervention in Venezuela by a coalition of American democracies could rapidly descend into a much more significant conflict, mainly if hardliners in Havana perceive the operation as an American-led proxy war directed against Cuba and Cuba’s overseas interests.

Forget about North Korea, Venezuela is the next major national security crisis was originally published on Global Security Review.

Over two million Chinese workers have been laid off in recent months due to “overcapacity.” Companies have been shut down as employers either sold their businesses or simply disappeared. These layoffs have increased the numbers of unemployed youth in urban areas, increasing the risk of social unrest. Chinese Communist Party Chairman Xi Jinping has suggested sending China’s increasingly debt-prone youth to work in the country, in a “Second Cultural Revolution.”

Few have taken the offer despite employment opportunities in farming, food processing, and rural tourism. Industrial manufacturing—comprising approximately 45 percent of China’s GDP—is suffering from debt-laden overproduction. Chinese corporations owe an aggregate amount equivalent to 170% of China’s GDP. China’s economy appears to be on shaky ground, as layoffs increase and consumer debt levels and capital flight skyrocket.

The state-supported National Institute for Finance and Development (NIFD) stated earlier this year that local and provincial governments, small businesses, and households owe an amount totaling 154 trillion yuan (almost $23 trillion)—228 percent of China’s GDP. The NFID estimates that household debt alone is projected to reach 66 trillion yuan ($8.45 trillion) within the next three years.

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Corruption, Speculation, and Money Laundering

Economists and media pundits within China have recently escalated rhetoric critical of financiers and industrial elites. Wang Xiangwei, a Beijing-based media pundit, harshly criticized speculators and financial tycoons for their prolific exploitation of regulatory loopholes and government connections.

In the South China Morning Post, Wang wrote that these speculators secured cheap loans for themselves while issuing high-risk financial products to finance projects and investments both within and outside of China.

Furthermore, China’s wealthy have begun moving massive amounts of capital abroad, under the guise of the government’s call for investing overseas—termed “going out.” A particular tactic being used is inflating the value of one’s domestic assets and guaranteeing these funds to overseas branches of Chinese banks, which in turn provide them with overvalued loans which finance asset acquisitions abroad.

Lay-Offs and Labor Disputes

China’s massive labor force has enabled it to become the globe’s manufacturing hub, creating massive domestic economic growth. Unemployment insurance covers only about 10% of China’s 270 million migrant workers according to the Chinese Government’s statistics agency.

Lin Yanling, of the Beijing-based China Institute of Industrial Relations, says that “the size of China’s labor force has peaked, but it’s wrong to think that there will be no employment problems.” Lin said 80% of China’s workers are “in a weak position” regarding their job and wage security, adding “if the economic situation is not good, their position will become even weaker.”

Any mass-disruption for manufacturing workers, migrant workers, or other low-wage worker is bound to have consequences for internal stability that could prompt a forceful intervention by the government. This and ongoing wage stagnation are the two issues of greatest concern. Thus, the government’s efforts to resettle urban unemployed in the country through offers of paying jobs could be a preemptive attempt to avoid internal disruption by dispersing concentrations of disaffected workers to more rural environs.

Long-Term Stability over Short-Term Growth

According to the South China Morning Post, the impending economic crisis is rooted in expansive fiscal policy, increased government spending, rising property values, extremely lax monetary policies, record-high bank lending, and exploitation of regulatory loopholes. In 2009, during the last economic crisis in China, then-Premier Wen Jiabao oversaw the disbursement of over $500 billion to stimulate the stagnating economy. This provided badly needed relief to the economy, but ongoing corruption and crony capitalism, combined with rising competition from lower-wage countries like Vietnam, ensured that growth continued to stagnate.

Between 2010 and 2015, Chinese economic growth steadily declined from 10.5% (annual GDP growth) to 6.9%, respectively. The current GDP growth target is 6.5%. Louis-Vincent Gave, co-founder of Gavekal Research, recently said “the 6.5% growth target, you can still achieve it, but at a higher and higher cost. So why would they [the Chinese Government] want to keep doing that?” Gave added that the practice of dropping growth targets could serve to decrease short-term growth, but promote long-term sustainable growth.

Thus, this practice would align with Xi Jinping’s initiative to increase risk management capabilities. While increased oversight would impede short-term growth, it would offer a safety net to the overall economy, while structural reforms would ensure longer-term economic stability.

Rising Debt, Corruption, and Unemployment Will Haunt China Throughout 2018 was originally published on Global Security Review.

A Saudi-backed proposal for a peace plan between Israelis and Palestinians would see the town of Abu Dis as the future capital of Palestine—instead of East Jerusalem. The proposed initiative would give the Palestinian Authority only limited sovereignty over Palestinian territory which has stirred widespread anger in the region.

The New York Times reported that Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman presented the proposal during Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas’ visit to Riyadh last month. It was during that visit that Bin Salman reportedly gave an ultimatum to Abbas that he was to either accept the proposed peace plan or resign. Activists are responding to the Saudi proposal on Twitter using the hashtag #JerusalemIsOurCapital.

Abu Dis is a Palestinian town located to the east of East Jerusalem, which is occupied and administered by Israel. Situated within Area B, Abu Dis is currently administered by both Israel and the Palestinian Authority.

Palestinians Would Have Partial Sovereignty Over a Non-Contiguous State

Under the Saudi-proposed peace plan, the Palestinians would have partial sovereignty over a non-contiguous state located in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The majority of Israeli settlements in the West Bank would remain. The Palestinian diaspora—Palestinian refugees and their descendants living in other countries—would not receive the right of return to Israel. Saudi Arabia reportedly gave Abbas two months to respond to the offer.

US President Donald Trump has recognized Jerusalem as Israel’s capital and has begun the process of relocation the US Embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, a decision that lies in contrast to several decades of U.S. policy in the Middle East and risks fuelling violence across the region. Regional leaders like Turkey’s President Erdogan and Jordan’s King Abdullah have publicly criticized the decision but were careful not to condemn the U.S. President’s decision too forcefully.

Palestinians Would Get Limited Sovereignty in Saudi-Proposed Peace Plan was originally published on Global Security Review.

1. The U.S. could agree with the North Korean regime over accepting some degree of the North’s nuclear capabilities.
2. The U.S. could use military force to decapitate the government of North Korea and secure its nuclear weapons.
3. The U.S. could steadfastly continue on its current (somewhat provocatory) strategy of containment. Through diplomatic efforts, economic sanctions, force posturing, and investment in ballistic missile defense systems innovation, the U.S. would seek to contain the North Korean regime to contain any future escalation.

Accepting a Nuclear North Korea?

The Trump administration could execute a complete policy reversal and accept North Korea’s nuclear arsenal in negotiations. This would undermine American foreign policy in that it would be seen as the capitulation of the United States to the rogue state of North Korea.

The North Korean government will, in no way, sign a nuclear weapons agreement with the Trump administration that sees them left without a nuclear arsenal. The concept of nuclear deterrence is fundamental to not only North Korea’s national security strategy but to the survival of the Kim family itself.

Military Options for North Korea

Based on the stated end-goal of “denuclearization” on the Korean Peninsula, it is unlikely that the U.S. would submit to demands like talks without preconditions, or agree on a framework for future negotiations. Such an action would look as if the U.S. was weak in upholding a stated national security objective.

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It would also be seen as a sign of weakness by countries like Iran, Russia, and China. The alternative would be to use military force—something that seems increasingly likely to occur.

Senator Tammy Duckworth (D-IL), an Iraq War veteran and Purple Heart recipient, said: “we are far closer to actual conflict over North Korea than the American people realize. Everything we’re doing shows a military that, in my personal opinion, has turned the corner.” Senator Duckworth added, “the president is likely to make this decision [to attack], and we need to be ready.”

Launching a Pre-Emptive Strike on North Korea

A conflict in North Korea could erupt with an overwhelming pre-emptive strike by the U.S. on North Korean government, nuclear, artillery, and military targets. This would involve strategic planning to ensure all necessary assets are in the region at the right time.

Despite the outdated nature of North Korea’s military forces, they remain a formidable adversary. North Korea ranks fourth among the world’s largest militaries with more than 1.1 million personnel in the country’s armed forces, accounting for nearly 5 percent of its total population.

Article 86 of the North Korean constitution states “National defense is the supreme duty and honor of citizens,” and it requires all citizens to serve in the military. The regime spent an average of $3.5 billion annually on military expenditures between 2004 and 2014, according to a U.S. State Department report.

Although its neighbors and adversaries outspend Pyongyang in dollar-to-dollar comparisons and defense experts, say it operates with aging equipment and technology, the regime’s forward-deployed military position and missiles aimed at Seoul ensure that Pyongyang’s conventional capabilities remain a constant threat to its southern neighbor. U.S. Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis has cautioned that war on the Korean peninsula would be “catastrophic” and he has described North Korea as “the most urgent and dangerous threat  to peace and security.”

“Sleepwalking” the path to war with North Korea

The alternate route to war is more subtle than an overwhelming pre-emptive strike. As the U.S. military steps up its air surveillance and show-of-force flights along North Korean borders, the risk of an incident occurring grows by the day. North Korean forces may perceive a show-of-force flight by a U.S. bomber as a critical threat and shoot it down, or they may believe it to be within North Korean airspace (even if it isn’t) and shoot it down just the same.

If an event such as this were to take place, there is little debate that the U.S. President would order a counterattack. North Korea has a significant number of artillery and short-range missile batteries within range of Seoul. There is little doubt that, in the event of an escalation to conflict, these would be used immediately to inflict as much damage as possible on South Korean and American positions (both military and civilian).

In contrast to Syria, where American destroyers launched Tomahawk cruise missiles at a target within Syrian territory from the safety of the Mediterranean and without much of a risk for a counterattack, U.S. forces engaged in a counterstrike against North Korea in such a scenario would be land, air, and sea forces of overwhelming capability. There would be very limited time to secure critical military assets and positions before they could be used against U.S.-allied forces.

The U.S., South Korean, and (presumably) Japanese forces would need to concentrate initial efforts on disabling North Korea’s artillery batteries and missile installations that are within range of Seoul, eliminating the regime’s command-and-control capabilities over their troops, and securing North Korea’s nuclear arsenal before it can be used.  It would be nearly impossible to execute a pre-emptive strike that minimized civilian and military casualties. Any war, conflict, or use of force on the Korean peninsula will risk a resulting death toll of a size not seen since the last Korean War.

Sleepwalking into War: The North Korean Quagmire was originally published on Global Security Review.

A leaked document published on the Chinese microblogging site Weibo, states that China is constructing numerous refugee camps capable of holding large numbers of asylum seekers fleeing potential disaster on the Korean Peninsula. “As the situation on the North Korean border intensifies, the Changbai County Government is preparing to build five refugee camps,” the document states.

The document has since been removed from Weibo. It remains unverified but is linked to the Changbai branch of the China Mobile Group, the largest state-owned telecommunications company in China. Changbai county sits on the Chinese side of the border with North Korea.

[bs-quote quote=”As the situation on the North Korean border intensifies, the Changbai County Government is preparing to build five refugee camps.” style=”default” align=”center”][/bs-quote]

The document states that “as required by Changbai County Government, the local China Mobile branch will be responsible for ensuring the full functionality of mobile signals and communication networks in the region.” It adds that Shenhai Fu, the local branch manager is leading the team, and had inspected the alleged construction site earlier this month on December 2 under the instruction of the Changbai County Government.

“Shenhai Fu has led the team to visit the settlement, and performed communications tests,” the document continues, adding that signals were still not up to par and weak in specific areas. The document’s language, as well as the subtitle “North Korean refugee settlement plans” imply the telecommunications services and tests were one part of a significant project.

The validity of the original three-page document hasn’t been independently verified at this time, however, analysts say that the format it was written in, the language used, the level of detail, the mention of Shenhai Fu by name (whose social media accounts are linked to China Mobile), as well as the fact the original document had since been completely culled, have led many experts to conclude the report is genuine.

Contingency Planning

“It’s a perfectly sensible decision and to be expected that China will be putting contingency plans in place for a potential influx of large numbers of refugees from the Korean Peninsula given the current situation,” China-Korea expert Dr. Leonid Petrov told the Australian Broadcasting Corporation.

“I know that Russia — who also shares a small border with North Korea — has been building refugee camps some 15 years ago as part of its contingency plans, in case of an exodus triggered by famine or war or the like.” Petrov continued by saying “it’s only a sensible decision, and from the Chinese perspective, it would be wise to plan [in advance] and prepare the capacity to accept and absorb large groups of people, given that the neighboring provinces are heavily populated by ethnic Koreans.”

He added that “pre-empting that situation is, of course, the ideal, which is why Beijing officially maintains its position of denuclearization on the peninsula.” Dr. Petrov also said the logistics mentioned in the document and language used make “perfect sense” given the geography the region along North Korea’s border with China.

China Constructing Refugee Camps Along North Korean Border was originally published on Global Security Review.

The 2016 Brexit vote and rising the popularity of far-right nationalist political parties in Western Europe has led many observers to question the long-term viability of a united Europe. In the aftermath of the 2016 U.S. presidential election, many were concerned that European far-right politicians like Marine Le Pen would gain traction in their electoral contests.

However, despite considerable attempts by Le Pen’s campaign—and the Kremlin, in no small degree—Emmanuel Macron led a stunning rebuke of the populist trend circumventing the globe. Europe seems to be trending away from the right as the United States Government continues to be paralyzed by the competing factions of the governing Republican Party.

Rising ethnic, demographic, and economic tensions will make European integration more difficult. Furthermore, Europeans must repair the structural problems in E.U. institutions. For example, E.U. agencies set monetary policy for members of the Eurozone; however, member states retain control over their financial and security obligations. This leaves poorer E.U. states like Greece with vast amounts of debt and decreasing growth prospects. There is no unified E.U. security policy; each member state determines its national security strategy.

The E.U. Will Attempt to Implement Reforms in 2018

Europe is in dire need of reform, both politically and economically. The bloc faces significant internal divisions. Demographics, economic stagnation, and ideological arguments threaten the European Union’s ability to act as a global power.

Over the next two years, the E.U. will need to decide whether or not it is in search of an ever-closer union, mainly as it manages Brexit negotiations. The bloc’s leadership badly needs to prove the legitimacy and value of the Union, and consolidating power as the UK leaves may be the way forward.

While Brexit initially seemed to undermine the E.U.’s standing overseas, it may have had the opposite effect. Member states on the continent have primarily reaffirmed their commitment to the bloc, particularly following the election of pro-EU President Emmanuel Macron of France.

In fact, the loss of the UK may facilitate more easy implementation of EU-wide fiscal and monetary policies, as the UK has famously retained its currency—the pound—and with it, monetary sovereignty.

Security concerns may play a decisive role in further E.U. integration. Concerns about U.S. credibility following the election of Donald Trump could lead to higher military integration by E.U. members. Germany, which has maintained a more pacifist stance since the end of the Cold War, is integrating parts of its’ armed forces with the militaries of the Czech Republic, the Netherlands, and Romania.

Increased numbers of NATO and European troops have been deployed along Europe’s frontiers with Russia and Belarus.  Additionally, there has been more and more talk of greater security integration and E.U.-wide policy towards defense and security.

What’s the future of the European Union?

Economically, Europe is still at risk. Eurozone banks continue to distribute capital unevenly due to irregular E.U. banking regulations. Migration within the E.U. will persist, as will migration to Europe from Africa, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia. Separatist movements will continue, encouraged by the Brexit movement.

Demographically, Europe’s population is changing. Aging population will consume government revenues as health care will be an even more significant concern. Youth unemployment in countries like Spain and Italy will continue to be a security risk, as this is a group at risk for violent radicalization. Growth will be dependent on Europe’s abilities to reform E.U. institutions, provide employment, and manage public anxiety about issues like immigration, terrorism, and national identity.

Of immediate concern is the aftermath of the recent Catalonian independence crisis in Spain. The handling of the issue by the central government in Madrid, the imprisonment of Catalonian political leaders, and the steadfast refusal of Catalonia’s leaders to find a compromise could destabilize the internal politics of the bloc, and encourage other separatist regions in E.U.-states like Belgium to pursue secession referendums of their own. The dispute could be prolonged in the aftermath of snap elections called in the wake of Madrid seizing administrative power over Catalonia.

The European Union Faces Challenges to Its Legitimacy in 2018 was originally published on Global Security Review.

China will send troops to Syria to aid President Bashar Al-Assad’s forces, according to reports in Saudi outlet The New Khaleej. This move comes alongside China’s increasing concerns regarding the presence of Islamic militants in the region of East Turkestan, who have accused of aiding opposition groups in Syria.

During a meeting with Syrian Presidential Advisor Bouthaina Shaaban, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi praised the regime’s efforts at combating fighters from the Islamic East Turkistan Movement. The Syrian government has also claimed that some 5,000 soldiers of Uyghur origin, an ethnic Muslim minority that Chinese authorities regularly accuse of terrorism, have arrived in Syria, illegally passing through Southeast Asia and Turkey.

The report states that the Chinese Ministry of Defense intends to send two special operations forces units known as the “Siberian Tigers” and the “Night Tigers” to aid Syrian government troops.

This is not the first time Chinese troops have crossed into Syria; in 2015 the Syrian regime permitted some 5,000 soldiers to operate within its territory in partnership with local forces. They were in the Western region of Latakia. Chinese military advisors were also among the deployment, which included naval and aerial assets.

China is one of the five veto-wielding powers of the UN Security Council and, along with Russia, has used its power on more than one occasion to protect the interests of the Syrian government. Russian support has given the government an upper hand in the six-year-long civil war, especially as the battle against ISIS comes to an end.

More than half a million people are believed to have been killed since 2011, the vast majority by the Assad government and allied forces. The regime has also used chemical weapons against civilians and prevented aid from reaching those affected on the ground. UN officials further estimate that some ten million people have been displaced as a result of the fighting.

China to Deploy Special Forces Units to Syria was originally published on Global Security Review.

The United States formally recognizes Jerusalem as Israel’s capital, according to an announcement made by President Donald Trump on December 6, 2017. The statement brushed aside widespread international opposition to the move. Trump will be directing the State Department to initiate the relocation of the American embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, which is claimed by Israelis and Palestinians. The move is expected to take several years.

During a public address from the Diplomatic Reception Room at the White House, Trump said his announcement “marks the beginning of a new approach to the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians.” He continued by saying that “there will, of course, be disagreement and dissent regarding this announcement — but we are confident that ultimately, as we work through these disagreements, we will arrive at a place of greater understanding and cooperation.” He added that “this is nothing more or less than a recognition of reality.”

Trump’s decision goes in direct contrast to decades of American policy, as well as the rest of the international community, except Israel. No nation has its embassy in Jerusalem. It is also likely to stymy any effort to restart long-stalled peace Israeli-Palestinian peace talks. Israel is the only country in the world where the international community largely unrecognizes the national capital that is claimed by the government. In the last days of the Obama administration, then-Secretary of State John Kerry said Palestinians have a shared claim to the holy city.

Trump’s controversial move is nearly guaranteed to derail peace talks between Palestinians and Israelis. Palestinians have sought to lay claim to East Jerusalem as the capital of their future state. Israel has occupied East Jerusalem since 1967. Trump will sign a six-month waiver off-setting the embassy’s relocation on national security grounds, according to an official knowledgeable on the matter.

Successive U.S. presidents of both parties have signed the waiver since the Jerusalem Embassy Act went into law in 1995, perpetually forestalling the building’s legislated move over concerns it could spark a diplomatic or security crisis, which would be a death knell for peace talks.

“Some say they lacked courage, but they made their best judgment based on facts as they understood them at the time,” Trump said about past presidents who signed the waiver. “Nevertheless, the record is in. After more than two decades of waivers, we are no closer to a lasting peace agreement between Israel and the Palestinians. It would be folly to assume that repeating the same formula would now produce a different or better result.”

Palestinian leaders have already called for three “days of rage” to contest Trump’s decision.

Jerusalem is considered a holy city to Jews, Christians, and Muslims. Any change to contested city’s status quo has been met with fierce opposition. Israel’s decision to restrict Muslim access to the al-Aqsa mosque compound in 2015 set off widespread street violence between Palestinians and Israeli security forces. An Israeli judgment to install controversial metal detectors at the mosque’s entrance earlier this year was ultimately reversed after being met with mass protests by Palestinians.

[bs-quote quote=”With widespread calls for demonstrations beginning December 6 in Jerusalem and the West Bank, U.S. government employees and their family members are not permitted until further notice to conduct personal travel in Jerusalem’s Old City and in the West Bank, to include Bethlehem and Jericho. Official travel by U.S. government employees in Jerusalem’s Old City and in the West Bank is permitted only to conduct essential travel and with additional security measures. United States citizens should avoid areas where crowds have gathered and where there is increased police and/or military presence. We recommend that U.S. citizens take into consideration these restrictions and the additional guidance contained in the Department of State’s travel warning for Israel, the West Bank and Gaza when making decisions regarding their travel.” style=”default” align=”center” author_name=”U.S. Department of State” author_avatar=”http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/dos-logo-light.png”][/bs-quote]

Recognizing Jerusalem as Israel’s capital, and moving the U.S. embassy to the city could spark unrest across the Middle East and simultaneously undermine American efforts to develop a new peace plan. The State Department has issued warnings to U.S. embassies about possible protests across the Middle East.

U.S. Recognizes Jerusalem as Israeli Capital was originally published on Global Security Review.

On December 1, 2017, Israeli warplanes attacked targets in Syria. The raid was intended to convey a political message: that a permanent Iranian military base would never be permitted to be established on Syrian territory.

Reports in Yedioth Ahronoth, Israel Hayom, Maariv, and Haaretz, stated that the raid was preceded by leaked photos of the target (a military base) to the BBC some three weeks earlier.

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, Defence Minister Avigdor Lieberman, and the Chief of General Staff of the Israel Defence Forces, Gadi Eizenkot, have all suggested that an attack might be imminent in recent weeks.

Alex Fishman, a military analyst for Yedioth Ahronoth, said that with this raid “Israel has apparently moved from the verbal stage of threatening and warning the Iranians and the Syrians to the stage of action.”

[bs-quote quote=”Any military escalation with Israel would not probably be that profitable, but with Iran’s continuous military settlement and the raids attributed to Israel, it is possible to say that both sides are walking on the edge.” style=”default” align=”center”][/bs-quote]

The raid, according to Fishman, “is Israel’s way of explaining to all sides that if they do not take Israel’s interests into consideration and allow Iran to settle in Syrian territories as a large military force, they will have to pay the price at a military level. Now all the involved parties in the settlement process in Syria, including the Syrians, Iranians, Russians, Turks, Americans, and Europeans, should deal with Israel as a key entity which has the ability to militarily disrupt any settlement.”

Fishman added, “The military base that was attacked yesterday is located in the surveillance area from the Israeli borders (in occupied Golan).” He pointed out that the timing of the raid was not accidental, as it was carried out while this military base is still empty of soldiers, and that the message Israel has conveyed is “I do this before you launch this military base and raise Iranian flags here.”

Israel has drawn a “red line” when it comes to the Iranian presence in Syria

Yossi Melman, a military analyst, wrote in Maariv that the raid was “more a stout Israeli attempt to convey a message to Russia than to President Bashar Al-Assad and Iran … The message is that Israel is serious when it says it will not allow the establishment of Iranian military bases in Syria.”

Melman added that Israel is confident that the Syrian regime will not respond to the Israeli aggression. He wrote: “Assad cannot allow himself to respond to Israel’s violation of sovereignty more than launching ineffective rockets from his air defense system because Israel will respond with greater force. Launching a front against Israel is the last thing Assad wants at this stage.”

According to Melman, Israel has expanded its “red lines” imposed on Syria. Melman stated that the Israeli strike would not prevent Iran from continuing to pursue its strategic goals, including a military presence in Syria, and that Iran “would not give up its military achievements in Syria.”

Amos Harel, a military analyst for Haaretz, also stated that he believed that the raid was a message to Iran, the Syrian regime and the super powerful states as well.

Harel added that the most important question at present is how Iran would behave in the long term; and will it increase its efforts to remain in Syria? Harel continued by stating “Iran has a clear strategic goal of activating a link between Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Hezbollah in Lebanon. Any military escalation with Israel would not probably be that profitable, but with Iran’s continuous military settlement and the raids attributed to Israel it is possible to say that both sides are walking on the edge.”

Israeli Warplanes Attacked Syrian Military Base to Convey Message to Iran was originally published on Global Security Review.

The terrorist threat is likely to increase as the means and the motivations of states, groups, and people to impose harm diversify. Prolonged conflicts and the info age allow terrorists to recruit and operate on a large scale, demonstrating the evolving nature of the threat.

Terrorism kills fewer people globally than crime or disease, but the potential for new capabilities reaching the hands of people bent on apocalyptic destruction is all too real. This ultimate low-probability, high-impact event underscores the imperative of international cooperation and state attention to the issue.

Terrorists will continue to justify their violence by their very own interpretations of religion, but several underlying drivers are also in play. Within nations, the breakdown of state structures in much of the Middle East carries on to create space for extremists.

The Sunni-Shia Divide Will Fuel Ongoing Sectarianism

The ongoing proxy war between Iran and Saudi Arabia also is fueling Shia-Sunni sectarianism—with a few militant groups further fracturing over religious differences. Additionally, perceptions of “Western hegemony” remains a potent rallying cry for some groups, mobilized around striking the “far enemy.”

Even though the location of religiously driven terrorism will fluctuate, the rise of violent religious nationalism and the schism between Shia and Sunni are likely to worsen in the short term and may not abate by 2035.

A combination of ideologies such as Salafi-jihadism (like ISIL’s or al-Qaeda’s), in a region undergoing vast and rapid political change—against the backdrop of generations of autocratic government and economic disparities—create an ideological nexus where the likelihood of violence only increases. Militant Christianity and Islam in central Africa, militant Buddhism in Burma, and violent Hindutva in India will all continue to fuel terror and conflict.

Extremists will exploit anger and link perceived injustices with the collective identity of deepening religious affiliation in some areas of the world. Religion will become a more important source of meaning and continuity because of increasing info connectedness, the extent of state weakness in much of the developing world, and the rise of alienation due to the dislocation from traditional work in the industrialized world. Rapid change and conditions of political and economic uncertainty, if not insecurity, will encourage many individuals to embrace ideologies and identities for meaning and continuity.

The vast majority of believers will be peaceful, but those with extreme views will find like-minded followers and vulnerable recruits through info technology. Most world religions—including Christianity, Islam, and Judaism, Buddhism, and Hinduism—have exclusionary aspects of doctrine that may be exploited in this way.

Beyond religion, psychological and social factors will drive individual participation in terrorism, as well as help terrorist groups attract recruits and resources and maintain cohesion. Groups will exploit ethnic and kinship bonds, peer, social or familial networks, as well as a desire for adventure, fame, and belonging, to swell their ranks.

They will also exploit feelings of alienation that are spreading across the world as young people feel increasingly disconnected from the socio-cultural mainstream, that they are unable to take part from the political process, or lacking in certain economic or social advantages.

Advances in information technology—whether with the printing press and Gutenberg Bible in the fifteenth century or with the invention of the World Wide Web in 1989—allow religious content to spread widely, in part because religions are ideas that transcend borders and are usually more influential in daily lives than state authority.

Technology may be a double-edged sword.

On the one hand, it is going to facilitate communications, recruitment, logistics, and lethality. On the other hand, it is going to provide governments with strategies to identify and describe threats, if their publics let them. Technology will continue to enable non-state actors to mask their action and identity. The use of cyber tools to get down electric systems, for example, has possible mass disruption effects, a few with deadly consequences.

Communication technology also will be critical to non-state actors capability to recruit new members, fund operations, and disseminate messages. Advancements in technology will lower technological barriers to high impact, low likelihood terrorist WMD situations, and enable the proliferation of deadly, conventional weapons to terrorist groups.

Technology will further decentralize terrorist threats. Centrally controlled and hierarchical organizations like Al Qaeda could shift into widespread jihadist militancy, for example. This tendency will pose barriers to counterterrorism efforts and adjust the nature of future terrorist plots and approaches.

Non-State Actors: Terrorist Groups and Insurgencies was originally published on Global Security Review.

Secretary of State Rex Tillerson may have to resign by the beginning of 2018. A report published by the New York Times comes at a time when the relationship between Tillerson and U.S. President Donald Trump is increasingly strained.  White House officials were cited in a report detailing that a plan is being discussed to replace the current Secretary of State.

According to the New York Times, “The White House has developed a plan to force out Secretary of State Rex W. Tillerson, whose relationship with President Trump has been strained, and replace him with Mike Pompeo, the C.I.A. director, perhaps within the next several weeks, senior administration officials said on Thursday.” The report added,  “John F. Kelly, the White House chief of staff, developed the transition plan and has discussed it with other officials.”

On Thursday, President Trump responded to questions from reporters by saying, “He’s here. Rex is here.” White House Press Secretary Sarah Huckabee Sanders later rejected the reports in a statement: “There are no personnel announcements at this time.” Sanders added, “Secretary Tillerson continues to lead the State Department, and the entire cabinet is focused on completing this incredibly successful first year of President Trump’s administration.”

In response to media reports, Senator Bob Corker (R, Tennessee), Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, said Mr. Tillerson was “unaware of anything changing.”

What’s the Potential Cause of Tillerson’s Ouster?

Tillerson and Trump diverge sharply when it comes to foreign policy.  The BBC’s Barbara Plett compared the two to ‘chalk and cheese in temperament and the way they work…Mr. Trump is also said to have complained that his secretary of state is too ‘establishment.’”

Their differences in foreign policy have repeatedly come to light. The Secretary of State has sought diplomatic engagement with North Korea but has repeatedly been rebuked by the President.  When Tillerson stated that back-channel engagements with the North Korean regimes had been established, Trump tweeted, “I told Rex Tillerson, our wonderful Secretary of State, that he is wasting his time trying to negotiate with Little Rocket Man.”

During the GCC crisis, President Trump apparently supported the Saudi-led bloc and said that the blockade against Qatar was “the beginning of the end to the horror of terrorism.” Conversely, Tillerson has issued statements warning about the humanitarian impact of the blockade and warned that the embargo against Qatar might adversely affect the fight against terrorism.

The New York Times later reported that “President Trump tweeted on Friday that reports he would soon fire Secretary of State Rex W. Tillerson were ‘fake news,’ and that ‘I call the final shots.’ The tweet came just hours after Mr. Tillerson called reports that the White House wants him to resign ‘laughable,’ even as one of his closest aides planned to leave the department.”

White House Signals Secretary of State Rex Tillerson May Be Replaced by CIA Director Mike Pompeo was originally published on Global Security Review.

On November 28, 2017, North Korea conducted a test launch of a nuclear-capable intercontinental ballistic missile after over 70 days without any such activity. According to the U.S. Department of Defense, this is the third ICBM test launch of 2017.

U.S. Secretary of Defense James Mattis stated that the missile most recently launched by the North Koreans “went higher, frankly, than any previous shot they’ve taken.”

[bs-quote quote=”North Korea launched an intercontinental ballistic missile. It went higher, frankly, than any previous shot they’ve taken.
” style=”default” align=”center” author_name=”James Mattis” author_job=”U.S. Secretary of Defense” author_avatar=”http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/1200px-James_Mattis_official_photo.jpg”][/bs-quote]

The ICBM was launched from an area north of Pyongyang in Sain Ni, North Korea. The missile traveled east for about 620 miles (1000 kilometers) before splashing down into the Sea of Japan. The missile landed within Japan’s Exclusive Economic Zone which extends 200 nautical miles from the Japanese coastline.

This latest test launch by the North Koreans occurred just months after North Korea launched ballistic missiles over the northern Japanese island of Hokkaido on two separate occasions.

The missile was launched in a near-vertical trajectory, meaning that if it were fired for distance in a more horizontal trajectory, it would be capable of reaching Washington D.C. and other cities on the east coast of the United States.

The Pentagon has stated that it is working with its interagency partners in the Intelligence Community, Department of State, Department of Homeland Security, and Department of Energy to develop a more detailed assessment of the launch.

Pentagon spokesman Army Colonel Robert Manning said: “We [the United States] remain prepared to defend ourselves and our allies from any attack or provocation.”

The Response from South Korea

In response to the North Korean missile launch, the South Korean military demonstrated the capabilities of its precision-targeted missiles by firing a number of them off the coast of South Korea.

The latest provocation from North Korea comes at a time of division in the trilateral relationship between South Korea, Japan, and the United States. While the South Korean government, cautious about provoking hostilities with the North, has encouraged restraint and dialogue, the United States (backed up by Japan) has increased its threats of military intervention against North Korea if it continues to conduct testing to further its nuclear weapons and intercontinental ballistic missile programs.

North Korea Launches ICBM Capable of Reaching Continental U.S. was originally published on Global Security Review.

A video has emerged on Facebook of Secretary of Defense James Mattis telling a small group of American troops, “You’re a great example of our country right now.” He went on, “Our country, right now, it’s got problems that we don’t have in the military. You just hold the line until our country gets back to understanding and respecting each other and showing it.”

Mattis added that the United States has historically had “two powers” in facing the rest of the world: inspiration and intimidation. The U.S. has lost the former, the secretary said before saying, “we’ll get the power of inspiration back. We’ve got the power of intimidation, and that’s you…If someone wants to screw with our families, our country, and our allies.”

“You just hold the line,” Mattis told the troops—hang on to your toughness and your values—until things back home straighten out. The question is how far that line extends and how far he would go to hold it.

Mattis is using specific words for a specific reason.

Mattis seemed to stop short of crossing any lines in the president’s authority. He didn’t rebuke Trump directly or even mention him by name or title. It’s worth repeating the preface to Mattis’ “hold the line” imperative: “You’re a great example of our country right now. Our country, right now, it’s got problems that we don’t have in the military.”  Seen as a “Praetorian guard-like” statement by some, another interpretation of the impromptu speech is that Mattis is reiterating that the armed forces are apolitical and that the integrity of the military must remain intact, and continue to do so in the event of further political friction or even violence.

The use of the word “until” when Mattis says “hold the line until our country gets back to understanding and respecting each other and showing it” is worth noting. It could imply that Mattis sees the domestic political situation as being more top-down than grassroots; that it will be solved or at least alleviated to a measurable degree within a reasonable amount of time. Beyond this is speculation, but we do know that Mattis chooses his words mindfully, understanding the extent to which his words matter.

Is Mattis the “acting” Commander-in-Chief?

In May, NSA Director Mike Rogers reportedly told agency employees that the agency is in possession of damning SIGINT evidence relating to the Russia investigation. As Defense Secretary—a senior-level cabinet member, and a Principal member of the National Security Council—Secretary Mattis would undoubtedly be aware of any such evidence.

This isn’t quite how democracy is supposed to work in the United States. There’s a reason the Founding Fathers stressed the need for civilian control of the military. The founding documents of the Defense Department—formed 70 years ago—re-iterate that. It’s customary for the armed forces to serve as the bulwark against foreign enemies; they’re typically not used to do so against the whims and outbursts of the country’s elected commander in chief.

Historical precedent: the Nixon era

While unusual, this isn’t the first time the military has had to deal with an unstable President.  During the final weeks of Richard Nixon’s presidency, Nixon was so out of touch that he was losing the ability to exercise the powers of his position.

For weeks, the day-to-day operations of the White House — and, really, the Presidency itself — were handled by General Alexander Haig, a four-star Army general and the White House Chief of Staff. Secretary of State and National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger had near-total control and oversight over U.S. foreign policy.

Even early into his presidency, Nixon exhibited instability. Describing events that occurred nearly five years before Nixon’s resignation, Former CIA analyst George Carver reportedly said that when the North Koreans shot down a US spy plane in 1969, “Nixon became incensed and ordered a tactical nuclear strike… The Joint Chiefs were alerted and asked to recommend targets, but [Secretary of State] Henry Kissinger got on the phone to them. They agreed not to do anything until Nixon sobered up in the morning.”

“Al Haig is keeping the country together, and I am keeping the world together.” – Secretary of State Henry Kissinger in 1974 

In the weeks immediately preceding Nixon’s resignation, Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger urged General George S. Brown, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, not to take military orders directly from the President. In an attempt to save the country from any extra-constitutional power grab by a desperate President, the military chain-of-command took the extra-constitutional step of removing the President from the loop.

Schlesinger also considered options to remove the President from office forcibly. If it were necessary, the Defense Secretary’s tentative plan was to send the 82nd Airborne from Fort Bragg, North Carolina to Washington, D.C. As it turned out, Nixon resigned, and these contingencies remained just that.

If events spiraled in another direction, and if Brown had obeyed Schlesinger instead of Nixon, that would have amounted to significant insubordination. In another country, similar events would be considered to be a coup. While haven’t reached that point today, one can certainly imagine Secretary Mattis and Chief of Staff Secretary John Kelly thinking what they might do if an increasingly embattled President Trump issued an unusual order of his own.

Secretary Mattis: “We’ve Lost the Power of Inspiration; We’ve Got the Power of Intimidation.” was originally published on Global Security Review.

This report comes from Twitter user Mujtahidd, an account which is believed to be reporting from inside the ruling family in Saudi Arabia, wrote: “Arrangement among the UAE, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain is wider than our expectations. Israel and American bodies linked to Trump are involved.”

“The plan is complete. It is based on unifying the bases of security, media, culture, and education, including religion, in Egypt and all the Gulf States except Oman.”

[bs-quote quote=”Bin Salman was enthusiastic about the implementation of the plan due to Israel’s pledge to get Trump’s help to support his bid to become King of Saudi Arabia.” style=”default” align=”left”][/bs-quote]

The plan, according to Mujtahid, was drawn in Egypt which is the “supplier of cadres who will deal with the issues of media, security, Islamic movements, education syllabuses and religious institutions.”

The Crown Prince’s plan is based on unifying the bases of security, media, culture, and education, including religion.

According to Mujtahidd, it aims to “distance any political, cultural, educational, financial, religious effect on the people of Egypt and the Gulf States to reach a state of full and eternal normalization with Israel.”

It also said that the arrangement for this plan started in Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the UAE and Israel before US President Donald Trump was inaugurated, noting that former American President Barack Obama did not join the plan because he feared these states and the recklessness of Crown Prince Mohamed Bin Salman.

Trump, Mujtahidd tweeted, supported the plan and this encouraged Bin Salman and Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi Mohammed Bin Zayed to kick-start its implementation earlier than planned. The project includes hiring hundreds of Egyptian officials and officers in the Gulf States to supervise security, armies, media, religion, and education.

Mujtahidd added that the plan includes arresting hundreds of religious scholars, stressing that Bin Salman was enthusiastic about the implementation of the plan due to Israel’s pledge to get Trump’s help to support his bid to become King of Saudi Arabia.

The Twitter user added the plan was implemented and included the “use of social media to turn the public opinion against Islam in general and specifically political Islam and accepting Israel as a brotherly state.”

Saudi Arabia’s Grand Plan for Modernization—and better ties with Israel was originally published on Global Security Review.

This comes alongside news that the Polish military will create a 50,000-strong volunteer militia as fears grow of a resurgent Russia under President Vladimir Putin. Poland shares a border with Russia. Since Moscow has annexed Crimea from Ukraine and supported the insurgency in the east of the nation, Russia’s neighbors have warily observed its military expansion.

Polish President Andrzej Duda signed off a statement which will increase defense spending and increase the strength of the military by 50,000 troops from the current 100,000 troops. The bill will also include provisions for a volunteer militia force, numbering around 50,000, according to reports from state broadcaster Polskie Radio.

Increased Defense Spending is Policy Everyone Can Agree On

The bill—a rare piece of cross-partisan legislation—envisions defense spending increasing to up to 2.5 percent of Poland’s gross domestic product by 2030. Most NATO members have yet to meet their pledges to increase defense spending to, at least, 2 percent of their respective GDPs.

Of the 28 NATO members, only the U.S., the U.K., Greece, Poland, and Estonia currently meet the 2 percent threshold that all members have pledged to meet. “The Polish army will, within ten years, gain the capability of stopping every opponent,” said the Polish Defence Minister Antoni Macierewicz.

Poland is one of just five NATO allies that share a border with Russia, along with all 3 Baltic countries, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. NATO’s ongoing reinforcements in Eastern Europe has leaned towards alleviating the anxieties of Poland and the Baltic states (Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia), where multinational NATO battalions are based.

Deterrence or Expansion?

Russia has consistently argued that NATO expansion in the former Soviet sphere of influence is part of a strategic encirclement of Russian territory, rather than providing protection for European states that would be otherwise vulnerable to Moscow. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov has vowed that his nation would never strike a NATO ally and risk a conflict.

Nevertheless, confidence in Russian foreign policy among Western governments is at a post-Cold War low. The Kremlin has made a string of spurious claims about the character of its campaign in Syria, in which it’s denied all reports of infringing and bombing civilians. Russia’s official policy is to refuse any military backing for insurgents in east Ukraine. However, the insurgents themselves have claimed to have thousands of Russian troops in their ranks.

Poland Will Increase the Size of Its Military by Over 50% was originally published on Global Security Review.

Summary

• Madrid takes immediate control of its institutions and sets early regional elections for December 21.
• If the unionist forces prevail, they’ll fight to form a united front, because they’ve little in common with each other beyond their desire to stay in Spain.
• If secessionists win, as most polls indicate, they will need to determine whether or not to push ahead with secession, potentially risking a dangerous confrontation with the Spanish state, or disappoint a large part of their electorate by entering into negotiations with Madrid.
• In an ideal situation, the catastrophe would open the door for a discussion about Spain’s political and territorial model, similar to the one who followed the end of Franco’s dictatorship.

A couple of weeks following the election, which took place October 1, Madrid responded to Catalonia’s subsequent declaration of independence by dissolving the Catalan government, taking immediate control of its institutions and calling early regional elections for December 21. But Catalan society is broken, and also the political and emotional distance between the Catalan nationalists and the Spanish trade unionists so high, that the vote alone won’t end the region’s issues. The gap that separates the nationalists out of unionists raises questions regarding Spain’s future.

The nation which managed to construct a democracy following the conclusion of a dictatorship in the late 1970s seems disoriented as it endures its most significant crisis in four decades. Opposing Views of the Identical Event. Catalans were divided between nationalists and unionists long before last month’s referendum. The events of October 1 only created more controversy.

The nationalists argue that the vote, which occurred against all the odds, confirmed Catalonia’s desire. They also see the police crackdown on voters as evidence of Spain’s hostility towards Catalonia. The Spanish government and unionist voters, and on the other hand, assert that the referendum is illegal, that it lacked a proper electoral roll along with a valid electoral commission.

[bs-quote quote=”In an ideal situation, the catastrophe would open the door for a discussion about Spain’s political and territorial model, similar to the one who followed the end of Franco’s dictatorship.” style=”style-5″ align=”center”][/bs-quote]

From their viewpoint, the vote confirmed only that regional leaders are willing to violate the law to achieve their political goals. Although the interpretations of what happened differ broadly, there is no denying the fluctuations the vote produced. Before October 1 the proud and provocative–though internally fragmented—separatist government headed Catalonia.

The pro-freedom flag known as the estelada hung from balconies throughout the region, while the Spanish flag flew in only a couple of public buildings. Only the expert independence organizations seemed capable of phoning millions of Catalans to the streets to maintain the most significant demonstrations Europe has experienced in quite a long time.

Catalonia’s secession movement is part of a growing trend of nationalism in Europe

Nationalists controlled the streets, the story of the events, and they had been the only ones with a transparent strategy to sell their origin to the rest of the planet. By early November things had changed drastically. The Spanish administration ignored the Catalan government, and several former Catalan officials have been in prison or take shelter in Belgium.

Spanish flags competed with the esteladas on balconies and terraces, particularly in Barcelona. Unity groups had organized two massive demonstrations, demonstrating that they, too, can mobilize large crowds. It seemed as if Catalonia’s quiet majority, as politicians and commentators called them, had finally woken up that the region was facing the abyss.

Outside Catalonia, a form of nationalism has begun to take on as well. Merchants have happily announced that sales of Spanish flags had skyrocketed lately as a result. However, the growing nationalism also had a darker side. Conservative groups called for a boycott of products, and small far-right groups chanted fascist slogans at unity demonstrations.

Catalan nationalism has existed for hundreds of years, and the region has rebelled against Madrid many times. Economic troubles and corruption cases involving members of Spain party strengthened separatist sentiments in recent decades.

Catalan leaders are accountable for the situation, having encouraged independence to divert voters attention from unpopular spending cuts and their very own corruption scandals. Catalan conservatives decision to abandon their traditional quest for autonomy and concentrate instead of independence helped the secessionist parties to gain ground from the center-left and left, to the point that they now command the independence movement.

The 3 Core Ideas of Catalan Secessionism

The secessionist storyline is based on three core ideas: The Spanish state is hostile to Catalonia, it threatens Catalonia’s identity, and it takes advantage of Catalonia’s wealth. The fiscal issues are subject to endless debate because though Catalonia is a contributor to the Spanish state, other regions are, too. A debate in which Spain is hostile to Catalonia and the Catalan identity is contentious. Catalan is widely spoken in the region’s public administration. Also, schools instruct Catalan history and civilization, a radical difference in the life under Francisco Franco’s dictatorship, which banned regional languages. Hardcore Spanish nationalists, in actuality, lament Madrid’s decision to give Catalonia control of its education system, which they see as a secessionist factory.

To be specific, a few Spanish government representatives have spoken with contempt of Catalonia in latest months, and the pictures of cops using force to prevent individuals from voting October 1 did not help. However, these episodes aren’t elements of a plot against the region. A running joke in Catalonia is that nobody has made a more substantial effort to create secessionists than Spain’s prime minister. Catalonia’s freedom movement is active, but it’s heterogeneous. The individuals who’ve voted for secessionist parties lately fall into three principal groups. The first includes individuals who want freedom as quickly as possible, at any cost.

[bs-quote quote=”A running joke in Catalonia is that nobody has done more for the secessionist cause than Rajoy. ” style=”style-16″ align=”center”][/bs-quote]

They feel no cultural or emotional connection to Spain, a country they consider as alien, remote and antagonistic. They consider Catalonian institutions more legitimate than their Spanish counterparts, plus they believe that Spain’s judicial system is corrupt and subject to Madrid’s political sway. They also tend to have negative opinions of southern Spanish regions, which in their view receive too much money from the state. This category is firm in the Catalan hinterland, where only Catalan is spoken and where migrants from elsewhere in Spain well.

The second group consists of those who consider independence as ideal, they’re angry at the Spanish government for its reluctance to negotiate with a legal referendum, plus they attribute Madrid’s intransigence to the crisis. This group has some relations with the 3rd one, made up of those who don’t need independence, but who vote for separatist parties in protest against the Spanish authorities. For them, the problem isn’t necessarily Spain, but the Spanish state and, particularly, Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy’s authorities. Both of these voting blocs eventually could go back to a more moderate position, if Spanish authorities listened to them.

A running joke in Catalonia is that nobody has done more for the secessionist cause than Rajoy. Catalonia’s communications infrastructure is a well-oiled broadcasting and propaganda machine. Everything, from radio and TV to WhatsApp classes and events, is utilized to disperse pro-independence views. Catalan nationalists also have a knack for promoting their origin abroad. For the last five years, pro-independence organizers have designed demonstrations to be unusual events which will draw the attention of Television broadcasters and captivate social network users around the world. Even Barcelona’s football team plays a part in the marketing campaign: Its games are a stage for expert independence messages.

In each game, for instance, people start to sing in favor of independence when the clock reaches 17:14. Catalan officials are almost always keen to speak to international media to market their platform, and the area has started unofficial embassies in dozens of nations. By comparison, Catalonia’s unionists lacked a collective voice, then later, in a lot of cases, would decide to remain quiet on the topic of secession to prevent a confrontation with the pro-independence camp. The Spanish authorities, meanwhile, have done little to win back the minds and hearts of ordinary Catalans who’ve turned into independence only as a protest against a government that appears uninterested in them.

The Spanish Government’s strategy (or lack thereof) for managing the Catalan secession issue only increases secessionist legitimacy.

Madrid’s strategy to deal with the secessionist movement concentrates on the fact that independence is illegal. The central government has made no visible attempt to present a story to counter that of the separatists. The strategy seems to work everywhere in actuality, The ruling party, the Popular Party, is still the most famous political force in the nation. Taking into consideration the region’s political situation, however, employing the same strategy in Catalonia is insecure.

What the separatists need can be illegal under the current constitution, but that does not make their emotions any less real. Six weeks after the independence referendum, the psychological and political space between a society and the rest of Spain is as vast as ever. Madrid cannot afford to ignore the millions of Catalans who no longer feel at home in Spain. In the same time, the Catalan leadership is trapped in its own story, the snowball it’s generated is getting ever more significant as it rolls out of control.

Whichever side wins the December 21 regional elections, the Catalan conflict won’t end there. If secessionists win, as most polls indicate, they will need to determine whether or not to push ahead with secession, potentially risking a dangerous confrontation with the Spanish state, or disappoint a large part of their electorate by entering into negotiations with Madrid. And if the unionist forces prevail, they’ll fight to form a united front, because they’ve little in common with each other beyond their desire to stay in Spain.

In an ideal situation, the catastrophe would open the door for a discussion about Spain’s political and territorial model, similar to the one who followed the end of Franco’s dictatorship. Spain’s transition to democracy gave policymakers chance to explore the sort of country they desired for the future. Thus far, however, no signals have emerged that any form of debate will take place between Madrid and Catalonia.

Spain-Catalonia Secession Crisis Won’t End After December Elections was originally published on Global Security Review.

India’s GDP trajectory over the next 34 years is distinctly separate from its GDP per capita progression, demonstrating that while strong population growth can be an integral driver of Gross domestic product growth, it may also make it more challenging to boost income levels.

Nevertheless, this gap is closing. U.S. Gross domestic product per capita is presently around four times the size of China and almost nine times that of India. By 2050, these openings are projected to reduce to about double China and approximately three times India’s, demonstrating long-term income convergence.

The global economy will slow down with time, with a marked moderation in growth rates following the year 2020. Annual worldwide financial growth will average around 3.5% until 2020, slowing down to 2.7% for 2021-2030, 2.5% for the decade following that, and then to 2.4% for 2041-2050.

This will happen because many advanced economies are experiencing and will experience a marked decline in their working-age population. At the same time, emerging economy growth rates will average out as these economies grow.

Challenges for policymakers in achieving a long-term, sustainable expansion

To realize their full economic potential, emerging market governments must implement structural reforms to improve their macroeconomic stability, infrastructure and institutions, evaluations show the high possibility that emerging economies must grow and thrive in the coming decades.

But to realize this opportunity in total, they must undertake sustained and adequate investments in education, infrastructure, and technology. Worldwide demand growth and falling oil price over latest years have highlighted the significance of savings for long-term sustainable growth. Underlying all this is the requirement to develop political, economic, legal and social institutions to create incentives for innovation and entrepreneurship, making economies wherein to do business.

Looking forward, the global economics faces many challenges to profitable economic growth. Structural developments, like aging populations and climate change, require forward-thinking policies that equip the workforce to be able to make societal contributions later in life while promoting sustainable development.

Falling international trade growth, rising inequality, and increasing economic uncertainties will intensify the need to achieve economies which generate opportunities for everybody in a broad selection of industries. Businesses will need to adopt flexible and proactive approaches to navigate fast-changing and aging markets.

Market developments will create opportunities for business.

These will appear as these economies advance to new industries, to engage with world markets as well as their populations—which will be more youthful on average than in advanced countries—get more affluent.

As these emerging nations develop their institutions, fostering social stability and strengthening their macroeconomics principles, they’ll become more attractive places to conduct business and live, bring talent and investment. These economies are often volatile and quickly evolving, however, so companies will need operating strategies to succeed in them. Businesses should be ready to adjust their brand and market positions to match and preferences.

An in-depth understanding of the local marketplace, policy agendas, and consumer priorities will be crucial. Frequent collaboration with local partners will be essential. One key recommendation is that international companies along with other investors will be patient enough to ride out the short-term economic and political downs and ups which will unavoidably occur every once in a while in markets as they head toward adulthood. However, failure to interact with these markets means missing out on the bulk of the expected global economic development between now and 2050.

Acheiving Sustainable Economic Growth in the E7 was originally published on Global Security Review.

North Korea remains committed to obtaining a credible and effective nuclear deterrent. The closer it gets to its end-goal, there is less time for the United States and its allies to put a stop to Pyongyang’s ambitions.

Based on factors like the capabilities of the U.S. Intelligence Community, the advancement of North Korean missile and nuclear technology, and the degree of risk that Washington and its allies are prepared to tolerate, the U.S. might have already missed its opportunity for preventative military action.

Estimates show that, at most, Washington would have 18 months before the window closing, after which, the United States and its allies would have no choice but to adopt some form of deterrence policy toward North Korea. Most indications that a pre-emptive attack on North Korea by the United States is in the works have yet to materialize, implying that military action is not likely this year. Others, however, have already appeared.

These deployments do not necessarily mean the U.S. is preparing for war. They do, however, elevate the risk of conflict in East Asia.

The U.S. is enhancing its forward position in and around North Korea. Three U.S. aircraft carrier strike groups are en route to the Western Pacific, where they’ll conduct a combined exercise in middle November. Such a concentration of force is rare. The last time three U.S. carrier strike groups convened for a combined deployment was in 2007. This forward deployment will give the U.S. force projection capabilities within striking distance of North Korea.

The U.S. Air Force, meanwhile, has declared that, for the very first time, it is going to send a squadron of a dozen F-35A stealth fighter jets to Kadena Air Base in Japan in early November for a six month deployment. Stealth fighters would be prominent fixtures in any U.S. attack on North Korea.

The US has also dispatched nuclear-powered submarines to the waters around the Korean peninsula. It is likely that at least one submarine is carrying nuclear-armed cruise missiles. Furthermore, the U.S. Military recently increased its stockpile of munitions in Guam by approximately 10 percent between late August and late September.

Analysis: the U.S. is keeping its options open with regards to North Korea

Analyzed together, these developments imply that the US is currently preparing for a confrontation. However, this does not necessarily mean that Washington is gearing up to start a war with Pyongyang. The US and it allies are in a standoff with North Korea. In a standoff, it is necessary to make preparations for conflict, even if one does not intend for a conflict to arise.

Military deployments, exercises, and preparations—such as the ones underway in the vicinity of the Korean Peninsula—may just be part of the US attempt to keep its options open with regards to dealing with North Korea. Nevertheless, these developments give some indication of what a military campaign would look like—while raising the risk of conflict in the region.

North Korea, after all, will be watching out for these types of military deployments and preparations by the United States. If North Korea concludes that a strike is imminent, Pyongyang will be more prone to attempt some form of pre-emptive action of their own. Furthermore, even if both parties manage to avoid war, large-scale build-ups and military exercises intended to contain and discourage North Korea might be the new normal.

U.S. Deploys Three Carrier Strike Groups to Korean Peninsula was originally published on Global Security Review.

Special Counsel Robert Mueller has indicted Former Trump Campaign Chairman Paul Manafort on 12 counts, including conspiracy against the United States, conspiracy to launder money, and for making false and misleading Foreign Agent Registration Act (FARA) Statements. Richard Gates III, an associate of Manafort, was also indicted.

The indictment alleges that Manafort and Gates funneled over $75 million through offshore accounts and that Manafort himself laundered more than $18 million to fund property acquisitions, home renovations, and private school tuition.

Manafort and Gates are alleged to have received tens of millions of dollars in income as political consultants in Ukraine. The indictment states that to hide that income, they laundered it through “scores of United States and foreign corporations, partnerships, and bank accounts.” Manafort and Gates consulted pro-Russia Ukrainian politicians on lobbying, public relations, and political strategy. Gates is referred to as “Manafort’s right-hand man” in the 32-page indictment.

Political Consulting in Ukraine

A primary focus of their work in Ukraine was the advancement of the pro-Russia Party of Regions, and their presidential candidate Viktor Yanukovych, who would be elected in 2010. Yanukovych would later flee to Russia in 2014 amidst widespread uprisings in Ukraine.

In the indictment, Mueller highlights an entity called the European Centre for Modern Ukraine as “a mouthpiece for [deposed Ukrainian President ] Yanukovych and the Party of Regions.” It is alleged that the Centre was part of a “cover story” that was developed by Manafort and Gates to distance themselves from their work in Ukraine.

U.S. law mandates that when American citizens are engaged in work for a foreign country, they must register as foreign agents of that state, as stipulated under the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA). Neither Manafort nor Gates registered as foreign agents during their time working as consultants for then-President Yanukovych.

Manafort and Gates initially stated to FBI investigators that their role was to introduce various companies to the Centre and that their efforts did not include lobbying work on behalf of the Party of Regions within the United States. However, the indictment alleges that Manafort and Gates not only selected the companies that would conduct the work on behalf of Yanukovych, but they also engaged in weekly calls and email communications to direct the steps that would be taken by the lobbyists. The indictment alleges that Manafort and Gates paid lobbyists more than $2 million from offshore accounts to conduct work on behalf of Yanukovych and the governing pro-Russia Party of Regions within the United States.

Asset Forfeiture

A critical aspect of the indictment is that Special Counsel Mueller is seeking the forfeiture of assets obtained using laundered money on which no taxes were paid. The assets listed in the charges include a life insurance policy, and multiple properties, including Manafort’s residences in Virginia and the Hamptons, New York.

Trump Campaign Officials Indicted in Special Counsel Investigation was originally published on Global Security Review.

Forecast: China’s political stability will hang in the balance.

Xi will emerge from the party’s congress with the political capital required to see a lot of his ambitious visions through. However, in the aftermath of widespread mortality among the Party’s top ranks, the president will focus his instant attention on stabilizing the country.

Xi will seem to contain any economic issues in the home or disputes overseas that may sabotage the picture of the Party or the president’s status within it. This effort will consist of steadying China financial system and hugely leveraged firms while mitigating the possibility of volatility. To that end, China has tried to blunt the impact of U.S. Trade measures, insisted on discussion with North Korea while discouraging U.S. Military actions and struck a temporary deal with India to end their tense border standoff.

China’s sensitive environment won’t cause its leaders to ignore economic reform entirely. The party’s newly instated officials, after all, will have to boost the public’s confidence in the authorities as the economy stays stable but weak.

Within the last several months, Beijing has combined broad-based structural reforms like the consolidation of businesses, production cuts and the enforcement of environmental regulations with renewed attempts to chip away at the mountain of debt crippling the nation’s state-owned enterprises, financial sector and local authorities. These reforms will only accelerate in the upcoming quarter.

After three decades of historical financial growth and social change, Beijing, amid slower growth and the aftereffects of a debt binge, is transitioning from an investment-driven, export-based economy to one fueled by domestic consumption.

Meeting demands for clean air, affordable houses, improved services, and continued opportunities are going to be essential for the government to maintain legitimacy and political order. President Xi’s consolidation of power could threaten an established system of steady succession, while Chinese nationalism—a force Beijing occasionally encourages for support when facing foreign friction—might prove hard to control.

Analysis: Beijing’s Balancing Act

Beijing probably has ample resources to prop up growth while efforts to spur private consumption to take hold. Nevertheless, the more it “doubles down” on state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in the economics, the more it’ll be at higher risk of financial shocks that cast doubt on its fiscal management capabilities.

Automation and competition from low-cost producers elsewhere in Asia and even Africa will put pressure on wages for unskilled workers. The nation’s rapidly shrinking working-age population will act as a strong headwind to growth.

China Faces a Daunting Task in Managing Its Growth and Security was originally published on Global Security Review.

China does not engage in alliance structures targeted against third countries. This was to allow for China to retain an independent foreign policy stance while avoiding international entanglements due to its alliances with others.

The collapse of the Cold War system and the rise of China’s economic and military influence have brought this policy under scrutiny as well. Beijing has watched cautiously as NATO has expanded eastward and as the United States has strengthened its military alliances in the Asia-Pacific region.

Beijing’s no-alliance policy leaves China potentially facing these groups alone, something it has neither the military nor the economic strength to effectively counter.

The current semi-alliance structure employed by Beijing is designed to counter its weaknesses while ensuring China isn’t beholden to its partners.

The Shanghai Cooperation Organization, China’s push for strategic bilateral partnerships (even with its ostensible rivals), and increased military and humanitarian disaster drills with other nations are part of this strategy.

The strategy is less about building an alliance structure against the United States than it is about breaking down the alliance structures that could be built against China by getting closer to traditional U.S. partners, making them less willing to take strong actions against China.

In its maritime strategy, Beijing is working with India, Japan and Korea in counter-piracy operations and engaging in more naval exchanges and offers of joint exercises and drills.

Multilateral security agreements support U.S. naval dominance in Asia.

Beijing’s strategy, however, is falling short as the United States begins to more openly embrace China as a potential entity to be countered against, and is courting allies and partners like India to play critical functions in bolstering a rules-based order throughout Southeast and East Asia.

China and India have similarly-sized populations, and by 2050 India may overtake China as the world’s largest and most populous economy. China’s one-child policy, exclusionary immigration policies, and population management efforts have wreaked havoc on the country’s demographic profile. China, in the coming decades, will play host to a much older population than other rising or developing powers like India or Vietnam.

Furthermore, an English-speaking democracy like India posits an ideal strategic partner for Washington, as it endeavors to strengthen its foothold in Southeast Asia, particularly as China begins to flex its newly-minted naval muscles around the South China Sea.

India has a competent green-water navy that can be significantly bolstered if provided with training and equipment by the United States. Traditional U.S.-allies like Australia and Japan were regularly participating in multi-lateral war games with the United States and India throughout the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea.

The U.S. strategic plan for the Indo-Pacific.

In a 2017 speech, then-U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson laid out part of the Trump administration’s Asia strategy: re-orienting towards India and applying pressure to China.

The secretary said that the administration is “determined to dramatically deepen” the U.S.-India partnership at diplomatic, economic, and military levels.  Tillerson added, “President Trump and Prime Minister Modi are committed—more than any of our leaders before them—to building an ambitious partnership not only between our two great democracies but other sovereign nations working towards greater peace and stability.”

The secretary’s remarks on relations between the world’s largest democratic states emphasized the concept of an Indo-U.S. strategic partnership as “the eastern and western beacons” for a global, rules-based order that is currently—and increasingly—under strain. China responded with a statement saying it “contributes to and defends the rules-based world order” and seeks to advance international cooperation through the United Nations. It also hopes for a “healthy and sound” China-U.S. relationship.

State Department officials have indicated that this speech was designed to map out a strategy for a U.S.-India alliance or quasi-alliance over the next century. In this model, East Asia’s leading democratic states—namely Australia and Japan—would balance with the United States against China’s growing challenges to and influence over the international rules-based order.

With regards to the impact a re-positioning to India would have on U.S.-China relations, Tillerson stated that the United States continues to seek constructive relations with China, but “won’t shrink” from challenges posed by China when it “subverts the sovereignty of neighboring countries, and disadvantages the United States and our friends.”

Balancing China: The Foundations of an Indo-U.S. Strategic Partnership was originally published on Global Security Review.

Domestically, these problems include decreased public trust in institutions, “fake news” proliferating on social media, a growing wealth gap, and technological disruption to financial and labor markets.

On the global stage, there is considerable anxiety about the role the U.S. will play in what seems to be an increasingly multi-polar world order.

The international community will scrutinize the United States’ every move over the next decade.

They will be watching for signs of internal dissent, cooperation, contradiction, and isolationism. Economic policy, ethnic tensions and identity politics, tax policy, and workplace regulations will be areas of focus.

Lack of progress in these areas could signal a broader decline for the United States. This would mean a growing gap between the wealthy and the poor, decreased federal authority, and diminished U.S. influence in global affairs. Nevertheless, the United States’ possesses undeniably massive levels of human and security capital. It is deeply entrenched in international political and economic systems, while a clear separation of powers within U.S. government institutions ensures that abrupt withdrawal from foreign engagements remains unlikely.

U.S. influence is likely to remain stagnant or constrained in the short term.

Contradictory rhetoric from the executive branch will impede U.S. credibility abroad and harm American interests. Persistent contradictions from within the administration heighten the risk of U.S. engagement in a significant conflict.While the short-term outlook for the United States’ role as the global leader remains uncertain, in the long-term, the U.S. will continue uniquely positioned to stay at the forefront of the worldwide order.

The United States has weathered hard times before.

The 1970s were a period of high national anxiety but were followed by a robust economic recovery and a greater sense of global leadership. Ingenuity and strong institutional foundations at the state and municipal levels, innovation in the private sector, and financial and human capital projections more balanced than other developed countries will be a critical advantage in overcoming internal divisions.

The U.S. Must Manage Domestic & Foreign Challenges in Order to Wield Credible Global Influence was originally published on Global Security Review.

In the meantime, social networks have provided new tools for citizens to vent their political frustrations.  Conservative religious groups—including Brotherhood affiliates and movements—and ethnically-based organizations like those based on Kurdish identity are poised to be superior alternatives to weak governments in the region.

Such groups typically supply social services better than the nation and their politics resonate with publics who’re usually more conservative and religious than the region’s political and economic elites.

If left unchecked, current trends will further fragment the region. 

The effect of Islamist groups is very likely to expand, reducing the tolerance for and presence of minorities, setting the stage for additional migration flows.  Hazards of uncertainty in Arab countries like Egypt, and possibly Saudi Arabia, could induce rulers to impose control via force–an impulse at odds with countertrends like the technological empowerment of human data flows, and poverty reduction.

Additionally, a transition to democracy could offer an attractive model, if it delivers better stability and inclusive wealth.  Progress on poverty reduction, education, and girls’ empowerment in individual portions of the region provides momentum for tapping into the growing number of young people which will be coming of working age.

Deepening crises undermine the credibility of international peace building and security institutions.

Geopolitically, developing humanitarian crises and regional conflict in the Middle East and North Africa will threaten to further undermine the credibility of international dispute resolution and human rights standards.  Perceptions in the area’s capitals which Washington is undependable have invited competition from Russia, and possibly China, and hedging by nations regarding US obligations.

These perceptions stem from unenforced red lines in Syria, withheld support for Mubarak along with other Arab incumbents in 2011, an alleged tilt toward Iran and away from traditional Sunni allies and Israel, and a sense of neglect due to the US rebalance to Asia.

Iran, Israel, and Turkey are most likely to rise in power and regional influence

In the meantime, Iran, Israel, and perhaps Turkey are likely to rise in power and influence relative to other nations in the area but will remain at odds with one another.

Iran’s growing influence, nuclear capabilities, and aggressive behavior will continue to be a concern for Gulf and Israel Arab nations.  The sectarian nature of Iranian and Saudi regional competition, which promotes inflammatory rhetoric and allegations of heresy throughout the region, heightens these concerns.

Converging Economic and Demographic Trends Threaten Security in the Middle East and North Africa was originally published on Global Security Review.

• At-sea deployments of nuclear weapons by India, Pakistan, and perhaps China, would increasingly nuclearize the Indian Ocean throughout the next two decades.
• The presence of multiple nuclear powers in the Indian ocean operating nuclear-armed vessels increases the potential risk of miscalculation and inadvertent escalation.

India will be the world’s fastest-growing economies throughout the next five years

India will be the world’s fastest-growing economies throughout the next five years as China’s economy cools and growth elsewhere sputters, but internal tensions over inequality and religion will complicate its expansion.

New Delhi, however, will continue to offer smaller South Asian nations a stake in India’s financial growth through development assistance and increased connectivity to India’s economy, contributing to India’s broader effort to assert its role as the predominant regional power. The quality of India’s development depends on addressing general poor public health, sanitation, and infrastructure conditions.

The rate of malnourished kids, for instance, is higher in India than in Sub-Saharan Africa. Populism and sectarianism will intensify if Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan fail to provide employment and education for growing urban populations and officials continue to govern principally through identity politics.

Human health, food security, infrastructure, and livelihoods will deteriorate from pollution, earthquakes and the effects of climate change, including shifting monsoon patterns and increasing glacier melt.

South Asia’s openness to the private sector, community groups, and non-governmental organizations, however, should position it well for an era of empowered individuals, mainly if governments curb their support for chauvinistic groups that divide societies.

India will focus its attention on both Islamabad and Beijing—seeking military partnerships with Europe, Japan, the US, and others—to boost its conventional capabilities while striving for escalation dominance vis-a-vis Pakistan.

India will continue to offer smaller South Asian nations a stake in India’s financial growth through development assistance and increased connectivity to India’s economy. This strategy will contribute to India’s broader effort to assert its role as the predominant regional power.

Violent extremism, terrorism, and instability will continue to hang over nuclear-armed Pakistan.

The threat of terrorism, from Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LET), Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), and al-Qaeda and its affiliates as well as ISIL’s expansion and sympathy for associated ideology—will remain prominent in the area.

Competition for jobs, coupled with discrimination against minorities, might contribute to the radicalization of the region’s youth, especially given abnormal sex ratios favoring males in several nations.

In increasingly volatile Pakistan, which neighbors India, there is a significant concern at the regional and global levels that a non-state actor could obtain a nuclear weapon in Pakistan. This scenario would be particularly challenging to manage, as conventional deterrence practices don’t deter a non-state actor like a trans-national terrorist group, creating a significant threat for neighboring India.

Pakistan will feel compelled to address India’s economic and conventional military capabilities through asymmetric means. Pakistan will seek to enhance its nuclear deterrent against India by expanding its nuclear arsenal and delivery means, including pursuing battlefield nuclear weapons and sea-based options.

India, by contrast, will focus its attention on both Islamabad and Beijing—seeking military partnerships with Europe, Japan, the US, and others—to boost its conventional capabilities while striving for escalation dominance vis-a-vis Pakistan.

South Asia: India and Pakistan was originally published on Global Security Review.

India has ignored China’s August 19 deadline for withdrawing Indian troops from the Doklam Plateau. Despite Chinese threats of ‘annihilation,’ the deadline has come and gone, raising questions about how this dispute will be resolved—or further escalate. Both parties, at the time of this briefing, have agreed to stand down their respective troops deployed along the Line of Actual Control. However, India and China have both made it clear that they are not relinquishing their respective claims, leaving the door open for heightened tensions down the road as this dispute continues to develop.

For nearly two months, China and India have been engaged in a tense standoff on the Doklam Plateau. Indian and Chinese troops are positioned just meters apart along the Line of Actual Control. The dispute began on June 16 when Indian forces physically prevented Chinese soldiers and construction workers from constructing a roadway through the Doka La mountain pass. India justified its actions by stating that Bhutan had requested Indian assistance, under the terms of a Bhutan-India treaty agreement. Bhutan claims the pass is within its internationally recognized territory on the tri-junction border it shares with China and India.

While India ignores the August deadline, China has warned citizens against traveling to India.

China’s August 19 deadline for Indian withdrawal from the plateau was a rarity. In issuing such a deadline, China has backed itself into a corner, a potentially embarrassing scenario for Chinese President Xi Jinping. It can either find a way to save face (domestically and internationally) by ending the dispute with India on mutually beneficial terms, or it can escalate the situation further.

The former option would be risky in that China risks looking weak, like a “paper tiger.” Conversely, the latter option would hurt China’s image abroad but would give China’s leaders the ability to play upon growing domestic nationalist sentiments. However, conflict is highly risky in that China would also risk economic disruption which would hinder its’ strategic political and economic interests.

The Chinese government claims that the tri-junction is actually several miles south of Doka La, therefore placing the pass within Chinese territory.  China’s actions in the area are seen as a threat by India due to close proximity of Chinese troops and development projects to the Siliguri corridor, which narrowly connects India’s remote north-western territory to the Indian mainland. Maintaining sovereignty over the Siliguri corridor is a geostrategic priority for India; an incursion would cut off any connection between India proper and the Indian northwest.

Chinese Propaganda and Disinformation Tactics

On August 9, the Chinese government claimed that Bhutan’s government told Beijing through diplomatic channels that Bhutan doesn’t regard the Doklam standoff as being within Bhutanese territory. However, Bhutan refutes the Chinese claim and reiterated that the Bhutanese position is that Chinese actions violate existing agreements.

In an effort to craft an alternative narrative where Bhutan recognizes the Doklam Plateau as belonging to China, not Bhutan, Chinese state media has routinely insisted that Bhutan and China have no dispute. China also reportedly has been using disinformation campaigns and psychological warfare tactics against Indian targets to intimidate troops and manipulate public opinion.

Troop Deployments and Military Exercises on the Doklam Plateau

China has about 300 troops deployed on the Doklam Plateau.  Another 800 Chinese troops (not quite battalion-strength) are stationed in the nearby area. India has around 350 troops deployed facing Chinese troops, with three additional brigades stationed in nearby areas.

India’s armed forces do not plan for additional troop deployments to the plateau, as their intent is to deter China while avoiding an escalation in tensions. However, India’s military command has moved its forces into a state of “No war, no peace,” a state of alert where soldiers take up pre-determined positions in the event of a conflict.

The Indian Army also conducted its planned Operational Alert training exercise early. Originally planned for later in September or October, the Operational Alert exercise began in early August. It was designed to acclimate troops to operating high altitude, while showcasing the battle readiness and deployment of Indian troops, without provoking Chinese soldiers stationed just meters across the border.

Analysis: probability of conflict increases if China’s actions are influenced by Xi’s domestic political standing

The Doklam standoff could have domestic political consequences, particularly in China.  The Communist Party’s 19th Congress will convene in November. President Xi Jinping expected to further consolidate his power during the Congress.

But, if Xi’s political credibility is damaged due to perceived weakness, his political future will be in jeopardy, as would the legitimacy of the communist party he has structured around him. Alternatively, Chinese political discourse may alter in the aftermath of the conference, allowing the Chinese military to withdraw troops without running afoul of the more disruptive, nationalist voices within the country.

India-China Dispute on the Doklam Plateau was originally published on Global Security Review.

Beijing and Moscow will seek to lock in competitive advantages and also to right what they bill are historical wrongs before economic and demographics headwinds further slow their material progress and the West regains its foundation.

Both China and Russia maintain worldviews where they’re rightfully dominant in their regions and able to form regional politics and economics to match their security and material interests.

Both have moved aggressively in latest years to exert more considerable influence in their regions, to contest the US geopolitically, and also to force Washington to accept exclusionary regional spheres of influence—a situation that the US has historically opposed.

National Security and Energy Interests of Rising and Declining Powers

For instance, China views the continuing presence of the US Navy in the Western Pacific, the centrality of US alliances in the region, and US protection of Taiwan as obsolete and representative of the continuation of China’s “one hundred years of humiliation.” Recent cooperation has been tactical and is likely to come back to competition if Beijing jeopardizes China’s dramatic growth has highlighted greater gaps between poor and rich.

Russian interests in Central Asia and as Beijing enjoys options for inexpensive energy supply beyond Russia. Furthermore, it isn’t clear whether there’s a mutually acceptable boundary between what Russia and China consider their natural spheres of influence.

India navigates its path

In the meantime, India’s growing economic power and profile in the region will further complicate these calculations, as New Delhi navigates relations with Beijing, Moscow, and Washington to shield its own expanding interests. Russian assertiveness will harden viewpoints in the Baltics along with other portions of Europe, escalating the potential risk of conflict.

Russia will seek, and sometimes feign, international cooperation, although openly challenging norms and rules it perceives as a counter to its interests and providing support for leaders of fellow “handled democracies” which promote resistance to American policies and personal tastes.

Moscow has little stake in the rules of the international economics and may be counted on to take actions that weaken the United States’ and European Union’s institutional advantages. Moscow will test NATO and resolve, seeking to undermine Western authenticity; it will attempt to exploit splits between Europe’s both north and south and east and west, and also to drive a wedge between the US and the EU.

Likewise, Moscow will become more active in the Middle East and these areas of the world wherein it believes it can check US influence. Lastly, Russia will Stay dedicated to atomic weapons as a deterrent and as a counter to stronger conventional military forces, as well as it’s ticket to superpower status.

Russian military doctrine allegedly includes the limited use of nuclear weapons in a situation where Russia’s vital interests are at stake to “de-escalate” a conflict by demonstrating that continued conventional conflict risks escalating the emergency to a large-scale nuclear exchange.

The Assertions of Rising and Declining World Powers was originally published on Global Security Review.

There is a saying in Catalonia:  “once they send in the tanks, they may have missed the battle.” Spanish authorities didn’t send the Spanish military to intervene against the independence referendum. However, they did ship in the police, which, in turn, lead to clashes that reportedly left over eight-hundred individuals injured.

The events of the referendum haven’t only exacerbated Spain’s worst political crisis since democracy was re-established four decades ago, they’ve given the independence movement serious momentum, which Madrid will fight to stop.

Madrid Paid a High Price for a Nominal Victory

At the weeks leading up to the vote, the Spanish administration’s strategy was to delegitimize the referendum by interrupting its organization. It was a partial success. Polling centers were closed, and the ballot boxes were confiscated, forcing individuals to vote under abnormal circumstances, without a legal electoral list and without any control to prevent them from voting several times. Consequently, the referendum results, by which 90 percent of voters favored liberty, with a participation rate of roughly 40%, per the Catalan authorities, can’t be considered reliable.

If the Spanish state has even obtained a partial legal victory, it arrived at a high price. Though a judge allowed the police crackdown on voters, it was met with shock by Catalans and international public opinion. The resulting peaceful disobedience of thousands of Catalans gave the liberty process an appearance of validity it didn’t have before.

Therefore, even though a lot of the Catalan government’s arguments for liberty are dubious, Madrid’s actions have given the additional pretext for Barcelona to declare independence unilaterally. From the start, Spanish Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy’s approach to coping with the Catalan situation was controversial.

Spain’s mountainous geography has led to the emergence of strong regional identities which are distrustful of the central government.

For the past five hundreds of years, successive governments have chosen for a carrot-or-stick approach to ensure the integrity of Spain. The twentieth century offers clear samples of both: While Francisco Franco’s dictatorship from 1939-1975 attempted to suppress Spain’s regional identities by denying them cultural and political rights, the constitution of 1978 generated probably the most decentralized political systems in Europe, providing Spanish regions high levels of autonomy. This was intended to curb Spain’s natural tendency towards fragmentation. However, it did not eliminate it, and Spain today remains divided.

The present conservative government in Madrid is not likely to authorize a referendum in Catalonia, as it’d open the door for other regions, most notably the Basque Country and, to a lesser extent, Galicia, to need the same. Even a progressive administration will be skeptical of any decision which can lead to the dissolution of the nation.

Then there’s the dilemma the emotional connection between Catalonia and Spain, that has deteriorated over the last decade. An economic crisis, increasing anti-establishment sentiments, recurrent corruption scandals and controversial political events, like the Spanish Constitutional Court’s decision to block portions autonomy status of Catalonia in 2010, have all ruined the image of the Spanish state in the opinion of many Catalans.

The Catalan government has made a conscious effort to deepen nationalist and anti-Spanish sentiments in the region. A strong narrative has taken root in the area, presenting the Spanish state as something alien, remote and hostile to Catalonia. Consequently, support for Catalonia’s freedom climbed from approximately 20% to about 50% between 2007 and 2017.

Opinion polls before October 1 indicated that a substantial part of Catalan society would welcome institutional reforms to give Catalonia greater control over its taxes while maintaining the region within Spain. Catalonia represents approximately 20% of the Spanish gross domestic product and Madrid will be hesitant to give up substantial quantities of cash it uses to conduct the state and also to invest in other regions.

The Catalan issue will persist for some time.

But these reforms might prevent the nation from breaking, even though they aren’t on the desk. That is since Madrid and Barcelona have presented their dispute as a zero-sum game where one of the two parties has to be defeated.

The events during and after the referendum only made things worse. The Catalan government is one step closer to declaring independence, which might induce Madrid to react by suspending the autonomy of Catalonia or calling for early regional elections. While either of those options would remove the present Catalan leadership, which Madrid does not consider legal, from the equation, they’d only lead to further social unrest and potentially new episodes of violence.

Furthermore, suspending autonomy or holding ancient regional elections without first introducing real institutional reforms at the national level would do little to solve the crisis. Pro-independence sentiments are not likely to go away anytime soon. In this context, the minority government of Rajoy would become fragile domestically as well as internationally. To date, two of the three opposition parties in Spain have affirmed Madrid’s decision to obstruct the Catalan referendum.

However, the pictures of the police cracking down on voters are making it hard for unionist parties to side with the government of Rajoy. The same holds for the European Union, which affirmed Rajoy before the referendum but chose to remain quiet as events unfolded on October. In the event social unrest in Catalonia rise, the bloc will likely change its perspective of the catastrophe as an internal issue and pressure Madrid to negotiate a compromise.

In the end, Brussels and a lot of the bloc’s authorities are not likely to tolerate prolonged instability at the 4th largest economy in the eurozone. In fact, on October 2, the EU Commission urged all relevant actors at the referendum to move very quickly from confrontation to dialogue. Things in Catalonia are likely to get worse before it gets better. And when the Spanish government manages to keep the nation together, the catastrophe will leave long-lasting scars, that will form politics for many years to come.

Catalonian Secession: Madrid Stuck Between a Rock and a Hard Place was originally published on Global Security Review.

Tensions are increasing between the Shia-minority and the Kingdom’s Sunni ruling class in the aftermath of the execution of Shiite cleric Nimr al Nimr. Regional jihadists are attempting to foment sectarian conflict in the kingdom by exploiting the unrest post-execution. In hopes of diluting attention focused on al Nimr, Saudi Arabia decided he’d be executed alongside 46 others, the majority of which were Sunnis accused of having links with Al Qaeda.

Per sentencing protocols, Saudi authorities would not have to give prior notice of the execution.  Security forces were able to suppress low-level actions by activists, but a worrying concern has been the rising number of jihadist suicide strikes taking place not just in the Sunni portions of the country, but in Shiite populated areas.

Shiite extremists are bombing Shiite mosques

Suicide bombings targeting Shiite mosques are designed to goad Shiites into retaliating, creating an even more significant security issue for elites, especially Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, who has assumed a leadership role in Saudi counterterrorism and defense efforts.

Jihadist exploitation of the al Nimr execution would involve strikes on religious targets and security forces, given the difficulties in targeting and disrupting petroleum infrastructure with such attacks. The killing of al Nimr will complicate negotiations for a political settlement in Syria.

Saudi Arabia and Iran have agreed to sit down in December when the region’s foreign ministers meet to negotiate on Syria. The two sides disagree over the groups that should be party to a post-Al Assad political solution, assuming all parties can even create the necessary battlefield conditions to engage in a political transition in Syria.

The proxy conflict in Syria between Iran and Saudi Arabia is ongoing in Lebanon, where a political agreement on the presidency is contingent on improved Iran-Saudi dialogue.

Saudi Arabia is Fostering a Sunni Coalition

Saudi Arabia isn’t the only Sunni power experiencing tensions with Tehran. As Turkey grows more assertive in the area, Iraqi Kurdistan and Syria will be crucial arenas for competition between the old opponents.

Saudi Arabia’s severing of diplomatic relations with Tehran is a test for the Sunni regional coalition that Riyadh has painstakingly tried to gather in the past few years.

Thus far, the states that have followed Riyadh’s lead to Iran protests are Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, and Sudan. Bahrain, at the heart of the Saudi camp, has already reminded his ambassador from Iran and expelled the Iranian charge d’affaires in October.

Saudi Arabia has been attempting to foster a tighter relationship with Cairo to underpin its Arab coalition and will be signing grants and loans worth $3 billion for Egypt on Jan. 5 to make apparent the priority Saudi Arabia is giving the relationship.

Egypt will gladly accept the monetary support, but Cairo can be expected to maintain a more balanced approach with regards to contentious cultural disputes in the region. The execution of Al Nimr is a piece of a much more significant regional game.

The United Arab Emirates, which was in close military coordination with Saudi Arabia in Yemen, Libya and Syria, downgraded its diplomatic ties with Iran by recalling its ambassador and ordered a reduction in the number of Iranian diplomats stationed at the Emirates. Sudan that has seen its alliance with Riyadh reinforced while distancing itself from Iran—expelling the Iranian ambassador—has received increased Saudi monetary assistance.

Kuwait, conscious of its Shiite minority, condemned Iran after the attack on the Saudis Embassy but stopped short of severing diplomatic relations. Egypt chose to be more cautious, condemning Iran and avoiding any mention of Mohamed Fathi Abdel Ati, an Egyptian national who had been one of the Sunnis executed in the same group as al Nimr.

Analysis: Saudi Arabia will look abroad for support after lackluster support from Sunni neighbors

Saudi Arabia will focus on securing its oil facilities while dealing with sporadic bouts of unrest and jihadist attacks. While managing these domestic concerns, Saudi Arabia will look overseas for allies at the time of need.

The response will be mixed from its Sunni neighbors, based on how much they rely on security and assistance. The United States and others in the West will meanwhile do their best to maintain their distance from the proxy conflicts which are part and parcel of the changing regional balance of power between Iran and its adversaries.

Increased Sectarian Tensions in the Middle East as the Saudi-Iran Proxy War Heats Up was originally published on Global Security Review.

On Oct. 4, the region’s pro-independence parties, Junts pel Sí, along with the Popular Unity Candidates, declared that the Catalonian parliament would hold a session on Oct. 5th to proceed with its move towards independence. A Spanish Court ruling has since suspended the Catalan Parliament.

If Catalonia proceeds with a formal declaration of independence, Madrid would probably suspend the region’s autonomy and take immediate control of its government.

While the official purpose of the session would be to explore the results of the referendum that took place on October 1, secession forces within Catalan’s regional government initially planned to use the meeting to announce independence. Based on a Sept. 7 law passed by the Catalan parliament, the regional legislature must declare independence if people vote in favor of secession.

However, the Catalan President has decided hold off on a formal declaration, pending negotiations and discussions with Madrid. However, he stated that the catalonian people have a right to a vote to independance, and this issue is not one that will die quickly.

The current situation in Catalonia

On Oct. 1, 90 percent of poll respondents supported independence from the Spanish state. Presently, all communication channels between the Spanish and the Catalan governments seem to be broken. Madrid insists that the referendum was prohibited and refuses to negotiate with the government which has broken the law.

Furthermore, on Oct. 3 Spanish King Felipe VI accused the Catalans authorities of violating the Spanish Constitution. The Catalan government, in turn, insists that it’ll only negotiate with Madrid if a legally binding referendum is on the table, something which  Spanish authorities vehemently oppose.

If Catalonia proceeds with a formal declaration of independence, Madrid would probably suspend the region’s autonomy and take immediate control of its government.

Could Madrid seize control and suspend Catalan autonomy?

Not only could this decision be controversial in Catalonia and the rest of Spain, but it could also be challenging to enforce. This step would lead to significant street protests and potential acts of vandalism against Spanish institutions throughout the region. Support from security forces will be required.

However, Madrid expresses worry over the fact that Catalonia’s regional police, known as the Mossos d’Esquadra, did not obey a Spanish judge’s order to close down polling centers on referendum day to prevent individuals from voting. Courts in Catalonia have already begun investigations against Mossos for an offense of disobedience. Since the beginning of the independence process, expert secession forces have organized many massive demonstrations.

Their main aim was to show Madrid as well as the international community that countless thousands of Catalans support independence. However, they’re also a broader demonstration of strength along with a reminder that any action contrary to Catalonia, especially one as drastic as suspending the region’s autonomy, will lead to massive protests.

Analysis: Outside mediation may be necessary if tensions escalate and violence increases.

In a situation of widespread regional revolt, Madrid will face the dilemma of having to choose between using force in Catalonia or entering into negotiations with the regional government. The former could come to the price of deepening one already considerable catastrophe and possibly triggering an intervention from the European Union.

Thus far, the bloc and most of its authorities have sided with Madrid, calling the Catalan referendum prohibited and pledging to honor the unity of Spain. However, E.U. leaders have also cautioned that a continued forceful response by the central government in Madrid would result in an escalation of violence, and have advised Spanish and Catalan authorities to reestablish dialogue to reach an agreed-upon solution.

However, if tensions between Madrid and Barcelona carry on or escalate, an outside mediator may be required to ensure stability and security both in Spain and in the European Union.

Catalonia Moves Toward Independence—Will Madrid Seize Control? was originally published on Global Security Review.

Early in August and without pretext, Secretary of Defense James Mattis circulated a memorandum to Defense Department staff stressing the importance of ethics, saying he expects all staff, uniformed and civilian, “to play the ethical midfield.”

The Department did not provide any further specificity regarding Secretary Mattis’ motives in sending the memorandum. The memo, dated August 4, 2017, reads as follows:

MEMORANDUM FOR ALL DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE EMPLOYEES

SUBJECT: Ethical Standards for All Hands

Those entrusted by our nation with carrying out violence, those entrusted with the lives of our troops, and those entrusted with enormous sums of taxpayer money must set an honorable example in all we do.

I expect every member of the Department to play the ethical midfield. I need you to be aggressive and show initiative without running the ethical sidelines, where even one misstep will have you out of bounds. I want our focus to be on the essence of ethical conduct: doing what is right at all times, regardless of the circumstances or whether anyone is watching.

To ensure each of us is ready to do what is right, without hesitation, when ethical dilemmas arise, we must train and prepare ourselves and our subordinates. Our prior rejection and our choice to live by an ethical code will reinforce what we stand for. so we remain morally strong especially in the face of adversity.

Through our example and through coaching of all hands, we will ensure ethical standards are maintained. Never forget, our willingness to take the Oath of Office and to accept the associated responsibilities means that even citizens who have never met us trust us to do the right thing, never abusing our position nor looking the other way when we see something wrong. I am proud to serve alongside you.

James N. Mattis

cc:
Deputy Secretary of Defense

What prompted Mattis’ memo?

Mattis’ framing of the idea of training as mindfully engaging in ethical conduct—at all times—could be interpreted as a subtle nod towards potentially trying events to come. Events, where the Department of Defense, must maintain its integrity and ethical responsibility at all costs.

Also worthy of recognition is Mattis’ point about upholding the trust that others place in the organization. The trust Mattis speaks of is far more valuable and significant than the trust an employee has in an employer. He speaks of the faith the American people have in their armed forces in their ability to protect them and the national security of the United States. The legitimacy of the U.S. is partially guaranteed by its supposedly civilian-controlled military, and Mattis (while a retired 4-star general) knows that trust and legitimacy must be maintained at all costs.

Why was the memo distributed?

One assessment is that Mattis could be telegraphing a message that staff should still respect and work with transgender employees. Other military leaders have already begun dismissing the president’s directive.

Another read of the memo is that Mattis is warning DoD employees against obeying any illegal orders that Trump might soon issue, on Twitter or otherwise. One can’t dismiss that idea either, especially since Congress just departed for August recess. If Trump wanted to try something crazy (firing attorney general Jeff Sessions and special counsel Robert Mueller, for example), now would be a natural time for him to do so.

Mueller has convened a grand jury to keep pressing the investigation into possible collusion between the Trump campaign and the Russian government. Subpoenas are flying. Document requests have been sent. One target of the investigation seems to be erstwhile national security adviser Michael Flynn, who served in the Army for 33 years until he was forced out in 2014. Then he began his second career shilling for Russia and Turkey.

Department employees or serving members of the armed forces may have documents in their files that Mueller wants to read. Mattis may be reminding them that, even in these bizarre and difficult times, they are duty-bound to do the right thing.

The Subtext of Secretary Mattis’ Mysterious Memo was originally published on Global Security Review.

If there isn’t any meaningful resolution of the crisis or an abatement of public anger, Dr. Jennifer McCoy, Distinguished University Professor of Political Science at Georgia State University, says a significant escalation in tensions and armed conflict is possible, from what is currently mainly peaceful protests with low levels of violence.

Harsh repression has been widely propagated by the government or by government-armed militias and gangs. However, the risk of escalation increases due to the large number of young Venezuelans that are coming out and setting up barricades in the streets, mainly in the evenings after protests have ended, and engage in fights with police, the National Guard, and the government-armed gangs.

Dr. McCoy notes that the youths coming out in opposition aren’t using firearms. Rather, they’re using Molotov cocktails, sticks, and are setting fires in the streets. The danger here is if this low-level of violence escalates and spirals out of control with increasing levels of chaos and violence between civilian protesters, the political opposition, government-armed militias and street gangs, and government police and military forces.

Is Venezuela the Next Syria?

In some ways, it is possible Venezuela’s situation could escalate to the level currently observed in the Syrian civil war. That would be the absolute worst-case scenario, according to Dr. McCoy, with some key differences. Both crises arose from food and resource shortages, but ethnic and religious factions—like those engaged in the Syrian civil war—don’t exist in Venezuela.

In Syria, the military has supported Assad partly because of the ethnic and religious alignments in the region and—to some degree—the belief that the armed forces best chances of survival lay with Assad. In Venezuela, the socialist Chavez movement arose from the military. It was when it incorporated some civilian leftist intellectuals that it became a hybrid civic-military coalition movement.

The Venezuelan military, however, has a long professional history, and members of the armed forces have been very reluctant to fire on their citizens, and have been pushing for the military to maintain the legitimacy and professionalism of the institution of the armed forces. Still unclear, however, is the degree to which the military has been politicized in Venezuela.

Since Chavez and his supporters came to power 15 years ago, they’ve made political promotions within the military, but it is unclear how far lower-ranking troops, who are also suffering from low salaries and food and medicine shortages, will support their superiors if they are called on to repress their fellow citizens.

Regional Geopolitics and the Venezuelan Crisis

Geopolitically speaking, the situation in Venezuela is much different than the conflict in Syria. Venezuela’s neighbors are democratic. The Maduro government is also very conscious of legitimacy; it doesn’t want to be seen as an authoritarian regime—and a military takeover would carry the stigma associated with an authoritarian ruler. In this day and age, military coups aren’t as accepted in the Western hemisphere.

While the worst case scenario is Venezuela devolving into civil war, Dr. McCoy believes that point is still some ways off. Venezuela’s democratic neighbors—Columbia, or Brazil, for instance—would likely exert tremendous pressure on the government and security services in Venezuela to negotiate an end to hostilities before it escalates into a full-blown civil war.

If the worst is to occur, with continued failures of the state to govern effectively, if the country enters a state of general lawlessness, then there will be repercussions for the entire hemisphere, as well as Europe, Dr. McCoy says. While Venezuela doesn’t produce drugs, it’s a major transport hub for drugs going to Europe and even to Africa before making their way to Europe.

Drug trafficking increases under lawlessness, as we saw in Honduras after 2009. There was a coup, and for a while, the country was run by a very weak government, and lawlessness increased dramatically. Now, Honduras has one of the highest homicide rates in the world. Countries like the United States are seeing a significant increase in the number of people arriving from countries like Honduras that are plagued with violence. An actual collapse of the state in Venezuela would likely mean large numbers of economic migrants and refugees fleeing the violence.

Particularly, the Venezuelan border with Colombia would be most fragile. For a while, Venezuela closed the border with Colombia as thousands of people would try to cross the Amazon into Colombia just to try and get food or medicine.

If the security situation in Venezuela worsens, the Colombian border would be the main point where people would cross. Internally, Colombia is just starting to get its peace agreement in place, so further destabilization in Venezuela could have significant ramifications for Colombia.

Source: Jennifer McCoy, Ph.D., Distinguished University Professor of Political Science at Georgia State University. Dr. McCoy served as Founding Director of the Global Studies Institute at GSU (2015-16), and as Director of the Carter Center’s Americas program (1998-2015) where she led projects strengthening democratic institutions, provided mediation and encouraged dialogue and hemispheric cooperation. Her latest book is International Mediation in Venezuela (co-authored with Francisco Diez, 2011).

How Likely is a Civil War in Venezuela? was originally published on Global Security Review.

Leftist governments have been kicked out in Argentina, Peru, and Guatemala. Venezuela’s left-wing populist government is stripping the country of its democratic institutions in a sharp slide towards authoritarianism, leading to a sharp increase in lawlessness across the country.

Furthermore, while Venezuela doesn’t produce drugs, it’s become a major transport hub for drugs going to Europe or  Africa before being routed to Europe. Drug trafficking increases under as the rule of law decreases. After a 2009 coup in Honduras, the country was run by a fragile government—lawlessness increased dramatically.

Honduras now has one of the highest homicide rates in the world. Countries like the United States are seeing a significant increase in the number of people arriving from countries like Honduras that are plagued with violence.

Unrest in Venezuela and Regional Security in the Americas

An actual collapse of the state in Venezuela would likely mean large numbers of economic migrants and refugees fleeing the violence. The United States, Mexico, Brazil, and Colombia would all see massive amounts of refugees fleeing the conflict.

The Venezuelan border with Colombia, in particular, would be the most fragile. Venezuela closed the border with Colombia for a time as thousands of people attempted to cross the Amazon into Colombia to get food and medicine.

If the security situation in Venezuela becomes increasingly destabilized, the Colombian border would be the main point where people would cross. Colombia is in the process of implementing a domestic peace agreement, so a mass-migration from Venezuela could create a humanitarian crisis with significant political and security ramifications for bordering countries like Brazil and Colombia—and more developed countries in the region like Canada and the United States.

Central and South America was originally published on Global Security Review.

China’s first overseas army base in a small Africans nation of Djibouti is most likely the first of many that China intends to construct around the globe, which could bring its interests into conflict with those of the United States. China has the fastest modernizing army in the world after the United States, according to insights shared with Bloomberg News by U.S. intelligence officials.

China Envisions Itself as a Global Power

This will have implications for the China-United States competitive relationship and could underscore the conflicting security interests of China and the United States around the globe, according to officials.

As part of China’s expanding military and economic clout, the country is taking a stronger and more aggressive position in staking its territorial claims in the South China Sea, cross-straight relations with Taiwan, and in promoting its One Belt, One Road, trade initiative.

The People’s Liberation Army announced the opening of a logistics support base in Djibouti in July, stating it’d back up China’s military escort, peacekeeping and humanitarian missions in Africa and western Asia in addition to exercises and emergency evacuation.

China is attempting to undermine U.S. influence around the globe.

Where Chinese interests conflict with those of U.S., Beijing is actively seeking to undermine U.S. influence, intelligence officials say. This report on how U.S. intelligence agencies view China’s global aspirations come as Chinese President Xi Jinping seeks to consolidate his power during October’s Communist Party Congress.

U.S. President Donald Trump plans to visit China in November and, although the two nations have discovered regions of cooperation, such as over United Nations sanctions against North Korea, they’ve increasingly disagreed over trade, Beijing’s territorial claims in the South China Sea, and Syria’s civil war.

As Xi Consolidates Power, He Must Deal with China’s Systemic Economic Problems

Ahead of the Communist Party Congress, officials in Beijing have doubled-down in their repression of internal dissent. The world’s second-largest economy is on course to achieve its 6.5 percent annual growth target, according to the Party.

China is fueling this growth, in part, by seeking more in-depth technology cooperation with corporations based in the United States. In the long-term, China must overcome systemic corruption, rampant speculation, and sub-prime lending, to maintain its growth targets. Failure to do so could lead to internal disorder and unrest, and potentially deal a devastating blow to the legitimacy of the governing Chinese Communist Party.

U.S. Intelligence: Expect More Overseas Chinese Military Bases was originally published on Global Security Review.

China’s interests lie in maintaining the status quo. Russia’s interests lie in disrupting it.

For China, Pyongyang’s behavior recalled memories of 1994, when Beijing sent a delegation to Pyongyang to notify the then-Kim Il Sung (the grandfather of current leader Kim Jong-Un), that China would be initiating official diplomatic relations with South Korea.

A furious Kim Il Sung threatened Chinese officials that North Korea would develop diplomatic ties of their own with the Republic of China—Taiwan—in retaliation. Nevertheless, Pyongyang neglected to carry out that threat, and China continued in its plans to normalize relations with South Korea.

Where China Withdraws—Russia Steps In.

Many in China are wondering why North Korea thinks it can get away with criticizing China in such a public manner. The answer, it seems, lies with China’s “strategic partner,” Russia.

In January 2017, the Chinese authorities found that Pyongyang had shipped out its first wishes for a happy New Year in Moscow, not Beijing. As China has stepped up economic pressure on North Korea by cutting off coal exports and implementing restrictions on doing business with North Korea, Russia has stepped in to exploit the situation and to fill the gap. Russia is now Pyongyang’s top coal provider.

Furthermore, North Korea has been importing crude oil from Russia to reduce its energy dependence on China. Early this year, Russian authorities representatives visited Pyongyang to talk about railroad transportation cooperation.

Is North Korea Getting Help on its Missile Program?

In the summer of 2017, in the wake of one of North Korea’s ballistic missile test launches, Ukraine was cited as a source of North Korean missile technology.

However, the Ukrainian government vehemently denied the allegations. Objectively, Ukraine would have little to gain from providing North Korea with weapons technology, as it would significantly hinder their efforts to increase U.S. support for their fight against Russian-backed separatists.

Analysis: Chinese-Russian Divide Over North Korea Reveals Greater Tensions to Come

China’s interests lie in maintaining the status quo while Russia’s interests lie in disrupting it. China desperately wishes to avoid a military confrontation on the Korean peninsula. It fears a U.S.-allied and unified Korea, on its border, and would inevitably have to manage a massive humanitarian crisis on its doorstep.

Russia, however, sees opportunities in stoking tensions on the Korean peninsula. Increased international and U.S. attention on North Korea means less focus on Russia’s military engagements in Ukraine and Eastern Europe.

Moscow could very well be encouraging further North Korean belligerence to divert attention away from a large-scale military operation in Ukraine or Belarus in the wake of its Zapad-2017 war games, which reportedly saw the deployment of over 100,000 Russian, Belarussian, and CIS troops across Russia’s and Belarus’ eastern borders.

The divide over North Korea reveals that the China-Russia “strategic partnership” is flawed. In the coming decade, it is likely that the two countries will find themselves at odds over their respective national interests.

North Korea Crisis Reveals Fractures in the China-Russia Strategic Partnership was originally published on Global Security Review.

In a rare televised interview on September 3rd, 2017, Vasyl Hrytsak, the head of Ukraine’s Security Service (SBU) accused the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) of carrying out terrorist attacks in Ukraine.

Hrytsak proceeded to allege that these attacks were designed to destabilize the situation in Ukraine further, to give the pretext for a full-scale invasion by the Russian military. Directly addressing Aleksandr Bortnikov, the director of Russia’s FSB, Hrytsak accused the FSB of violating the fundamental rules of war by carrying out terrorist attacks designed to strike fear into the populations of Russian-majority regions of eastern Ukraine.

“I appeal to you as an officer,” Hrytsak said in the interview on Ukraine’s Priamy television network. “There are rules even in a war which should not be broken by secret service agents. You have transgressed all of these rules.” Hrytsak continued:

“You and I both know Russian secret service agents were involved in terrorist attacks committed in Odessa, Kharkiv, Kherson, and other cities. Dozens of people died as a result. But this time you have broken all of the rules and are prepared to destabilize the situation in Russia in order to justify invading Ukraine in a massive military campaign…You were ready to blow up your own Russian citizens in order to destabilize the situation in Russia and give grounds for invading Ukraine, to launch a full-scale invasion.”

The FSB has a history of executing false-flag “terror” attacks.

The “terrorist attacks” that Hrytsak referenced were riots and violence in Odessa that killed 48 in May of 2014, a February 2015 bombing in Kharkiv that resulted in four deaths, and a Kherson car bombing in April 2016 that killed one. The SBU believes all—alongside U.S. intelligence officials—to be the handiwork of the Russian FSB. John Schindler, a former NSA analyst, quotes a senior U.S. intelligence official as saying that there is “absolutely no doubt” the FSB was behind these specific attacks inside Ukraine.

This wouldn’t be the first time Russian security forces executed a false-flag terrorist attack to create the pretext for broader military action. In 1999, four apartment buildings in Russia were bombed, killing nearly 300 civilians. Moscow accused Chechen terrorists of carrying out the deadly attacks and was given the green-light of renewing its bloody campaign against Chechen separatists. However, little evidence supported the Kremlin’s claims, while there was considerable evidence that pointed to the FSB as being behind the attacks.

Analysis: Heightened Risk for Escalations in Russia-Ukraine Conflict

These accusations, if true, point to a doubling-down of Russian efforts to justify further engagement in Ukraine. Leaked emails that were hacked from a top Kremlin official detail a secret plan to decrease the influence of pro-Western Ukrainian politicians in Kiev and simultaneously create conditions that would justify further interference by Russia.

The SBU head’s statement was delivered just as Russia was gearing up for its massive Zapad 2017 military exercises with neighboring Belarus, directly on Ukraine’s northern frontier. In the short-term, there is a high possibility of increased hostilities in Eastern Ukraine. Of particular concern is the in the region separating the Crimean peninsula from the Russian mainland.

How to Justify an Invasion: Russia’s FSB Accused of False-Flag Terrorist Attacks in Ukraine was originally published on Global Security Review.

There seems to have been a de-escalation between India and China in the border dispute over the Doklam Plateau, but the dormant battle across the Himalayas continues.

The Himalayas form a powerful barrier. But, there are areas where the boundary is contested, producing constant tension. The long frontier between India and China is disrupted by two nations south of the Himalayas primary variety and open to India’s heartland: Bhutan and Nepal.

As Bhutan and Nepal are strategically vital to India’s interests, New Delhi yields considerable influence on them, and can, at times, overstep.

India has exercised influence on their internal policies, including by enforcing trade restrictions. The Himalayas are still an efficient line of defense for India against potential Chinese aggression, since traversing them is very difficult. However stronger Chinese influence on Bhutan and Nepal might be strategically lethal for India.

India and China are both emerging world powers with ambitions of regional hegemony. India has numerous concerns aside from its Himalayan border. China became a close commercial and strategic partner of its longtime adversary, Pakistan. Furthermore, the Chinese navy is increasing its presence in the Indian Ocean as part of its One Belt, One Road initiative.

China’s Growing Influence in the Southern Hemisphere

Chinese influence is climbing in Africa, on the other side of the Indian Ocean, and its influence is growing in neighboring Burma, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka. And on the other hand, India firmly supports Vietnam, that has repeating disputes with China over the South China Sea and works in close cooperation with the United States.

In the 1950s, China annexed Tibet, which is poorly populated because of its elevation and climate. It is located just north of the primary section of the Himalayas. It isn’t just strategically significant, but it’s a source of water to vast portions of South Asia, Southeast Asia, and China.

China has brought infrastructure such as improved railroads to Tibet. It’s now working on similar projects to connect China to neighboring states in the Himalayas. China has been improving access to the region with contemporary railroads and highways. It’s also increasing its presence in the area with major road and railway projects through the Himalayas, connecting it with Pakistan, and plans to construct comparable links to Nepal.

Improved rail infrastructure in the Himalayas would connect these states to China’s entire transportation network, which continues to be further developed and modernized. Additionally, China might use its control over the region’s water as a means of exerting influence.

Analysis: China is Unprepared for a Conflict with India

A big issue for China is the 19th Congress of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee, which is scheduled for October 19. A blunder in Doklam could, in the worst case, cause a power struggle that forces Chinese President Xi Jinping to step down. Xi might still face criticism in the Congress for having to back down in Doklam, but not as far as in other situations. China’s expansionist policies in the South China Sea and elsewhere have won praise throughout China.

Xi’s expansionist policies leave analysts with many questions about where he is leading China. Relations between China and neighboring states like Japan, Vietnam, and the Philippines, are tense.

Lastly, it is becoming more and more clear that there is a decreasing chance of a peaceful reunification with Taiwan. More pressingly, the ongoing North Korea nuclear weapons crisis presents extreme risks to China in the short term.

Asian Hegemony: Ongoing Tensions Between China and India was originally published on Global Security Review.

Russia’s annual strategic “Zapad” (запад; Russian for west) military training exercises—held in Russia’s Western Military District and regions of Belarus—began on September 14. Troops from neighboring ally Belarus joined alongside Russian forces in the week-long demonstration of military force.

Historically, Russia (and the Soviet Union before it) has maintained a habit of conducting offensive operations under the guise of training exercises. The drills will reveal the Russian military’s tactical capabilities and provide indicators on the threats it is focused on.

How Moscow could use the exercises to its advantage

Moscow could use the exercises to boost its presence in states along the front line with North Atlantic Treaty Organization forces and to increase its military assets in Belarus.

The two nations have partnered in the drills ever since 2009. Within their 1st year as a collaborative endeavor, the drills had been the biggest joint exercises Russia had conducted in the post-Soviet era. Official statements announced that 12,500 military personnel Participated In the 2009 exercises, which included 100 combat, tanks, armored vehicles, artillery airplane and 20 warships.

These drills took place in the crucial Area surrounding the Baltic area and mimicked not only the invasion of Poland but a strategic nuclear strike on Warsaw, increasing concern among NATO member countries.

Russia has conducted several large-scale snap exercises along NATO’s eastern flank with little to no notice and in a non-transparent manner.

Russia and Belarus held the next Zapad exercises in September 2013. Expanded to include all branches of Russia’s army As well as rapid response Units of the Collective Security Treaty Organization, the drills likely were considerably bigger than the previous exercises, even though the exact numbers are up for debate.

The exercises simulated an assault by Baltic terrorists on Belarus which resulted in a mixed air, naval forces, and urban warfare response. And as had become custom by that time, they ended with a mock atomic attack, this time against Sweden. More important, Russia employed a number of the same approaches it tried in the 2013 Zapad exercises, including the use of unmanned aerial vehicles, when it got involved with battles In Ukraine and Syria during the following two years.

Moscow isn’t happy with Minsk.

Belarus and Russia entered into a formal “Union State” in 1999 to promote trade and other policies, but the goal of a single currency was never realized. Some experts suggest Putin could use the financial component of the “Union State” arrangement as his legal justification in annexing Belarus.

Putin has been growing uneasy with the West warming to President Lukashenko of Belarus since 1994. The U.S. has sought to get closer to Belarus by lifting some sanctions it imposed to encourage political forums. Last year, The European Union also lifted its five-year sanctions on Belarus, a country with about 10 million people.

Moscow also isn’t happy that Belarus continues to depend on Russian subsidies because the collapse in oil prices has made Moscow cut back on spending. Moreover, Lukashenko’s ties with Moscow worsened when he positioned himself as a neutral mediator for the Ukraine peace talks.

At the same time, there’s a chance Belarusian’s officers might side with Russia in a military conflict. Some of the officers were trained in Russian military schools and are paid less than their peers in Russia. Belarusian troops realize that if Belarus gets annexed by Russia, they’ll be better paid—with the bonus of serving in the armed forces of a nuclear-armed power.

Russia, meanwhile, beefed up its own forces along the borderlands and boosted its security support to regional allies and breakaway territories. Now that Washington has expanded its sanctions against Moscow — and the Kremlin has promised an “asymmetrical” response — Russia is looking to use this year’s military drills to send a message to the West.

Heightened Tensions between Russia and the West

The United States and NATO built up their forces along the European borderlands after Russia annexed Crimea and began backing Ukrainian separatist forces in 2014. The West deployed continuous battalion rotations of 1,000 troops to the Baltic states and Poland and increased its presence in the Black Sea.

Held along the Europe’s borders with Belarus and Russia, Zapad-2017 has emerged as an item of skepticism for governments and media outlets in Europe and the United States.

Ukrainian Defense Minister Valeriy Heletey commented that the 2017 Zapad exercises could be a prelude to an assault on any “country of Europe that shares a border with Russia.” This concern is well-founded, given that troop deployment disguised as military training have preceded Russia’s three most recent foreign military engagements.

This concern is well-founded, given that troop deployment disguised as military training have preceded Russia’s three most recent foreign military engagements. Those skeptical about Russia’s intentions will point out that Russian partners can be underreporting numbers since the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe’s so called Vienna Accord require OSCE nations to permit in observers for particular activities between 13,000 troops or more.

Analysis: Biggest risk comes from non-transparency and Russia’s displeasure with Belarus

The 2017 Zapad exercises are drawing attention because Russia can avoid the need for official outside observer nations by claiming it will have less than 13,000 soldiers in the drills. However, several smaller exercises will be conducted simultaneously, allowing Moscow to avoid the conditions put forth in the Vienna Accord.

Western intelligence and military agencies believe that over 100,000 troops could be deployed. According to statements from the U.S. Department of Defense, Russia has conducted several large-scale snap exercises along NATO’s eastern flank with little to no notice and in a non-transparent manner.

The biggest risks stemming from the Zapad drills are possible errors, including stray shots, local attempts to test response  through other measures, escalations in existing conflict zones (such as in Ukraine, Abkhazia, or South Ossetia), or attempts to use nonlinear/hybrid warfare tactics, or asymmetric tactics,  in order to further consolidate the Russia-Belarus “Union State.”

Could Russia Attempt a Crimea-Style Operation Against Belarus? was originally published on Global Security Review.

Despite Venezuela’s enormous oil reserves, the decline of the country’s oil production can be attributed to four major factors: the first, the current absence of qualified extractors that could exploit the heavy petroleum reserves. Nevertheless, as oil prices rose, the government demanded changes to arrangements made with companies to get higher revenues. When companies denied, their assets were captured and expropriated.

Oil Industry Mismanagement

Even when petroleum prices were higher, the government spent the proceeds to finance the country’s social programs, but failed to reinvest properly at all levels from the capital intensive business that is oil production.

The second is the failure of President Chavez’s government to understand the degree of capital expenditure which was needed to continue developing the country’s petroleum. After Petroleos de Venezuela (PDVSA) Workers had gone on strike, they were dismissed and replaced by workers loyal to President Chavez, regardless their lack of expertise. Over 40,000 workers were fired and were replaced with over 120,000—largely inexperienced—workers. This resulted in a substantial decrease in oil production.

Venezuelan Oil Tankers

The next reason is Venezuela’s tankers inability to deliver their freight. Vessels which sail the high seas are obliged by the international maritime law to meet environmental criteria. This usually implies that the tankers must be cleaned before traveling to overseas ports to prevent environmental harm In the port, port facilities or others boats.

For the boats to be cleaned, workers in scuba suits scrub crude oil by hand from the tankers. PDVSA has since failed to pay back the service providers that keep clean and repair the vessels, the accumulation of cleaning invoices that the company can’t pay has caused the tankers transporting oil to be stranded up to two months.
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Global Oil Prices

The last reason is the fall in petroleum prices in the international industry. The decrease in oil prices that began in late 2014, when the overall poor economic performance in China, Brazil, and Europe fuelled a fall in the requirement, while the distribution and production continued to increase. The situation sent Venezuela’s economy to a plunge; the petroleum sector contributed to 95 percent of Venezuelan exports. Even when oil prices were higher, the government spent the proceeds to finance the country’s social programs but failed to reinvest properly from the capital intensive business.

The International Monetary Fund estimates that Venezuela’s inflation rate will increase up to a crippling 720% this past year. The country’s economic catastrophe has further exacerbated deep political tensions, causing a constitutional crisis, mass protests, looting, and civilian casualties with the death toll now in excess of 100. Price controls were intended to keep the essential goods affordable to the poorest inhabitants of the country, however, manufacturers reduced production because of the limit on what they can charge customers.

The crisis has forced people to deal with the shortage of foodstuffs in stores and supermarkets by substituting unavailable products like corn flour and pasta with locally grown plantains and potatoes. Nevertheless, shortages of basic and specialized medications, along in the lack of medical care in virtually all of the country’s health service units continue to be widespread. This has led to looting and massive demonstrations in the streets of Venezuela.

Analysis: The Economic Roots of Venezuela’s Collapse was originally published on Global Security Review.

Seven days after Trump’s inauguration, a stream of reporting emerged from independent Russian media outlets. On January 27, 2017, Novaya Gazeta reported that Sergei Mikhailov, the Deputy Chief of the cyber unit in the successor agency to the KGB—officially the Information Security Department of the FSB—was in attendance at a meeting of high-level FSB staff during the first week of December. In that meeting, security personnel suddenly entered and grabbed Mikhailov, placed a light-proof bag over his head, and dragged him from the room.

Mikhailov hasn’t been seen since, and Interfax, the independent Russian newswire, has corroborated the story, which quotes an anonymous FSB official saying that Mikhailov and his deputy Dmitry Dokuchaev, were accused of “breaking their oath and working with the CIA.”

However, it was reported sometime later that two sources indicated that he may have been an asset for a foreign intelligence agency inside the FSB. On February 1, charges of high treason on behalf of the United States were brought to them. Again—in this case citing investigators—Dokuchaev and Mikhailov were thought to have cooperated with the CIA.⁠

The men are alleged to have “transferred confidential data to the American company Verisign and to other commercial organizations which in turn transferred these data to intelligence agencies of the USA”. Representatives from VeriSign did confirm that data was received by the company, although stated that it was not confidential in nature.

According to Novaya Gazeta, Mikhailov specifically passed along information about Vladimir Fomenko, owner of Kings Servers, to U.S. intelligence officials. This information was regarding Fomenko’s involvement in the cyberattacks on the electoral systems of Arizona and Illinois. At the same time, Interfax news agency reported that an additional 8 people had been identified by the FSB as accomplices.

The Mystery of the Seven Dead Russian Diplomats

Since election day in November 2016, seven Russian diplomats—including Russian ambassador to the United Nations Vitaly Churkin, and ex-KGB head Oleg Erovinkin—have been killed or found dead in increasingly questionable circumstances. Churkin’s death is under investigation by the New York City medical examiner, while Erovinkin—who is believed to have assisted Christopher Steele with compiling the now-infamous kompromat dossier—was found dead in the back of his Lexus.

The goal of Russian interference in the American election was to foment disillusionment with democratic institutions—to delegitimize Western political systems. Within the Kremlin, officials originally believed that Hillary Clinton would win the United States’ 2016 presidential election. Russia’s interference strategy was intended to shape a political climate so rife with mistrust and division that a Clinton administration would be forced to concentrate on ensuring domestic policy and stability, at the expense of American foreign policy interests.

The lack of planning in the event of a Trump victory created, rather than solved, a new problem for the Kremlin. The U.S. federal government’s executive branch has become increasingly unpredictable, a stark departure from the decades of more-or-less predictable U.S. foreign policy to which the Kremlin has become accustomed. As President, Trump is not the authoritarian that Putin is able to be. Military power is largely in the hands of Secretary of Defense Mattis, having been given a near-unprecedented degree of autonomy in directing military operations by Trump.

Furthermore, the Kremlin seems ill-prepared for an operation of this magnitude, ostensibly having failed to understand the strategic (long-term) implications for sponsored institutional disruption in a state (the U.S.) with bureaucratic and democratic institutions designed to impede would-be authoritarians. In Russia, such leaks do occur, albeit with greater consequences.

Strategic Analysis: Growing internal friction and high profile moles within Russia’s security services diminishes their ability to maintain order—and power.

As Russia’s economy declined after having enjoyed a hot streak during the early 2000s, thanks to skyrocketing commodity prices, Putin’s foreign policy devolved into a projection of Russian hard power, with the intent of rebuilding national pride in a resurging global power.

As the 2018 presidential election approaches, protests and dissent are growing throughout Russia. Typically, Moscow’s and Saint Petersburg’s middle class and opposition elites are the typical protesters; they have greater access to the West and it’s social networking and media, and are more exposed to democratic ideas.

The majority of Russians, however, receive news and information through state-managed channels, and many are dependant on state institutions for employment or pensions. Living in the “Regions” (industrial, non-cosmopolitan cities, towns, and villages, excluding the two main cities), most Russians have experienced a sharp decline in their standard of living.

Russia’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP), per capita, has dropped over 41% from its 2013 height of $15,543. For a country having suffered through a corrupt transition from the Soviet control economy in the early 1990s, followed by a complete economic collapse in 1997, an ongoing major decline, overseen by a kleptocratic elite would likely result in a large degree of public unrest and resistance.

Historically, the Kremlin manages internal unrest by harnassing Russian nationalism and engaging in conflict abroad, under the guise of protecting Russian security interests, or restoring Russia as a global “great power.” The key for the Kremlin, and ultimately, Putin, is to make sure that these campaigns generate tangible rewards for the Russian electorate.

Russian FSB Official Linked to DNC Hack Charged with Treason for “Aiding CIA” was originally published on Global Security Review.

As the conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East, and the threat of escalations on the Korean Peninsula continue to draw the majority of international media attention, Venezuela’s deepening political and economic crisis rapidly grows regarding significance for security in the Americas.

To understand the complexities the perfect storm of food and economic insecurity, political repression, and violence stemming from the absence of any form of law and order, we spoke to Jennifer McCoy, Ph.D., distinguished University Professor of Political Science at Georgia State University. Dr. McCoy served as Founding Director of the Global Studies Institute at GSU (2015-16), and Director of the Carter Center’s Americas program (1998-2015) where she led projects strengthening democratic institutions, provided mediation and encouraged dialogue and hemispheric cooperation. Her latest book is International Mediation in Venezuela (co-authored with Francisco Diez, 2011).

Dr. McCoy directed the Carter Center’s projects on Mediation and Monitoring in Venezuela (2002-2004), the Ecuador-Colombia Dialogue Group (2008-2010), and the U.S.-Andean Dialogue Group (2010-2011), and led over a dozen election monitoring and observation missions.

The Current Situation: Repression, Resource Insecurity, and the Risk of Escalation

According to Dr. McCoy, three main scenarios could potentially play out. One of these is the current situation; people willing to publicly protest led by a unified opposition with specific demands are being met by the government with repression. If no concessions are made by the government, the unrest could potentially peter out if no change occurs.

The Maduro government has been hanging on… waiting for oil prices to rise… trying desperately to make its bond payments…

This has happened twice before in the past three years. Venezuelan’s went out into the streets, drawing international attention, and resulting in dialogues that were sponsored by the international community. Each time, an exchange was sponsored and then protests died down, but nothing was changed as a consequence of the inter-party dialogues. The government and its economic policies continued, the social situation deteriorated, and the stage was effectively set for another crisis like the one we see now.

But what makes this round of protests really different and more sustained is the lack of elections as an alternative means to resolve differences. The cancellation of all election options, as well as the Supreme Court’s undermining the authority of the legislature (the only institution controlled by the opposition), means the people are losing hope of peaceful means of changing the situation.

Russia and China have provided the Venezuelan government with financial support as it tries to hang on. The government is counting on the situation to improve—i.e. for oil prices to rise—before the presidential elections scheduled for late-2018. They’ve already delayed or all-out suspended local, regional, and governor elections and successfully halted an effort by the opposition to have a recall referendum that would cut short the president’s term.

Source: Jennifer McCoy, Ph.D., Distinguished University Professor of Political Science at Georgia State University. Dr. McCoy served as Founding Director of the Global Studies Institute at GSU (2015-16), and as Director of the Carter Center’s Americas program (1998-2015) where she led projects strengthening democratic institutions, provided mediation and encouraged dialogue and hemispheric cooperation. Her latest book is International Mediation in Venezuela (co-authored with Francisco Diez, 2011).

Crisis in Venezuela: Economic Collapse, Violent Unrest, and Human Survival was originally published on Global Security Review.

Dr. Jennifer McCoy, Distinguished University Professor of Political Science at Georgia State University, discussed a third potential outcome for the situation in Venezuela: a negotiated solution. A negotiated settlement means addressing the food and medical shortage and ensuring people’s basic survival needs are met while providing international economic support on the condition that certain political and institutional reforms are implemented.

Years ago, Venezuela cut itself off from the Inter-American Development Bank, the IMF, and the World Bank. Since then, it has been relying on loans from Russia and China in exchange for oil as collateral, but that’s increasingly becoming an unsustainable source of funding for the Venezuelan government.

China and Russia are becoming more leery about continuing to loan new money because of depressed oil prices, instability, and their internal problems. As a result, Venezuela’s financial options are thinning out. However, Dr. McCoy notes that negotiations could resolve this issue in this third scenario, which is the most optimal.

In exchange for international aid, Venezuela’s government would agree to implement changes in monetary and fiscal policy and agree to reinvest revenues, particularly in the nationalized oil sector. The national oil company has lost its capacity to produce efficiently and in the required volume. Venezuela’s commodity-based economy requires an efficient oil industry to generate sufficient revenue to reinvest in other sectors so as to promote a more diversified economy.

Additionally, the government needs to agree to political negotiations, as well. The independence of Venezuela’s democratic institutions has been critically undermined, so there needs to be a major effort to restore the independence of the judiciary, the legislative branch, the security forces, and the media, in addition to setting in place a timetable for elections.

The problem, Dr. McCoy says, is that the government is reluctant to hold elections because if they perceive it as an all-or-nothing situation if they (the Maduro government) falls out of power. If the Chavez movement loses control of the Venezuelan government, they fear recrimination and are afraid of losing all the gains they’ve made—in their eyes—for the Venezuelan people through what Chavez called his “Bolivarian revolution.” There is significant corruption that permeates the government and armed forces, and reported criminal activity, as well. Therefore, many officials will be reluctant to risk giving up power if they think they will be tried and punished, or if they expect a witch-hunt without due process.

Also looming over members of government is the possibility of extradition to the United States. This threat is particularly worrisome for those who’ve already been indicted in the U.S., or who have had sanctions imposed upon them by the U.S. in response to corruption, drug trafficking, or human rights abuses.

Applying transitional justice in Venezuela

Transitional justice is usually implemented after countries have emerged from a civil war with a peace agreement, or after a transition from a military dictatorship or authoritarian regime to a democratic system. In the past, it’s granted pure amnesty to everybody.

Now, Dr. McCoy says, it typically provides reduced sentences for human rights abusers, and potentially for corrupt officials, conditioned on their agreeing to provide compensation to the victims or the country, acknowledge responsibility and tell the truth, and guarantees not to repeat the criminal activity. Some form of negotiation must include elements transitional justice to ensure a peaceful transition of power, and more importantly, to even have the ability to hold elections where it’s possible that the government could be ousted.

What’s at stake for American interests?

A failure to reach a solution in Venezuela would have considerable implications for American interests, both economic and national security. A failure would result in a marked increase in the number of Venezuelan’s fleeing the country, either seeking better economic opportunity or fleeing political violence and oppression.

This risk involves the point that if there is a state collapse, oil production will likely cease in Venezuela and worldwide prices escalate. an interruption in oil exports to the U.S. from Venezuela would be the first time that has happened, despite political tensions and lack of ambassadors in each country.

The criminal and extremist activity would increase in the absence of order. There have been allegations that Venezuela has sold visas to Hezbollah in Iran, Dr. McCoy says, noting that these haven’t necessarily been concretely proven, but provide a window into the range of threats that could emerge from Venezuela if it became a failed state.

Source: Jennifer McCoy, Ph.D., Distinguished University Professor of Political Science at Georgia State University. Dr. McCoy served as Founding Director of the Global Studies Institute at GSU (2015-16), and as Director of the Carter Center’s Americas program (1998-2015) where she led projects strengthening democratic institutions, provided mediation and encouraged dialogue and hemispheric cooperation. Her latest book is International Mediation in Venezuela (co-authored with Francisco Diez, 2011).

Solving the Economic & Security Crisis in Venezuela was originally published on Global Security Review.

Following this past week’s second firing of a North Korean ballistic missile over Japanese territory, remarks were made in a joint press conference held by U.S. Permanent Representative to the U.N. Nikki Haley, and National Security Advisor Lt. General H.R. McMaster.

Ambassador Haley said that she’d “hand over” the North Korean issue to Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis for him to solve—if diplomatic efforts continued to fail. The Ambassador’s delivery indicated some exasperation with the lack of diplomatic progress.

China will resist any effort to further intervene until, at least, the conclusion of this year’s Communist Party Conference, where President Xi Jinping is expected to further consolidate his power. China has been promoting itself as an official “global power.” Resolving such a crisis as the North Korean nuclear threat, particularly as the Kim regime is a growing thorn in Beijing’s side, would lend credibility to that claim.

Furthermore, proactive engagement by China could mitigate some of the Government’s concerns, such as a U.S. aligned, unified Korean Peninsula, or a mass-exodus of North Korean refugees across the Chinese border.

If this most recent provocation by North Korea against Japan does not cross the line issued by Secretary Mattis, it will be clear as North Korea will continue to test the limits of the U.S., Japan, and South Korea with increasingly aggressive ballistic missile provocations.

U.S. Defense Secretary Outlines Scope of Any Military Action in North Korea

In a statement released outside of the White House following a meeting with U.S. President Donald Trump, Secretary of Defense James Mattis sent a clear warning to North Korea:

“Any threat to the United States or its territories including Guam or our allies will be met with a massive military response, a response both effective and overwhelming.” The Secretary continued, saying, “Kim Jong Un should heed the United Nations Security Council’s unified voice. All members unanimously agreed on the threat North Korea poses. And they remain unanimous in their commitment to the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula. Because we are not looking to the total annihilation of a country, namely, North Korea.”

U.S. military action would be a sudden and massive attack on North Korean nuclear and military assets, for which no prior warning would be given.

Mattis issued his statement while flanked by Marine General Joseph Dunford, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In contrast to the off-the-cuff “fire-and-fury” rhetoric employed by Trump on August 8, Mattis read from a prepared statement and avoided using opaque language, with one exception.

What Constitutes a Threat?

After stating “Any threat to the United States or its territories including Guam or our allies,” Mattis did not provide context for his use of the words “any threat.”   Accordingly, it leaves both the White House and the military wiggle room for interpretation.

Mattis’ language could have been intended to justify for the U.S. to use force as a means of self-defense under Article 51 of the U.N. Charter. Action taken under Article 51 requires there be an imminent threat of “armed attack” if the assault has not yet begun, but does not require prior authorization by the U.N. Security Council.

Conditions for Military Action

Mattis’ use of “will be” in setting the conditions for military action against North Korea is critical. He did not say “might” or “would.” In contrast, on August 8, Trump stated that threats “to the United States” would trigger a military response. It was after this that North Korea threatened to target the area surrounding Guam with ballistic missiles.

By including U.S. allies (South Korea and Japan), U.S. territories (like Guam), and the continental United States in his statement, Mattis provided a clear definition as to what would merit a military strike by the U.S.

What Would a U.S. Military Strike on North Korea Look Like?

The Defense Secretary also described what military action by the U.S. against North Korea would look like. In stating that “we [the U.S.] are not looking to the total annihilation of a country, namely, North Korea,” Mattis implied that any military action by the U.S. would likely not be a massive invasion. U.S. military action, rather, would be a sudden and massive attack on North Korean nuclear and military assets, for which no prior warning would be given.

In ending his statement referencing the “unified voice” of the U.N. Security Council, Mattis implied his preference for resolving the situation peacefully. Primarily, Mattis views a diplomatic solution as preferable but has made sure that the United States is ready to use force if necessary.

U.S. issues “red line” on North Korea, but leaves room for interpretation. was originally published on Global Security Review.

As a candidate, Donald Trump structured his narrative around the idea that the U.S. had overextended itself—that allies were taking advantage of American military and economic support.  Trump contextualized the North Atlantic Treat Organization (NATO)—a bulwark of the post-World War II international order—as outdated while falsely stating the idea that some of America’s oldest allies owed the United States a financial debt for the American presence in Europe.

Trump pledged to usher in a new age of American isolationism. Throughout the campaign, he distanced himself from Secretary Clinton’s tough stance on Russia; he refused to pledge his steadfast support to NATO—characterizing the alliance as “obsolete”—arguing that the United States was overextended abroad and needed to concentrate on domestic affairs.

Simultaneously, Trump pledged to increase defense spending to “rebuild” the American military. After his inauguration, now-President Trump proposed a $54 billion dollar boost in defense spending in his first budget, with Congress authorizing an additional $15 billion to finance ongoing operations in Syria, Afghanistan, Iraq, and other areas around the globe until a full budget is approved.

Trump’s foreign policy: tweet loudly and carry a nuke.

Pundits and technocrats across the media spectrum proclaimed the president-elect as a sheep in wolf’s clothing, with some arguing that Clinton represented a greater threat to world peace. Incidentally, this argument was also put forth by Russian state media outlets (RT, Sputnik), by Wikileaks, and outlets like Breitbart, Zero Hedge, and InfoWars.

Before the election, one economist in The Hill stated that Trump would be “less aggressively militaristic.” Theodore Roosevelt’s mantra, “Speak softly and carry a big stick” could be easily adapted for Trump: “Tweet loudly and carry a nuke.” The Trump administration isn’t offering a retreat from American intervention; he’s offering a 21st-century version of imperialism while openly endorsing authoritarian regimes.

More crucially, President Trump seems to be a bigger proponent of American military force projection and realpolitik than any president since Richard Nixon. Since taking office, Trump has shown that he is not, in fact, “less aggressively militaristic.”

Impulsivity & International Security: The Consequences of Failing to Think Strategically

After reports had emerged that Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad again used chemical weapons against civilians, the U.S. responded by launching a barrage of Tomahawk cruise missiles at the Syrian Air Force base from which the chemical weapon strikes originated. This missile attack was seemingly conducted as a one-off operation in the absence of a broader strategy to de-escalate the Syrian civil war.

The one-off strike had little effect on the Syrian air force’s ability to operate. Moreover, it reveals a high degree of impulsivity and a failure to think strategically, increasing the risk of an unexpected global crisis. Such a crisis could be brought about by a miscalculation in judgment, or by impulsively ordering military action without considering a situation in its’ entirety. In a region like the Korean peninsula, for instance, the consequences of such a blunder would be dire.

What is U.S. Foreign Policy Under the Trump Administration? was originally published on Global Security Review.

“The United States has great strength and patience, but if it is forced to defend itself or its allies, we will have no choice but to totally destroy North Korea.”

U.S. President Donald Trump’s September 19th statement at the U.N. General Assembly in New York has attracted a virulent reaction from China.

“These are not the words the world is waiting for from a president of the United States,” were the words used in a September 20th editorial published by the Huanqiu Shibao.

“Pyongyang said it had sufficiently developed its nuclear ballistic missile technology to reach the United States. It is certainly a provocation to Washington, but America must not engage in such rhetorical jousting with threats,” warns an editorial in the China Daily, in line with the language used in a September 19th statement issued by the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which called for restraint and dialogue. The China Daily editorial went on to say that even if Beijing approved the recent UN sanctions, “unfortunately, experience proves that, confronted only with pressure, Pyongyang does not bend.”

The consequences of a nuclear conflict on the Korean peninsula would be catastrophic for China

The Chinese strongly oppose the outbreak of an armed conflict on the Korean peninsula. ‘Destroying North Korea’ would lead to an ecological disaster for Northeast Asia. Nuclear pollution would swallow northeast China, the Shandong Peninsula, and South Korea.

Even if a conflict were to remain under the nuclear threshold, that is a conventional war, China fears the outbreak of an overwhelming and potentially destabilizing refugee crisis on its border with North Korea.

Strategically, China’s ideal scenario is maintaining the status quo; China sees a unified Korean peninsula under the Republic of Korea flag as a threat and views North Korea as a buffer between itself and Western-aligned South Korea.

A return to the negotiating table

The key to resolving the issue “is in the hands of the United States and North Korea,” analyzes Yao Lu, a professor of international relations at the Institute of Public Administration at Jilin University, columns of the Anglophone daily China Daily.

Yao added, “for the good and long-term stability of the international community, both sides should take their responsibilities and come to the negotiating table to resolve their conflicts.”

China’s Response to Trump’s Threat to “Totally Destroy” North Korea was originally published on Global Security Review.

This is a direct response to the two  missiles launched by North Korea that have flown over the north of the country, according to the Japanese Ministry of Defense.

North Korea, which recently threatened Japan by saying it would “sink its territory” with a nuclear bomb, for its support of US-sponsored sanctions, also launched another missile that flew over northern Japan on August 29.

The defense spokesman said today that “the country watches over North Korea’s movements” for a possible new launch.

Japan’s anti-missile operations use Navy Aegis destroyers to shoot down airborne missiles and PAC-3 to resist projectiles.

Tokyo, which does not confirm the number of launchers installed in the country due to security concerns, has already extended its anti-missile system in several prefectures in the west of the country in mid-August after the North Korean government threatened to launch four missiles around the area surrounding the American island-territory of Guam.

The North Korean regime launched the most recent ballistic missile towards Japan on September 19, raising alarms across Japan and drawing criticism from the international community over its persistent weapons tests.

Japan installs anti-missile systems in north of country due to North Korean threat was originally published on Global Security Review.

On August 19, 2017, President Donald Trump gave his first speech to the UN General Assembly. In his speech, he stated that if the Pyongyang regime does not give up its nuclear program, the United States will have no choice but to “destroy North Korea. We have patience, but we have another option.”

Trump called the regime of Kim Jong-Un “depraved and responsible for the death, oppression, torture, and imprisonment of many citizens of the country.” He said North Korea’s pursuit of nuclear weapons is irresponsible and threatens the entire world with an “unthinkable loss of human life.” He said the North Korean leader is on a suicide mission for himself and his regime.

Trump tells UN: North Korea “Will be Destroyed” if Threats Persist was originally published on Global Security Review.

While eastern European leaders are certainly justified in their concern, it is the job of military leaders all over the world to ensure that their forces are prepared to deal with worst-case scenarios. Zapad and other large-scale war games are intended to test the readiness of military forces to deal with such situations.

History, and Russia’s military doctrine, tells us that for the Kremlin to legitimately consider the use of force against a sovereign state—under the guise of aiding Russian-speaking separatists, military drills, or otherwise, the Russian military and political leadership must perceive a legitimate threat to Russia’s national interest—largely the interests of its ruling oligarchic elite.

Additionally, the Kremlin must be sure of its ability to prevail in any forceful confrontation or to, a minimum, ensure a stalemate. Neither condition seems present.

Since last year’s strategic Caucasus-2016 exercise, no Russian allies or client states are under greater threat than they were last year. A few, like Bashar al Assad of Syria, have seen threats to their rule decrease in the past year.

How Likely is it that Russia Will Attempt a Crimea-Style Operation Against the Baltics?

NATO is now keeping a much closer eye on the Russian military techniques, particularly since the  Zapad-2013 exercises featured simulations of a pre-emptive nuclear strike against Sweden.

Western countries were caught unaware as Russia employed hybrid tactics to hide its deployment of forces to Crimea.

NATO has beefed up its presence in its Baltic and Eastern-European Union member countries, further reducing the already slim chances that Russia will want to attempt an incursion in Baltic or E.U. states.

NATO is now keeping a much closer eye on the Russian military techniques, particularly since the  Zapad-2013 exercises featured simulations of a pre-emptive nuclear strike against Sweden.

Preparing for a conflict doesn’t mean the Kremlin is planning to commence one.

The Russian military has been holding large scale strategic exercises each year of the twenty-first century, as the Russian economics has rebounded from the lows of the early 1990s. Preparing for such a conflict doesn’t mean the Kremlin is planning to commence one.

It is also worth noting a correlation between Russia’s economic state and its military spending and training. This would imply that the Russian Armed Forces have a tendency to train as far because they can afford to.

Until 2015, Russia’s military expenditures and the number of war games it conducted, both large- and small-scale, had been increasing at a faster rate than the rate of economic growth.

Russian Troop Deployments in Military Training Exercises

Russian GDP figures, Military Exercise Data, and Troop Numbers

Given the degree of attention focused on Russia’s military deployments, it’s highly unlikely that that Zapad-2017 will escalate into a full-scale or partial military conflict with NATO.

Even though Russia’s Gross domestic product grew to 2014, its costs grew by 300 percent at the exact same period and the number of war games increased by 157 percent from 2008 to 2014.

It should be noted that this precludes any so-called “black money” that would not appear on a publicly available balance sheet.

Security Analysis: Although Possible; War with NATO is Unlikely.

The biggest risks stemming from the Zapad drills are possible errors, including stray shots, local attempts to test responses through other measures, moderate or temporary escalation in existing conflict zones (such as in Ukraine, Abkhazia, or South Ossetia).

Additionally, due to regional geopolitical developments in the Russia-Belarus relationship, Russia may attempt to use “nonlinear” warfare tactics (asymmetric tactics) in order to further consolidate the Russia-Belarus “Union State.”

Zapad-2017: Analyzing Troop Numbers & Economic Factors was originally published on Global Security Review.

North Korea has fired a ballistic missile that flew over Japan before plunging into the northern Pacific Ocean, termed a “grave threat” by the Japanese prime minister. The South Korean military stated that the missile was launched just before 6 am local time on Tuesday from the Sunan region of North Korea, near the capital of Pyongyang.  The missile traveled about 2,700 kilometers (1,1677 miles), reaching a max height of 550km, according to a statement issued by South Korea’s Joint Chiefs of Staff.
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Experts believe that North Korea used the recently tested Hwasong-12 intermediate-range ballistic missile, the same variant that North Korea has threatened to fire towards the US territory of Guam. Japanese public broadcaster NHK reported that the missile flew across the northern Japanese island of Hokkaido and broke into three pieces before landing in in waters 1,180 kilometers (approximately 733 miles) off the coast of Hokkaido’s Cape Erimo.

A Threat to Regional Stability and Security

The Japanese government’s J Alert warning system advised individuals In northern Japan to take precautions.  NHK reports that there have been no instances of property damage as the missile fell in the waters over 700 miles from the Hokkaido coast. In a public statement shortly after the launch was reported, the visibly agitated Japanese prime minister Shinzo Abe said the act an unprecedented, severe, and grave threat to the security of Japan, and to overall regional stability.

In a 40-minute phone call between Abe and US President Donald Trump, the two leaders agreed to increase pressure on North Korea further.  Although there have been several recent missile launches by North Korea, a missile passing through the Japanese mainland will be seen as a larger provocation. This will be looked at by Japan, the United States, and South Korea as underscoring the seriousness of the threat posed by North Korea, Abe said.

Escalating Tensions and Fiery Rhetoric

Before the launch, tensions have been running higher than usual following an escalation in rhetoric from Mr. Trump towards North Korea, and North Korea’s statements that it was prepared to firing several missiles towards targets surrounding the US island territory of Guam.

What makes this recent development significant is that this is the first major North Korean test of Donald Trump’s rhetoric following the speech in which he threatened North Korea with “fire and fury.”  Of most concern is the Trump administration’s response,  as its’ foreign and defense policies are unpredictable, in comparison to previous administrations.  Four South Korean jets bombed a South Korean military training ground on Tuesday in a show of forceful readiness.

North Korea Fires Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missile Over Japan was originally published on Global Security Review.

China is a rising power. It is agreed that China has the capabilities to eventually significantly surpass the United States regarding global economic and political power. Chinese posturing in the South China Sea is an attempt to gauge and establish its sphere of influence in a region that has been long dominated by the United States.

Relations with the U.S. were tested particularly after Trump’s pre-inauguration phone call with the Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-Wen, which flew in the face of 40 years of diplomatic convention.

Trump’s anti-China stance when it comes to trade is questionable. His businesses have partnered with Chinese investors and banks, and his projects have been built using Chinese steel. It’s unlikely that he would risk jeopardizing his children’s—and his own–long-term business interests.

Some argue that the U.S. and China are on the verge of inevitable conflict. This “Thucydides Trap” says that as one power rises, the other declines and the two are destined for inevitable conflict. Statistically, this isn’t a far-fetched concept; only 4 out of 16 prior great-power transitions have not resulted in war.

Is the Thucydides Trap Inevitable? Not Necessarily.

In this realist view, China is an irresistable force approaching an immovable object—the United States. The U.S.’s commitment
to the Bretton Woods institutions, alliances, and political structures which have supported its global hegemony, it is argued, is proof of the inevitability of this conflict.

The 45th President of the United States, however, may not be so steadfast in those commitments. Nixon’s overtures to China and its subsequent admission to the U.N. marked an unprecedented shift in U.S. foreign policy. Anti-Communism was rampant, but the interests of capitalism took precedence over political ideology.

In return for access to Chinese markets, the U.S. recognized the People’s Republic of China as the sovereign authority over China, and supported the PRC’s entry into the United Nations, at Taiwan’s expense.

This rapid departure from the status quo served as a jumping-off point for bilateral U.S.-Soviet negotiations. All the while, Nixon utilized his public abhorrence of communism to distract from his use of realpolitik in a way that sharply contrasted with American ideology.

Trump’s continued self-contradiction and erraticism could serve a similar purpose, however unintentionally. The rhetoric on Chinese economic policy, on the surface, made Trump look tough against China during the election. However, following his taking office, Trump and his advisors have been leaning on China for assistance in dealing with North Korea.

Triangular Diplomacy: a New World Order?

Many have begun to draw comparison’s between the Trump administration’s foreign policy and Nixon’s model of triangular diplomacy. To incentivize Putin, the U.S. would endorse a consolidation of Russian power in Eastern Europe, the Caucasus and parts of central Asia, recognizing a Russian sphere of influence, and support productive bilateral oil partnerships.

A similar strategy would be deployed with regards to China, with the impetus for them being the arrangements created between Trump and Putin. In this scenario, President Trump utilizes American commitments and the existing global power structure as commodities to transact.

Yes, this is a retreat from the current status quo, but it is not isolationism—it is a restructuring of the global order to accommodate a shift in world power—a crude re-establishment of the triangular diplomacy model employed by Nixon and Kissinger with China and Russia.

At present, the United States seems to be in its last days as the leader of a unipolar international order. Rapid technological advancement is contributing to global economic uncertainty, and international security is increasingly threatened. Global influence is becoming increasingly multipolar. Some degree of flexibility and willingness to adapt in the face of changing norms is obligatory.

Trump may recognize this. He may not. Is he a madman theorist, or is he just mad? A comparison to Nixon may not be entirely appropriate, as Nixon was a prolific student of political theory and often read up diplomatic history.

However, madman theory dictates that one’s opponent must be entirely convinced of his opponent’s irrationality. President Trump has even managed to convince long-standing American allies of that. Danish foreign minister Kristian Jensen, when asked about the future of relations with the United States, responded by saying “Donald Trump changes opinions like others change underwear.”

China, the United States, and the Thucydides Trap was originally published on Global Security Review.

Under the leadership of President Vladimir V. Putin, Russia annexed Crimea from Ukraine, subsequently invading eastern Ukraine to foment a nationalist civil war, and directly engaged in the conflict and the subsequent secession of South Ossetia and Abkhazia from the sovereign Republic of Georgia.

These forays are not mere lashing out—the Kremlin is attempting to re-establish a traditional sphere of influence in its “near abroad.” Henry Kissinger emphasizes the fact that “the relationship between Ukraine and Russia will always have a special character in the Russian mind. It can never be limited to a relationship between two traditional, sovereign states, not from the Russian point of view, maybe not even from the Ukraine’s.”

The “Near Abroad” is a Security Buffer

The Kremlin felt that, in insisting that Ukraine was free to align itself with the European Union or even NATO, U.S. and European leaders were ignoring Russia’s views of its vital interests. Russia’s annexation of Crimea and ongoing involvement in the Ukrainian civil war, for instance, can be interpreted as Russia demonstrating it’s readiness to protect these vital interests.

To understand this view, one must look to Russia’s security history. Russia is perpetually “neuralgic” about external threats emerging on its western front having fought off invasions led by Napoleon and Hitler. After the collapse of the USSR, NATOs expansion into former Soviet states, closer to Russia, was seen by Russian leadership as a critical threat to Russia’s sovereignty.

In this light, Ukraine is seen as an essential buffer, as Soviet satellite states in the Warsaw Pact were during the Cold War. In this vicious cycle, the U.S., in turn, sees Russia as a threat, subjecting Russia to economic and political isolation, while visibly reinforcing defense commitments to NATO allies and partners in the former Soviet space.

The Geo-Strategic Element

While the U.S.-Russian relations are far from where they were during the Cold War, bilateral ties between the two are the most strained they’ve been since the collapse of the Soviet Union.

The Kremlin, increasingly isolated by the international community, has become rife with suspicion and conspiracy. Senior officials perceived the campaign rhetoric of Secretary Clinton as hostile towards Russia; many top political leaders and those in the security establishment believed that some form of war—be it conventional or nuclear—was likely.

Understanding Russia’s geopolitical position is critical to comprehending their defense perspective. To do so, we look at Russian military planning and security strategy, which lies in contrast to that of the United States.

The U.S. enjoys a much greater degree of security due to its geographic position between the Atlantic and Pacific oceans. Geography has strongly influenced U.S. defense planning towards the development and maintenance of a large, blue water navy, capable of global force-projection.

On the other hand, Russia’s armed forces are largely structured for land-based combat. Russia is a land power with a large army, a strong air force to support it, and a brown water navy to support coastal security and regional force projection. Russia’s military planners see a threat in NATO expansion and are structuring the Russian armed forces for a conventional conflict involving state actors that could, theoretically, arise along Russia’s Eastern Europe, Caucasian, and Eurasian border regions. This is not to say that Russia is planning any such conflict, rather, Russian military analysts have concluded that a conventional war is possible, and it would most likely occur along Russia’s western flank.

When one positions oneself from Moscow’s viewpoint, it becomes clear that Western leaders are responding to what they understand as expansionist, Russian aggression in Eastern Europe. However, it must be understood that, at the same time, Russia sees itself as responding to an expansionist NATO and considers its actions a means of ensuring Russian national security.

Russian National Security & Foreign Policy under Putin was originally published on Global Security Review.

Based on President Trump’s stated policy of unpredictability and instability, it’s difficult to say what his end-goals may be—or if he even has them. The administration seems to favor a realpolitik approach to global affairs—with an increasingly transactional form of diplomacy.

Trump himself is certainly no ideologue, nor is he a micromanager. The president prides himself on being a delegator—details aren’t his forte. Based on the fact that he frequently contradicts himself, changing his stance on a given policy from one week to the next, the President appears to be a communications channel for which the various spheres of influence within West Wing compete for access.

Strategic Irrationality

The defining feature of Trump’s self-professed success in negotiating is unpredictability. To put it in his words: “I don’t want to broadcast my intentions…You want to have a little bit of guess work for the enemy.”

Many have compared his behavior to Richard Nixon’s, particularly during talks with the North Vietnamese, and in his manipulation of tensions between China and the U.S.S.R. to the benefit of American commercial and national security interests.

The concept of ruthless perseverance in the pursuit of political objectives has been discussed and debated for over a half a millennia. In Discourses on Livy, Niccolò Machiavelli dedicated an entire chapter to the benefits of irrationality in politics, labeling it, “How at times it is a very wise thing to stimulate madness.” Centuries later, Richard Nixon put this theory into practice.

Richard’s Nixon’s Madman Theory

Nixon based his foreign and military policy on what he called “madman theory.” To show the North Vietnamese that there was no end to his hostility, he ordered the indiscriminate carpet-bombing of North Vietnam and Cambodia.

“I want [the North Vietnamese] to believe I’ve reached the point where I might do anything to stop the war. We’ll just slip word to them that ‘Nixon is obsessed about communism…and he has his hand on the nuclear button.’”

These tactics, along with unpredictable changes to U.S. foreign policy initiated by Nixon led to a thaw in relations with the Soviet Union, then led by Leonid Brezhnev. Brezhnev, like Nixon, was a proponent of brinkmanship—employing posturing and political doctrine to support a policy of mutually assured destruction when it came to relations between the two superpowers.

Both men believed that peace rested on an elaborate system of triggers that would guarantee nuclear holocaust in the event of any first strike. It was a combination of the absolute nature of this destruction with the instability of the peace that prevented it, it was argued, which guaranteed that no power would dare carry out a first-strike attack.

Nevertheless, some continue to argue that these negotiation tactics led to the development of a joint space exploration program, increased commercial ties, and, most importantly, nuclear détente.

Madman Theory 2.0: The Trump Doctrine

Trump, however, is not the prolific reader of foreign policy and political science that Nixon was. There are, however, some senior advisors, like National Security Advisor H.R. McMaster and Defense Secretary Jim Mattis, who are heavily informed on matters of military history and theory and have significant experience at the strategic level. Mattis’ Defense Department, more importantly, has been given near-complete autonomy with regards military authority.

In any case, an attempt at forming a Moscow-Washington axis could have unintended consequences. Many of the president-elect’s cabinet and advisor appointees are virulently anti-Iran, which doesn’t exactly align with Russia’s long-standing relationship with the Islamic Republic.

Given Trump’s prior statements on the matter, his seeming attraction to nuclear weapons also underscores the notion of his employing some form of madman theory, be it intentionally or otherwise.

One could even perceive Trump’s rhetoric as condoning—even encouraging—the use of tactical nuclear weapons in Syria. When asked by MSNBC‘s Chris Matthews whether he would support the use of nuclear weapons against ISIS, he answered:

“I would never take any of my cards off the table.”

Madman Theory 2.0: The Trump Administration Foreign Policy was originally published on Global Security Review.

Under Trump’s direction, the Department of Defense led by Secretary James Mattis has been given a significant degree of autonomy to operate within. Following a series of missile and nuclear bomb tests in North Korea, Secretary of State Rex Tillerson stated that the “era of strategic patience is over,” referencing the U.S. North Korea policy under prior administrations.

In April and May of 2017, the U.S. Navy began increasing its forward-deployed military presence in the region, in a show of force to the North. Concurrently, in attempts to call the United States’ “bluff” regarding a pre-emptive strike, North Korea has taken steps to escalate tensions with aggressive anti-American rhetoric and threats of nuclear war and continued weapons tests in defiance of the UN Security Council.

By May, the U.S. Navy had deployed two aircraft carrier strike groups (formerly referred to as battle groups) to the Korean Peninsula—the U.S.S. Ronald Reagan carrier strike group and the U.S.S. Carl Vinson carrier strike group.

By June, the Navy confirmed that a third carrier battle group, led by the U.S.S. Nimitz, was en route to the region. Upon its arrival, the United States’ will have three of its aircraft carrier-led battle groups operating in the vicinity of North Korea, almost 30% of the U.S. carrier fleet.

How would war involving the U.S. and North Korea play out?

According to senior Defense Department officials, a conflict on the Korean peninsula would be one of the most violent and devastating combat operations in over a generation. Despite that, allied forces led by the U.S. would be victorious. The high levels of projected casualties stem from the proximity of the South Korean capital of Seoul to the North Korean border.

Seoul is one of the most densely populated metropolitan areas in the world. It lies just over 30 miles from the North Korean border and is well in the range of the hundreds of artillery and missile batteries that the North has stationed just north of the demilitarized zone.

South Korea has approximately 625,000 active-duty troops and another 3.1 million troops on reserve. While North Korea has roughly twice those numbers, their equipment is highly outdated, albeit augmented by an asymmetric nuclear capability.

What are the risks and consequences of a pre-emptive strike on the North?

Minor equipment or troop movements on the South Korean border can spark aggression from the North. Therefore, American, South Korean, and Japanese forces preparing to launch a pre-emptive strike would need to do so clandestinely, to catch North Korean forces off-guard.

In this scenario, major military, nuclear research, bunkers, and weapons depots would be targeted, with marines and special forces being deployed from carriers and amphibious assault ships off the North Korean coast. Such an operation would need to be executed swiftly, and with overwhelming force.

Otherwise, risk larger numbers of civilian casualties that would result from an attack—conventional or nuclear—on the Seoul metropolitan area should the North maintain the capability to launch such offense after a pre-emptive strike.

The China Option: Regime Change or Diplomacy

Trump’s attraction to authoritarian heads-of-state could very well lead to a negotiated settlement, or at the very least, some form of detente. China publicly favors a diplomatic solution to the crisis. Alternatively, Chinese political and military leaders may decide that it’s in China’s strategic interest to support or execute a regime change in North Korea.

Economically, the West has much more to offer China than North Korea does. However, China remains wary of uncontrolled destabilization in North Korea as it would likely lead to an unprecedented humanitarian crisis, with high numbers of refugees flooding into China.

Escalation on the Korean Peninsula was originally published on Global Security Review.

Jared Kushner reportedly discussed the possibility of setting up back-channel communications with Russian Intelligence Officials to facilitate secret and secure communications between the top levels of government in Washington and Moscow.

In December, Kushner reportedly asked Sergey Kislyak, Russia’s ambassador to the United States, about the possibility of the Trump administration utilizing Russian diplomatic communication lines or facilities in order to circumvent the United States national security and intelligence bureaucracies.

Kushner’s lack of prior experience in national security and foreign policy was hopelessly apparent. In national security and diplomatic circles, it’s common knowledge that the FBI makes a practice of intercepting the communications of Russian officials within the U.S., while the National Security Agency (NSA) continuously monitors the communications and SIGINT of Russian government officials overseas.

American officials told the Washington Post that Ambassador Kislyak subsequently informed Russian officials in Moscow of the request Kushner made. Reportedly, Kislyak was surprised at the suggestion—the proposed backchannel would have carried obvious security risks for the soon-to-be-installed Trump administration, and for Russian national interests.

“Kislyak…was taken aback by the suggestion of allowing an American to use Russian communications gear at its embassy—a proposal that would have carried security risks for Moscow as well as the Trump team.”

What was going through Kushner’s mind when he presented this proposal? Objectively, one can determine that Kushner’s naiveté got the best of him; he was either unaware of the security risks associated with such an arrangement, or he assumed that his contacts in Moscow trusted him to the same degree that he trusted them. Regardless, it’s increasingly obvious that—for all his reported brilliance as a political tactician—Kushner remains ignorant—almost pathetically so—to the nuances and details of foreign policy and national security strategy.

Vnesheconombank Chairman Sergey Gorkov Met With Kushner—at Kislyak’s Request

“The idea of using Russian facilities to skirt Russian surveillance would either be a serious attempt to hide something or the actions of a young amateur,” said former FBI special agent Clint Watts to The Atlantic. Former CIA acting-Director John McLaughlan provided that “I can’t keep out of my mind the thought that, if an American intelligence officer had done anything like this, we’d consider it espionage.”

This meeting is one of several that took place between senior Trump campaign officials or Trump surrogates and Russian diplomatic or intelligence officials that are of investigative interest to the FBI’s ongoing counterintelligence and criminal investigations into Trump’s campaign and subsequent administration.

Kushner is also reportedly involved in a number of other, high-profile, and clandestine meetings with Russian and other foreign officials.  Just days after making the backchannel inquiry to Kislyak, Kushner met with Sergey Gorkov—at Kislyak’s request. Gorkov is a former Russian intelligence officer and chairman of Russian state-owned bank Vnesheconombank (VEB). He maintains close ties to Russian President Vladimir Putin.

“Putin effectively runs VEB as his private slush fund. If Putin wants to throw money at something like a bailout, or [the Winter Olympics in] Sochi, or Ukrainian industrial manufacturing, he uses VEB,” according to Anders Aslund, a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council. Aslund added, “VEB does not do any ordinary banking business. Therefore it is so remarkable that Jared Kushner met with the head of VEB.”

Vnesheconombank’s board is made up largely of Kremlin ministers; its chairman is Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev, and  Bank chairman Gorkov was trained at an FSB academy and has strong ties to both the KGB and its successor organization, the FSB. VEB frequently collaborates with Russian security services, providing agents with cover identities and institutional affiliations. VEB acts as the funding vehicle for Russian operations in Ukraine, Eastern Europe, Syria, and the Caucasus—effectively providing an entirely off-the-books budget for the Putin regime.

Initially founded as a traditional development bank along the lines of the World Bank, Vnesheconombank’s initial purpose was to deliver long-term funding for projects private sector banks would likely avoid, according to a Standard & Poor’s sovereign credit analyst.

However, as time passed VEB was systematically converted into a “special purpose agency to finance politically important projects.” For instance, VEB has been heavily involved in efforts to forge inextricable economic links between Ukraine’s industrial and energy sectors and Russia—which would then give the Russian government enormous influence over the domestic politics of Ukraine.

Photo credit: Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff via Visual Hunt / CC BY

Jared Kushner Wanted Secret Back-Channel with Russia was originally published on Global Security Review.

A question facing foreign policy experts the world over is whether or not the Russian Federation is preparing for war. The query involves a consideration of how the movement of Russian troops, currently and historically, may lend insights into the intentions of Moscow when it comes to the question of military action in or against other nations.

Is the Crimean Annexation a Harbinger for Further Russian Aggression?

The Russian Federation and its predecessors have long been involved in military action involving Crimea. The first major military operation occurred in the last century of the Russian Empire and was aptly named the Crimean War, lasting from 1853 to 1856. The rationale Czar Nicolas I utilized in trying to militarily seize Crimean territory in the middle of the 19th century was quite like the argument advanced by Russian Federation President Putin in the 21st century. Both leaders contended individuals of Russian descent living in the Crimean Peninsula needed to be protected.

Since the Crimean War, the peninsula has been in and out of Russian control, including being fully engulfed into the now-defunct Soviet Union. The Crimean people gained independence from the Soviet with the liberation of Ukraine from the USSR with the Declaration of State Sovereignty on July 16, 1990, by the newly constituted Ukrainian Parliament.

Full Crimean integration with Ukrainian State following the declaration of independence from the USSR lasted about 15 years. On February 23, 2014, Russian President Putin initiated steps to annex the Crimean Peninsula, using the Russian military. In contemplating whether the events in the Crimean Peninsula serve as a harbinger of what may occur in the not too distant future, a look at Russian military troop movements after February 23, 2014, is illustrative.

The first step President Putin took to annex the Crimean Peninsula was the movement of Russian maritime forces from the naval base at Sevastopol to what international observers considered provocative positions in the Black Sea, which surrounds much of the peninsula. The second step of President Putin in the annexation process was to infiltrate not only the Crimean Peninsula but other Ukrainian territories as well with unmarked Russian ground and special forces, in addition to a number of intelligence officers from GRU (Russian military intelligence) and the FSB/FIS (the domestic and foreign intelligence services that succeeded the Soviet KGB).

Within a matter of a couple of weeks of the Russian Army advancing notoriously into the Crimean Peninsula, a hastily called referendum was called among the Crimean population. On March 16, 2014, an announcement was made that a fully 97 percent of voters in the Crimean Peninsula voted to join the Russian Federation. A so-called treaty of accession was executed bringing the Crimean Peninsula into the Russian Federation over the objectives of the Ukrainian government and the United Nations, NATO, and a multitude of individual nations.

The Baltics in the Aftermath of the Crimean Annexation Into the Russian Federation

In the immediate aftermath of the Crimean annexation into the Russian Federation, the trio of leaders of the Baltic nations sounded alarmed. The leaders of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia, all stated without equivocation that they anticipated the Russian Federation making military moves into their territories in the future. The leaders of Baltic republics were united in announcing they, in fact, believed Russian military aggression in Ukrainian and Crimean territory was, in fact, a harbinger of war to come throughout the Baltics.

The Russian Federation and Former Warsaw Pact Nations

Following Russian military action on the Crimean Peninsula, some leaders of former Warsaw Pact nations expressed alarm that they believed that their countries were to be targeted by the Russian Federation, and its leader, President Putin. The government of Poland was particularly strident in voicing its concerns about the potential for Russian military action against its frontiers.

Many analysts attribute the alarms that sounded in some former Warsaw Pact national capitals to the removal by the United of defensive armament systems out of nations like Poland and the Czech Republic by order of the Obama Administration. The fact that many Warsaw Pact countries had actual experience with Soviet tanks rolling across their borders during the Cold War added to the heightened sense of apprehension across much of Eastern Europe.

As will be discussed more fully later in this analysis, the so-called Russian Reset of the Obama Administration, coupled with the theory of “lead from behind,” left Eastern European leaders feeling more vulnerable to Russian military excursions, or even widespread war, than at any time since leaving the Soviet orbit.

In fact, Russian military exercises did not focus with any great specificity on any former Warsaw Pact nation. On the other hand, the rhetoric of President Putin about reintegrating former Soviet Republics back into the Russian sphere started to extend further to encompass the idea of restoring Warsaw Pact nations into a Moscow lead alliance.

The tensions involving Eastern European, or former Warsaw Pact, nations eased a bit when the Obama Administration took steps to replace defensive weapons systems back in some of these countries during the latter years of President Obama’s second term. In addition, the seemingly more hardline approach to military excursions by different nations of U.S. President Donald Trump seems to have calmed nerves in Eastern European capitals, at least for the time being.

The Russian Federation and Syria

The actions of the Russian Federation in regard to the civil war in Syria and terrorist infiltration in that Middle Eastern country does provide clues on whether Moscow is preparing for war. Overall, Moscow has ignored admonitions regarding its involvement in Syria, including the manner in which it is using its own military and intelligence forces to support the Syrian regime.

Some analysts have concluded that the Russian presence in Syria is designed in part to bring that nation into its sphere of influence or even control. However, many of these same analysts also contend that Syria is serving as something of a proving ground in which Moscow is testing the extent to which it can act militarily in another nation without a counter-push from other nations, specifically the United States.

On some level, this is a reexamination of the Soviet foray into Afghanistan in the 1980s. Initially, the Soviets acted with little response from the United States, or any other nation, in Afghanistan. In the end, surreptitious U.S. involvement in Afghanistan, through groups like the Mujahedeen and nations like the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, resulted in the withdrawal of the Soviet Union from Afghanistan.

The Russian Federation and Iran

A similar proving ground for the Russian Federation is also in place in Iran, some analysts would argue. The Russian Federation was highly influential in forcing the conclusion of the multi-state nuclear agreement.

In point of fact, the content of that agreement, to which the United States via the Obama Administration, became a signatory party. The Russian Federation is now positioned to use that same agreement, and Iran more generally, as means of testing U.S. resolve in light of the new presidential administration.

The Russian Federation and the United States

In the current geopolitical climate, the posture of the United States vis-à-vis the Russian Federation remains the primary blockade to further Russian military aggression. The Russian Federation has been engaged in measures designed to test the resolve of the United States regarding desired military adventurism, or regional war, on the part of Moscow.

The reality is that many foreign policy experts expressed surprise that Moscow did not push further into Ukrainian territory, and perhaps even move into the Baltic States, while Barack Obama was in office. The Russian Federation overall faced little meaningful opposition from the United States when it claimed the Crimean Peninsula, acted in Syria militarily and engaged in extensive machinations in regard to the Iranian nuclear deal.

With the accession of the Trump Administration in the United States, the Russian Federation is forced to test the boundaries again of what it can and cannot do with impunity when it comes to military action and blowback from the United States. Presently, it is the perceived unpredictability of the Trump Administration that may be giving the Russian Federation pause when it comes to military adventures in limited theaters.

As an aside, Moscow appears to be testing these boundaries through the use of both its Navy and Air Force. Moscow has engaged in somewhat provocative encounters with U.S. military forces with Air Force flybys and naval exercises.

Russian Snap Military Exercises: The Dangers of Whole Government Drills

The actions of the Russian Federation concerning the Crimean Peninsula are not seen as the only signs that Moscow may be laying the foundation for a broader war. Contributing to this concept that Moscow may be preparing for war is also found in the ever-increasing number and size of Russian snap military exercises. Snap military exercises are those that are called without any sort of real warning.

What is most troubling about Russian snap military exercises since the Crimean annexation is not just the increase in their frequency nor the ever-enlarged number of troops of all types being involved in these exercises. The major red flag regarding Russian military intentions is the fact that these snap exercises have become whole government exercises. In other words, these snap “military” exercises have become something far more intensive and all-encompassing. They have become designed to place the entirety of the Russian military and government on a war footing for the purposes of these drills.

Historically, this level of military focuses, war focused, exercises that involve a nation’s government more fully tend to be indicative of a regime intent on mounting an offensive attack in the not too distant. Historically, whole government military exercises were seen with increasing regularity on the eves of the First and Second World Wars.

As an aside, few foreign affairs analysts believe that even if the Russian Federation is moving towards even more of a war footing that the regime headed by President Putin intends anything like a globalized conflict. Rather, most analysts conclude that the Russian Federation under President Putin has its sights on the Baltic states, Ukraine, and perhaps some other former Soviet Republics.

Why Moscow Would Launch a Military Strike

President Putin has made it clear that he supports the proposition that the Russian Federation expand and incorporate former Soviet Republics into a sphere of control under the heels of Moscow. The Russian Federation President has made this clear both in his rhetoric and in his military forays, particularly in the Ukrainian theater and on the Crimean Peninsula.

In the final analysis, Moscow may strike militarily if two conditions are met. First, the target of military action must be in the sights of the Russian Federation President himself. Second, there must be some assurance in Moscow that other nations, and particularly the NATO alliance and the United States, lack the resolve to take on the Russian Federation militarily in limited theater military conflicts.

How Moscow May Strike

Moscow is not likely to wage a widespread battle of any sort. Rather, if the country moves forward with military action, it will be sharply focused on specific theaters. These theaters are likely to be Ukrainian territory, the Baltic States, and perhaps in the Middle East.

What to Reasonably Expect in Regard to Russian Military Action in the More Immediate Future

Russia garners significant military advantages through the warm water ports of the Crimean Peninsula and the Ukrainian Republic. Similarly, the Russian Federation collects definite strategic advantages if it were to take direct control over the Baltic States.

Should Moscow elect to seize political control of the sovereign baltic states, the result would be significant international instability. For example, the movement of the Russian Federation into the Baltic States would—theoretically—trigger a response from the NATO Alliance as required by article five (5) of the North Atlantic Treaty; an attack on one member of NATO is an attack on all members. The same treaty obligation does not exist in regard to Ukrainian territories because that nation is not part of NATO.

When it comes to the likelihood of the Russian Federation going to war, the likelihood of further military action by Moscow in Ukrainian territory is likely. In fact, some well-regarded foreign policy analysts actually express some level of surprise that President Putin has not made further, more blatant military moves within Ukrainian territory.

The Baltic States present a bit of a different story when it comes to evaluating whether, when, and where the Russian Federation may elect to go to war or engage in more overt military action. The potential for NATO response has already been noted. In addition to that, the newly-elected U.S. President presents the Russian President and military leaders with something of an unknown.

Despite social media being ablaze with allegations of collusion between Trump advisors and Russia, actual facts supporting much of anything in that regard is largely circumstantial, at least thus far. In any case, it is clear that the Russian government really cannot know what to expect from President Trump when it comes to any campaign to incorporate the Baltic States into a larger Russian Federation.

The early days of the Administration of U.S. President Richard Nixon are illustrative concerning the Russian Federation, military action, and the Baltic States. Not long after President Nixon took office, his then-National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger met with him in the Oval Office. Kissinger advised President Nixon that many world leaders, including the leadership of the Soviet Union, thought President Nixon was unpredictable, if not crazy.

President Nixon is said to have smiled at his National Security Advisor, and responded “good.” President Nixon believed that foes of the United States who were uncertain about how the new President would respond to military aggression because he was considered unpredictable, actually played in favor of the United States and overall world peace.

The same sense of uncertainty is in the air when it comes to President Trump and many world leaders, including President Putin. There simply is no clarity on how President Trump might respond to even some type of limited offensive movement of Russian troops. This may serve as a sort of military aggression breakwater, at least for the time being.

Moscow’s Pursuit of Limited Theater War

In the final analysis, Moscow likely is preparing for limited theater war. This includes planning for further military action in the Ukrainian theater. Such action in the Ukrainian theater might include a direct more by Moscow on the so-called Donetsk People’s Republic, which is the greater Ukrainian theater. It might also include a similar Russian military movement into Donbas, which is also part of Ukrainian theater. The Russian Federation could engulf these areas in much the same way it took the Crimean Peninsula, slowly eating away at Ukrainian sovereignty.

Moscow’s thirst for limited theater war also includes planning to move on Latvia, Lithuanian, and Estonia. Finally, but less certainly, is the potential for more active military action by the Russian Federation in the Middle East. NATO, the United States, and European powers are not legally obligated to intervene as elements of the military, criminal, and security services of the Russian Federation violate the sovereignty of Ukraine. However, any attempted Russian military offensive on one or all of the three Baltic states would likely lead to the invoking of Article 5. As such, an appropriate and overwhelming response by NATO, the EU, and the United States is essential. It is necessary to demonstrate the integrity and resolve of the NATO alliance, the European Union, and the United States.

Is Russia Preparing for War with NATO and the West? was originally published on Global Security Review.

The natural environment of Russia gives it many advantages over many other countries. Russia has land along five different coastlines. Russia has coastlines on the Arctic Ocean, Pacific Ocean, Baltic Sea, Black Sea, and also the landlocked Caspian Sea. Russia also has significant amount natural resources, including oil and timber. In fact, Russia is the top producer of oil in the world.

Economy Of Russia:

Russia is the successor state to the Soviet Union, and the former Soviet Union was a communist nation. After the fall of the Soviet Union, Russia moved closer to being a free market economy. However, there is still quite a bit of government control over the Russian economy.

The Russian economy is significant, but it’s not large compared to other countries in Europe. The Russian economy is around half the size of California’s economy, but Russia’s population is around four times that of California.

Also, there is a highly uneven distribution of wealth. Corruption is extremely prevalent in Russia. Organized crime is known to have a strong presence throughout the country.

Government Of Russia:

While Russia is a democratic country, the fairness of their elections has been called into question by many people within Russia and outside the country. It appears that forces of corruption have a strong influence on elections in Russia.

Also, the government of Russia has been known to silence protesters and dissidents. In fact, some journalists have been killed by the Russian government. One of the most recent instances of a dissident being targeted by the Russian government was the nearly fatal poisoning of Vladimir Kara-Murza.

Russia Foreign Policy:

A key part of Russia’s foreign policy is an interest in regaining control over independent countries that were once part of the former Soviet Union. The Russian government currently meddles in the affairs of many regions of the world, and it often appears that the nation seeks to create a Russia global order of some kind.

Russia foreign policy can be quite subversive in its attempts to create Russia global order. Russia information warfare is a primary method the Russian government uses to influence the politics of other countries. One major part of Russia information warfare is spreading false information online.

Russia military action has occurred in recent times. Some examples of Russia military action include the invasion of Ukraine’s Crimea and advances of Russian troops into Georgia.

Russian Military, Politics, and Foreign Policy was originally published on Global Security Review.

Chinese foreign policy has a long history of isolationism. By keeping foreigners at a distance and by strictly regulating trade, China maintained its identity in an increasingly globalized world. Currently, its citizens enjoy Western brands and build products created by Western companies, but at its heart, China is very much the Empire it was centuries ago. Chinese foreign policy reflects this, perhaps most notably in the nine-point line.

China’s Ocean Boundaries

Described as vague and sweeping, China’s nine-point line has served as a marker for Chinese maritime claims in the South China Sea since the 1940s. However, those claims have not been recognized by international organizations nor by the five countries whose islands are crossed by the uncharted line. The international community has monitored China’s slow dominance over the region and the United States frequently maintains a naval presence there.

Resources in the area include oil and fisheries, but the area is most important for trade. The South China Sea is an international commerce lane. Laying claim to vast swaths of the sea can bring China superpower status. Also, it provides China with a platform upon which to flex China’s maritime strength as well as China’s military positioning.

Economic Power

With the growth of China’s economy, China has positioned itself as a potential superpower. As a superpower, China could realign ocean borders and boundaries in a more aggressive fashion than it has in the past. It can also control commerce throughout the South China Sea, actually cutting off international trade routes. This is similar to what the Chinese have done in the past to curb Western influence and maintain dominance over the region.

Military Power

After the first Gulf War, China paid attention to U.S. military strategy and was primarily concerned with the United States’ ability to traverse the Persian Gulf. China could not plan to match U.S. naval power, but it could, like Iran, develop a strategic resistance in the form of smaller ships, mines, and presence.

To protect the nine-point line, China created islands in the sea and increased its presence by occupying vacant islands. The Philippines, in particular, protested the increased Chinese military presence. China ignores the protestations and international law.

China’s military officials recently unveiled China’s second aircraft carrier, a development that increases China’s military strength in the region. The event also serves to reinforce China’s long history of isolationism and independence from the West.

Chinese Foreign Policy & National Security Interests was originally published on Global Security Review.

Leaving the EU is now looking like a distant possibility for France as well (many are calling it Frexit). Nationalists on the far-right like Marine Le Pen want increased national sovereignty over a collective Union. The United States-based think tank, the Pew Research Center, believes that more than 60% of the people in France view the EU as an unfavorable option. The study claimed that in case a referendum was held, almost 33% of the people would vote to leave, while 40% would want to remain. At least 22% would be left undecided, as per the reports of the study. Now, let’s talk about the strategic disadvantages of leaving the EU for France.

Leaving is Going to be a Serious Problem

First of all, leaving the EU is not an easy job by any means. Once a country joins the European Union, it can’t just up and leave at its behest. It is only recently that Britain invoked Article 50, which is the official notification of intent sent by Britain to the head of the EU, stating the country’s desire to leave. This is the first in a long line of steps for leaving the EU. Now, there are talks that serious levies will be placed on Britain, amounting to billions of pounds, for leaving the EU. Some countries in the EU claim that the process for leaving should become even harder and more expensive, which would ultimately prevent others from leaving too. This is a serious deterrent for any country that plans on leaving the EU.

The EU Nuclear Program

In order to combat the Russia deterrent, the European Union also plans to create its own nuclear weapons program. Under the proposed program, the nuclear weapons arsenal of France will be overseen by the European Union and will be put under common European command.

This will serve as a direct Russia deterrent, and will also provide protection to countries in the European Union. For France leaving the European Union, this could lead to serious sanctions, and a sizeable part of the country’s arsenal of nuclear weapons might also be seized by the European Union for use. For France, leaving the EU might mean increased sanctions because of its nuclear capability.

Economical Impact

Countries in the EU enjoy a variety of benefits, especially relating to trade between other countries in the EU. There are a streamlined set of guidelines that all countries are supposed to follow when trading with other countries in the European Union. Keeping aside the Russia deterrent or any other sort of deterrence that the country might face, perhaps one of the greatest issues that the country will face is related to trade.

However, if France decides to leave the EU, it will have to renegotiate deals with all of the major countries that it currently trades with. This could mean increased tariffs and costs, and could also lead some countries to increase trading prices with France. Naturally, this could cause serious problems for the country as that could lead to the abolition of long-standing trade deals that the country currently has in place. The main driving force for the campaign to leave the EU is due to the immigration policy, as well as a marked increase in the number of attacks in France.

Why Should France Stay in the European Union? was originally published on Global Security Review.

Russian-propagated disinformation campaigns, psychological manipulation efforts, cyber attacks on critical infrastructure, financial and military aid to paramilitary groups, and the deployment of unmarked special forces by Russia in Crimea and later in Eastern Ukraine exemplifies the concept of contemporary non-linear conflict. Rather than proceeding in strategic, iterative steps, the various elements of the Russian strategy worked in tandem to complement one another.

Russia’s annexation of Crimea and subsequent incursion into eastern Ukraine was launched on the pretext of protecting ethnic Russians and Russian speakers in the region. Russian media outlets and pro-Russian media in Ukraine began broadcasting continuous reports of anti-Russian violent demonstrations in Ukraine and that the security of the ethnic Russian population in Ukraine was in jeopardy.

The manner with which the Kremlin created the “conditions” for intervention is not dissimilar to those utilized by the Bush Administration prior to the 2003 invasion of Iraq. As the public would eventually learn, the administration had misled the congress and military about the possession of WMDs by Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein. This mistruth was the impetus for over a decade of bloody conflict that the administration was ill-prepared for.

The invasion was accomplished with great efficiency, but the Bush administration had failed to conceive a viable exit strategy. The occupation forces purged the entire bureaucratic state of the previously ruling Ba’ath party.

This purge created post-occupation conditions rife for corruption, disorder, and insurgency as a result of the critical shortage of experienced politicians and bureaucrats. The dismantling of the administrative and political structures that existed prior to the invasion left the country almost entirely bereft of adequate internal security measures.

By contrast, the Crimean annexation was masterfully executed by Russia; in no small part due to the Kremlin’s plan for integrating Crimea with greater-Russia. As the first wave of the “assault” was underway, the Russian legislature (the Duma) passed legislation that would make federal districts out of the territory of Crimea and city of Sevastopol (the location of Russia’s long-held Black Sea naval base).

In addition to their non-traditional “invasion,” the Russian forces made considerable and effective use of information warfare, cyber warfare, local militia, and protestors, combined with unmarked elite special forces units to foment a political coup within the autonomous territory. The new government then passed a seemingly “democratic” referendum in the Crimean parliament to formally request to join the Russian Federation. Coincidentally, the Parliament was surrounded by Russian “little green men;” special forces in unmarked uniforms.

Photo credit: quapan via VisualHunt / CC BY

Russia’s Justification for the Annexation of Crimea was originally published on Global Security Review.