Comments on: Annie Jacobsen Gets It Wrong about Nuclear Deterrence

By: Austen Ganley

Austen Ganley — Tue, 29 Apr 2025 02:40:15 +0000

I don’t find this article to be particularly reassuring.
First, I am confused about this: “The United States does not have a launch-on-warning or launch-under-attack policy/doctrine. .. the United States maintains a launch-under-attack option, which allows the president to employ intercontinental ballistic missiles pre-, mid-, or post-strike. The option requires nothing of the president.”
So it doesn’t have a policy, it has an option. But, isn’t that what Jacobsen said – the President decides the option? The point is its an under-attack decision. And the President is allowed to “employ” this option, but this “requires nothing of” them – what does that mean? I am struggling to understand how this should make us feel more reassured.
Second, maybe the article is right that these systems are not a “complete failure”. But, it also clearly indicates they are also not ideal: “making steady improvements in their ability”. I am more concerned with the lack of a fail-safe system than I am reassured that the system is not “worthless” – the major risks lie with the former, not the latter.
Finally, it is almost certain that if a nuclear war scenario arises, it will be different to any of the “thinking through scenarios” that have been performed. May be different in a good way or a bad way, but it will be different. I believe her point is that if things start to happen, they happen too fast for a considered response, and there is no precedent.
Even though the book might be a bit of a polemic, there is nothing I see in this response that indicates to me her general idea – a decent chance of things going terribly wrong quickly – is incorrect.

By: Richard Forest

Richard Forest — Sun, 30 Mar 2025 01:41:19 +0000

I agree with Michael Lackner, and had the same thoughts about why launch a strike that is likely to be misinterpreted by Russia. Also, why would the Russian president totally dismiss the calls from SecDef and SecState, insisting that POTUS talk to him? Seems kinda like a stretch that the Russian President would launch an all out attack in this scenario, knowing that the US would retaliate. Nonetheless, nuclear weapons are very scary. We’ve been lucky there hasn’t been a significant accident involving them. You might want to check out Command and Control by Schlosser. It goes through all the major accidents involving nuclear weapons, and it scared the crap out of me.

By: Jock Harter

Jock Harter — Sat, 31 Aug 2024 09:29:00 +0000

In 1972 , in l One of my additional duties( primary duty being an USAF navigator) was instructing C-130 aircrews in the safest and best method of transporting nuclear weapons from one European USAF base to another. The weapons were disarmed of course, but I personally delivered about 4 thermonuclear bombs from the UK to Italy(I think that was the destination) . We were “splashed” by a couple of F_104 German fighters practicing aerial combat. I reported this reckless event to top commanders in the European theater but never was contacted by the powers to be. Ever since then , and having in retirement studied mucho about Command and Control of Nuclear Weapons, I think the American folks and all countrys
should be educated on how quickly we could evolve in to nuclear Conflict ,e.g.in a heart beat! I don’t think 98% of my fellow Americans realize our current Administration is probably not capable of responding to a Nuclear threat . If the author, Ann, is advocating Nuclear disarming, boy I am on her team. But I am an ex- Air Force officer with no real platform. Sincerely, Jock Harter(Capt USAF).

By: Michael Lackner

Michael Lackner — Wed, 17 Apr 2024 05:18:29 +0000

I’ve listened to several interviews of Annie Jacobsen, was very impressed, and purchased the book. One can criticize the realism of the premise of a “bolt out of the blue” North Korean nuclear attack, but I was willing to “go” with that, as the point of the book is to show what happens when “deterrence” fails. And sometime, from somewhere, deterrence may fail. Others have criticized that her negative portrayal of the effectiveness of anti-missile systems is far too pessimistic. Israel recently achieved extraordinary success in intercepting and destroying the ballistic missiles fired against it by Iran. However, what troubles me more is what seems to be an internal inconsistency in the book itself.

A question I had, before starting the book, was prompted by Jacobsen’s observation repeated in every interview that an ICBM fired against North Korea must fly over Russia. With the potential for Russian misunderstanding, this is terrifying. But doesn’t the Pentagon know this? Why wouldn’t the Pentagon instead have in place a plan to retaliate against North Korea with submarine-launched nuclear missiles, not ICBMs, avoiding the Russia flyover altogether? Doesn’t the Navy routinely patrol submarines within striking distance of North Korea? Reading the book, this appears to be the case, though this fact is buried in a footnote.

Footnote p.94 “missile launch officer” cites an article stating, “Submarines and bombers would be the primary attackers in a scenario involving North Korea.” Subs could “fire 200 warheads roughly 15 minutes after the president gave the order.” Yet in her scenario, on page 133, she portrays the President selecting “option Charlie” to launch fifty Minuteman III ICBMs and only eight Trident SLBMs. Why? This doesn’t seem to make sense and seems inconsistent with the prior footnote.

Any submarine nuclear strike on North Korea would obliterate that country’s missile capability. True, this could produce significant casualties in southern China and eastern Russia (as she points out on page 95) that might precipitate retaliation. But a submarine strike would not trigger the mistaken Russian belief that Russia was under attack. She cites no authority to support that ICBMs would be the preferred “menu option” to attack North Korea in a nuclear crisis. I assume the black book options are highly classified, but if the article she cites in her footnote is accurate, retaliation with submarine-fired Trident SLBMs would seem to be a more plausible scenario. Any risk of escalation should be analyzed under THAT scenario, not the scenario of a massive U.S. ICBM attack flying over Russia that she crafts in her storyline.

The fact that Jacobsen used the ICBM counter-attack as a major plot element gives me pause that her book is not as objective as she portrays it to be.